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Through the adoption of a 'political econciny perspective', this thesis sets
cut to explore the dialectical interdependencies between, on the one hand, the
processes of peritral capifalist urthnizatiai and urthnin in the Sudan and,
on the other, the structure and operation of the wage labour market in Greater
Khartoum. The main focus is on three major questions. The first question
concerns the dyrnics of the process of rapid population growth, which the
Sudan has experienced since flag Independence in 1956. Though the increase in
the urban manual labour force is not in doubt, the thesis attempts to
substantiate the view that rural-urban unskilled labour migration cannot
legitimately be pointed out as the sole, or even main, dynamic of urban growth;
irrrnigrat ion by other categories (mainly the bourgeoisie, bareaucrats,
professionals, and their dependants) has contrilxited much more than iiinigration
by unskilled labourers. The dynamics of urban growth are accordingly explained
in terms of the implications of the cxlonial-type tra& xxx1iiy. These
processes not only have given rise to a pattern of urtanin (defined as a
socio-econanic way of life) tied to that econany, but, by initiating a process
of sni-proletarianizaticzi, also obstructed the emergence of large scale
rural-urban unskilled labour migration.
The Second question concerns the implications of the basic 'activities' of
perieral urbanism. (i.e. administration and import-export trade) for the
cçeraticzi of the wage labour market in Greater Khartoum since its emergence at
the turn of the century. In this respect the thesis argues that the processes
of peri1ieral urbanism not only depend on the stabilization of rural Sudanese
in primary export danestic production, bet also require a relatively small
urban manual labour force. The major sources of demand for urban unskilled
labour have been external to the 'basic' activities of periçiieral urbariism.
During the colonial period it was the construction industry which constituted
the major source of wage employment for unskilled labour. As a result of rapid
post-colonial urban growth, which has generated a substantial, and increasingly
growing demand for personal services, tertiary activities have emerged as the
single most important source of employment for unskilled labourers. Unskilled
tertiary employment in contemporary Greater Khartoum has, in the main, assumed
the form of 'self-employment'.
The third question concerns the origins and implications of the sening
structural segmentation of the urban labour market. In this respect the thesis
points out how the varied 'forms' of employment of manual labour (i.e.
'permanent', 'temporary' arid 'casual' wage employment together with
'self-employment'), which underlay the seeming segmentation, have almost
unanimously been construed by scholars as manifestations of differential terms
and conditions of employment for the different sections of the urban manual
labour force. In the consideration of the origins of these differential terms
of employment, scholars generally point to the significance of 'pressure' by
trade unions. But the thesis attempts to substantiate the view that there are
hardly any significant differences between the conditions of the different
sections of the manual labour force, whether in terms of reward, job security
or the so-called 'legislative protection'. By establishing the relative
uniformity in the conditions of the urban manual labour force, however, the
thesis does not dismiss the seeming segmentation as an 'illusion'. It only
seeks to discredit the widely-held, but poorly-substantiated dualistic
conceptions asserted by scholars. The thesis accordingly argues that the varied
'forms' of employment stem parUy fran the requirement of different capital
accumulation processes, arid partly fran designs to create divisions within the
manual labour force through a distinction between unionized and non-unionized
workers. The significance of trade unions, however, does not arise fran its
past or present role, but fran its potential threat to the processes of
periçieral capitalism which are founded upon the basis of cheap labour. The
seeming structural segmentation, far fran being the consequences of
differential terms of employment, is thus viewed as the precondition for the
prevalence of generally poor terms and conditions for the wage labour
throughout the econaiiy.
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In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the
Merciful.
[Let them reflect) how the mountains were
hoisted;
how the earth was outstretched.
Therefore give warning; your mission is only
to warn them.
You are not their overseer.
(Surah 88:17-23)
Since it is not for us to create a plan for
the future that will hold for all time, all
the more surely what we contemporaries have
to do is the uncompromising critical evalua-
tion of all that exists, uncompromising in
the sense that our criticism fears neither
its own results nor the conflicts with the
powers that be.
K. MARX (quoted in Critique of Anthropology)
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EDITORIAL NOTE
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given in the Bibliography.
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but [ 1 is editorial insertion.
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PRELUDE TO THE STUDY
2The reader is not only entitled to know how
a study developed; he or she must know if
the analysis is to be properly assessed
(Mohamed Yousif A. El-Mustafa, 1983:1).
This thesis bears little relation,if at all, to the kind
of work I had in mind when in 1980 I applied for registration
as a Ph.D. student in the Department of Sociology and Social
Anthropology of Hull University. At the time I was still a
research student at the Institute of Social Anthropology
(Bergen University) completing a thesis on the structural
constraints on the development of productive forces among the
Jok Gor Ingessana, an agro-pastoral group in south-eastern
Sudan. In my initial application to Hull University I stated
my intention to pursue further research into the constitution
and functioning of domestic agricultural production in rural
Sudan. But, far from pursuing that objective, on arrival in
Hull I red'fined my task as a study of the so-called 'urban
informal sector', and in the course of my field work I
progressively refined the focus of my interests. The net
result is the present thesis.which explores aspects of the
dialectic between the political economy of peripheral
capitalist urhanism in the Sudan and the structure and
operation of the wage labour market in Greater Khartoum.
It may seem odd that before I came to Hull in late
November, 1980, I was little interested in, and knew virtually
nothing about, 'urban studies'. I had in 1977 declined an
invitation to participate in a research project on
urbanization and social change in the Sudan. The project was
financed by the Economic and Social Research Council (Sudan)
3with Professor Valdo Pons as Consultant. I thanked Professor
Pons for the invitation, which also held the possibility of a
scholarship from the Economic and Social Research Council to
pursue post-graduate studies at the University of Hull. I
explained that I had "other commitments" (but, fortunately, I
did not confess that I held 'urbanology' in low esteem).
Having now spent four years conducti;ng.research into aspects of
Sudanese urbanization and urbanism in the very the Department
of Sociology which I had earlier declined to join, I find it
difficult to justify my original disinterest in 'urban
studies'. Many good old friends and colleagues who knew of my
research interests before I came to Hull, have at times voiced
their surprise, and in some cases their disappointment. More
than once I have beentaxed with 'betraying' the convictions I
had once forcefully expressed against 'urban studies'. A few
cynics have even suggested that married life, parenthood, and
family obligations in Greater Khartoum have led me into the
"urban trap" into which so many "dedicated" rural researchers
in underdeveloped countries are said to have fallen (cf.
Chambers, 1983:7ff).
In this Prelude I attempt to describe the circumstances
under which I developed my interest in the general issues of
peripheral capitalist urbanism and in the structure and
operation of the urban wage labour market in the Sudan in
particular. I believe this background is essential to the
understanding of the (rather unconventional?) focus of this
thesis. In the course of the account, I will also discuss the
methods of study adopted.
4THE PREHISTORY OF THE STUDY
As an undergraduate student of Social Anthropology and
Sociology at Khartoum University (1971/72 - 1975/76), I was
most interested in all courses addressing issues of
'underdevelopment' in the so-called 'Third World', but I
devoted most attention to those dealing with aspects of
agro-pastoral production systems in the Sudan. I find it
difficult to specify the origins of this interest. The choice
of courses at undergraduate level is a product of several
complex factors, and may be explained as much in terms of the
contents of the courses, and the personal qualities of the
lecturers, as in terms of the social background and/or the
ideology and political commitments of the student. At any
rate, in spite (or perhaps because?) of the fact that I was
born and brought up in a major Sudanese city (El-Obeid, the
capital of Kordofan Region), I was least attracted by urban
questions.
My combined interest in 'rural research' and 'development
studies' was later reinforced by involvement in 'rural' field
research. Between 1972 and 1978 I was fortunate enough to work
during the long summer vacations in several research projects
in different parts of rural Sudan as a research assistant to
several staff members of the Faculty of Economic and Social
Studies (Khartoum University). (After my graduation in 1976 I
was appointed as teaching assistant in the Development Studies
and Research Centre, DSRC, of Khartoum University). During the
same period I had the opportunity to conduct a 'pilot survey'
5(on the New Haifa Scheme) and to work on my own on two major
field studies (among the Kababish Arabs and the Jok Gor
Ingessana).
My thesis at Bergen University was based on data collected
in the course of my fieid work among the Jok Gor (1977-78).
The study was part of a research project financed by the
Norwegian Agency for International Development (NORAD) which,
through the recommendation of the project directors, gave me a
Fellowship (1978-1980) to pursue studies for the Magister
Artium Degree at the Institute of Social Anthropology of
Bergen University. With the support of Dr. Abbas Ahmed Mohamed
(then Dean, Faculty of Economic and Social Studies, Khartoum
University) and Dr. Sadig Rasheed (then Director, DSRC), I
was released by Khartoum University to conduct the Ingessana
field work and to travel to Norway to read for the
Magistergrad, and I was also given a commitment of finance for
my doctoral studies after the successful completion of studies
at Bergen.
THE HISTORY OF THE STUDY
When I obtained my Mag. Art. Degree, the Institute of
Social Anthropology of Bergen University decided to publish my
thesis (Salah El-Din El-Shazali Ibrahim, 1980). This caused me
to reflect on whether I could really make a "substantial
further contribution" to the understanding of the domestic
form of agricultural production among the Jok Gor in my
planned doctoral thesis; and it occurred to me that, since all
I would have to do on the Ingessana study was more research of
6a similar kind, my stay in Hull might prove more beneficial to
my future career as lecturer and researcher if I were to gain
'new experience t
 either by studying another group or by
venturing into a field of study with which I was least
familiar. I decided to take the latter course, and the field
of 'urban studies' was the 'natural' choice. While making this
decision, I was immensely helped by the relentless
encouragement and inspiration of my friend and colleague
Mohamed Yousif Ahmed El-Mustafa, who had by then already
conducted his field work in the Sudan and returned to Hull to
write his doctoral thesis on capital accumulation,
'tribalism', and local government politics in a Sudanese town
(Moharned Yousif A. El-Mustafa, 1983). Mohamed and I spent
hours and days in Hull pursuing a discussion, first begun
during our undergraduate years, on aspects of the political
economy of the Sudan. Our ideas and thoughts intermingled to
the extent of virtual mutual assimilation.
Having made the decision to go 'urban', I initially
thought of focussing on aspects of small industry in Greater
Khartoum, a thought in keeping with my earlier interests in
the analysis of production systems. I accordingly approached
Professors Ian Cunnison, then Head of Department, and Valdo
Pons and discussed with them my change of research
orientation. Professor Pons and Dr. Terry King kindly agreed
to be my joint supervisors.
With the enthusiastic support of my supervisors and
colleagues, I spent five months in what initially appeared to
me as an obscure 'maze' of literature on urban studies. The
7two weekly post-graduate workshops in the Department (the
"Research Workshop" convened by Professor Pons and the
"Methodology Workshop" convened by Mr. Ray Francis) were very
helpful as forums for discussions, over and above those I had
with my supervisors, of my initial research plans and
analytical framework. In due course I was led to broaden the
focus of my research to cover, in addition to small scale
industry, various forms of petty trading.
By April, 1981, I felt that I had done sufficient reading
on the literature on 'Third World urbanization', and
especially on the controversy over the so-called 'urban
informal sector', and I thought that it would at that stage
prove fruitful to go to Khartoum to 'sensitise' myself to the
'real life' conditions of petty commodity producers and street
traders. This seemed essential partly because of the relative
scarcity of published material on petty commodity production
and street trading in urban Sudan, and partly because I had
lived outside the Sudan since the economic crisis first
started to escalate in 1978. I consulted my supervisors, who
encouraged me to go to the field to conduct a pilot survey. I
accordingly left for Khartoum where I spent a period of six
months from April to September 1981. My pilot survey covered
rope-bed makers, car-mechanics and street traders. As in the
present thesis I do not analyse the data on. rope-bed makers
and car-mechanics (though I make use of data on their income
in Chapter Seven), it is not strictly relevant to discuss my
reasons for choosing these two groups from among the multitude
of petty commodity producers, but reference to the issues
8concerned is made in Chapter Seven.
THE PILOT SURVEY
As soon as I launched the pilot survey in Greater Khartoum
I	 became	 thoroughly disillusioned with
	 the	 alleged
'convenience' of urban research. The 'inconveniences' I
experienced were partly a consequence of the conflict between
the requirements of research and the norms of social life to
which I was expected to conform in Greater Khartoum. Being
among relatives, friends, relatives of friends, and friends of
relatives, I was expected to continue my normal participation
in the social life in Greater Khartoum. Though I managed to a
large extent to evade many of these obligations, I will
certainly have to answer for this when I return to Khartoum
and attempt to reactivate my former social networks.
The pilot survey itself presented no particular intrinsic
'convenience' compared to my experiences of rural research.
But in contrast to the communities in the villages and camps
among which I had previously conducted field work, I
inevitably found that the people whose social production
relations I was studying were dispersed all over the Three
Towns. Movement between the three cities was therefore vital,
and transport posed one of my first major practical problems.
Taxis, when they could be found, were time-savers, but very
expensive. While buses and box-cars were relatively cheap to
use, their services were infrequent and their routes often far
removed from where I wanted to go. Buses and box-cars also
usually demanded muscle for regular use. To resolve this
9problem, I had to share my wife's good old Beetle car to track
down informants, and twice a week I had to queue all night at
petrol stations to secure the weekly ration of ten gallons of
petrol. Soon, however, I was amazed to find that I was not
'wasting' my time in queues for it was here I encountered,
conversed with, and interviewed, many 'informal workers'
ranging from hawkers and purveyors of tea and coffee to
'professional' queue-standers (queue standing is itself an
occupation). At a later stage the authorities introduced a new
petrol rationing system according to which cars with certain
registration letters were given a week's ration in one day.
The new system reduced queues drastically; but as the ration
for each car was simultaneously reduced from ten to seven
gallons a week it became imperative to seek petrol on the
'black market', sometimes at the petrol stations themselves
and sometimes elsewhere, but always at virtually double the
official price.
The research technique of immersion in the 'community'
-sometimes (mistakenly?) referred to as "participant
observation"- was therefore out of the question in Greater
Khartoum. Whereas in rural areas I lived with my informants,
participated in their activities and, sometimes, took
initiatives like organising 'adult literacy programmes' to
express my gratitude and appreciation, in Greater Khartoum
there was no readily accessible 'community' of informants.
Petty commodity producers and petty traders working on a
semi-permanent basis in the same peripheral market do of
course constitute a proto-community in that, at least during
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the working day, they constantly interact with each other and
enter into complex relations ranging from debtor-creditor
relations to membership of rotating credit associations. But
the people I encountered were individual informants, leading
different careers, involved in different sets of production
relations, and living in different parts of the conurbation.
With the progress of the pilot survey I came to recognize
even more the advantages of 'immersion' as a research
technique, not only because it enables researchers to acquire
a deeper insight into the social life of informants, but also
because the continuous presence of a researcher among
informants is instrumental in gaining, to varying degrees,
their confidence and trust. Throughout the fieldwork period I
lived with my in-laws in Khartoum North, and drove each
morning to one of the locations where I knew that potential
informants would be present. After sunset I would return home
because there were no informants to interview; and only in the
cases of some rope-bed makers, who lived in their workshops,
and a handful of street traders, who kindly admitted me to
their homes, did I manage directly to observe some aspects of
their 'normal' life.
The impossiblity of 'total immersion' and the consequent
constraints on confidence made it difficult to use a formal
questionnaire approach. None of the informants I approached
with my preliminary questionnaire was willing to respond,
although I always spent some time explaining my research.
Suspicion was of course justified, not only because nearly all
street traders were unlicensed, but also because, in addition
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to harrassment by the Municipality, informants feared the
unpredictable consequences of interviews with someone who
might turn out to be a member of the State Security
Organization. Such suspicions were particularly acute among
unskilled migrants from Kordofan and Darfur Regions who were
justifiably insecure because of the apparent tendency for the
regime to identify "Westerners't
 with armed opposition in
Northern Sudan. My approach accordingly had to be informal,
and I had to spend hours of casual conversation and/or
observation with each informant before I could reasonably ask
for information on how the informant, entered the activity,
or on conditions of work, income, debt relations, etc. As I
was born and brought up in Kordofan Region, I was almost
always able to relate events, or to mention names of people
and places, known to Kordofanese, and this helped to some
extent in the maintenance of communication. But my accent and
physical appearance inevitably identified me as a member of
the Jallaba (the term used to categorize "Northerners" who had
emigrated to trade in the West), and on occasions this
reinforced suspicions about my motives.
After the first two months of the pilot survey I managed
to resolve the confidence problem with a number of informants
in different occupations, and I accordingly classified
informants in each occupation into two categories. The first
category consisted of 'casual' informants, whom I interviewed
once or	 twice only, while the second comprised those
'friendly' informants with whom
	 I	 retained	 relations
throughout the period of my field work. Through interaction
12
with the second category, I was able to supplement interview
data with partial observations. During the six-month period of
the pilot survey, my 'casual' informants totalled 67 petty
and/or street traders, 40 rope-bed makers, and 14
car-mechanics; and my 'friendly' informants 18 street traders,
23 rope-bed makers and 9 car-mechanics.
FROM PETTY COMMODITY PRODUCTION TO PERIPHERAL URBANISM
On September 11th, 1981, I left Khartoum for Hull, where I
intended to write a progress report on the findings of the
pilot survey, and to pursue discussions with my supervisors
and colleagues in preparation for the "main" fieldwork. A few
days after my return I heard the news of the 'Street-cleaning
Campaign', launched on Sept. 12th 1981, through which the
Sudanese authorities attempted to evict 'unemployed people'
from Greater Khartoum and to curb labour migration to the
capital. I sought to find Sudanese daily newspapers to know
more about the tofficial line' on the campaign, and entered
into correspondence with colleagues, friends and relatives
back in Khartoum to obtain as many interpretations and
insights as possible. I soon gathered that virtually all
unskilled self-employed tertiary workers (street traders,
car-wash and shoe-shine boys, etc.) were being rounded up and
arrested, and that 'thousands' had already been evicted from
Greater Khartoum. In Chapter One I present a detailed account
of this campaign. it is sufficient to stress here that the
news of the campaign provided a valuable 'shock' to stimulate
further my interest in the analysis of the dynamics of urban
13
growth as well as of the sturcture and operation of the wage
labour market in Greater Khartoum.
My initial reactions to the news were twofold: concern
over the fate of the unskilled rural migrants who were
arrested and anxiety over the probable implications of the
campaign for my field work. On the one hand, it was obvious
that the authorities were showing no sensitivity whatsoever
either to the "causes" of rural-urban labour migration or to
the predicament of these unskilled migrants when faced with
the loss of the incomes they earned in urban areas. On the
other hand, I was particularly worried about the consequences
of the reaction of informants to my 'disappearance' only 24
hours before the campaign was launched. I was certain that the
problem of confidence would be very difficult to handle on my
later return to the field.
Three weeks following my return to Hull I presented a
seminar to the Weekly Post-graduate Research Workshop. Most
demoralized, I gave an account of my pilot survey as well as
of the campaign and its probable implications for my main
field research, and I voiced my misgivings 	 about	 the
government policy towards unskilled labour migrants in
Khartoum. My presentation was brief and far from systematic,
but in their relentless search for clarification and details
my colleagues started to make comments and to ask questions
that were to prove useful and provocative. The most important
issues they touched on were the implications of the processes
of	 underdevelopment	 for rural-urban migration;	 the
'hyper-urbanization' view of third world urbanization; the
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apparent 'redundancy' and poverty of unskilled 'self-employed'
tertiary workers; and the apparent structural segmentation of
the wage labour market and the role of the so-called 'urban
informal sector'. It was relatively easy for me to discuss
issues relating to the political economy of the Sudan and the
"causes" of rural-urban migration, but although the data I
gathered during the pilot survey convinced me that these
tertiary workers were no 'poorer' than wage workers in
government and large scale industry, I could not respond
systematically to questions regarding their 'redundancy' and
'insecurity' or to the nature and origins of the apparent
segmented structure of the urban wage labour market. As I
pursued discussions with my supervisors and colleagues it
gradually became clearer that it was essential for me to
address myself to the 'wider' questions of urban growth and
the structure and operation of the Sudanese urban labour
market as a whole.
I spent several months searching the literature on the
urban wage labour market in the Sudan and other underdeveloped
countries, only to conclude that there were in my view serious
misconceptions on the implications of 'peripheral capitalism'
for both rural-urban unskilled labour migration and
socio-economic urban life. With the exception of a handful of
recent contributions by El-Wathig Kameir (1980a; 1980b),
Mohamed El-Awad Galal El-Din (esp. 1978) and Mohamed Yousif A.
El-Mustafa (1981), there has been virtually no analysis of
Sudanese urbanization from a political economy perspective.
(At that stage, Mohamed Yousif was still writing his thesis,
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which remains a seminal contribution to Sudan urban studies).
In the earlier literature, developed from other perspectives,
rural life was characterizeii as 'traditional' and/or
'stagnant t , and urban areas were mainly viewed as 'islands' or
'enclaves' of 'development' that were not only immune to the
'backwardness' of the wider society, but also acted as centres
for the diffusion of 'development' to the rest of the country.
The presence of various workers categorised as 'unemployed'
and 'underemployed' was accordingly conceived as a consequence
of high rates of rural-urban migration rather than of the
specific constitution of urban socio-economic life to which
the processes of peripheral capitalism have given rise. From
my earlier rural research I was convinced that,
notwithstanding the wealth of 'information' contained in
Sudanese urban studies, the 'conventional wisdom' dominating
analyses of Sudanese urbanization had grossly distorted the
conceptualization of the processes of semi-proletarianization
in the countryside, and had also mystified our understanding
of the peripheral capitalist basis of the processes of urban
capital accumulation, which depend first and foremost on
primary export production and the colonial-type trade economy.
A close assessment of census data further reinforced my
misgivings towards the conventional wisdom, for I came to see
that the dynamics of accelerated urban population growth in
the Sudan in the intercensal period 1955/56-1973 can only
partially be explained in terms of rural-urban unskilled
labour migration. This led me to be highly sceptical of the
widely-held but poorly substantiated contentions in 	 the
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literature regarding the processes governing the operation of
the urban wage labour market and the origins and implications
of the apparent structural segmentation. I have since become
convinced that it is largely futile to engage in a study of
the 'micro-processes t
 of petty commodity production and street
trading in Greater Khartoum in the absence of a clear
understanding of the 'wider context' in which these processes
operate. But, as such an understanding could only be achieved
on the basis of the descriptive data contained in the
literature, I decided to construct my interpretation on the
basis of the method of polemics, or critique, by which I
expound my argument through both the statement of my own
interpretation and the exposition and refutation of what I
consider ideological distortions and/or faulty assumptions
expressed in the literature.
THE MAIN FIELDWORK
As a result of the Street-Cleaning Campaign, which brought
to the fore the question of unskilled tertiary self-employment
in the operation of the labour market, my interest in small
scale industry began to subside. I accordingly decided that on
my return to Khartoum to conduct further field work I would
give more attention to the conditions of unskilled tertiary
workers.
After the Street-Cleaning Campaign was first launched, I
was able to return to Khartoum twice for a total of 9 months.
As I had anticipated, most of my formerly 'friendly'
informants left me in no doubt that I was no longer welcome.
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When I approached one of the unlicensed vegetable-sellers, he
not only refused to respond to my questions about the effects
of the campaign, but actually collected his vegetables in a
sack and left the market-place for the rest of the day. Though
none of my informants said so openly, it was clear that they
had identified me with the State Security Organization. It was
therefore imperative for me to concentrate on positively
establishing my identity as a researcher from Khartoum
University, which is one of very few institutions in the
country that cannot be easily identified with the regime. The
"headed letters" I asked the Director of the DSRC to write
certifying my status were of no use; and I knew that I had to
find a way to take informants to Khartoum University, and to
entertain them at the DSRC, in order to re-establish
communication. On several occasions I deliberately offered
informants lifts to the centre of Khartoum city, although I
had no intention of going there. I would then inform them on
the way that I had forgotten about an "urgent appointment" at
my office in the University, and would drive to the Centre,
where I then invited them to have tea (in accordance with
Sudanese custom). By this method I was able to regain the
confidence of a few of my 'friendly' informants. But this was
only possible for traders at the peripheral markets of Burn
(Khartoum) and Kober (Khartoum North), as Khartoum University
is in the way from them to the centre of the city.
As a result of these difficulties, I decided to
concentrate mainly on traders at Kober peripheral market. Ny
in-laws live only a few hundred meters from Kober peripheral
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market, and many of the women traders in the market knew
before hand of my identity and of my involvement in
scholarship in 'London' (For ordinary Sudanese, anywhere in
Great Britain is London).
A further group of informants I could easily interview
were the car-wash boys around Khartoum University; and through
networks of friends I was also 'introduced' to car-wash boys
in a ministry near the University. But it was not easy to
interview boys operating at more distant places (e.g. those
washing at central markets or in front of cinemas). more
serious difficulties were encountered in my attempt to locate
(let alone interview) launderers. Unlike the car-wash boys and
petty traders, both of whom operate in streets or other public
places, launderers perform their tasks inside houses. Given
restrictions on admission of 'strangers' to houses, I could
only interview launderers working at the houses of relatives
in three different neighbourhoods; and through two of these
casual launderers I was introduced to members of their
respective "residential groups".
THESIS WRITING
By April 1983 I was satisfied that I had sufficient data
for my analysis, and so returned back to Hull. At the time my
intention was to analyse the 'wider' issues of
proletarianization and the political economy of peripheral
urbanism (including the structure and operation of the urban
wage labour market) in two of the six chapters I intended to
write, but the main focus was to be on the rnicro-processes
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studied through fieldwork. Since I had already formulated a
preliminary analysis of unskilled tertiary self-employment in
a "progress report" submitted to my supervisors, I decided to
start by writing the chapters dealing with 'macro' analyses.
The first of the draft chapters I wrote developed into Chapter
Two of this thesis; in it I analyse the question of
proletarianization and stabilization of domestic producers in
rural Sudan. Contrary to my plan, however, what I had
initially envisaged as one chapter dealing with the peripheral
urbanism and the structure and operation of the labour market
has evolved into four chapters (Chapters Three, Four, Five and
Seven). Chapter Three analyses the dynamics of population
growth in Greater Khartoum between 1955/56 and 1983; Chapters
Four and Five deal with the operation of the urban wage labour
market in Greater Khartoum during the colonial and
post-colonial periods respectively; while Chapter Seven
analyses the nature, origins and implications of the apparent
structural segmentation of the urban wage labour market.
It is difficult to relate all the incidents and
coincidents that resulted in the evolution of a single chapter
into two-thirds of the thesis. But as the process of writing
was in itself a process of learning (I cannot say I knew
before hand what I wanted to write), this should not be
surprising. By the time I had finished these four chapters,
which I consider to be central to my work, I had little option
but to condense my analysis of all forms of tertiary
self-employment to the scope of a single chapter. This is
Chapter Six in which I analyse the findings of my field
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research. The first "progress report" I wrote provided the
framework of Chapter one, but for the critique of
'conventional wisdom' I drew on all the other draft chapters.
A final point to be made in this Prelude concerns the
decisiontogive this thesis the subtitle of "pLoitatLon.4inthe
political economy..". The reason is that the thesis deals
with, and attempts to bring into one analytical framework, a
host of issues ranging from proletarianization, rural-urban
labour migration and unskilled tertiary self-employment to the
dynamics of urban growth, the processes governing the
operation of the urban wage labour market, labour legislation,
and the significance of trade unions in the generation of the
apparent structural segmentation of the labour market. I am
well aware that a fully comprehensive analysis of each of
these issues could well require a whole thesis on its own
right. It is in this sense that my analyses can only be
regarded as exploratory. Indeed, it is more than a conventional
remark to say that I believe the thesis presents as many or
more questions than it answers. If the answers I present prove
helpful, to any extent, in the understanding (and
transformation) of aspects of peripheral capitalist urbanism;
and if the questions I pose serve, again to any extent, to
stimulate further research into any of the wide issues
broached in this thesis, I shall be happy indeed.
CHAPTER ONE
THE URBAN QUESTION IN THE SUDAN:
THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES
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There is a general failure to recognize that
the ... social forces which initiated and
shaped the process of urbanization [in
contemporary Africa] ... were not generated
by traditional African social structures but
by the development and expansion of the
capitalist mode of production. In reality,
the city in Africa is a clear .expression of
the nature of underdevelopment ... (Iiariotti
& Magubane, 1979:273).
In this thesis I attempt to present a historical (i.e.
processual and structural) analysis of the political economy
of the wage labour market in Greater Khartoum, the conurbation
of the "Three Towns" of Khartoum, Khartoum North and Omdurman.
In undertaking this task, I am not only seeking to achieve a
better understanding of the course through which that labour
market initially emerged, and later expanded, but also
attempting to illuminate the interconnections between the
structure and operation of the urban wage labour market in the
Sudan and the processes of peripheral capitalism
characterizing the Sudanese social formation as a whole. Ny
ultimate object is to expose aspects of the peripheral
capitalist	 foundations	 of urbanism	 (defined	 as a
socio-economic way of life) in the country.
The theoretical and methodological issues involved in the
argument of this thesis are several and complex. Through a
critique of 'conventional wisdom' in studies of 'Third 1orld
urbanization' in general, and Sudanese urban studies in
particular, I propose to consider in this chapter the most
critical of these issues in order to clarify the conceptual
framework adopted and the main concepts utilizei. The chapter
starts with a brief background to urbanization and the
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so-called 'urban problem' in the Sudan with	 particular
emphasis on the "Street-Cleaning Campaign", which first
triggered my interest in the structure and operation of the
urban labour market in the Sudan. On the basis of this
background I shall explain the focus of the thesis and
elaborate on aspects of it through a critique of the
literature.
THE POST-COLONIAL URBANIZATION PROCESS
The decades since flag Independence in 1956 have witnessed
the rapid acceleration of urban growth in the Sudan. On the
eve of Independence, the urban population (i.e. population in
areas with 5,000 or more inhabitants) amounted to 853,872, or
8.3% of the total population in the Sudan. By 1973 it had
increased to 2,605,896, or 17.4% (Salih El-Arifi, 1980:388),
while the preliminary results of the Third National Population
Census show that the urban population in 1983 totalled
4,153,559, or 20.2% of the total population in the country.
Though this urban growth is partly a consequence of relatively
high fertility rates assumed to prevail in cities (see Mohamed
El-Awad Galal-El-Din, 1977b; 1980b; Mona Khalifa, 1979), the
prime factor is said to be increased rural-urban migration.
The dramatic difference in the rates of growth between rural
and urban areas has been pointed out by Pons (1980a:XV):
Between the two national censuses of 1955/56
and 1973, the [Sudan's] total population is
thought to have increased at a little over 2
per cent per annum, with the rural
population growing at about 1.5 per cent per
annum and the urban at about 7 per cent.
As in other underdeveloped countries, the pattern of
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urbanization in the Sudan is characterized by uneven
distribution between regions (Table 1:1), the dominance of a
few major cities (Table 1:2), and the concentration of
population in the capital in particular. The population of
Greater Khartoum increased from 245,735 in 1955/56, to 784,294
in 1973, and to 1,343,651 in 1983. Pointing to the impact of
migration upon growth rates in the conurbation between 1955/56
and 1973, the ILO Mission (ILO,1976:351) maintained that:
The urban population in Khartoum has thus
increased during this period by about 215
per cent, or 6.6 per cent per annum, well
above the estimated natural rate of growth
of population in the city of 2.5 to 3.0 per
cent. The difference between these two
figures is, of course, due to the massive
increase in the number of migrants arriving
from other rural and urban areas.
THE 'URBAN PROBLEM'
The pattern of urbanization in the Sudan in general, and
the concentration of urban population in the capital in
particular, is often held to aggravate many 'urban' problems.
Extreme shortages of various consumer goods and the rampant
growth of 'black markets', rapid increases in house-rents and
squatting, congestion in public transport and pressure on
other social services are all at times attributed to the
"massive drift" of rural population into the few large cities.
Furthermore, the slow, but persistent, increase in the
urban manual labour force has been viewed as a salient factor
in the formation of the poor and the unemployed. The increase
in the number of unskilled 'self-employed' tertiary workers in
particular has led policy-makers, administrators, and some
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113
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Table 1:2
Total Population and Rates of Increase
1955-1973 for 'Large' Sudanese Cities
- -
	
7OOF INCREASTOWN OR CITY	 1955/56	 1964/65	 1973	 1955/56-1973
Greater Khartoum 254,363
Port Sudan	 47,562
Wad Medani	 47,677
Kassala	 40,612
El-Obeid	 52,372
Gedaref	 17,537
Atbara	 36,298
Kosti	 22,688
Nyala	 12,278
Juba	 10,660
Wau	 8,009
El-Fasher	 26,161
Geneina	 11,817
Malakal	 9,680
Sennar	 8,098
Ed Dueim	 12,319
En Nahud	 16,498
New Haifa	 -
Shendi	 11,031
El-Gezira Aba	 -
438,890
78,940
63,660
68,130
62,560
45,090
48,250
37,860
26,160
13,325
10,011
40,540
20,740
12,100
17,640
15,880
19,770
12,100
16,470
16.670
784,294
132,632
106,715
99,652
90,073
66,465
66,116
65,404
59,583
56,737
52,750
51,932
35,424
34,894
28,546
26,257
26,005
24,373
24,161
22.216
Source: Saiih El-Arifi, 1980:398
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scholars to conceptualize the operation of the urban labour
market in Greater Khartoum in terms virtually identical to the
"hyper-urbanization" view of 'Third World urbanization' (cf.
Lerner, 1967; Bairoch, 1973). They accordingly seem to contend
that the rate of urbanization is 'excessive' and that insofar
as the rate of growth of the urban wage labour force is higher
than the rate of expansion in wage employment, a rapidly
growing section of the urban manual labour force is made
redundant. The manifestations of this 'redundancy', it is
asserted, are not only the increase in the numbers of
'under-employed', 'self-employed' tertiary workers earning
very low incomes, but also the ever-increasing problems of
crime and squatting and, at least for policy-makers and the
State Security Organization, of political instability (see
Ja'afar M. Numeiri, 1972; El-Sayed El-Bushra, 1972a:ll et
passim; Siddik I. Mukhayar, 1977))2) it is relevant to note
here that a similar view is also held in apparent sympathy
with the so-called 'redundant labour force' by some scholars.
Thus Mohamed El-Awad Galal El-Din seems to explain the lack of
wage employment by the relatively high capital-labour ratios
in Sudanese manufacturing industry (cf. Chapter Five); and, in
his call for the abandonment of this pattern of industrial
investment, he (1978:121) has maintained that:
As is clearly observed, ... while the
numbers of migrants are increasing their
chances of finding employment are decreasing
such that migrants face nothing but
unemployment and dependency upon kinsmen and
co-villagers.. Otherwise increasing numbers
of migrants join the already-inflated
tertiary sector, in which they undertake
trivial activities, which do not contribute
to the increase in production, while they
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accentuate the shortages. When their incomes
from these activities are low, increasing
numbers of migrants resort to trickery,
fraud, subterfuge, robbery and burglary,
etc. (My translation).
Furthermore, although the ILO Mission to the Sudan (1976)
seems - through the adoption of the 'urban informal sector'
concept- to emphasize the 'profitability' and 'potential' of
unskilled tertiary 'self-employment', it has nevertheless
conceded that some of the activities pursued are characterized
by very low productivity and that, as a result of this,
'informal workers' tend to earn incomes far below those of
wage workers in government, public concerns, and large scale
private enterprises. But the Mission views the low incomes
earned by the so-called 'informal workers' as the consequence,
not of 'redundancy', but of 'official harrassment' (or
'favouritism' of the so-called 'formal sector') and the lack
of linkages between the 'informal sector' and the rest of the
urban economy (mainly lack of demand from the 'formal
sector'). Though the views of the ILO Mission have been
subjected to severe criticism, its dualistic conception of the
structure of the Sudanese urban labour market has remained
virtually unchallenged (cf. Chapter Seven).
THE POLICY OF POLICING
In partial response to its concern over the 'urban
problem', the Sudanese authorities decided, as many other
governments have done, to try to curb unskilled labour
migration to Greater Khartoum. On September 12th, 1981, it
therefore	 launched	 what	 was	 initially called
	 the
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"Street-Cleaning Campaign" ostensibly to evict those migrants
in the capital considered to be "unemployed" or "potential
criminals". In addition to the Police Force, the People's
Armed Forces, the State Security Organization and Prison
Wardens were mobilized. Several raids were launched in central
and peripheral markets around the Three Towns as well as in
other public places, and a house-to--house search was
undertaken in 3rd and 4th Class residential neighbourhoods.
Official sources disclosed that in the course of the first day
of the campaign around 8,000 people had been arrested and were
awaiting eviction from the conurbation of Khartoum (Al-Sahafa,
13.9.1981). Two weeks later official sources were quoted in
the daily newspapers as saying that around 12,000 people had
been arrested; other sources in Khartoum gave almost double
that figure. All routes leading to Greater Khartoum which
since 1976 have been heavily guarded by the army (to check
smuggling of arms into the capital by opposition groups) were
closed; and all those who failed to show their identity cards,
or to prove that they are 'employed' in Greater Khartoum or
elsewhere, were turned back. The daily newspapers in Khartoum
followed the operations closely in the first weeks and praised
the campaign (which was renamed the Street-Discipline
Campaign) for its achievements. On the second day of the
campaign (13.9.1981), Al-Ayam described those arrested as
being:
elements who have deserted the regions where
their labour could be productively absorbed
at Kenanah, Asalaya, New Haifa and Gezira
[all of which are large-scale irrigated
agricultural schemes] as well as in the
rainfed regions of Kordofan and Greater
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Fashir. They have come here to the capital
to become criminals and unemployed, and
to	 occupy	 themselves with illegitimate
activities. They all came from the
production areas to crowd in the outskirts
of Khartoum like sardines in cans ... they
are the cause of the increase in house-rent,
of congestion in public transport, public
places and restaurants ... In short, they
are the cause of all the sufferings of the
ordinary man in Khartoum (my translation).
The views expressed by Al-Ayam (which, like all newspapers
in the country, is state-owned and reflects the official line)
are not in any sense unique. Identical views were expressed by
several high-ranking Government Officials. The Police
Inspector-General was quoted in Sudanow (October, 1981:22) as
saying that those arrested were the "elements responsible for
disturbing	 the peace and activating the black market".
Likewise Sudanow (ibid.) reported that:
Officials say that massive screening is
being carried out on the detainees and that
genuinely employed persons are released
immediately. Those who prove to be refugees
will be sent either to refugee camps or to
their countries of origin. Vagrant Sudanese
will be referred to their own regions.
People who receive prison sentences will
serve them at production centres like Rahad
and Kenanah.
Although Greater Khartoum has since 1975 experienced an
influx of refugees, mainly from Eritrea (cf. Chapter Three),
only a few "unregistered" refugees were actually arrested in
the course of the campaign. "Registered refugees" are entitled
not only to residence in the capital, but also to either
employment or assistance from the representative of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Though I could
not find information on the number of refugees arrested, it is
not in doubt that over 90% of those arrested were Sudanese
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drawn mainly from the multitude of unskilled 'self-employed'
tertiary workers (vendors, hawkers, pedlars, shoeshine and
carwash boys, etc.), the rest were either unlicensed petty
commodity producers (e.g. shoe-makers) or casual agricultural
wage labourers (employed in horticultural farms in Greater
Khartoum). By being tself_employedl, these 'elements'
constituted an easy target for the campaign to evict the
"unemployed" who, it seems, are defined as those without
'employers'. Though at present the 'raids' are not as frequent
as they were during the first two years, the campaign is
nevertheless officially considered to be in force.
In relating the story of the Street-Cleaning Campaign it
is relevant to note that similar attempts to curb rural-urban
unskilled labour migration have taken place in many other
African countries. Among these countries are Kenya (1964),
Zaire (1966 and 1969), Ivory Coast (1967) and Ghana (1969);
"Tanzania actually restricted travel to Dar-es-Salaam in 1964
and ordered that the unemployed be returned home" (Salah
E1-Shakhs, 1974:5).
THE FOCUS OF THE THESIS
Whether the Street-Cleaning Campaign was initially carried
out specifically in order to evict 'unemployed migrants' and
those who activate "black markets", 3 or whether it simply
aimed to get rid of, and to neutralise, an alleged politically
dangerous stratum in the context of a planned further
deterioration in the standard o living of poor Sudanese,4
is not for me to speculate. But it is relevant to note that,
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with the exception of rapid increases in house-rent, the
problems concerning supply of goods and the pressure on social
services are hardly 'urban' at all, although they are often
said to be; the situation in rural areas is undoubtedly worse.
Likewise, there is no evidence that the increases in rent are
caused by unskilled migrants, and indeed the most exorbitant
increases in rent are in First and Second Class residential
neighbourhoods, which are the exclusive areas of capitalists,
bureaucrats and professionals. There is thus good reason to
believe that, in the eviction of unskilled 'self-employed'
tertiary workers from Greater Khartoum, the prime concern of
the authorities has been the provision of consumer goods and
services to the relatively more powerful and organized 'urban
groups' (the regular armed forces, the different fractions of
the bourgeoisie, civil servants, professionals, students,
etc.)) 5
 As a result of this, unskilled rural migrants were
progressively projected as the cause of an alleged
specifically 'urban' problem rather than as the hardy victims
of a broader problem of 'underdevelopment' in the Sudan of
which the so-called 'urban problem' is only one manifestation
or consequence.
Class bias (towards or against a certain class) is of
course characteristic of all government policies, and the
Street-Cleaning Campaign represents only one particular,
clear-cut instance. The point in relating the story of the
campaign, however, is not to pursue the question of the nature
of the Sudanese state and its class basis. It is rather to
raise three other major issues, which this thesis sets out to
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analyse and explain.
The first issue concerns the "causes" of rural-urban
unskilled labour migration which many scholars contend the
authorities have overlooked, while the second relates to the
role of unskilled rural migrants in the acceleration of the
process of rapid urban growth in post-colonial Sudan.
Notwithstanding the wealth of information in the literature on
Sudanese urbanization, the dominant 'paradigms' in Sudan urban
studies have not only failed to yield systematic explanations
of the nature and origin of the proletarianization process
underlying rural-urban migration of unskilled workers, but
also mystified the dynamics of urban growth in the Sudan in
which migration by unskilled workers is only one of several,
at least equally important, factors. Thus the first two issues
this thesis sets out to analyse are (1) the 'structural
determinants' of unskilled labour migration and, (2) the
dynamics of population growth in urban Sudan in general and
Greater Khartoum in particular.
The third major issue concerns the dynamics underlying the
proliferation of tertiary self-employment unskilled workers
as well as the extent to which the conditions of these
self-employed workers differ from those of wage workers in
government departments and private concerns. It is noteworthy
in this regard that there is an. almost exclusive tendency in
the literature to view the proliferation of unskilled tertiary
activities solely from the standpoint of the individual
participants -i.e. as being the consequence of initiatives by
unskilled workers who, in the absence of wage employment, seek
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to find alternative 'income-generating' opportunities. This
approach to unskilled tertiary self-employment not only tends
to reduce social structures and processes to their agents
(i.e. it fails to investigate the sources of the demand for
unskilled tertiary services),	 but	 also	 overlooks	 the
implications of the processes of peripheral capitalism
characterizing the Sudanese economy for socio-economic urban
life, which governs the operation of the urban wage labour
market. Through a critique of the 'conventional wisdom' in
Sudan urban studies in the rest of this chapter, I attempt to
discuss aspects of all three issues.
(6)
THEORY AND IDEOLOGY IN SUDAN URBAN STUDIES
Though the weaknesses of the conventional wisdom in Sudan
urban studies can be explained in terms of flaws in its
approaches to theoretical abstraction, my contention is that
these limitations are partly consequences of a specific
ideology that, like coloured binoculars, has conditioned and
simultaneously constrained the conceptualization of rural
labour migration, urban population growth and socio-economic
life in urban Sudan. The concept of ideology adopted in this
work, I must stress, should not be taken in the so-called
'orthodox Marxist' sense as opposing 'ideology' to 'science'
in a dualism that replicates the distinction between 'false'
and 'true'; 'assumed' and 'real'; and 'finctional' and
'factual'. It is rather a concept which denotes what may
loosely be termed a 'world view' formulated in keeping with
the interests of a certain class. Accordingly, there are as
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many ideologies as there are classes in society. Thus, in
asserting that the conventional wisdom in Sudan urban studies
has an ideology, I am not denying possessing one myself.
However, insofar as the ideology of the 'conventional wisdom'
in Sudan urban studies has penetrated into research, and into
the analysis of research findings, it has simultaneously
placed serious constraints on the understanding of the object
of inquiry.
Furthermore, the concept of ideology adopted in this work
posits or assumes neither the internal cohesion, nor the
stability over a period of time, of the corpus of ideas
comprising	 an	 ideology. To assert the existence of a
consistent ideology betrays the assumption that the
perceptions of all individuals are static, or are consistently
in keeping with (or against) the interests of their respective
classes, all of which assumptions areproblematical.
THE MYSTIFICATION OF THE DYNAMICS OF URBAN GROWTH
It is obviously impossible to present in this chapter a
systematic critique of all the ways in which the ideology of
the conventional wisdom, which is by and large in keeping with
the	 class	 interests	 of	 the bourgeoisie	 and	 the
petty-bourgeoisie, has mystified the exposition of the
processes of urbanization and urbanism in the Sudan. Thus, in
order to illustrate (as opposed to exhaust) the ways in which
ideology has penetrated into analyses, I will take as an
example the way in which the conceptualization of the dynamics
of urban growth has been distorted.
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As maintained earlier, the process of rapid urban growth
is said to be the consequence of increased rural-urban
migration (even though the role of high fertility has been
recognized). But though some scholars mention, in passing, the
tendency of young educated men to "move into Khartoum" in
search of employment and/or post-secondary education (e.g.
Mohamed El-Awad Galal-El-Din, 1980a:433), and "the movement
east to west of traders, investors, crop dealers, and
government officials" into Nyala (Mohamed El-Had! Abu Sin,
1980), migration has generally been construed as wage labour
migration. As I shall demonstrate in detail in Chapter Three,
however, increased migration to Greater Khartoum (or, for that
matter, to all large urban centres in the Sudan) cannot
legitimately be construed as being solely, or even mainly,
wage labour migration. Quite a large proportion of "migrants"
to the Three Towns is indeed comprised not only of "non-wage
earners" (e.g. businessmen, civil-servants, professionals),
but also of people who are not "earners" at all (e.g.
students, house-wives, children and elderly people). The
magnitude of migration by these groups, and its impact upon
the process of rapid population growth in urban Sudan have
generally escaped analysis in those studies investigating the
dynamics of urban growth. Indeed, it is exceptional in the
literature to describe members of these categories as
'migrants' at all.
I interpret the adoption of a restricted defintion of
'migrant' as a consequence of a class ideology which is
hostile to unskilled rural migrants. This is due to the fact
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that the restricted definition is used to denote much more
than a mere categorization of individuals as being "born
outside, but living in, a certain place". Otherwise, the
members of the other categories mentioned above, and who were
born outside, but live in Greater Khrtoum, ought to have been
included in the assessment of migrarion' as a factor in urban
growth. The concept of 'migrancy' constructed by the
conventional wisdom, however, discards the spatial connotation
of the concept and institutes in 	 its	 place	 a social
categorization denoting exclusion from the 'urban power
structure'. In other words, the presence in urban areas of
capitalists, professionals and bureaucrats (and of their
dependants as well) has in effect been considered part of the
"nature of the urban world" and, as such, has not been
analysed. Insofar as the restricted definition raises the
issue of power relations in urban Sudan (and, by implication,
in the country at large), it simultaneously corroborates the
general ideological (and material) degradation of manual work
by the hegemonic classes in the country. Thus, on the rare
occasions when "movements" by merchants, civil servants, and
so on, are considered at all (e.g. Mohamed El-Hadi Abu Sin,
op.cit.), such "migrations" are viewed as being conducive to
the 'general welfare' of the urban area to which these
powerful strata have "moved". The role of these migrations in
the process of rapid urban population growth, or in the
consequent 'bottle-necks' relating to the supply of consumer
goods and services, however, is never questioned. Yet, unless
these	 distorting ideological intrusions are exposed and
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challenged, we will not be in a position to ask, let alone to
investigate and explain, the dynamics of urban population
growth. In Chapter Three I attempt to illuminate aspects of
these dynamics with particular reference to Greater Khartoum.
LABOUR MIGRATION AND PROLETARIANIZATION
In confronting the ideology of the conventional wisdom on
the role of labour migration in the process of urban growth it
should be emphasized that rural-urban unskilled labour
migration does not constitute the sole, or even the
predominant form of labour migration in the Sudan. Leaving
aside the seasonal movements of nomadic pastoralists,
intra-rural labour migration is indeed more significant, not
only because it concerns the overwhelming majority of rural
migrants in the country (upwards of two million by one
estimate), but also because without it the large scale
irrigated and rainfed agricultural schemes on which the
Sudanese economy is heavily dependent could hardly function.
Taken together, the two forms of labour migration constitute
aspects of one and the same process: labour migration in
search	 of wage	 employment	 and/or	 'income-generating
opportunities'. To this extent, then, the search to ascertain
the causes of rural-urban labour migration should
simultaneously be an attempt to understand and explain the
nature and origins of labour migration in general. With the
exception of a very few studies (notably Mohamed El-Awad Galal
El-Din, 1978:89-134; Mohamed Yousif A. El-Mustafa, 1983:43 et
passim), the literature on Sudanese urbanization has tended to
39
separate these two closely-related forms of labour migration,
and to focus on the 'causes' of migration to the urban centres
in particular. But even the exceptions which have used a
single framework of analysis in the study of intra-rural and
rural-urban migrations are not always devoid of limitations of
their own (cf. below).
The search for causes specific to rural-urban migration
has had serious methodological consequences as far as the
object of inquiry is concerned. Thus, though scholars disagree
as to whether rural-urban migration of unskilled workers is
the cause of an employment problem (e.g. Mohamed El-Awad Galal
El-Din, 1980a:432) or a mechanism contributing towards a more
equitable distribution of wealth in a country plagued by
regional	 and	 other	 inequalities	 (e.g. ILO, 1976:351;
Kannappan, 1977a:92), all focus on the issue of wage
differentials between rural and urban areas as the primary
reason underlying rural-urban labour migration. Though such an
emphasis is expected in contributions by economists adopting
the tools of conventional, synchronic economic analysis (e.g.
Beshir Omer Fadlalla, 1982a:2 et passim), the role of income
differentials assumes even more prominence in those
contributions purporting to assess trends in migration over a
period of time (McLoughlin, 1966; 1970; Mohamed E1-Awad Galal
El-Din, 1973; 1974a; 1974b; 1978; 1979a; 1980a).
According to these latter studies, prior to the Second
World War labour migration in the Sudan was mainly intra-rural
and directed towards employment in the agricultural sector. At
that	 time, it is asserted, the rewards for labour in
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agriculture were higher than in urban employment, and labour
shortages were consequently not uncommon in Sudanese cities in
general and Greater Khartoum in particular. Since World War
II, the argument continues, the shortage of labour in urban
areas has turned into a large surplus to the extent that the
colonial government had to refer migrants in Greater Khartoum
to the agricultural regions. Mohamed El-Awad Galal El-Din
(1974a:20)	 has	 explained	 the	 emergence	 of	 this
'labour-surplus'	 with	 reference	 to the "revisions and
increases" in urban wages between 1948 and
	
1968,	 and
maintained that:
These revisions and increases have resulted
in a real and substantial difference not
only in cash income but also in real income
between town and country and the average
income in Khartoum has become more than five
times the Sudan average. It is true that
income in Khartoum is distributed in such a
way	 that	 migrants	 (especially	 recent
migrants) receive relatively very low
income. Nevertheless, their incomes are far
above what they might expect to earn in the
rural areas.
The flaw in postulating income differentials as the cause
of rural-urban labour migration is twofold. First, though it
is generally true that the annual cash incoñie of unskilled
urban workers is higher than the cash income from cash crops
of an average small farmer, differences between their
respective real incomes are very difficult, if not virtually
impossible to quantify and corroborate. This is particularly
so because a large component of the real income of small
farmers and pastoralists is furnished through productive
activities in the so-called "subsistence-sphere" of domestic
production.	 To	 assign	 cash	 values	 to	 these
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"subsistence-products" in order to render them comparable to
the cash wage of urban workers involves the arbitrary
procedure of having to decide a monetary value' for products
non-marketable in the countryside (although these products may
have high market values in urban areas). Coupled with
differences in the nature of needs as in the cost of
satisfying them between rural and urban areas, the whole
exercise becomes little more than star-counting. The obvious
examples of housing, transport and foodstuffs which absorb a
substantial part of urban wages, but involve little more than
the direct labour of farmers, illustrate the difficulties
involved.
The second, and methodologically even more serious, flaw
is the assumption that when wage differentials obtain between
rural and urban areas the consequence is a simple migration
process (in this instance, "urbanization"). What such an
assumption overlooks is precisely that these unskilled
migrants are not wage labour in the sense assumed by economic
theory; and their migration is not a simple process of
"allocation of human resources" entailing rural-urban
migration, which is conceived in terms of simple 'geographical
mobility'. Bearing in mind that these unskilled migrants are
drawn from the so-called 'traditional sector' in which they
figure as small farmers and pastoralists or, to be more
specific,	 as non-wage producers,	 their migration reveals
itself as being more complex 	 a	 social	 process	 than
geographical movement. Rural-urban migration in this instance
is no less than the consequence and 	 manifestation	 of
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proletarianization, that is to say, of the process of
transforming peasants and pastoralists into wage labourers. By
postulating income differentials as the cause of rural-urban
labour migration, the conventional wisdom has not only failed
to understand the socio-econornic transformations taking place
in rural Sudan, but also stopped short of explaining why the
overwhelming majority of rural Sudanese, which continues to
reside	 in	 the countryside,	 has	 not	 undertaken the
'geographical movement' in search for these 'high' urban
wages.
Related to the process of proletarianization is the
formation of wage labour markets in the Sudan. Before the turn
of this century, such markets were virtually non-existent (cf.
Chapter Four). Thus, following the establishment of the
British colonial state in 1899, the colonial administration
encountered real difficulties in its attempt to secure the
necessary supply of skilled and unskilled wage labourers to
undertake various construction and other tasks. The magnitude
of this labour shortage has been described by Martin (1970)
who visited the 'Anglo-Egyptian Sudan' twice (1907/8 and 1913)
to assess the 'economic, financial and administrative
evolution' of the country. Martin considered in some detail
the labour situation in the various provinces, and his account
on Sennar Province (ibid., p. 223) illustrates the situation
in the country as a whole:
The labour obtainable locally in Sennar
counts for very little. Wages, however good,
do not attract it, for the natives are
mostly herders or cultivators, making just
sufficient to supply their immediate bodily
wants; anything more than this they do not
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ask.
The point to be emphasized is that while wage
differentials may be useful in illuminating aspects of the
allocation of proletarianized labour, they cannot help to
specify the conditions under which non-wage producers become
proletarianized. At the turn of this century, wages, "however
good", did not induce rural Sudanese to enter the labour
market. The colonial state accordingly had to introduce
various policies in order to stimulate the "natives" to seek
wage employment, and to import labour from beyond the
boundaries of the country in order to obtain the required wage
labour force. Rather than create a fully proletarianized wage
labour force, the colonial design was to set into motion a
process of semi-proletarianization that would stimulate a
small section of the domestic producers to engage in forms of
seasonal wage labour migration.
From around 1925 onwards the processes of
proto-proletarianization in the Sudan entered a new phase as
the Gezjra Scheme was established and seasonal wage labour
migration started to involve more and more non-wage producers.
In short, the ever-increasing migration of unskilled workers
to urban areas which currently arouses concern is in essence
the crystallization of that process of
semi-proletarianization; and it is consequently essential to
analyse and explain how this proletarianization process has
been initiated, reproduced and, in recent years, emphasized.
With a handful of exceptions (notably O'Brien, 1980; 1981;
1983a; 1983b; 1984a; 1984b; Mohamed Yousif A. El-Mustafa,
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1 981 ; 1 983; El-Fatih Shaa' -eldin, 1 981 ; 1 982), this
proletarianization process has not captured the attention of
scholars investigating the increased migration of unskilled
labourers in the Sudan; the main focus has been on the supply
of labour to large scale irrigated and rainfed agriculture and
whether or not it is 'sufficient' (see, e.g., ILO, 1976;
Nigam, 1977; Abdel Sadig Ahmed El-Bashir, 1982; Khalid Af fan,
1 983)
That the process of proletarianization underlies the
current urbanization of unskilled manual labourers does not,
of course, imply that every form of rural-urban migration is a
consequence of proletarianization. As I shall argue in Chapter
Three, the educational system in the Sudan is also an
important factor contributing to the urbanization of sections
of the rural population. In other words, while superficially
rural-urban migration of various strata may seem similar
insofar as members of each stratum undertake a geographical
movement, the underlying dynamic of each type of movement
defines its social character differently. The rural urban
migrations of students and merchants have different underlying
dynamics; and the dynamics of both differ from that of
migration by proletarianized small farmers and pastoralists.
The tendency to generalize about all these migrations as
simple 'geographical mobility' thus conflates significantly
different processes. In Chapter Two I attempt to analyse
aspects of this proletarianization process, and to explain why
only a relatively very small percentage of domestic producers
in rural Sudan undertake rural-urban migration.
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THE SPECIFICITY OF THE 'URBAN'
The conventional wisdom in Sudan urban studies has tended
to emphasize the primacy of Greater Khartoum as the "most
important production and consumption centre" in the Sudan
(see, e.g., El-Sayed El-Bushra, 1971a; 1971b; 1972a; 1972b;
1976; 1980; Salih El-Arifi, 1971; 1972; 1980; Mahmoud Khidir
Rizgallah, 1980). Such a claim is usually corroborated by
'hard data' such as that Greater Khartoum has 77 per cent of
the total number of industrial establishments in the Sudan, 73
per cent of the country's entire industrial labour force, 85
per cent of all commercial companies and 80 per cent of
banking activities (e.g. El-Sayed El-Bushra, 1976:87ff).
Together with the assumed 'high urban wages' considered
earlier, these "high levels of development" are postulated as
factors contributing to labour migration to the capital.
Migration to other large cities is explained along similar
lines (e.g. in relation to El-Obeid, Tajel-Anbia All El-Dawi,
1 975)
Furthermore, in their conceptualization of the
"intra-urban processes" prompting wage labour migration to
Greater Khartoum, scholars have generally tended to single out
the post-colonial expansion of "modern" manufacturing industry
as the prime factor. Some have also tended to list the
"increase in opportunities for tertiary employment" as another
factor (e.g. El-Sayed El-Bushra, 1972a:11; Mohamed El-Awad
Galal El-Din, 1978:121; El-Wathig Kameir, 1980b:46), but none
has specified the nature and origin of these "tertiary
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activities". A further but no less controversial factor is
said to relate to the concentration of services (e.g.
health-care, recreation, education) in Greater Khartoum (e.g.
El-Sayed El-Bushra, 1972a; Mohamed El-Awad Galal El-Din, 1980b;
Salih El-Arifi, op.cit.). Though this last factor touches on
the role of higher education which underlies the rural-urban
migration of students (cf. Chapter Three), the way it has been
formulated (that wage labourers are attracted to Greater
Khartoum because of the services to which they have no access
in their places of original domicile) is most unsatisfactory.
Though no systematic study of access to services in Greater
Khartoum has been conducted, from personal experience as well
as from evidence from other urban areas in the country (cf.
Mohamed Yousif A. El-Mustafa, 1983; Fatima Babiker Mahmoud,
1984), it could well be argued that the distribution of
services is generally biased in favour of the more affluent
strata in Greater Khartoum. Thus the sole "intra-urban
process" which has been given weight in the literature is the
emergence of manufacturing industry.
The assertion that Greater Khartoum is the most important
industrial centre in the Sudan is, of course, indisputable,
though over the last decade the conurbation has experienced a
relative decline in its position (cf. Chapter Five). Nor would
I contest the relatively significant employment opportunities
generated by the emergence of manufacturing industry during
the post-colonial period. But to assert that 'modern'
manufacturing industry in Greater Khartoum constitutes the
prime source of attraction of migrants is questionable,
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precisely because industry (both 'modern' and 'traditional')
is one of the smallest sectors of the 'urban economy' in
Greater Khartoum (cf. Chapter Five). To insist that most
investments in the Sudan are concentrated in Greater Khartoum
(e.g. Salih El-Arifi, 1980:405ff; ]3eshir Omer Fadlalla,
1982b:24) is misleading for it overlooks the fact that the
Sudan is a predominantly agricultural country, and that public
and private investments are essentially oriented towards large
scale irrigated and rainfed agriculture. Though I have no
figures for precise comparison of total investment in
agriculture and industry in the Sudan as a whole, I suggest
that the value of investment in any one of the large scale
irrigated agricultural schemes (Gezira, Rahad, etc.) by far
exceeds the total value of industrial investment in the Sudan
as a whole. It is sufficient to substantiate the rural
orientation of investment to note that in a relatively small
rural project like Kenanah (with an area of 80,000 feddans
compared to 2.5 million feddans in Gezira), the value of
investment is US$ 613 million according to official figures, but
US$ 1 billion according to inofficial estimates (see,
Wohimuth, 1983:198). Depending on which rate of exchange is
taken for calculation (there are two official exchange rates
and a third is found in the 'black market'), the value of
investment in Kenanah is roughly six to ten times the £S
251,671,000 which represent the net working capital of all
'modern' manufacturing industrial establishments in Greater
Khartoum	 in	 1978/79 (see Tables 1-1 & 1-11 in Sudan
Government, 1982: pp. 28 & 38). The position of agriculture in
48
the Sudan has been emphasized by the ILO Mission (1976:31)
which maintains that:
Agriculture is the dominant sector in the
Sudanese economy and is likely to remain so
for several decades. At present, it
contributes 38 per cent of GDP at factor
costs, it constitutes over 95 per cent of
exports,	 it	 contributes	 directly and
indirectly over 50 per cent of government
revenues, and it
	
provides	 income	 and
employment	 for the majority of the
population.
The point I seek to stress is that the 'primacy' of
Greater Khartoum cannot be viewed as originating in its
position as the 'most important production centre' in the
Sudan. In one sense, the Three Towns may be viewed as the
most unproductive area in the country, precisely because the
basic avenues of urban capital accumulation (i.e.
import-export trade) are tied to the processes of primary
export production which take place in rural Sudan.
Nevertheless, because a substantial portion of the 'economic
surpluses' created in rural agriculture ends up in the
capital, the conurbation is the most important consumption
area in the Sudan. The inability of scholars to recognize
this apparent contradiction in the position of Greater
Khartoum, and indeed of any other urban area in the Sudan,
stems from the way in which the	 'urban'	 has	 been
conceptualized. As with the misconception of the rural-urban
migration	 of unskilled workers discussed earlier, the
inability of Sudan urban studies to go beyond formal
appearances	 is	 the major	 factor	 underlying	 their
misconception of the specificity of the 'urban'.
In defining 'urban areas', almost all scholars have
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contented themselves with a spatio-demographic criterion
(i.e. areas with at least 5,000 inhabitants which is the
definition adopted by the 1955/56 Census in the Sudan).
El-Sayed El-Bushra (1972a; 1973), however, expresses doubts
about the 'validity' of size as a criterion, particularly
"in cases like the Sudan" which, as agricultural countries,
may contain "villages" of fairly large size with the
consequence that the distinction between "large village" and
"small urban area", which relates to the "functions" of
urban areas, is blurred. El-Sayed (1972a:3) thus rejects the
spatio-demographic criterion and advances a definition based
on the functions of the locality:
It is, therefore, the functions performed by
a settlement and the services rendered for
the neighbouring region that determine
whether a place is urban or not. In other
words, the field of influence of a
settlement is a true measure of its urban or
rural character ... The functions performed
in such central places 	 are	 those of
commerce, industry, administration,
education, religion and recreation. It is
because of the existence of these functions
in towns that these centres witness the
daily ebb and flow of population from the
surrounding countryside.
Though both definitions of the 'urban' may be of some
utility in helping us to i'dentify characteristics that may be
found wherever cities exist (i.e. the 'urban' is a place of
'population	 concentration'	 in	 which	 'functions'	 are
performed), neither definition attains the status of a
'theory' of urbanization or how populations come to be
concentrated. The spatio-demographic definition, to do it
justice, does not claim such a status as it explicitly assumes
population concentration, and the functional definition cannot
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constitute a theory of urbanization, precisely because it
reifies towns by conflating function and origin, manifestation
and cause. How could there be "functions" without
concentration of population and the prior existence of 'urban
areas'? Thus whether we adopt a spatio-demographic. or a
functional criterion or both in defining the specificity of
the 'urban' in general, the end-result, methodologically
speaking, is identical: towns are abstracted from their
"historical and social context" and treated as
	 "static
suprahistorical entities" (cf. Mariotti and Magubane, 1979).
In their attempt to conceptualize the 'urban' scholars
have thus not only failed to question the emergence of urban
areas as a form of human settlement, but have also mystified
the differences between past and current urbanization patterns
in the Sudan. This failure is most clearly manifested in the
attempts of El-Sayed El-Bushra (1971a; 1971b; 1972a) to
consider aspects of Sudanese urbanization from the ancient
Meriotic civilization (ca. 750 B.C. -A.D. 450) up to the
present. His accounts of the historical urbanization processes
are pursued from an evolutionary stance according to which
each "stage" (the Meriotic, Christian, Funj, Turco-Egyptian
colonial, British colonial, etc.) is produced, without a
break, by the simple duplication of the "functional" elements
of the preceding stage, or by the addition of new functions.
Such an approach would imply that ancient Meroe,
eighteenth-century Sennar and present-day Khartoum are all
cases of a single simple form: a human settlement fulfilling
functions for its hinterland. Whatever 'variations' may be
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noted between these 'cities', they are all systematically
reduced to 'quantitative differences' in the specific form of
the functions assumed by cities. In recognition of such
quantitative variations, El-Sayed El-Bushra (1969) has thus
attempted an 'occupational classification' of Sudanese towns,
which contains a good deal of 'information' but makes no
explanatory contribution.
CONVENTIONAL STUDIES OF 'THIRD WORLD URBANIZATION'
I would emphasize that not all contributions to Sudan
urban studies are ahistorical, 7 and that the tendency to
treat urbanization as an independent process in history is not
an affliction peculiar to conventional wisdom in Sudan urban
studies, as some observers seem to suggest (cf. Hale and Hale,
1971a:4). Indeed, "the credibility of the town as • a generic
social entity has become extraordinarily well-established" in
urban sociology, economics, geography and historiography in
general (Abrams, 1978:9; see also; Castells, 1976a; 1976b;
1977); and there persists a general failure to recognize that
"between the cities of ancient and medieval times and the
modern metropolis or conurbation there is a connection of name
and in part of function, but nothing like identity" (Williams,
1973:7, quoted by Magubane, 1979:33). The conventional wisdom
in Sudan urban studies is simply a 'regionally specialised'
version of two ahistorical 'paradigms' which have dominated
the literature on 'Third World urbanization'.
The	 first	 of	 these	 paradigms is the 'unilineal-
evolutionary' approach, which conceptualizes the contemporary
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urbanization process in underdeveloped countries as a
'reiteration' of the historical process in 19th century
Europe. 'Third World urbanization' was accordingly expected to
result in economic (particularly industrial) development (e.g.
Hauser, 1957; Reissman, 1964). An off-shoot of this paradigm
is the view of 'urbanism' as a cultural process generating a
'modern' way of life (cf. Wirth, 1938; Wilson & Wilson, 1954;
Mitchell, 1959; idem. & Shaul, 1965). By the 1960s, however,
the expectations of the unilineal-evolutionary perspective
proved to be poorly-founded as underdeveloped countries failed
to	 initiate	 and	 sustain	 industrialization	 processes
commensurate with their rates of urbanization.
Though a group of scholars advocating 'modernization
theory' have ignored the realities of urban life in
underdeveloped countries and continued to propagate views
reminiscent of the unilineal-evolutionary conception of
urbanization, an increasingly large number of scholars have
recognized the demise of the early paradigm and, in the course
of	 post-mortems,	 have	 established	 the	 so-called
'hyper-urbanization thesis'. Noting the 'de-coupling' of the
alleged 'twin-processes' of urbanization and
industrialization, this second group has come to view the
contemporary urbanization process in underdeveloped countries
as a 'deviation' from the "Western model" and one which is
'excessive' and contrary to the goals of economic development
(Barber, 1967; Lerner, 1967; Ward, 1969; Bairoch, 1973). A
corollary of this view is the conception of 'Third World
cities' as 'parasitical' (Hoselitz, 1953) and of 'urban life'
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in underdeveloped countries as a	 'consumer innovation'
(Mabogunje, 1974).
In spite of their differences regarding the nature and
implications of the process of urbanization in underdeveloped
countries, these two paradigms exhibit the same tendency as
the conventional wisdom in Sudan urban studies to analyse the
emergence and expansion of urban areas, and to conceptualize
life in cities, in isolation from other processes taking place
within the wider (national and international) soclo-historical
context in which they are "embedded". The methodological
implications of this tendency have been pointed out succinctly
by Mariotti and Magubane (1979:270/71) and deserve quoting in
full:
The widespread occurrence (both in time and
place) of the urban phenomenon should not be
allowed	 to	 obscure	 its	 particular
manifestations. An examination of
urbanization must be within definite limits.
Also, the peculiarities of the circumstances
in which urbanization occurs must be taken
into account. Failing to do this, social
scientists undertake the fruitless task of
establishing universal, abstract laws of the
urban process. The search for laws which may
explain all cities betrays the misconception
that urbanization is an independent process
in history. Isolated from other social
processes, the development of cities appears
to be a fortuitous occurrence or a function
of such factors as geographic location,
population growth and dispersal, or terrain.
Attempts to account for the emergence of a
city in these terms become exercises in the
description and correlation 	 of	 traits.
Trivialities assume a significance equal to
necessities;	 cause,	 consequence	 and
coincidence become confused, and underlying
social processes remain hidden by	 the
elaboration of appearances.
The basic	 conclusion of my earlier discussion of
rural-urban migration as the consequence of proletarianization
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in the case of unskilled workers, and of education and capital
accumulation in the cases
	 of	 students	 and merchants
respectively, was that rural-urban migration is not a
one-dimensional 'event' but, rather, a manifestation and
consequence of varied processes. I accordingly argued that
rural-urban migration cannot be studied or explained as a
universal phenomenon except at the level of superficial
appearances	 (geographical	 mobility	 and	 population
concentration)	 and	 that	 insofar	 as	 the dynamics of
urbanization are socially and historically specific, we should
always be cautious not to conflate different processes
resulting in population movement and concentration. But since
the social processes resulting in population concentration
(i.e. proletarianization, capital accumulation, education, and
so on) are to be ascertained with reference to the political
economy of concrete social formations, the product of that
concentration, the 'urban', cannot be studied and explained
otherwise.
Thus the proposition that "cities are the products of the
society which creates them" (Pahl, 1968a:3) should not be
treated as a flat truism and discarded as such; we have to
explain how and i cities are produced and reproduced in
society. The analytical framework which conceptualizes
rural-urban migration and the rise of cities as consequences
and manifestations of praxis ('human action') by individuals
and groups bound by definite social production relations is
what I term the "method of political economy" (see below). But
the problematic which seeks to establish the social forces
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that lead to the emergence and reproduction of cities as a
form of human settlement should not be confused with that
which assumes the emergence of cities as a social form and
attempts to explain how their siting or location is
determined, or how urban space is organized (cf. Saunders,
1981:219ff; Badcock, 1984:59ff))8
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF URBANIZATION
To argue that the processes of urbanizatioh should always
be studied within specific "social and historical" limits does
not imply that it is	 impossible to make meaningful
generalizations about the 'social specificity' of
urbanization. Through the application of the 'method of
political economy' in the field of 'urban studies', numerous
scholars have increasingly moved towards establishing the
social forces underlying urbanization processes, as well as
towards the abstraction of salient features of these processes
and of the social forces underlying them. But such
generalizations are firmly based on analyses of overall
socio-economic processes, which have particular configurations
in each urbanization pattern.
The method of political economy traces the initial rise of
the 'urban' back to the rise of classes in society. Thus in
the Sudan, as elsewhere (cf. Adams, 1966; Marx, 1977), the
separation between 'town' and 'country' was initially
instituted subsequent to the emergence of class society and
the development of the level of the productive forces to a
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stage in which the agricultural surplus produced sufficed to
maintain a non-productive class of rulers and their supporters
(administrators, priests, army, servants, etc.). But the
varied processes through which classes initially emerged, and
the multifarious mechanisms by which rulers instituted,
validated and reproduced their power and authority, and which
underpinned the appropriation of agricultural surpluses,
cannot be conceptualized in universal or general terms; they
can only be grasped a posteriori to studies of the political
economy of concrete societies) 9 As th agricultural
surpluses appropriated by the ruling classes and concentrated
in urban areas were greater than what the ruling classes
needed for their own and their armies' consumption, the
accumulated 'wealth' progressively attracted people from
diverse backgrounds. Some of these attracted had special
skills, such as craftsmen and artisans who earned their living
by rendering their talents to the disposition of rulers;
others ('traders') brought 'exotic' items for exchange; and
long-distance trade in 'luxury goods' provided a further
avenue for the consumption of the accumulated wealth. The
concentration of wealth in urban areas meant that they were
the most important consumption centres in their regions; and
for this reason industry and commerce sought the proximity of
the urban dwellers, who possessed wealth and could afford the
purchase of their goods. In short, the so-called functions of
the city cannot be accorded precedence over the rise of
classes, the appropriation of surplus-labour (or, as at
present, of surplus-value) and the concentration of people and
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wealth. This point is succinctly expressed by Portes and
Walton (1977:9) who maintain that "The city did not arise to
serve, but to subdue".
The underlying dynamic in the emergence, reproduction
and/or expansion of cities which the method of political
economy seeks to investigate is, therefore, the set of social
production relations binding classes in society. This set of
relations is, however, in a constant state of motion owing to
its contradictory constitution and the conflicting interests
of the classes it binds together; and it is this motion which
continually produces change in the organization of social
production and/or in the basis of differentiation between the
producing and appropriating classes. In other words, with the
transformation of the structure of social production relations
in a class society, the underlying dynamic of urbanization is
simultaneously transformed irrespective of whether or not the
specific city as a spatial unit has expanded, collapsed or
retained its former residential size and population density.
As Sawers (1984:4) points out:
Perhaps the most central proposition of the
new urban political economy is that the city
is merely a reflection of the larger
economic and social fabric, termed the mode
of production... One significant implication
is that cities in different societies or at
different times are very different,
therefore there can be no single analysis of
cities or of urbanization. ...This applies
specifically to the study of cities in less
developed countries, in socialist societies,
or in earlier historical epochs. Political
economists are careful not to project the
experience of developed countries onto
cities in very different circumstances.
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THE CONCEPT OF DEPENDENT URBANIZATION
Two main factors underlay the progressive incorporation,
over the last two decades or so, of the method of political
economy in the field of 'urban studies'. The first factor,
which concerns the literature on Western cities (see,
Pickvance, 1976; Castells, 1977; Harloe, 1977; idem. & Lebas,
1981; Pons & Francis, 1983b; Tabb & Sawers, 1984; Smith,
1984), is the urban political upheavel of the 1960s which
forcefully brought to the fore issues of
	 'urban social
movements'	 and the collective means of consumption. The
deepening of the fiscal crisis facing municipal (and
metropolitan) authorities in industrialized countries has
served to retain the momentum of political economic urban
research. The second factor, which relates to the literature
on urbanization in underdeveloped countries, is the emergence
of the world-system-dependency perspective, which was
initially developed in relation to the political economy of
Latin American countries but progressively applied to other
underdeveloped areas as well (see Frank, 1969; Magdoff, 1969;
Emmanuel, 1972; Rodney, 1972; Wallerstein, 1974; Samir Amin,
1974b; idem., Arrighi, et. al., 1982). Under the influence of
this perspective, many scholars have come to recognize that
the production processes which underpin urbanization in
underdeveloped countries cannot be analysed or understood in
isolation from the impact of capitalist penetration and the
imposition of 'dependency relations' upon these countries
through the institution of the international division
labour.
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The growing influence of the world-system-dependency
perspective coincided with	 increasing discontent
	
among
scholars over the conception of urbanization in underdeveloped
countries presented by the unilineal-evolutionary and
hyper-urbanization paradigms. The new perspective was
consequently hailed by scholars as a breakthrough from the
'impasse', and since the early 1970s there has been a growing
tendency to characterise the process of urbanization in
underdeveloped countries as being 'dependent' and/or
'peripheral capitalist' (see McGee, 1971; 1979; Castells,
1977; Roberts, 1976; 1978; Walton, 1976; Yujnovsky, 1976;
Slater, 1978; Cross, 1979; Magubane, 1979; Mariotti &
Magubane, 1979; Portes & Walton, 1981; Gilbert & Gugler, 1983;
Abu-Lughod, 1976; 1979; 1984; idem. & Hay, 1977; Sandbrooks,
1982; Chase-Dunn, 1984). In contrast to the earlier paradigms,
there has been a consistently growing recognition that:
in	 one	 essential	 respect	 at	 least
mid-twentieth-century Dakar and Lagos differ
from mid-nineteenth-century Leeds and
Manchester: the cause of their existence,
the basis of their economic life, is not
factory industry but commerce. They have
been brought into being to meet the needs of
European trade. Their main function is to
drain out	 of Africa its ground-nuts,
palm-products, coffee, cocoa, cotton,
minerals; and to pump into Africa European
consumer goods - cloth, kerosine, bicycles,
sewing machines... (Hodgkin, 1956; quoted by
Gugler & Flanagan, 1978:30).
One conspicuous corollary of the application of the method
of political economy in analyses of 'Third World urbanization'
has been an unfortunate situation similar to what Sorokin
(1956, quoted 'by Pons & Francis, 1983a:2) has called
"rejection by reversal". That is to say, in their attempt to
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stress the relevance of the broader processes of
'underdevelopment' to the analysis of 'Third World cities',
advocates of the 'dependent urbanization' view have shifted
attention from intra-urban to inter- and extra-urban
processes. As a result of this tendendy, analyses of 'Third
World cities' have become virtually synonymous with the
scrutiny of the position of underdeveloped countries in the
global capitalist system in the context of the
'disarticulation of sectors' consequent on the penetration by
the capitalist mode of production. As expressed by Portes and
Browning (1976a:7-8), in emphasizing the asymmetrical
structure of the international capitalist system, scholars
adopting a 'world- system-dependency' perspective have tended
to view:
dependent urbanization in a less positive
light. The cities, especially major ones,
were not centers for advancement but, by and
large, centers for exploitation of a
subordinate periphery. The phenomenon of
urban primacy was thus the reflection,
vehicle, and locus of a
	
situation	 of
dependency. Primate cities served as
geographical centers where an international
structure of domination became translated
into an internal structure 	 of	 surplus
extraction. Imbalances between city and
countryside thus functioned to perpetuate,
not remedy, a situation of underdeveloprnent.
Notwithstanding my sympathy for this view of the
'dependent' and/or 'peripheral capitalist' basis of the
processes of urbanization in underdeveloped countries (see
below), I believe the focus of this new paradigm on the inter-
and extra-urban processes has seriously distracted attention
from the analysis and understanding of specific socio-economic
processes	 taking place within cities in underdeveloped
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countries. In other words, though urban hierarchies in
underdeveloped countries may rightly be viewed "as links in
the chain of national-international dependency" 	 (Walton,
1976:48ff),	 very	 little	 has been achieved by way of
illuminating, with reference to concrete cities, the
implications of the structures of peripheral capitalism for
'urban' soclo-economic processes. It is consequently far from
clear in the literature whether, and in what way, 'Third World
cities' are themselves 'underdeveloped' (i.e. whether the
cities are subject to the same processes operating at the
national level).
THE PETTY COMMODITY PRODUCTION APPROACH
Though the lacunae in the literature on the political
economy of cities in underdeveloped countries loom large, some
attempts have been made to analyse certain facets of
'peripheral urbanism'. Besides valuable analyses of the
"housing question" and/or "shanty towns" in 'Third World
cities' (e.g. Burgess, 1978; Dwyer, 1979), significant
insights into certain aspects of peripheral urbanism have been
furnished by the 'petty commodity production approach'.
The petty commodity production (PCP) approach emerged
mainly as an internal critique of the concept of "urban
informal sector" as used by the ILO studies (e.g. ILO, 1972;
1976; Sethurman, 1981). Its advocates sought to refute the
argument of the ILO studies by challenging the assumption of
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the "unarticulated sector", and they used micro-studies in a
number of 'Third World cities' in an attempt to corroborate
the view that the problems of the so-called "urban informal
sector", far from being consequences of inadequate linkage to
the rest of the 'urban economy', are in fact explicit
consequences of that linkage (or 'articulation'). The volumes
edited by Bromley (1979c) and Bromley & Gerry (1979b) contain
the main body of this critique.
In his Introduction to The Urban Informal Sector, Bromley
(1979a) raised a number of questions as to the relevance of
the dualist view embodied in the concept of the 'informal
sector' and stressed that it had assumed currency in spite of
its tendency to conflate people, enterprises, households and
activities. He clearly demonstrates that the concept gained
ground not so much because of its theoretical validity but
because it is a convenient vehicle to promote "reformist"
policy recommendations. These latter are thought to be
directed towards a 'moderate' equitable distribution of wealth
at a time when the international community has become aware of
the 'radicalizing' effects of widening disparities in
underdeveloped countries (cf. Moser, 1979). Thus none of the
ILO Mission Reports following the Kenya Report (i.e. ILO,
1972) disputed or opposed the recommendations of the latter;
disagreements were confined to further refinements of the
definition and classification of the 'informal sector'. But
the pcp approach turned away from this to a study of the
social production relations and the linkages that exist
between the so-called 'urban informal sector' and the rest of
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the 'urban economy' (namely, the large scale capitalist
enterprises). Gerry (1979a), for example, attempts in his
study of Dakar to document how the small-scale manufacturing
and repairs enterprises are in many complex and contradictory
ways related to the operation of the urban economy as a whole.
In particular, he draws attention to the way in which the
small producers end up producing surplus-value for the large
scale capitalist enterprises thereby supporting the expanded
reproduction of capital.
Le Brun and Gerry (1975) provided the initial framework
for the conceptualization of the relations between the
capitalist mode of production and the PCP (identified as a
'pre-capitalist' form) as contradictory and as working
simultaneously towards the dissolution and conservation of
PCP. Central to this effect is the process of differentiation
among petty producers which has two poles: (a)
proletarianization and (b) the progressive transformation of
small enterprises into full-fledged capitalist production
units. The process of proletarianization tends to eliminate
PCP which is said to be a consequence of competition between
large scale enterprises and PCP for raw materials and markets.
The transition from PCP to capitalist production, on the other
hand, is seen in a few cases to be in accordance with the
possibilities of a technical division of labour whereby an
increasing degree of specialization is achieved. Such a
division of labour is held to allow the head of the production
unit to engage increasingly in the organization of work and
the marketing of products rather than in production itself.
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But this technical arrangement leads to a corresponding social
division of labour: the head of the unit no longer entertains
'paternal relations' with the other producers working in his
unit (said to be typical of relations in PCP); and the other
producers in the unit become wage labourers producing
surplus-value for their employer. Various transitional forms
are conceived by Le Brun and Gerry to mediate these two poles
in the differentiation process.
Gerry (1979b) applied this framework in his study of Dakar
and stressed the importance of PCP which, by providing cheap
products, helps maintain a low wage level. He maintains that
because of this function the capitalist mode of production has
an interest in conserving PCP. But as the market for the
products of petty commodity producers is actually the larger,
the capitalist enterprises seek access to that market and
thereby compete with petty producers over raw materials and
customers with the effect of eliminating PCP. Gerry
(1979b:1158) accordingly maintains that while only a small
number of PCP units succeed in graduating to the status of
incipient capitalist enterprises,
More and more [small] enterprises are forced
to underutilize the skills available to
them, to use increasing amounts of low
quality	 inputs,	 and	 to	 suffer grave
restriction on their	 ability	 to even
reproduce their current situations.
Gerry (ibid.) concludes that "large numbers of petty
producers would be driven towards the miserable fringe of the
urban economy, where dependence upon discarded and recycled
raw materials, unskilled labour and impoverished clients is
the general rule".
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The case of small manufacturing in Dakar, however, seems
to over-emphasize the competitive nature of relations between
'big business' and PCP. These relations are by no means
confined solely to the realm of competition. Indeed, a number
of contributions to the PCP approach have convincingly argued
that many of the 'income-generating productive activities'
have emerged in response to the specific needs of big industry
and that their economic organization is related intimately to
the latter. Birkbeck (1979), for example, documents how the
emergence of garbage-picking in Colombia has been augmented by
demand from the giant paper and cardboard factories. The
apparent poverty of the garbage-picker, we are told, is not
because he is 'unemployed', but because of the terms of his
'employment'. Or as Birkbeck has put it, the garbage-picker
"works for the factory but is not employed in it". Bromley
(1979b), on the other hand, has documented and analysed how
many of the 'self-employed' street traders of Cali are in fact
very little more than disguised wage workers, "out-workers"
and "commission-sellers" who undertake the distribution of
commodities on behalf of, and for the benefit of, large scale
commercial enterprises. Bromley has accordingly argued that as
these street traders do not enjoy the benefits of "permanent
wage workers" they should be viewed as "casual workers".
I believe that the PCP approach has succeeded both to
discredit the concept of the 'urban informal sector' and to
expose critically important aspects of the conditions and
roles of workers in petty commodity production and unskilled
tertiary services in 'Third World cities'. But that success
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notwithstanding,	 a	 conspicuous	 feature of the	 PCP
contributions has been an uncritical acceptance of certain
assumptions contained within the concept of the 'urban
informal sector', which acceptance has served to perpetuate a
distorted conception of the structure and operation of the
urban wage labour market in underdeveloped countries. The most
unfortunate of these unquestioned assumptions concerns the
alleged implications of the distinction between "stable
wage-work" and the various forms of "casual employment" (see
Bromley and Gerry, 1979a:5-19). Thus, although the findings of
such micro-studies have admirably corroborated the destitution
of a large majority of 'casual workers', they have also
subscribed to the view of the ILO studies concerning the
'privileges' of the so-called 'formal workers', who are
conceived of as a 'labour aristocracy' which, through its
trade unions, exerts pressure to improve its conditions -
sometimes even at the expense of perpetuating the insecurity
of casual workers (ibid., p. 9). As I shall explain in more
detail in Chapter Seven, this last assumption not only tends
to blur aspects of the conditions of wage labourers in the
so-called 'formal sector', but also lends support to the
dualistic ('formal/informal') conception of the structure of
the urban wage labour market. But it is important to point out
that these flaws are only contingent to analyses within the
PcP approach; that is to say, the focus of the PCP approach
has been on 'micro-processes' rather than on the wider context
of the urban labour market in which these micro-processes
operate. In short, the task of providing a comprehensive
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'medium-range' ('city level') analysis of the structure and
operation of the urban wage labour market in underdeveloped
countries remains virtually unexplored. We need now to relate
the 'micro' findings of PCP approach to the 'macro' (national
and international) analyses of peripheral capitalism and to
the processes of 'underdevelopment'. This thesis aims to
contribute to the construction of such an analysis.
PERIPHERAL CAPITALIST URBANISM IN THE SUDAN
The foregoing discussion of the social specificity of the
'urban' and of 'dependent urbanization' may appear
'excessively pedantic'. But my view is that its necessity and
relevance to any attempt to analyse and explain socio-economic
processes in contemporary urban Sudan can hardly be
over-estimated. In this section I propose to recapitulate the
main implications of the foregoing discussion for the analysis
in subsequent chapters.
The first significant implication is that, in order to
understand the dynamics of urban growth in contemporary Sudan,
I do not need to deal with the long and varied history of
Sudanese cities; I shall therefore focus on the contemporary
social production relations which assumed their present form
following the establishment of British capitalist-colonial
rule in 1899. As explained by Abdel Mohsin Mustafa (1975), the
British colonial state effectively transformed the Sudan into
a supplier of cheap primary products and a market for imported
manufactured goods and, in the process, enforced a complete
transformation of the structures and processes of the Sudanese
68
economy. Rather than consolidate the preceding production
processes and markets, the colonial state "imposed an
altogether new process, and an altogether new market to which
the productive resouces were to be oriented and to the service
of which they were to be committed" (idem., p. 13).
The transformations imposed by the British colonial
administration (1899-1955) resulted in the institution of what
I term peripheral capitalist urbanism in the Sudan. By the
phrase	 "peripheral	 capitalist	 urbanism",	 I	 mean	 to
characterize	 the pattern of "urban life" whose primary
objective is the fulfillment of the requirements of 	 a
colonial-type trade economy. In this respect, I fully
subscribe to the view of Samir Amin (1977:147) who has noted
how the concept of the "colonial-type trade" has been used by
different scholars to denote different phenomena through
different methods of abstraction such that:
its meaning has been reduced to a mere
description: the exchange of agricultural
products against manufactured goods. Yet the
concept is much richer: it describes
analytically the exchange of agricultural
commodities provided by a peripheral society
shaped in this way, against the products of
a central capitalist industry imported or
produced	 on	 the spot by European
enterprise.. (emphasis added).
The "way" in which the Sudan has, under conditions of
full-scale capitalist colonization, been "shaped" as an arena
for primary export production as well as a market for imported
manufactured goods will be explored in Chapter Two. In the
same chapter I also attempt to highlight the origins of the
processes of semi-proletarianization which underlie
rural-urban unskilled labour migration. But it is important to
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stress here that the institution of the colonial-type trade
economy has involved, inter alia, the imposition of a pattern
of 'urban life' founded on the basis of, and intended to
fulfil the requirements of that economy. In other words, the
primary processes underlying the pattern of socio-economic
life in 20th century urban Sudan have been;
(a) administration, whose basic objective was, and
remains, the creation and sustenance of conditions
conducive to the imposition and/or reproduction of
primary export production and the colonial-type trade
and;
(b) commerce (import-export trade and related
activities such as banking, transport and insurance) in
which the most significant processes of urban capital
accumulation take place.
The process of peripheral capital accumulation in urban
Sudan, during both the colonial and post-colonial periods, has
been admirably documented and analysed by Mohamed Yousif A.
El-Mustafa (1983) with reference to Hassaheisa Town. I fully
agree with his identification of capital accumulation as the
primary urban process dominating socio-economic life. However,
insofar as Mohamed Yousif defined his task as the illumination
of the interconnectedness between capital accumulation,
'tribalism', and local government politics in Hassaheisa, he
tended to view "administration" more as a "constraint"
impinging upon urban capital accumulation than as a process
resulting in the urbanization of that majority of the urban
population consisting of public employees and their dependents
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together with students (cf. Chapter Three).
When the processes of peripheral urbanism and the dynamics
of urban population growth in the Sudan are put into
perspective, their observed implications for the structure and
operation of the urban wage labour market become easier to
understand. In Chapters Four and Five I will analyse the
'intra-urban processes' that have governed the operation of
the urban wage labour market from the turn of the century to
the present. In these two chapters I set out to illuminate the
constraints imposed by the colonial-type trade economy upon
the labour absorption capacity of the 'basic' activities in
Greater Khartoum. I shall accordingly argue and attempt to
corroborate the view that the demand for wage labour in both
commerce and administration in Greater Khartoum is not only
very limited, but also cannot be substantially expanded
without jeopardizing primary export production, which
constitutes the central pillar of the colonial-type trade
economy to which the two activities are tied. As a result of
these constraints, the larger part of the demand for urban
manual labour during both the colonial and post-colonial
periods has been external to these two basic activities. The
limited measure of post-colonial capital-intensive
industrialization in Greater Khartoum, which has arisen partly
in response to lucrative concessions by the state, has
generated an equally limited demand for workers. But owing to
excessive rates of labour turn-over, manufacturing employment
has continued to assert a conspicuous, but by no means major,
role in the operation of the urban wage labour market. It
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should be noted, however, that while the construction industry
was the major source of demand for manual labour during the
colonial period, during the post-colonial period it is
population momentum which assumed that role through the
generation of a substantial demand for a wide range of
unskilled tertiary services. Unlike the labour demand in the
construction industry, however, the demand generated by the
population momentum is not transient. In Chapter Six I present
the findings of nly own field research into aspects of
unskilled tertiary self-employment.
One major conclusion of the argument I seek to develop in
this thesis is that, in the context of the colonial-type trade
economy, the process of peripheral urban growth seems to be
endowed with a self-inflationary character: the more the
processes of commerce and administration are intensified, the
larger becomes the number of people involved in them (i.e.
growth among the commercial bourgeoisie, bureaucrats and
professionals, and their dependants), and the greater becomes
the demand for community and personal services (further urban
growth through increase in the membership of skilled,
semi-skilled and unskilled categories performing services).
Unskilled tertiary self-employment accordingly unravels itself
as part and parcel of the working of an underdeveloped urban
socio-economic way of life.
Furthermore, in my brief assessment of the PCP approach I
have pointed out how the exclusive focus on aspects of
'self-employment' has tended to perpetuate misconceptions and
poorly-founded assumptions
	 concerning the
	
origins and
72
implications of the seeming structural segmentation of the
urban wage labour market. These limitations are also true of
the literature on the structure and operation of the urban
wage labour market in the Sudan. In Chapter Seven I therefore
attempt a detailed account of aspects of the terms and
conditions of work for wage labourers employed in the
so-called 'formal sector', comparing them with those of the
'self-employed' unskilled tertiary workers analysed in Chapter
Six. Contrary to all the studies which overemphasize the
implications of the distinction between 'formal' ('permanent')
wage workers and 'informal' ('casual', 'temporary' or
'self-employed') workers, I shall argue that the conditi.ons
of all sections of the urban manual labour force	 are.
basically uniform. In arguing this, howeve, I do not assert
that the so-called 'informal workers' earn as 'high' incomes,
or enjoy as many 'privileges', as do the 'permanent' wage
workers in government departments, public concerns and large
scale commercial and industrial private enterprises; but I do
maintain that all sections of the urban manual labour force in
general, and unskilled manual workers in particular, endure
equally deplorable work conditions, and that they are all
poorly remunerated. In asserting the relative uniformity of
the conditions of urban manual labour, however, my aim is
neither to suggest that the different forms of employment are
identical, nor to discard the apparent structural segmentation
of the labour market as a 'myth'; it is rather to discredit
the poorly-founded conceptions of the origins and implications
of that apparent structural segmentation. These origins will
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accordingly be explained in terms of the implications of the
different forms of employment for the distinction between
unionized and non-unionized workers. Labour legislation in the
Sudan denies union rights to 'temporary' and 'casual' workers
and, as a result of this, union membership is exclusive to
'permanent' workers. The significance of the unionized!
non-unionized distinction, however, does not stem from the
present role of trade unions, but rather from the potential
threat of strong unions to a system of production based on
cheap labour. The conclusion I attempt to corroborate in
Chapter Seven is thus that the apparent structural
segmentation of the wage labour market, far from being the
consequence of differential terms and conditions of employment
for different sections of the manual labour force, is indeed
the precondition for the maintenance of generally poor terms
and conditions of employment for wage workers throughout the
economy.
NOTES
1. All statistical data on the Sudan quoted in this work
should be taken as 'crude approximations' rather than
'relatively precise' values. This is particularly true of the
returns of the Second National Population Census of 1973. The
"final results" of that census are yet to be published
-although the preliminary returns of the 1983 census have
already been made available to the public. Another feature of
the first two censuses is that their categories are often
incompatible and this makes comparisons very difficult. Siddik
Nasir Osman (1977) has presented a useful account of the
limitations of basic statistics in the Sudan.
2. A comprehensive statement of the official view of the
consequences of accelerated urbanization is incorporated in
the speech delivered on 2nd August 1972 by President Numeiri
at the 17th Annual Conference of the Philosophical Society of
the Sudan (The complete Arabic text has been published in, ed.
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El-Sayed El-Bushra, 1972c). The main emphasis in that speech
was on, on the one hand, the pressure on housing and the other
services in urban centres and, on the other, the consequent
reduction in the rural labour force. Though the same views
continue to be held by officials, in recent years particular
attention has been accorded to the issue of "public security"
and "peace and order", as indicated by the official statements
in the daily newspapers in Septembe.r-October 1981 concerning
the motives behind the "Street-Cleaning Campaign" the story of
which I shall relate later in the chapter.
3. As the "Street Cleaning Campaign" was originally launched
under the pretext of combating "unemployment" and "black
marketing", the government was put to task by critics pointing
to the fact that if there was any group to be held responsible
for black-marketing, then it should be the commercial
bourgeoisie. In addition to the wholesale arrests of unskilled
migrants, a number of 'big merchants' (including one who is a
member of the National People's Assembly) were arrested.
Special courts headed by military officers were established by
a Presidential Order to try merchants accused of activating
black-markets. A handful of 'big merchants' were summarily
tried and convicted; but a few weeks later the member of the
National Assembly was released as were the other 'big names'.
In effect, the 'martial courts' confined themselves to the
task of trying and convicting small retailers and petty
traders.
4. Shortly after the campaign was first launched, the
government announced that it would no longer provide subsidies
to prices of sugar, wheat flour and petrol. This 'coincidence'
(?) has induced many Sudanese to speculate whether the
campaign was launched precisely in order to pacify the poor
strata which might stage demonstrations opposing the
implementation of the measures prescribed by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) as a precondition for releasing loans to
the ('literally') bankrupt Sudanese government.
5. Be the 'real' motive behind the campaign as it might, in
its early days the campaign succeeded to some extent in easing
the pressure on the supply of foodstuffs (not least because of
the relatively substantial numbers of unskilled migrants
arrested	 and/or	 evicted	 and	 of	 hesitation	 by
'black-marketeers' to withhold supplies at a time when
house-to-house search was being undertaken). Capitulating on
this (unintended?) consequence of the campaign, the government
has since started to send troops down-town every time pressure
on consumer-goods mounts.
6. The initial draft of this critique of Sudan urban studies
was initially written as part of a paper presented at a
workshop held at the Institute of Social Science, the Hague
(Salah El-Din El-Shazali Ibrahim, 1984a). Insofar as my aim is
to expose the limitations of the conventional wisdom in Sudan
urban studies, it is beyond the purpose of the critique to
provide an overall review of all the arguments presented in
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the literature. For the benefit of those interested in
pursuing further readings, I should mention that a number of
edited volumes on Sudanese urbanization are available (Hale &
Hale, 1971b; El-Sayed El-Bushra, 1972c; Pons, 1980c). Though
the volume edited by Valdo Pons may prove somewhat difficult
to obtain as only a limited number of 'advanced copies' are
available at present, it is nevertheless particularly
recommended as it contains not only a. massive collection of
early, but not easily accessible articles, which have been
updated by the editor, but also 12 new contributions
especially written for the book. An extensive and up-to-date
annotated bibliography was compiled for the volume.
7. Besides the laudable contributions of Mohamed Yousif A.
El-Mustafa (1981; 1983) to which I will refer later in this
and subsequent chapters, the only contributions to Sudan urban
studies which have shown a degree of sensitivity to the impact
of socio-economic transformations to urban life in the Sudan
are those by Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed (1980) and Abdel Ghaffar
M. Ahmed and Mustafa Abdel Rahman (1979). These two scholars
are critical of the "sharp dichotomy" between rural and urban
areas presented in "dualist theories and model" and which
blurs the participation of the rural population in primary
export production. But in their rejection of this "sharp
dichotomy" the distinction between "rural" and "urban" seems
to have been reduced to an element of scale or population
density reminiscent of the 'rural-urban continuum' thesis.
They have accordingly argued that by distinguishing between
'urban areas' and 'small urban centres' we would be in "a
position to see a continuity between urban and rural sectors"
(Abdel Ghaffar and Mustafa, 1979:2). The significance of their
contributions, however, stems from their conception of the
role of small urban centres in terms of a process that changes
with the transformations in the structure of social production
relations. Thus Abdel Ghaffar and Mustafa (1979:6/7) inform us
that:
In comparing these [pre-colonial] centres
with those taken over or created after the
colonisation of	 the	 Sudan during	 the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, many
differences can be seen. Small centres during
colonial rule, rather than serving just as
meeting places where transactions were
carried out, extended their domination over
the surrounding countryside..
The major structural changes that took place during the
colonial period, we are told, were twofold (cf. ibid.).
Firstly, the monetarisation of exchange and the emergence of
private ownership and sale of land (which are said to have
alienated manpower from this vital resource); and secondly,
the abolition of slavery which created a demand for wage
labour	 (thus	 giving scope for the capitalist mode of
production	 assume full control in the small urban centres
and	 most	 of	 the	 countryside").	 Accompanying	 these
transformations, the argument continues, were four factors
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that enhanced the pattern of exploitation of the countryside.
These factors were (a) the establishment of the small urban
centres as "seats of authority"; (b) the provision of services
(particularly education); (c) the destruction of the
"indigenous system of relations of production" (except for
those elements of it that could be transformed to serve the
ends of further exploitation) and, (d) the growth of a migrant
labour force ("The whole population in the countryside is kept
as migrants on a waiting-list; the main body of the reserve
army of the unemployed").
In Chapter Two I will discuss in detail aspects of the
transformations that took place during the British
capitalist-colonial period and so I do not need to consider
here the controversial views expressed by Abdel Ghaffar and
Mustafa regarding the nature and implications of the changes
imposed through British colonial policy. However it is
relevant to stress here that the "exploitation" of the
population of the countryside by the 'dominant urban classes'
is not merely a "colonial development"; they were only the
mechanisms of "exploitation" (or, more precisely, of the
appropriation of surplus-labour and/or surplus-value) that
experienced transformations. In spite of the significance of
their contribution, especially regarding the cases of the two
'small urban centres' they have docuemented, the tendency of
Abdel Ghaffar and Mustafa to focus exclusively on aspects of
the "role of small urban centres" in order to discredit the
"sharp dualistic dichotomy" has precluded them from
considering the specificity of the dynamics underlying the
contemporary urbanization process in the Sudan.
8. In contrast to El-Sayed El-Bushra, who postulates the
unchanging character of 'urbanism' in time or space, Winters
(1977) puts to question the relevance and validity of theories
developed in relation to Western urbanism when applied to
"exotic cities". What seems to underlay Winters' argument is
the assumption that in regions with cultures differing from
Western culture, different 'forms' of urbanism should be
expected to emerge and that these differences relate not only
to function but also to urban morphology. In order to
substantiate these differences, Winters recognizes the utility
of "urban archetypes" in the process of "contextualizing"
urbanisrn. The concept of "urban archetypes" is intended to
imply a "connection between some aspects of urban form
(usually morphology or function) and ethnic group, religion,
politico-economic system, technology, or the like" (.idern, p.
501). As it stands, thus, the concept of urban archetypes
suggests	 that	 cultural	 traits	 could be regarded as
"independent variables" significant in explaining the
emergence of certain urban forms and that a city or cities can
be identified with cities of a particular archetype. Attempts
to construct archetypes include those on the Islamic or Middle
Eastern city (e.g. von Gruenbaum, 1961; Benet, 1964; Lapidus,
1973) and Yoruba city (Mabogunje, 1961).
Despite Winters' recognition of urban archetypes in
methodological terms, he contends that some, and perhaps most,
"traditions of urbanism" cannot be directly associated with
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any single archetype. But the point he makes is not that any
classification (which is what archetypes are all about) is
selective and arbitrary. Rather, what he seems to suggest is
that 'by their nature' most urban traditions represent forms
"intermediate" between two or more archetypes and in these
cases the task is to identify the archetypes involved.
According to Winters, the traditional Muslim cities of
northern and central Sudan (from ca. .1520 to 1898) are cases
in point. Thus though Islamic elements were incorporated into
these cities, he contends, nowhere was the result much like a
Cairo or a Fez; and apparently Sudanese urbanism "combined"
Muslim and Black African urban traditions. With the aid of
archetypes,	 Winters	 attempts to illucidate the precise
character of medieval Muslim urbanism in the Sudan.
In his consideration of Sudanese traditional cities as
"Muslim	 cities",	 Winters	 emphatically	 stresses	 the
implications of the distinction between	 'orthodox'	 and
'popular Islam and points out that the "conventional
archetype" in the literature was constructed in relation to
the former while the inhabitants of the different regions of
the Middle East adhere to one or the other variant of the
latter. In his own words ( p . 506):
The standard Muslim urban archetype, with its
emphasis on the Friday prayer as the
ideological basis of urban nodality and on
the mosque as the central urban morphological
feature, is keyed almost entirely to orthodox
Islam. It does not really attempt to deal
with popular elements, and in the Sudan,
where orthodox Islam was not very important,
this is fatal. [...] Islam in the Sudan
-popular Islam- had two other contributions
to make to Sudanese urbanism. First, with its
emphasis on proselytizing and teaching, it
was	 connected with the foundation and
maintenance of cities as centres of religious
education. Second, with its obsession with
saints, and in particular on the burial
places of saints, it was associated with
saints' tombs, or qubab, the major monuments
of Sudanese cities.
In emphasizing the role of popular Islam in the Sudan,
moreover, Winters does not claim that Sudanese Islam is the
only variant that involves veneration of saints. Both saints
and gubab exist throughout the Muslim world and they are often
given prominence in other places as in Sudan (e.g. Morocco
-cf. Geertz, 1968). The difference between popular Islam in
the Sudan and that of other countries is thus conceived to be
of degree rather than an absolute one. To this extent, Winters
contends that Sudanese traditional cities had most of the
expected features of Middle Eastern cities: markets, quarters,
irregular streets and mosques (though in muted form).
Having established the "connection" between Sudanese
traditional cities and the urban archetype of the Islamic
city, Winters suggests that the former can only partially be
associated with the latter. This is particularly the case
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because features such as the centering of cities on a palace,
the significance of agriculture as an urban function, the
predominance of a Black African technology, etc., which are
observed in Sudanese towns, can only be associated with, and
explained by, the presence of residual, pre-Islamic, African
cultural traits characteristic of many cities in Black Africa.
Owing to the lack of a Black African urban archetype parallel
to the Middle Eastern Muslim archetype, Winters concludes, the
"precise relationship of Sudanese urbanism with Black urbanism
must remain a little hypothetical" (p. 520).
Despite its ostensible attempt to refute claims of the
unchanging character of urbanism, the contribution of Winters
involves a number of factual as well as conceptual errors. The
most obvious of the factual errors is in his attempt to define
the creation and reproduction of cities as centres of
religious education, and particularly in his characterization
of the status of those whom he calls 'fakys' ('holy-men'),
even in the case of al-Damir town, which is mentioned as a
"better example" of the educational centres. Rather being a
'clergy', the majority of fakys actually consisted of traders,
as mentioned by Burckhardt (1819:258 et passim) in the
particular case of Damir, and as documented by Wad Daifallah
(cf. Yusuf Fadl Hassan, 1974) in the cases of many other
'saints' around Sudan then. Indeed, it was trade more than
religious teaching which was the main occupation of these
'saints'. The conceptual confusion involved with the concept
of 'urban archetypes', however, has more serious implications
than the factual erros which could be noted and corrected.
Viewed critically, the attempt to construct urban archetypes
in order to relate urban form to culture would eventually mean
the construction of as many archetypes as there are human
"cultures". In view of the obvious difficulty encountered in
specifying the "domain" of any one single "culture", we are
logically led to conclude, as Mabogunje (1964, quoted by
Ginsburg, 1972:412) suggests, that 'cultural differences',
even within countries, will lead to different urban forms. The
end-goal of archetypes thus is a relativism parallel to the
argument of the substantivists in economic anthropology who,
in refuting the empty generalizations of the formalists, have
ended in viewing each economy as a system that could only be
explained on the basis of the 'folk-model' of the people to
whom it belongs. In effect, what Winters has not admitted to
be his logical conclusion is precisely that the "specific
character" of Sudanese traditional urbanism is its being
"Sudanese". Owing to the obvious tautological nature of such a
conclusion, however, Winters seems to opt for designating the
precise character of Sudanese urbanism as an "intermediate
form" between two or more urban archetypes while ignoring the
question of whether or not such an "intermediate" form could
be construed as an "archetype" in itself. Likewise, the
contributions of Winters could be characterized as an exercise
in mystification not only because he does not discuss the
method involved in the selection of either the urban features
or the cultural traits assumed to have generated them, but
also because he does not attempt the elucidation of the
"specific character" of urban areas and how such a character
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emerges	 or	 gets changed. But this is largely because
'urbanism' is viewed in terms of archetypes, which are static
conceptual 'classes' embodying a non-historical conception of
time and movement. But as Castells (1977:8) makes the point:
To explain the social process that underlies
the organization of space is not simply a
matter of situating the urban phenomenon in
its context. A sociological problematic of
urbanization must regard it as a process of
organization	 and	 development	 and,
consequently, set out from the relation
between productive forces, social classes and
cultural forms (including space).
9. Archaeological research in the Sudan indicates that the
evidence of class society along the banks of the Nile goes
back to as early as 3500 B.C., the time when the "A-Group"
emerged in the region near the Second Cataract following the
raids into Nubia by the third and fourth kings of the First
Dynasty of ancient Egypt (cf. Reisner, 1918; 1919; Arkell,
1961). The development of the "A-Group", as that of the
"C-Group" which succeeded it, was rooted in subsistence
farming and animal husbandry; the social organisation of both
groups is thought to have remained "tribal and autonomous
until the end of the C-Group period as there are none of the
signs of monarchical authority" (Adams, 1967). The emergence
of large centralised states in the early stages in Nubian
history seems to have been inhibited by two main factors. The
first was the repetitive raids by Egyptian troops to subjugate
Nubia (ibid). The second, and more significant factor was the
existence of large sectors of nomadic pastoralists who, by
harrying the sedentary population, eroded the foundations of a
stable state which is essential for the initiation and
sustenance of urbanization (cf. Haycock, 1971:3lff).
Following the 'dark ages' in Nubia about which little could
be guessed, there emerged, from unknown origins, the Kingdom
of Cush (ca. 1000 B.C.- A.D. 400) which, for nearly a century,
extended its dominion to Egypt (forming the XXVth Dynasty, ca.
721-661 B.C.). Both before and after the Cushite rule of
Egypt, the city of Meroe constituted the capital of the
kingdom while Napata, Kawa and Faras were relatively smaller
urban centres (cf. Ahmed M.A. Al-Hakem, 1972). Other scholars,
however, tend to believe that Napata constituted the initial
capital but after the Cushite retreated from Egypt the
southern city of Meroe became the capital (hence the
distinction between 'Napatan' and 'Meroitic' periods).
It is mere truism to maintain that the fertile soil along
the banks of the Nile has, from the beginning, facilitated the
production of agricultural surpluses to support the ruling
classes. During the Cushite period, however, the level of
development of productive forces was augmented by the use of
iron, which "not only allowed agriculture to make great
strides through the use of iron hoe, with the concomitant
increase in production... but also by providing iron weapons,
made	 it possible for centralized authority to develop"
(Shinnie, 1967:168). Thus, whereas the earliest 	 Napatan
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monarchy had few luxuries, during the period when the Cushites
ruled Egypt they had control of a developed kingdom, and
wealth rolled in (cf. Haycock, 1971). The subsequent
introduction of the sagiya, ox-driven water-wheel, in lieu of
the manual shaduf to lift water vertically for irrigation had
far-reaching effects in the further development of agriculture
as it dissociated, for the first time, irrigation from the
level of the Nile (Adams, 1967:12). The effects of the sagiya
on Lower Nubian urbanization could hardly be over-estimated as
the region is characterized by abnormally high river banks so
that a fall in the level of	 flood previously	 meant
depopulation while with the new irrigation technique the
continuity of sedentary habitation was freed 	 from the
ecological constraint.
The greatest achievement of the Meroitic kingdom that is of
particular significance for the consolidation of urbanization
in the region was the subjugation of the nomadic groups who
were not only difficult to tax, but also constituted a threat
to the sedentary population. According to Haycock (1971:33),
the cattle peoples of the northern Butana, particularly the
very dangerous Rehareha who used to harry cultivators, were
eventually obliged to yield to king Harsiotef (? 404-268
B.C.):
Once the Butana became a safe grazing ground for
the Meroites, their wealth in herds could
increase., the fine temples of Musawwarat and
Naq'a standing in very indefensible position in
Butana wadis are evidence of the general security
and prosperity which already must have prevailed
in the third and second centuries B.C. near
Meroe.
Though the ruling classes in this ancient kingdom seemed to
ideologically consolidate and legitimize their hegemony
through ritual beliefs and practices (the suprahuman character
of the monarch which was enhanced by physical separation of
monarch from subjects), domination was materially established
through control over land which constituted the basic means of
production. The basic structure of the social production
relations in the Meroitic kingdom has been described by Adams
(1967:22) who maintains that:
During the whole of its Dynastic phase Nubia was
at least in name a single state with a divine
king, state religion, priestly governing class,
and all the surface trappings of Oriental
despotism... Nevertheless the Napatan and Meroitic
tombs give evidence of a highly stratified
society, in which a relatively small ruling class
must have controlled a large part of the
productive resources. A necessary concomitant of
such a system is of course a large slave
population; something which is further attested by
the numerous human sacrifices in the royal tombs.
Throughout the "ancient" period, urban areas were thinly
populated as the exclusive residence of the ruling class, the
king and provincial priests and their dependents, and those
'slaves' supporting them (the army, servants, craftsmen and
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artisans). This was true even of Meroe, the largest urban
area, in which the Royal Enclosure was "almost a complete town
by itself" separated from the other part of the city which
contained	 "the	 houses	 of the	 artesous	 and	 their
master-craftsmen, who supplied the needs of the Royal
Enclosure" (Ahmed M. Al-Hakem, 1972:38ff). No traders were in
existence as the monarchs monopolized long-distance trade.
The centuries that lapsed between the downfall of Meroe in
around A.D. 350 and the establishment of British colonial
administration	 in	 1899	 witnessed	 several	 radical
transformations in the socio-economic structures of the
country. Following the Meroitic period, three smaller kingdoms
emerged and this resulted in a relative proliferation of urban
areas. The conversion of the three kingdoms to Christianity
(ca. A.D. 540), and particularly after the infiltration of
Muslim traders after the conquest of Egypt in A.D. 640, not
only undermined the system of divine monarchs presiding over
slave populations, but also laid the foundations for the
emergence of both individual private landownership in northern
riverain Sudan and the merchant class that came to inhabit the
urban areas. The last of the fetters of royal monopoly,
however, were only removed during the late decades of the
eighteenth century as a result of a high degree of
decentralization in the Funj kingdom. As a result of these
developments, new organisational patterns for social
production emerged in northern and central Sudan. Quasi-feudal
estates were established by local rulers; holy-men-cum-traders
started to acquire riverain land and to deploy slaves in
incipient forms of 'commercialized agricultural production';
and a tenantry class consisting of "outsiders" (individuals or
groups who migrated from their 'homeland') started to emerge
(cf. Yusuf Fadi Hassan, 1973; O'Fahey and Spaulding, 1974;
Spaulding, 1979a; 1979b; El-Haj Hamad M. Kheir, 1982). Many
developments were concurrently taking place in western Sudan,
where the Keira of Darfur and their off-shoot, the Massaba'at,
of Kordofan came to establish centralized kingdoms (cf.
O'Fahey, 1980; idem. and Spaulding, 1974). Rulers started to
maintain their power and authority through sheer military
might rather than through 'divine right'; taxation rather than
appropriation of the produce of slave-populations became the
source of revenue for rulers; and the population density of
urban areas started to increase as traders and 'own-account'
craftsmen came to establish themselves in towns. Up to the
1880s, moreover, slaves constituted the largest single section
of the urban population in Sudan (cf. Chapter Four).
CHAPTER TWO
STABILIZATION AND PROLETARIANIZATION IN RURAL SUDAN
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The transformation of precapitalist economy
into peripheral capitalist economy clearly
presupposes	 the	 "monetarization",	 the
"commercialization" of the subsistence
economy. Clearly there is here no mechanism
of "monetarization" that is not at the same
time a mechanism of penetration by the
capitalist mode of production (Sarnir Amin,
1 974a: 142).
The purpose of this chapter is to present background
information on the main transformations that have taken place
in the constitution and functioning of domestic agricultural
production in rural Sudan from the inception of British
colonial rule in 1899 to the present. This broad background is
needed to put into perspective the process of
proletarianization, which underlies the slow, but persistent,
urbanization of domestic
	
producers	 as unskilled wage
labourers.
The central focus of the chapter is on aspects of the
basic design, the implementation and consequences of the
colonial imposition of primary export production upon the
domestic form of agricultural production. I shall argue that
while the colonial policy to promote primary export production
has set into motion a process of qualitative differentiation
among domestic production which seemingly promises the
dissolution of the domestic labour process, or form of labour
subjection (i.e. the 'household' as a unit of production),
other colonial policies sought seriously to conserve the
domestic production. Notwithstanding the achievement of flag
Independence in 1956, these contradictory policies have been
perpetuated up to the present, though in the early decades of
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Independence the 'post-colonial' regime was interested more in
the promotion of primary export production than in the
conservation of the domestic form. Coupled with the resilience
inherent in the 'subsistence sphere' of the domestic form, the
end-product of these contradictory policies has been (a) a
petrification of the domestic form of agricultural production
manifested in the inability of the overwhelming majority of
domestic producers to develop their forces of production and
(2) the initiation of a process of semi-proletarianization
whereby, in addition to participation in domestic production,
domestic producers have become increasingly involved in
seasonal wage labour migration.
In the first section of this chapter I attempt to
highlight the conditions of domestic production in
pre-colonial Sudan; and on the basis of that account I set out
to assess the transformations that domestic production has
experienced since the turn of the century. Though the
"conservation policies" stemmed from, and as such were
integral to, the strategy to promote primary export production
in colonial Sudan, for the sake of a clear exposition of the
transformations I draw a conceptual distinction between them.
Accordingly I shall consider aspects of the imposition of
primary export production before assessing the conservation
policies. In the final section I attempt to illuminate the
course in which the processes of proletarianization and
rural-urban labour migration have been accelerated.
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DOMESTIC PRODUCTION IN PRE-COLONIAL SUDAN
Prior to the establishment of the British colonial state,
the large majority of Sudanese was engaged in basically
subsistence-oriented agro-pastoral activities. Production was
mainly geared towards the creation of use-values for the
consumption of producers and their dependants and/or
associates, though part of the produce in some regions was
surrendered in tribute and/or other dues to the local ruler
and/or overlord. Various forms of barter relations (as between
sedentary cultivators and nomadic pastoralists) contributed to
the further consolidation of subsistence production by
furnishing products in demand but which could not be produced,
or which were produced but their supply was not sufficient.
The collapse of Sennar's regulated economy and royal trade
monopolies during the eighteenth century that associated (or
stimulated?) political decentralization in the Funj Kingdom
(1504-1820) resulted in the consolidation of an independent
class of private traders (cf. O'Fahey & Spaulding, 1974;
Spaulding, 1979b). This emergent merchant class sought to
procure various strategic and luxury items available in the
country (e.g. gum arabic, ostrich-feathers and eggs, hides and
senna-leaves) through the initiation of barter relations with
the rural farmers and herders in the various parts of what
have come to be northern, central and western Sudan. In
exchange for these items, the traders furnished the natives
with 'luxury' goods such as glass beads, antimony, nutmegs and
razors (cf. Burckhardt, 1819:289ff). Local level trade in
grain and animals under normal conditions, however, was almost
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an impossibility for traders, precisely because cultivators
and herders were in close proximity to each other and could
exchange directly as they had done so for centuries. Traders
therefore entered the rural grain and livestock markets only
when there was crop failure in a regIon as in the case of
Shendi reported by Burckhardt (idem., p.272) when peasants
brought bundles of ostrich-feathers to exchange for dura
(sorghum vulgare). Under normal conditions, peasants would
provide their surplus grain to exchange for luxury items and
the traders would resell the grain so procured (together with
the produce of their own farms) to the urban population and/or
nomads from other regions as the case of Beja nomads coming to
al-Darnir (ibid.).
Although barter relations between traders and rural
cultivators and herders initially emerged in the northern and
central riverain regions as well as Kordofan and Darfur, the
opening of the White Nile during the Turco-Egyptian period
(1821-1885) facilitated the penetration of traders into parts
of Southern Sudan where trade in ivory (and, later, slaves)
promised lucrative profits (Hill, 1959; 1970; Gray, 1961). At
the time when barter relations were being established in the
South, damour cloth, together with foreign currencies such as
the Spanish Dollar, were being adopted in northern and central
riverain Sudan as a measure of value and unit of account if
not as a medium of exchange as well. Nevertheless, in the
country as a whole rural production systems were oriented
towards the creation of use-values; the only exception to be
noted were
	 those	 estates	 owned by rulers and the
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holy-men-cum-entrepreneurs in which slaves, followers of
holy-men and/or tenant-subjects were settled to undertake
agricultural production. In these estates the direct producers
worked for subsistence as their strategy, but the surplus
extracted by the overlords was directed for exchange and,
ultimately, for investment in agriculture in the riverain
regions (through purchase of slaves) or for purchase of
animals in the rainland regions.
A significant consequence of the establishment of the
Turco-Egyptian colonial government in the Sudan was the
obstruction of the development of the local merchant class. In
its early years, the Turco-Egyptian colonial administration
exercised monopoly virtually over all merchandise, and severe
punishment was meted out to any trader caught with contraband
(Hill,	 1970:95). When these monopolies were effectively
abolished towards 1840-41, however, the main trading
activities came under the control of an expatriate merchant
community (Greeks, French, Austrian, British as well as
Egyptian Copts) which was instrumental in enticing the
European Powers to put pressure on the Egyptian Viceroy,
Mohamed All Pasha, to abolish the monopolies. But although
that colonial administration imposed a system of taxation that
approximated confiscation (Holt, 1961:43), forced peasants in
Kordofan to collect gum for which they were almost unrewarded
(Pailme, 1844:28ff), and compelled villagers in the Southern
Funj Region to work in the gold plants before realizing their
unprofitability	 (Santi	 and	 Hill,	 1980:52ff),	 the
Turco-Egyptian colonial administration did not interfere to
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any significant extent with the production processes in the
country by promoting changes into either their logic or their
structures of social production relations. The only exception
to this categorical generalization was the attempt to force
peasants in parts of the northern rgion to grow indigo in
addition to their subsistence crops. Owing to the
unprofitability of indigo manufacture that measure was soon
abandoned (Hill, 1970:67).
The atrocities that characterised the early years of
Turco-Egyptian colonial rule, and the progressive alienation
of various Sudanese strata through six decades, resulted in a
widespread discontent among Sudanese that culminated in the
outbreak of the Mandist Revolution in 1881. The various groups
that united to create the Handist State (1885-1898), however,
were soon to engage in internecine conflicts following the
death of the Mandi in 1885; and the Khalifa's external wars
further weakened the regime. Before the major defeat of the
Mandist Ansar at Karari which paved the way for the
establishment of the 'Anglo-Egyptian' Sudan, the country
experienced a period of fatal instability. Whole regions were
depopulated through either massacre and emigration (as in the
case of the Ja'aliyyin of Shendi region) or recruitment to the
Khalifa's army in Omdurman (as in the case of the Baggara of
Western Sudan). The concomitant deterioration and abandonment
of agricultural production resulted in the famous Sannat Sitta
('the sixth year') famine of 1897 (1306 A.H.). But though the
battle of Karari was the decisive step in the establishment of
the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, the pacification of	 all
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Sudanese groups was achieved three decades later as
small-scale Mandist and other (e.g. Nuba, Nuer, and Ingessana)
resistance continued for a relatively long period after the
annexation of Ali Dinar's Dar Fur Sultanate in 1916.
THE IMPOSITION OF PRIMARY EXPORT PRODUCTION IN COLONIAL SUDAN
One of the first tasks undertaken by the British colonial
administration in the regions brought under control was the
creation of conditions conducive to agricultural production in
order to achieve the colonial strategy of promoting primary
export production. A detailed assessment of British policy and
its particular configurations in the different regions,
however, is not only beyond my purpose, but also difficult to
present here (not least because of my own incompetence for
such a formidable task). I propose simply to illustrate the
situation in the various regions through a few carefully
selected cases, which will then be related to the general
policy. Before dealing with the imposition of primary export
production, we need to take note of the measures undertaken by
the colonial government in relation to the land tenure system
in the country.
THE COLONIAL SYSTEM OF LAND TENURE
Prior to the establishment of British colonial
administration in the Sudan, two main forms of landownership
prevailed. 2
 In the relatively densely-populated riverain
regions of northern and central Sudan, individual private
landownership was taking root through the centuries although
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the land so owned was confined mainly to the immediate
vicinity of settlements. During the Funj period in particular,
individual private landownership was consolidated through the
wathiga system by which monarchs granted land, as a gift, to
local rulers and holy-men (O'Fahey and Spaulding, op.cit;
Spaulding, 1979a; 1979b). The wathiga ("charter") institution
not only constituted a recognition of individual private
landownership by the central government (as opposed to the
former system in which only monarchs held title to land but
subjects were granted usufruct rights), butalso resulted in
the creation of a class of landlords owning vast tracts and
extracting dues and/or agricultural surpluses from their
tenants and/or slaves. But though the first transaction
concerning land in the northern riverain region took place as
early as A.D. 830 (Yusuf Fadl Hassan, 1973:38), it was only
during the 18th century that land started to become a
commodity with a "price on its head" and could be exchanged
through "sale, mortgage, marriage and inheritance" (Spaulding,
1 979b) (3)
The Funj land charters were not confined to riverain land,
and some of them concerned rainland in the fertile Gezira of
central Sudan. An institution similar to the Funj wathiga also
prevailed in the Keira kingdom of Dar Fur (O'Fahey &
Spaulding, op.cit.; O'Fahey, 1980). The hakura ("concession"
or "monopoly") of the Keira, however, differed from the Funj
land charters as it sometimes specified the period of
concession during which the hakura-holders could appropriate
for themselves all the taxes and dues of the area granted, but
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this restriction was not applied to all hakura-holders,
particularly those from the royal family or 'caste'. In the
rainlands in general, the abundance of land, coupled with the
largely nomadic-pastoral activities of the inhabitants, did
not prompt the emergence of individial landownership among the
subjects, and various forms of communal ownership vested in a
'tribe', or one of its sections, were recognised by nomadic
pastoralists)4) Among the rainland sedentary cultivators,
moreover, land use was legitimized through membership in a
village community. In the various parts of Southern Sudan, the
inhabitants held land in common as 'tribe' or group and an
individual had no rights except as a member of such 'tribe' or
group, irrespective of whether the land was riverain or
rainland (cf. Bolton, 1948).
The Turco-Egyptian colonial government followed a course
similar to that of the Funj monarchs, and granted estates to
local notables in order to win their support. The
Turco-Egyptian administration, however, expropriated land from
the Ja'aliyin around Shendi and settled on it some of the
loyal Shaigiyya following the murder of Isrnail Pasha (the
Viceroy's son) towards the end of 1822. During the brief
1andist rule (1885-1898) no changes were introduced into the
basic structure of the land tenure system though the ownership
of vast territories was transferred from disloyal to loyal
groups; but this was soon to be reversed by the British
colonial administration (Mohamed Hashim Awad, 1971:219).
As soon as the 'reconquest' of northern and central Sudan
was	 completed, the British colonial administration paid
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particular attention to the system of land tenure, and issued
its first Titles to Land Ordinance in 1899. By this law the
colonial administration announced that all land in riverain
Sudan which was continuously cultivated in the preceding five
years was to be considered the private property of
cultivators. The newly established colonial administration
also recognized the rights of wathiga-holders but restricted
their	 total share in the crop produced by tenants to
one-fifth. This recognition was withdrawn in 1906, and
systematic attempts to dispossess landlords, but without
recourse to violent expropriation, were made as the colonial
government started to settle and register titles to land.
According to Bolton (1948:188):
The general policy adopted in the course of
land settlement of riverain land and the
Gezira was to recognise claims based on
continuous cultivation but not to recognise
claims based only on ancient grants or on
the cultivation by a claimant's ancestors of
land subsequently abandoned.
In accordance with the registration policy, thus, the
class of wathiga-holders was deprived of vast tracts that were
not under crop. In those areas where tenants were settled,
moreover, the colonial government sought to make arrangements
whereby tenants could buy land from their overlords. The
establishment of the Gezira Scheme further weakened the
position of wathiga-holders as the government absorbed a large
number of estates in the scheme and the owners were offered,
in addition to preference in tenancy allotments, an annual
rent of 10 P.T. per feddan (ca. 1.038 acres). The Gezira Land
Ordinance of 1927 provided for the purchase of all land
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required for permanent works or for seed and research farms on
payment of compensation not exceeding LE 1 a feddan.
Through denial of titles to uncultivated land,
arrangements for purchase of land by tenants, and rent and
purchase of land in the Gezira Schema, the colonial government
managed within a relatively short period to dissolve
substantially, but not completely, large-scale landownership.
Not all wathiga-holciers, however, were dispossessed, and it
was government policy in the Singa District, for example, to
allow overlords to continue extracting dues from tenants.
Likewise, the craft of political expediency resulted in
massive areas being granted to 'notables' (particularly the
three most distinguished 'sectarian' leaders: Abdel Rahman
Al-Mandi of the Ansar, Ali El-Mirghani of the Khatmiyya, and
Yusuf Al-Hindi) in order to bind them with 'economic fetters'
to the colonial administration (Hassan A. Ibrahim, 1980;
Taisier Mohamed Ahmed Au, 1982:138 et passim). Nevertheless,
the British administration sought seriously to 'protect'
tenants from excessive dues - a measure that is in keeping
with the conservation policy which I shall explain in more
detail later.
Furthermore, in the rainlands of central, eastern and
western Sudan, as in the riverain and rain lands of Southern
Sudan, individual private landownership was not recognized by
the colonial government, and no land settlement or
registration was undertaken. As with the uncultivated land of
riverain northern and central Sudan, these 'unsettled' areas
were categorically classified as government-owned divided into
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two classes: (a) Government land subject to no right, and (b)
Government land subject to rights vested in a community such
as tribe, section, village, or, at least in the case of the
Nuba Hills of Western Sudan, in individuals (Bolton, op.cit.).
This classification has remained intact right to the present.
In general terms, the class of government land subject to
no right is confined mainly to the northern and central
riverain regions and includes the deltas of Tokar and Gash in
eastern Sudan. It is out of this class that successive
governments during both the colonial and post-colonial periods
allotted land to native and expatriate entrepreneurs for
agricultural investment. The class of Government land subject
to rights, on the other hand, is mainly the abundant rainland
where usufruct rights of nomadic pastoralists and sedentary
cultivators were recognized and includes all land in Southern
Sudan.
In their analyses of the colonial land tenure system, many
scholars have tended to view the system under British
administration as a "restoration" of the 'original system'
that prevailed in the country prior to Funj, Turco-Egyptian
and Mandist "interference" (e.g. Mohamed Hashim Awad, 1971;
Fatima Babiker Mahmoud, 1978:42). Their emphasis seems to be
on the ability of the British colonial government to liquidate
partially the class of big landlords. What should be stressed
here is that such a view of the colonial system of land tenure
has grossly overlooked the essential nature and implications
of the system imposed. The denial of titles to uncultivated
riverain land did not affect the wathiga-holders only; and the
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policy of the colonial administration not to recognize
individual landownership in Southern Sudan and the rainlands
in general, with its concomitant dissolution of the class of
hakura-holders created by the Keira kings, resulted, on the
one hand, in regional disparities co'ncerning the possession of
resources to be converted into capital and, on the other, in
the vulnerability of the inhabitants of the rainlands as the
government could withdraw the usufruct rights; this has indeed
been taking place since the inception of mechanised rainfed
farming. Let us elaborate these aspects of the consequences of
land settlement and registration to conceptualize the precise
nature of the system imposed and its short- and long-term
implications.
As maintained earlier, through denial of titles to
uncultivated riverain and Gezira lands, the British colonial
government managed to dispossess wathiga-holders of vast
tracts. But although the government recognized, as private
possession, land which had been continuously cultivated by
small farmers, the conditions that prevailed in the riverain
regions in the decades preceding land settlement and
registration resulted in the deprivation of many small farmers
from possessing land. Thus all of those who were forced to
emigrate during the last years of Mandist rule to escape
massacres (such as the Ja'aliyyin around Shendi and Metamma),
as well as those who emigrated earlier in thousands to escape
the taxation system of the Turco-Egyptian colonial
administration, automatically became dispossessed as they had
not been present in their homes to cultivate continuously, and
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for five years at least, prior to the establishment of British
colonial rule in order to be eligible for possession. A class
of landless Sudanese was thereby created. Unfortunately, no
statistics, or rough estimates, on the riverain Sudanese who
became landless at the inception of British rule are
available. That their number was relatively 'substantial',
however, is beyond doubt. As I shall explain in Chapter Four,
it was for the mobilization of sections of these landless
persons as unskilled urban workers that the colonial
government established its Labour Bureau. The majority of the
landless, however, was stabilized under the domestic form of
agricultural production in the northern region (cf. below).
The creation of a landless class in the riverain region
was not the only consequence of land settlement and
registration; the long-term consequences have proved more
serious, precisely because the colonial land tenure system has
in effect meant the continuous reproduction and growth of the
class of the landless. In this respect we have to bear in mind
that at the time of registration the level of development of
the productive forces permitted the cultivation of only
relatively small areas by the members of any one household;
and it was these areas under crop that were registered as
private property. As the land so registered is nearest to the
Nile and,	 consequently,	 the most	 affected by hadam
(river-washing), which continuously decreases the size of this
land, natural population growth has resulted in a severe
scarcity of private land and the northern province in
particular became a very hostile region to later generations
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of small farmers and/or their descendants.
The recognition of the short- and long-term effects of the
colonial land tenure system imposed in the riverain regions
provides further corroboration of the limitation of the
'conventional wisdom'. Thus, in their conceptualization of the
'push factors' underlying emigration from the Northern Region
scholars point to 'scarcity of land' as the prime factor, but
very few seem to recognize that this 'scarcity' is not a
natural characteristic of the region. It refers to land
privately-owned by small farmers and not the total area of
arable land in the Region, the larger part of which is
"government land subject to no right" but allotted for
government and private investment. As access to government
land presupposes the acquisition of sufficiently large capital
to install pumps in the land allotted, which is beyond what
ordinary landless strata could afford, the result of
government allotments has been an acute unequal distribution
of land (though not jural ownership) in the Northern Region.
As pointed out by Mohamed Yousif A. El-Mustafa (1981), through
the introduction of water-pumps during this century the size
of arable land in the Northern Region was increased out of all
proportion to population growth, but very few benefited from
this increase. No precise figures are available to compare
privately-owned land with government land in riverain Sudan as
a whole. In the particular case of Dongola District, by 1977
the proportion of milk (free-hold) land in some villages
amounted to only 13.8% of the total area under crop (El-Haj
Bilal Orner, 1979:74).
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Leaving aside the land privately-owned and the large
tracts of government land allocated to public and private
schemes, a recent report by the Northern Regional Ministry of
Agriculture (1981) has refuted all claims of land shortage in
the Northern Region. The report claims that while around
300,000 feddans are being brought under cultivation, there are
230,000 feddans that can be brought under crop "without
recourse to major investments". The report adds that, besides
these two categories of land, there are 'marginal' areas
estimated at about 165,000 feddans which, in addition to the
watercourses that are distant from the Nile but with
agricultural potential (ca. 300,000 feddans), can be brought
under cultivation with major investments. In other words, in
addition to the inequitable distribution of land in the
Northern Region, there are still over 900,000 feddans that can
be brought under crop. A basic assumption in the
interpretation of the "natural and/or ecological causes"
stimulating migration from the Northern Region thus withers
away.
Furthermore, although the categorical classification of
rainland in western, eastern and southern Sudan as 'government
owned' did not result in the creation of a landless group as
in northern and central Sudan, the implications for the
'natives' are nevertheless severe. The government thus could
(and did) withdraw the usufruct rights in order to introduce
large-scale mechanized rainfed and irrigated schemes. The
progressive 'marginalization' of nomadic pastoralists (cf.
Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed, 1973) has thus been legitimized by the
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system of land tenure imposed by the British colonial
administration and which has been left intact by the
successive national governments. Over and above the relative
security of free-holders in riverain regions, the
institutionalization of private landownership also provided
free-holders with an asset that could be converted into
capital which the inhabitants of the rainlands lacked. Until
recently the 'local bourgeoisie' seems to have been drawn
almost exclusively from among the population of the riverain
regions.
MONETARIZATION THROUGH TAXATION
As the British colonial administration established its
control over the country, it became evident that the measures
introduced into the system of land tenure were not intended to
'restore' the kind of production that had formerly obtained in
the Sudan. Thus as the different groups were pacified, one of
the first measures to be introduced was a new tax to be paid
in cash. In the riverain regions of northern and central Sudan
which were the first to be brought under effective control,
taxes on land, houses, date trees, animals and boats were
imposed. In most other regions, particularly the Nuba
Mountains, Southern Funj and Southern Sudan, various forms of
collective tribute were initially imposed, but as the
government consolidated its control a poll-tax (capitation)
levied on adult males by virtue of their sheer existence was
imposed. Towards the 1930s the poll-tax was replaced by taxes
on possessions in some regions (e.g. the Ingessana Hills
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District), while in others it remained intact until it was
abolished by a national government well after Independence in
1 956.
Generally speaking, the taxation system introduced by the
British colonial administration cannot be viewed as excessive
or comparable to taxation under the Turco-Egyptian colonial
government. Indeed a system of 'light taxation' was envisaged
as one of the basic 'pillars' of
	
colonial	 policy)5
Irrespective of whether or not it was wilful policy (and I
believe it was), the new taxation system proved decisive in
the transformation and future development (or, rather,
'underdevelopment') of small-scale agricultural production in
rural Sudan. Rather than being simply a method for channelling
surpluses or revenue to the colonial state, in virtually all
parts of the rural Sudan the cash tax resulted in a demand
that could not be satisfied in the context of
subsistence-oriented production or through the traditional
barter-relations that formerly existed in the country. In
order to obtain cash to pay taxes in those non-monetized
regions, a series of transformations took place in the
hitherto subsistence-oriented production systems. These
transformations concerned the monetarization process, the
imposition of primary export production, commercialization and
the creation of conditions conducive to the dominance of
merchant-capital in the country. Coupled with the colonial
policy to establish markets for foreign, mainly British,
manufactured goods with the concomitant subjection of local
industries and handicrafts to competitive exclusion or wilful
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destruction, these transformations have come to undermine the
the capacity of domestic agricultural production to satisfy
the needs of domestic producers. This has been the case as
these transformations have resulted in the incorporation of
the subsistence production systems into the capitalist world
system, but in such a way that small farmers and pastoralists
were to participate in the world-system more as producers than
as consumers (cf. below).
A first and general level in the assessment of the impact
of taxation to be paid in cash concerns the question of
monetarization. At this level it is important to stress the
social character of the modern money form (as opposed to the
techno-functional definitions of the economist). Money thus is
not viewed as being simply "what money does" (i.e. means of
payment, unit of account, measure of value, medium of
exchange, store of wealth, etc.). Insofar as the modern money
form represents a materialized expression of value, and as
value (use and exchange value simultaneously), or value in
general, is an attribute of human labour (i.e. the value of a
commodity is derived from the abstract labour embodied in it),
the modern money form can only be meaningfully conceptualized
in its essence as the "materialization of human labour in the
abstract" or as the "specific material (externalised,
objectified) expression of abstract labour (Banaji, 1976a;
also see Salah El-Din El-Shazali Ibrahim, 1980:157ff). The
fetishistic character of the modern money form thus stems from
its role in concealing the essence of value in abstract human
labour, while simultaneously presenting value in precisely a
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perverted manner as its own 'property'. In other words, the
modern money form is a representation of the social character
of private labour, or the social relations of commodity
producers.
The point in discussing the soci.a1 character of the modern
money form is that the process of monetarizing non-pecuniary
systems not only implies that the producers have become able
to	 'exchange'	 through the medium of money, but, more
significantly, it simultaneously transforms the
subsistence-oriented systems into petty-commodity production
systems and subjects them to the law of value which the use of
the modern money form entails -i.e. it introduces a new set of
social production relations associated with, but veiled by,
the use of money.
THE IMPOSITION OF PRIMARY EXPORT PRODUCTION
	 -
In conceptualizing the transformation of non-pecuniary to
monetized systems in colonial Sudan, it is crucially important
to note the colonial situation which brought about, perforce,
that transformation. The design of the colonial administration
was not simply to monetarise taxes or the exchange of
commodities because the use of money is more 'civilized' or
'convenient'.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 the	 British colonial
administration not only sought the destruction of 	 the
traditional	 barter-relations 	 that	 formerly supplemented
subsistence production, but also deliberately sought to
transform the non-pecuniary, subsistence-oriented production
systems into ones that produce for export. In other words, the
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imposition of the cash tax forced the subsistence producers in
all parts of colonial Sudan to resort to cash cropping, sale
of animals and, to a lesser extent, wage employment, in order
to obtain cash to pay taxes (and, simultaneously, to avoid the
punitive patrols that maintained t]q and order'). Hence
despite the drastic fall in the prices of gum arabic from 60
to 35 piastres per kantar (ca. 100 lbs), there was a steady
rise in gum exports from Sudan (El-Fatih Shaa'el Din
Khalafalla, 1982:9; Fatima Babiker Mahmoud, 1984:34ff). Gum
tapping was, and still is, undertaken almost exclusively by
domestic producers around the Central Savannah belt in
general, and Kordofan region in western Sudan in particular.
Northern riverain Sudan also experienced an intensification of
trading activities after 1899 as the local producers started
to surrender part of their products, particularly food crops,
to the merchants who undertook exportation, especially to
Egypt where there was a growing demand (El-Haj Bilal Omer,
1979:166). Other crops, such as sesame and groundnuts,
together with livestock, were also exported in greater amounts
from the Sudan as the British colonial government established
its control over the country (cf. Adel Amin Beshai, 1976).
In emphasizing the increase in the volume of crops
exported from the country, it should not be assumed that the
intensification of cash-cropping in colonial Sudan was a
'quantitative' (albeit monetized) increase for exchange
patterns that formerly obtained in the Sudan. Far from that
being the case, the increased involvement of small farmers in
primary export production was not only a qualitative break,
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but also one that led to a structural malformation in the
logic and pattern of small scale agricultural production in
the country. Whereas gum tapping formerly constituted a refuge
for subsistence farmers in cases of crop failure, and the
collected gum was exchanged for dura, under British
colonialism farmers had to tap gum even when enough dura was
harvested. Likewise, while other agricultural produce was
formerly bartered only when surpluses were obtained, with the
imposition of taxes to be paid in cash a marketable product
had to be surrendered irrespective of supply. In short, cash
cropping has become an integral part of the productive
activities of the small farmers in rural Sudan. It is relevant
to stress in this respect that the contentions in ttie
literature that the productive activities of small farmers in
rural Sudan are 'traditional' overlook the point that although
certain elements of the 'traditional' patterns have been
retained in the contemporary production systems (i.e. the
domestic form continues to be the main labour process and the
domestic producers still cultivate food crops for immediate
consumption), a whole transformation has taken place in these
production systems whether conceived from the standpoint of
their underlying logic (subsistence and self-sufficiency as
opposed to primary export production) or that of the sets of
social relations of production involved (see below).
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THE 'UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT' THESIS
In considering the issue of the imposition of primary
export production, it is relevant to note that many scholars
have tended to assert that, in its penetration into the
Sudanese social formation, capital has concentrated its
'exploitation' in specific regions of the country (especially
in the "triangle" of Khartoum-Gezira--Kassala Provinces), and
that it is because of this concentration that a pattern of
'uneven, development' between the various regions, but
particularly between North and South, has developed (e.g.,
Garang,'1973:85; ILO, 1976:XX et passim; El-Wathig Kameir,
1980b:6lff; Abdel Rahman Abakar Ibrahim, 1984; idem. & Pool,
1980). This contention is, I believe, very controversial. In
asserting this I do not of course wish to overlook certain
differences between the "triangle" (or at least two of its
three provinces) and the rest of the country - differences not
least among which is the fact that Khartoum and Gezira
Provinces have in many respects been favoured in the
allocation of social services (education, health-care,
recreation, etc.). I wish rather to emphasize the point that
the colonial policy to impose primary export production in the
Sudan was carried out in all regions without exception, and
that all primary export production in the Sudan is dependent,
directly or indirectly, on the domestic form of agricultural
production. As far as the 'direct dependence' on the domestic
form is concerned, there is one basic 'contextual' difference
between the 'triangle' and the rest of the country which must
be noted. While in the 'triangle' primary export domestic
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production is largely undertaken by 'tenants' settled in
large-scale irrigated schemes in the establishment of which
relatively substantial investments have been made (the Gezira,
New Halfa, Rahad and the numerous but smaller pump-schemes),
in the rest of the country primary export production is
undertaken by the seemingly 'independent' small farmers. As I
shall explain later in the chapter, the tenants (with or
without family labour) failed to meet all the labour
requirements of the irrigated schemes, and this necessitated
resort to wage labour; but likewise in small scale agriculture
resort to wage labour is observed. In these cases of resort to
wage labour in order to supplement domestic labour, as well as
in the case of mechanised rainfed schemes in which there is an
exclusive reliance on seasonal wage labourers, the importance
of the domestic form of production cannot be overlooked. The
system of seasonal wage labour migration prevailing in the
Sudan pressuposes the existence of the domestic form of
production, which maintains the seasonal migrants during the
rest of the year (see below).
The point to be stressed, then, is that in all regions
brought under colonial control, taxes to be paid in cash were
levied and this resulted in the emergence of primary export
production as an integral aspect of domestic agricultural
production in rural Sudan. Though the type of agricultural
produce converted to cash crop was initially decided by
merchants from among the products of each region for which
there was demand elsewhere, the colonial administration
started actively to impose cotton as a cash crop in most
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regions amenable to its rainfed or irrigated cultivation, but
without jeopardizing the production of food crops that
maintained the producers and their dependants. The
establishment of the Gezira Scheme as the world's largest
plantation under one administration has been amply discussed
(cf. Gaitskell, 1959; Barnett, 1975; 1977; Collins, 1976;
O'Neill, 1978; Founou-Tchuigoua, 1978; Mohamed Mirghani Abdel
Salaam, 1979; O'Brien, 1980; 1981; 1984a; Sorbo, 1980; Taisier
M. Ahmed Au, 1982), but the imposition of cotton during the
colonial period was by no means confined to the Gezira Scheme
and the smaller, public and private, pump-schemes in which
tenants were settled. The 'introduction' of rain cotton in the
Nuba Mountains is one ('extreme'?) case of imposition upon a
community	 of	 'traditional'	 small farmers. In view of
poorly-founded contentions asserting that the "British
colonial policy did succeed in relegating the [Nuba] region to
being one of the least developed areas in the country.. [as
it] kept the Nuba almost as they were centuries ago" (Ibrahim
Kursany, 1983:36), there can hardly be a better example to
refute the allegation of 'uneven development'.
Though the Nuba groups as a whole were not brought under
effective colonial control until the 1930s, by 1912 many Nuba
were already paying collective tribute in cash (cf. Roden,
1969). The imposition of the tax, and the subsequent search
for cash, resulted in lowland cash-cropping although the Nuba
preferred to live on the tops and slopes of hills. The
compulsory substitution of poll-tax for communal tribute in
the early 1920s instigated fierce resistance by the Nuba to
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the colonial government, and many Nuba groups sought refuge in
the hills. The colonial administration thus had to send
punitive patrols	 repeatedly,	 not only to enforce the
collection of the poll-tax, but also to force the Nuba out of
their fortified positions and to resettle them in the
lowlands. Though it does not specifically mention the cause of
resistance, a letter by Newbold 6 indicates the magnitude of
that resistance in the case of one Nuba group, the Tira, who:
...clashed with the government forces in
1921 and twice in 1922, after which, they
were compelled to move down from their hill
tops to the plain. They were drifting back
within a few years and further action had to
be taken in 1925, 1929, and 1930 (Henderson,
1952:47)
In the process of the pacification and resettlement of the
Nuba, the colonial government went to great trouble as it
attempted to allocate to the Nuba arable land that was
occupied by other groups. The colonial Governor of Kordofan
wrote in 1934 that:
When I came [to Kordofan Province] I found
most of the land [in the Nuba Hills] taken
up by Arabs, Fellata and merchants. Nuba had
14%. I have got them up to 40% in West and
30%	 in	 East	 [Hills]
	
now (Henderson,
1 952:67).
Once pacified and resettled in the plains, the Nuba were
persistently pushed to grow cotton (which was first introduced
by the Turco-Egyptian colonial government, but to be
cultivated by 'Arabs' and the West African 'Fellata' in small
plots for the local textile industry). In his 1935 draft
report on 'Development in the Nuba Mountains', the colonial
Governor of Kordof an Province (cf. Henderson, 1952:492ff)
stated explicitly the objectives of his plans; and the
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following extracts provide an insight into aspects of their
nature;
Firstly, we want to increase cotton
production by improved strains and by
bringing in non-cotton growing communities.
Improved strains need research. The bringing
in of new communities, especially Nuba, is
being attacked, after some delay, and the
production graph shows that they are
overtaking the non-Nuba by degrees. I do not
think it is generally realized how little
Nuba Mountains cotton was, until recently,
grown by Nuba, who are, potentially, better
cultivators than Arabs or Fellata.
Secondly, we must not put all our eggs in
one basket (even though the American cotton
grown here seems a very good basket)
Nuba cotton has a good name and sells well,
but food crops and other crops must be grown
in needful ratio.
Apart from grain we must find out more about
sesame and groundnut, e.g., where they are
mostly grown, whether they are good quality
for export, and their relation to other
crops.
Thirdly, Any plan, therefore, we have must
be comprehensive, i.e. it must include
communications, water-supply, transport, all
kinds of products exportable in quantity (I
do not think with a limited staff we should
waste time and energy on trivialities like
bees-wax and native curios), livestock, and
agricultural research (original emphasis)
The same process was repeated in 'remote' parts of
Southern Sudan. Thus as the British troops pacified the
different groups in Equatoria Province of Southern Sudan, a
poll-tax was levied, and the natives consequently sought to
earn sufficient cash through the sale of dura and, in some
cases, cthillies. Dura, being a food crop, gained popularity
among the small farmers as it could easily be integrated in
their 'subsistence' activities. In 1926, however, the colonial
administration decided to 'introduce' cotton throughout the
whole of Moru and Maridi districts of Equatoria, but the
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natives showed no inclination towards its cultivation. It was
only through direct compulsion and resort to a 'communal'
(conscript) labour system that cotton was cultivated. Despite
recourse to force, the colonial administration considered
cotton as a crop through which cash was earned by the natives
to pay their taxes. When the colonial government decided to
increase cotton production in Equatoria by "bringing in the
non-cotton growing" Azande farmers, the latter had to be
resettled (cf. Wyld, 1949) and this, again, led to punitive
campaigns. Reining (1966:31) has considered the circumstances
under which the Zande 'Scheme' was established:
At the	 start of the Scheme cotton
cultivation was interpreted by the
administration to be a form of public
service. In order to introduce the crop
effectively	 into	 the	 subsistence
agriculture, compulsion was considered
necessary for a few years. Persons who
failed to sow the cash crop or cultivate it -
properly were punished by being required to
do some public service, usually a month's
labour on the roads or other public works.
The necessity for compulsion in order to 'introduce'
cotton effectively, it should be emphasized, was not dictated
by the 'lazinesst of the natives, or their ignorance
concerning the 'value' of cash. Indeed when the Zande Scheme
was established in the late '1940s almost all sedentary
cultivators in Southern Sudan were already involved in some
form of cash-cropping in order to pay taxes, if not to buy
manufactured goods as well (see below). The necessity for
compulsion was a consequence of the contradiction between, on
the one hand, the desire of the colonial administration to
increase	 its	 cotton	 exports	 and, on the other, the
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'opportunity cost' for the natives in growing cotton rather
than dura. In view of the comparative advantage of dura
cultivation, which became popular among the Southern farmers,
the deliberate policy to transform the production systems in
the South into ones that produce raw material for export to
industrialized countries becomes very clear. Table (2:1),
which is compiled from data provided by Catford (1953), gives
the comparative exchange value of cotton and dura respectively
in relation to the poll-tax in the Maridi subdistrict over a
number of years, taking 1928 values as 100.
Table 2:1
The Comparative Exchange Values of Cotto.a....aridDura
in Relation to Poll-Tax in Maridi Pistric
(1 928=100)
YEAR	 COTTON	 DURA
1928	 100	 100
1929	 135	 75
1931	 25	 N.A
1940	 22	 N.A
1944	 17	 N.A
1948	 28	 114
1949	 34	 123
1950	 44	 113
The unwillingness of the natives of Equatoria to grow
cotton is thus not difficult to explain. Not only dura
constituted a food crop which could be consumed by the
domestic producers themselves in case of difficulties in
marketing, but it also fetched a higher exchange value
compared to cotton, the prices of which had continuously been
decreasing in the years that preceded the establishment of the
Zande Scheme in the late 1940s. The effective 'introduction'
of	 cotton	 thus necessitated	 not only 'compulsion' and
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conscription for public work but also differential rates of
taxation whereby, as Catford (op.cit., p.158) explains;
non-cotton growers were required to sell,
through authorized dealers, a larger
quantity of grain than those who had grown a
cotton plot of a satisfactory size and
standard. The price paid by the buyers to
the growers, and the subsequent
	 retail
price, were both carefully controlled.
In considering the imposition of cotton upon domestic
production systems it is important to note that, besides being
one of the main sources of cotton in the world market,
colonial Sudan also figured as one of the world's main
producers of gum arabic, sesame and groundnuts (cf. Adel Amin
Beshai, 1976; Fatima Babiker Mahmoud, 1984). Until very
recently, all three crops were almost exclusively furnished by
the so-called 'traditional' domestic producers in different
regions around rural Sudan.
THE DOMINANCE OF MERCHANT CAPITAL
A corollary of the British colonial policy to impose
primary export peasant production has been the initiation and
consolidation of new patterns of interaction between the
'traditional' domestic producers and traders. As maintained
earlier, barter relations between natives and merchants
obtained prior to British colonization; and the natives used
to exchange their agricultural surpluses and/or the luxury
items found in their regions (ivory, ostrich-feathers, etc.)
for items imported by traders through long distance trade.
Although these barter relations enabled traders to realize
lucrative profits, the exchanges were sporadic and dependent
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on the availability of agricultural surpluses or the
prevalence of abnormal conditions such as crop failure in
which cases farmers and pastoralists would resort to, for
example, gum-tapping and ostrich hunting. The implications of
these barter relations for the subsistence production was a
positive contribution to the viability of subsistence
production. With the imposition of cash taxes, and the
resultant emergence of cash-cropping and sale of animals as
integral parts of production systems in rural Sudan, the
interaction between merchants and domestic producers in rural
Sudan assumed dimensions that had formerly been lacking. Thus,
in order to obtain cash, domestic producers had to sell part
of their produce or animals to the traders. The latter knew of
the predicament of the domestic producers and their desperate
need f or cash, and responded by offering the 'lowest prices'
in order to realize the 'highest profit margins' possible. The
role of the small trading centres in the 'exploitation' of
small producers through, inter alia, the payment of depressed
prices for produce and animals is relatively well-documented
(e.g. Abdel Ghaffar and Mustafa, 1979; El-Haj Bilal Omer,
1979; Salah El-Din El-Shazali Ibrahim, 1980; O'Brien, 1980;
Mohamed Yousif A. El-Mustafa, 1983).
The policy of the British colonial administration to force
the small producers to interact with merchants did not cease
with	 the imposition of cash-cropping. Through different
measures in the various regions, 7
 the colonial
administration sought to consolidate the position of traders.
The "main work" of the colonial District Commissioner was thus
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described in 1927 by Mr. Robertson, 8 then D.C. himself, as
being to "try to open up the country"; to realize that
objective he "travelled hundreds of miles every year, climbed
hills to see hill villages, making roads, opening markets,
keeping the peace.." (cf. Salah El-Din El-Shazali Ibrahim,
1980:161). The colonial administration not only opened markets
in which merchants could undertake their activities, but also
sought to broaden the scope of trading activities by creating
demand among the natives for imported, mainly British,
manufactured goods through the deliberate severance of the
traditional	 barter	 relations among the different local
communities, the undermining of home crafts and local
industry, and the introduction of new commodities for which
there had formerly been no demand.
The issue of the restriction on barter relations in
products furnished by merchants in the particular case of the
Southern Funj region, which is yet another tremotel and 'least
()developed area, has been mentioned by Mr Dick, 	 a colonial
administrator who wrote in his diary that:
Obviously bona-fide purchases of grain in
small quantities for the particular Berta's
own consumption would be allowed. Berta
would be allowed to buy or barter dried fish
from the Burun since merchants do not deal
in these and the Berta are the Burun's only
market... A sop to the merchants will be
strict control of Berta pedlars who have
taken away a certain amount of trade in the
past, and action against any arab found
trading.
It is interesting to note here that Mr Dick actually
attempted to separate the places where the Burun conducted
selling from those in which they made purchases. This was an
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attempt to rule out possibilities of having barter-relations
between the merchants and the Burun. Hence Mr Dick concluded
that "the object .. is to force the Burun to understand cash,
and to make them travel to fetch any goods they want".
The dependence of domestic producers on goods supplied by
traders was enhanced further through the policy to subject the
various local industries to competitive elimination by
'dumping markets' with imported manufactured goods to be sold,
at least initially, at relatively cheap prices. Imported goods
such as household utensils thus penetrated int all parts of
the country, including Southern Sudan, at the expense of the
home crafts. As described by Reining (1966:83) with reference
to the Zande District in which "bush-shops" were established,
"the locally produced wooden and pottery food bowls had been
replaced almost entirely by enamelware; vessels made of
calabashes had been replaced by glass bottles; andgourd cups
by enamel, tin and aluminium cups". In the case of industries
which withstood competition from imports, the colonial
administration sought their destruction through the use of
force. The long established textile (damour) industry which
survived competition due to the durability, and low price, of
the cloth is a good case in point. The story of the
destruction of this industry is told, in rather muted and
apologetic terms, by Bacon (1948:337ff) who maintains that
The home crafts of ginning and spinning and
of weaving local cloth (damour) of useful
quality was in old days thinly but widely
spread throughout the Arab Sudan. Naturally
[sic] it dwindled with the advent of cheap
cotton piece-goods from England and Japan,
and for a time it was suppressed by law to
avoid the carrying over from year to year of
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seed which might be infected with diseases
and pests, notably the pink-boliworm. The
industry is now [1948] encouraged on the
understanding that spinners buy ready ginned
lint that is made cheaply available for the
purpose of eliminating home ginning with its
attendant dangers. For this purpose the
coarser cottons are preferred as being
easier to spin.
In view of the colonial policy to impose cotton
cultivation upon "non-cotton-growing communities" discussed
earlier, the contention that the ban on cotton cultivation
among the communities that had formerly depended on the local
industry on grounds of "infected seed" clearly points to the
ideological blinkers worn by colonial administrators. The
'improved seeds' which the Nuba and Azande were forced to
cultivate, needless to say, could have averted the alleged
"dangers". Owing to the resistance by the Sudanese in the
regions in which the ban was enforced,MO) the colonial
administration sought to break the independence of the local
textile industry through the provision of ready ginned lint.
But though the latter was initially supplied at low prices,
its spinning required a longer time and this resulted in an
increase in damour prices. The competitiveness of the local
damour industry with regard to its price was thus destroyed,
but owing to its durability some of the better-off sections of
the population continued to purchase it.
A further measure undertaken by the colonial
administration to prompt the small producers to interact with
merchants was the introduction of new commodities for which
there was no demand. Coffee, tea, flash-lights, etc. were thus
brought to the attention of domestic producers all over the
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country, and this created a new source for the 'desire to
obtain cash'. The direct intervention of the colonial
government in the introducion of manufactured goods in regions
where private traders failed, or were unwilling, to do so has
been described by Reining (1966:152ff) with reference to the
Azande in Southern Sudan.
The colonial administration wanted to create a demand for
cash among the Azande to ensure their participation in cotton
growing. The administration was aware that the Azande's demand
for cash was limited not only because taxatIon could be met
through dura cultivation, but also because the "upwards of 200
bush-shops" in the Zande District were generally poorly
stocked with consumer goods. The "bush-traders" were
interested more in buying the produce of the natives than in
selling imported goods as the prices of the latter were
rigidly controlled by the colonial government. As a result of
this, the administration established a "Trading Division"
within the Equatoria Project Board, which was established to
promote, among other things, the Zande Scheme, in order to
introduce imported goods which the Azande might desire to
purchase (thereby creating a demand for cash which could be
satisfied through cotton cultivation in the Scheme).
Though the severance of barter relations, the destruction
of local industries and the aggressive marketing of imported
goods undoubtedly benefited traders in rural Sudan as they
were enabled to increase their profits through the consequent
intensification of trading activities, the basic design of
British colonial policy seems to have been geared towards a
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completely different	 goal.	 The	 intention behind	 the
consolidation of the position of merchants seems to have been
the creation of demand for cash and, ultimately, the
stimulation of further intensification of primary export
domestic production which, besides serving to meet the needs
of foreign (mainly British) industry, would increase
government revenue through taxation of produce and/or exports.
In spite of the apparent concern of the colonial government to
consolidate the position of merchants, the interventionist
government policies relating to strict price control, stock
monitoring and rationing, and favouritism to the foreign
export-import firms operating in the Sudan effectively
subordinated, and constrained capital accumulation by the
local Sudanese traders who were interacting with the domestic
producers (cf. Mohamed Yousif A. El-mustafa, 1983; Fatima
Babiker Mahmoud, 1984). The pattern of interactionbetween the
traders and small producers which the colonial government
initiated has developed a logic and directions of its own;
and in the context of 'post-colonial' developments it has
resulted in unfettered monopoly and monopsony situations.
Black markets for consumer goods, and 'depressed prices' (or
'concealed wages') for domestic producers, together with the
various forms of debt-relations that developed between traders
and domestic producers, are all aspects of the present pattern
of interaction (see below).
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PRIMARY EXPORT PRODUCTION AND PERIPHERAL CAPITALISM
In emphasizing aspects of British colonial policy to
initiate and sustain interaction between traders and domestic
producers, it is not my intention to subscribe to the nebulous
notions of 'dependency' (cf. Cockroft, et al., 1972; Frank,
1969) and 'unequal exchange' (cf. Emmanuel, 1972; Magdoff,
1969), both of which over-emphasize the 'external' factors at
the expense of 'internal' processes in the conceptualization
of the origin of contemporary peripheral social formations;
furthermore, they purport to analyse the implications of the
institution of the international division of labour in terms
of exchange relations. As I have argued elsewhere (Salah
El-Din Shazali Ibrahim, 1980:162), if the term "exchange" is
to be adopted, a more relevant concept for th analysis of the
interaction between merchants and domestic: producers in
colonial Sudan is one of 'forced exchange' and not 'unequal
exchange'. The material bases of 'underdevelopment' (or, to be
more specific, of peripheral capitalism) are consequences of
the interaction between external factors (i.e. colonial
policy) and internal processes and concern the constitution of
production processes in the colonies (or the re-orientation of
these processes towards primary export production), the class
structure that emerged as a result of that re-orientation, and
the social production relations that bind together the
different classes.
British colonialism in the Sudan, as elsewhere, had its
roots and raison d'etre in the inherent expansionist tendency
of the capitalist mode of production taking hold in Britain,
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and the search by the British bourgeoisie to combat the
falling rate of profit in British industry. British
colonialism in the Sudan was capitalist-colonialism, and its
underlying dynamic should not be conflated with other,
pre-capitalist, forms of colonisation in the Sudan (e.g. the
Turco-Egyptian colonial period). Capitalist-colonialism was
the method by which Great Britain, and the
industrial-capitalist countries of Western Europe in general,
could temporarily resolve the contradictory constitution of
the capitalist mode of production insofar as the colonies
fulfilled a two-fold function of (a) ensuring a supply of
cheap primary products (raw material and foodstuffs) which
would reduce the cost of production in industrial countries
and, (b) constituting new markets in which the manufactured
goods could be sold thereby increasing the prof it (surplus
value) which could be fed back to enhance further industrial
development.
In discussing the dynamic of capitalist-colonisation the
point is to stress that in the imposition of primary export
production in colonial Sudan the basic objective was to
procure raw materials and foodstuffs at production costs lower
than those prevailing in the industrial countries for similar
products (cf. Samir Amin, 1974b:l3ff). But whereas in the
industrial countries, where 'wage labour' constituted the
dominant form of labour subjection or 'labour process',
increased profits (or lower costs) could be effected through
the extraction of relative rather than absolute surplus
va1ue, 11 in the Sudan (as in many other colonies) 	 cheap
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labour for primary export production was obtained through the
preservation of certain elements of the domestic form of
agricultural	 production.	 That	 is to say, through its
'subsistence sphere' the domestic form
	 of	 agricultural
production provided a form of labour which was virtually
self-reproducing and for this the lowest possible 'prices'
could be paid for primary products without jeopardizing the
continuity of production. In other words, 'prices' of cash
crops were not calculated with reference to the requirements
of the physical reproduction of labour, but were instead
treated as an additional 'incentive' which (coupled with the
new taxation system backed by punitive campaigns) would
'induce' domestic producers to expand in their cash-cropping.
Reining (1966:204ff) provides an interesting account of how
'prices' paid to the Azande were fixed, and though no
comparable data from other parts of the country are available,
his account serves to illustrate the point sufficiently:
Dr. Tothill 12
 had warned in his original
proposals	 that prices	 to the cotton
cultivators must be as high as possible
He had advised a higher price for cotton
than had been paid before: a minimum of 40
to 50 piastres for 100 pounds based on the
1938 price at Liverpool, about sixpence a
pound of cotton lint. A minimum of 40
piastres was originally agreed upon as a
desirable level, but this figure became the
average price, not the minimum, in the first
year of the Scheme. The world price for
cotton lint had risen during the war and
continued to rise fabulously afterwards
If Dr. Tothill's figures are used as an
index, the minimum price paid to the Azande
in 1952 should have been about 380 piastres
for 100 pounds of seed cotton, since the
lint was sold for 49 pence a pound [at
Liverpool] .. But in that year the average
price to the Azande was 113 piastres, with a
minimum of 50 piastres for 100 pounds of the
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lowest grade.
The domestic form of agricultural production thus provided
the cheapest labour for primary export production not only
among the so-called 'traditional' farmers, but also in those
large scale 'modern' schemes. The colonial administration
indeed did not establish, or lease land to capitalists to
invest in large scale irrigated agriculture except where
relatively substantial amounts of capital were required to
meet the cost of canalisation, irrigation pumps, etc., which
were beyond the capacity of the small producers to provide.
Otherwise, Sudanese farmers were maintained as 'peasants'
working in the context of the domestic form of agricultural
production.
THE PETRIFICATION OF THE DOMESTIC FORM
The point in the foregoing account is to stress the
colonial design to achieve primary export domestic production
in such a way that a substantial portion of the consumption
requirements of domestic producers would be procured through
the application of labour in the so-called 'subsistence
sphere' of agricultural domestic production. In other words,
though the British colonial administration has, perforce,
incorporated domestic producers in rural Sudan into the
international capitalist market, that incorporation was
intended to be partial. Domestic producers were incorporated
more as producers than as consumers. The proceeds from
cash-cropping thus were (and still are) 13 so low that they
covered only partially the costs of reproduction of domestic
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labour. The cost of housing (construction and maintenance of
huts, etc.), the basic food crop and vegetables, the provision
of water and fire-wood, and the rest of the activities covered
under the category of "household tasks", are all furnished
through the direct labour of domestic producers. The proceeds
from cash cropping, sale of animals and the multifarious forms
of petty commodity production undertaken by small producers
hardly sufficed to cover the cost of clothing, taxes and
supplementary consumer goods such as sugar, tea and coffee,
cooking-oil, soap, etc.
The pattern of the incorporation of domestic producers
into the world market not only resulted in the severance of
the 'critical interplay' between the capacity of domestic
producers to produce and their capacity to consume, but also
led to a virtual petrification of productive forces in primary
export domestic production. To understand aspects of this
petrification, however, we have to take into account the
interdependencies between the level of the development of the
productive forces and the level of accumulation by domestic
producers. On the one hand, the tools and techniques employed
in cash cropping in colonial Sudan were the same 'primitive',
labour-intensive, tools and techniques of pre-colonial times.
1ith that low level of development of the productive forces
the opportunities for horizontal expansion (and, ultimately,
accumulation) were very limited. On the other hand, the
proceeds from primary export production were so low to the
extent that not only did they not allow scope for accumulation
of resources to be deployed in the development of productive
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forces (through adoption of more efficient techniques as well
as through engagement of wage labour), but also hardly
sufficed to meet immediate consumption requirements. It was
only a small minority of 'strategically positioned' domestic
producers who, in benefiting from the the differentiation
process, managed to develop their productive forces (see
below). For the overwhelming majority of domestic producers,
not only was such a development of the productive forces
difficult to realize, but also the satisfaction of immediate
consumption requirements was to become increasingly difficult
to achieve without supplementing their proceeds from
cash-cropping with wage employment for others.
Some scholars assert that the processes of monetarization
and commercialization promise to dissolve the domestic form of
production through the differentiation process thereby set
into motion (e.g. Fatima Babiker Mahmoud, 1984). But this
assertion	 overlooks	 the point that, by virtue of its
'subsistence sphere', the domestic form of
	 agricultural
production seems to be endowed with a characteristic
resilience, which obstructs the thorough proletarianization of
those producers who find themselves unable to satisfy all
their needs through application of labour in domestic
production. The outcome of the interplay between these two
contradictory tendencies (i.e. differentiation and resilience)
has been a process of semi-proletarianization, that is to say,
of 'casual' and/or 'seasonal' resort to wage employment.
Throughout the British colonial period,
	 it was	 basic
government policy to maintain conditions conducive to the
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sustenance of the 'structurally malformed' domestic production
as shown by its reluctance to expropriate land under crop and
its avoidance of the emergence of a substantial class of
landless Sudanese through various stabilization measures.
These conservation measures are to some extent also true of
government policy in present-day Sudan. Before considering the
differentiation process, I will attempt to present a brief
assessment of these "stabilization policies" through which the
colonial government managed to constrain the process of
proletarianization in colonial Sudan.
THE COLONIAL STABILIZATION POLICY
Generally speaking, British colonial policy in the Sudan
has often been described as being in a category of its own
when compared to British policy elsewhere in Africa where the
'colonial situation' has in many regions resulted in the
formation of substantial strata of wage labourers and the
emergence of 'White-settler-colonies'. Many scholars (e.g.
Mohamed Hashim Awad, 1971) seem to explain the alleged
'unorthodoxy' of colonial policy in the Sudan with reference
to the desire to avoid any measures that could be instrumental
in enticing mass revolution as had taken place during the
Turco-Egyptian colonial era, while others (Fatima Babiker
Mahmoud, 1978; El-Wathig Kameir, 1980b) have additionally
invoked a 'climatic factor' whereby they seem to argue that
the hot climate of the Sudan is hostile 	 to European
settlement.	 Other	 interpretations	 (Mekki	 Abbas, 1951;
Gaitskell, 1959) attempt to explain that 'unorthodoxy' in
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terms of the 'personal qualities' of Lord Cromer and Earl
Kitchener who had "insiders knowledge" of the status of
Europeans in Egypt so that in his Memorandum to the Foreign
Office concerning the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty on the status of
colonial Sudan, Lord Cromer intended 
€0 deprive the Europeans
coming to the Sudan of the privileges ('capitulations') they
had enjoyed in Egypt) 14
 A further 'factor' can be sought in
the fact that the Sudan was one of a very few colonies in
which the 'flag' did not follow 'trade'. Given the
'competition' between colonial administrators and the trading
companies in India as well as Africa, and the powers assumed
by the trading companies to the extent of effectively
administering colonies, the 'sensitivity' of the personnel of
Sudan Political Service could have some influence on colonial
policy.
Although the different interpretations current in the
literature pose 'factors' that must have influenced, to
varying degrees, colonial policy in the Sudan, none touches on
the basic differentia that sets Sudan (rather than colonial
policy) apart from other British colonies in Africa.
Resistance by 'natives' to colonial domination was thus hardly
unique to the Mandists. In the Sudan, as elsewhere, all forms
of native resistance were ruthlessly pacified; there could be
no .
 more an antagonizing measure than the 'Anglo-Egyptian'
invasion itself, precisely because the number of 'natives'
killed in the course of a single day at the battle of Karari
(upwards of 20 thousands by one estimate) virtually matches
the total number massacred throughout the Turco-Egyptian
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colonial period. Likewise, while the affiliation of the
administration of colonial Sudan to the Foreign Off ice15
must have had some influence upon the conception and
implementation	 of	 policies	 insofar	 as	 the	 colonial
policy-makers had what could be 'iewed as a 'global
perspective', the fact that the greatest potential resource in
the Sudan is its vast agricultural land must have been the
decisive element in the determination of colonial policy
concerning the exploitation of the natural resources of the
country. Unlike the Copperbelt and the other British colonies
in Central and Southern Africa, the Sudan had comparatively
trivial mineral resources, and no mining industry of any
appreciable size developed; as such there was no need to
create a substantial fully-proletarianized wage labour force.
When a relatively substantial demand for cheap seasonal
agricultural labour emerged after the establishment of the
Gezira	 Scheme	 in	 the	 1920s,	 however,	 the colonial
administration spared no effort in inducing systems of
seasonal wage labour migration, but in such a way as not to
jeopardize the domestic form of production in the so-called
'traditional	 sector';	 this	 was	 precisely because the
precondition	 for	 the procurement of
	 cheap	 seasonal
agricultural labour was, as it is now, the sustenance of the
'subsistence sphere' of domestic production. As viable
domestic agricultural production presupposes the existence of
stable communities (i.e. being tied to the land as opposed to
being	 fully-proletarianized),	 the colonial stabilization
policies could be viewed as fully in keeping with the overall
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design of British imperial policy to exploit to the maximum
the natural resources of the colonies.
ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF WAGE LABOUR
At a first and more general level, the evidence of
stabilization policies may be substantiated with reference to
the course adopted by the colonial administration in securing
the labour force required to undertake manual tasks in the
context of a virtual lack of wage labourers. Labour demand was
initially largely confined to urban areas, and, in the main,
concerned tasks in government departments, building and other
infra-structural projects as well as commerce. In spite of the
urgency of that demand, the colonial administration
subordinated the needs of the urban wage labour market to the
policy to promote primary export domestic production. Thus not
only were no proletarianization measures undertaken, but also
only a section of the landless class created through land
registration in riverain regions were mobilized, while quite-a
number of the landless were stabilized as tenants in
government schemes (see below). When the numbers of northern
migrants, ex-slaves and prisoners proved insufficient to meet
all the demand for urban labour, the administration resorted
to the importation of labour from beyond the borders of the
country. In Chapter Four I shall account in detail for the
initial emergence and expansion of the urban labour market in
colonial Khartoum; I will confine my discussion here to the
situation in rural Sudan.
The initial tasks in rural Sudan generated by
	 the
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inception of British colonial rule concerned the construction
and maintenance of roads, rest-houses for colonial
administrators, court houses and, at least in the 'favoured
regions', schools and dispensaries. In the undertaking of
these tasks, however, virtually no unskilled wage labour was
required as the colonial government resorted to forms of
conscript labour whereby village headmen were required to
provide as many able-bodied men as was deemed sufficient for
the undertaking of the task in question. It is noteworthy that
in many parts of central and western Sudan the policy to
conscript labour fitted with prevalent notions among the
sedentary cultivators concerning work for a dahawa (half day)
for the village headman on his farm (cf. Spaulding, 1979a).
Conscript labour not only reduced the costs of construction
tasks for the colonial administration, but also required no
form of migration by villagers as the tasks were performed
either wholly inside, or in the immediate vicinity of, their
respective villages. As all such tasks were usually undertaken
during the dry season when no agricultural operations of any
significant magnitude are carried out, there is no evidence
that the days annually required in conscript labour disrupted
domestic agricultural production.
Though the colonial policy to resort to conscript labour
has been considered in a number of recent contributions
(O'Brien, 1980; 1983a; El-Fatih Shaa'eldin, 1981; 1982), the
significance of the conscript labour system in colonial Sudan
has not been systematically studied. But though in many parts
of northern, central and western Sudan there is no evidence of
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a heavy resort to conscript labour, in Southern Sudan it seems
to have been the main source of unskilled workers as far as
can bee seen from the official ("confidential") reports. In a
letter from the Commissioner of Equatoria Province to the
colonial Civil Secretary (No. E.P/37.B.1; dated 9.1.46), for
example, the conscript labour requirements were detailed in
the following manner:
During the peak period of the current
district	 and	 P.W.D.	 [Public	 Works
Department] building programme it is
estimated that in Juba Town alone 1,450
conscript labourers will be required. This
figure, together with labour required for
P.W.D. road camps throughout the district
will give a total of approximately 2,000 or
11% of the nominal roll of district
tax-payers. This does not take into account
the labour required to clean and maintain
certain district roads, rest houses and
court houses. From conversation on trek it
is apparent that in some cases young men are
having	 to do three separate months of : -
conscript labour in Juba every year, and -
sometimes more.
	 -
As noted by El-Fatih Shaa'eldin (1982:12), the British
colonial administration continued to conscript villagers to
work even after it (voluntarily) ratified the 1930 Forced
Labour Convention. In its last decade, however, the colonial
administration decided to rename 'conscript labour' as 'tribal
labour'. In a "Strictly Confidential" letter to the Governor
of Equatoria (CS/SCR/37.C.1/1; dated 28 Jan. 1946), the
colonial Civil Secretary drew the attention of the Governor to
the point that
In paragraph 1643 (b) of your December 1945
Diary the phrase "conscript labour" is used.
Conscript labour by recent instructions can
only now be employed with permission of the
Labour Board and I presume that you mean by
this phrase the recruitment of tribesmen for
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work of a communal and social nature for the
benefit of the community as a whole.
Would you please see that the words
"conscript labour" are not used in those
diaries which are non-confidential and which
are handed to the press.
IMPORTATION OF UNSKILLED LABOUR
As the tasks to be undertaken in rural Sudan (except
perhaps in the South) were often of such a magnitude that
resort to conscript labour for their undertaking would
effectively disrupt domestic agricultural production; and as
there was a demand by private employers for agricultural
labour which could not be met through conscripted labour,
resort to wage labour was imperative. The method by which the
colonial government solved its labour supply problem was
observed by Martin (1970:219) who in the early decades of
colonial rule wrote that;
	 -
For all large undertakings such as the
construction work on the new Blue Nile dam
at Sennar, it has been found necessary to
seek beyond the borders of the Sudan for the
required unskilled labour, and this has been
partially found in the case referred to by
applying to the gaols in Egypt. in December
1913, 1,080 convicts from the Tura and Abu
Zibil penitentiaries [in Egypt] were brought
to the Sudan for employment upon the Gezira
irrigation works at Sennar.
McLoughlin (1966) has documented further the evidence of
colonial policy to import unskilled labourers into Kassala
Province and described how in 1907 about 400 Abyssinians
settled in Kassala in response to the expressed demand from
the Public Works Department for labourers. From that year
onwards, Abyssinians (in unspecified, but seemingly
substantial numbers relative to demand) developed a system of
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annual migratory cycle where they used to come during the dry
season (after harvesting their food crops) to work in the
Sudan for three or so months.
The definitive solution to the colonial problem of labour
shortage was, however, effected through the policy to
encourage West African 'Fellata' (Hausa, Bornu, etc.) to come
and settle in the Sudan not only as wage labourers, but also
as primary export domestic producers (cf. Isam Hassoun, 1952;
Balamoan, 1976; Duffield, 1980; 1981; 1983). At present,
descendants of West African immigrants are estimated to be
around 10 per cent of the population of Northern Sudan.
According to Duffield (1983:45) West African
settlement in Sudan only became significant
in terms of numbers with the colonial
conquest of Nigeria and Sudan at the turn of
the century, and was primarily characterised
as a settlement of rural peasant cultivators
and agricultural labourers drawn largely
from the poorest sections of the Hausa
peasantry. A large number of Hausa, however,
also formed their their own quarters in the
towns of northern Sudan, the majority in
occupations which could all be subsumed
under	 the heading of unskilled manual
labour.
RE-PEASANTIZATION OF THE LANDLESS
At the time when the British colonial administration was
heavily engaged in the importation of labour to meet its
demand for unskilled labourers, concurrent attempts were being
made to rehabilitate in primary export production the returned
emigrants in riverain regions who had lost their claim to land
as a result of the land settlement and registration policy.
As maintained earlier, a number of landless 'northerners'
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entered the labour market as unskilled wage labourers in
Greater Khartoum (cf. Chapter Four; also see, El-Wathig
Kameir, 1980b:4lff), and the Gash-Tokar agricultural region
(cf. McLoughlin, 1966:116). However there were also others who
accepted to stay in their homeland as share-croppers (cf.
El-Haj Bilal Omer, op. cit.), while quite a substantial number
were absorbed as tenant-farmers in the numerous schemes
established by the colonial government in its "land subject to
no rights". In the specific case of Dongola, the Suleim basin
was opened in 1909 with an area of 24,000 feddans, while the
first scheme in Shendi District at ZeidabM6) was opened in
1905 and later, under the Sudan Plantation Syndicate, was
extended to cover an area of 15,233 feddans. As described by
Bolton (1948:194), in the government-controlled
pump-schemes in the Northern Province land
is leased to tenants on a yearly lease. The
tenant pays a water rate and a nominal rent
of 1 m/m a fedddan. He takes the whole crop
except in the case of cotton which is shared
equally by Government and tenant.
The increase in agricultural production in the Northern
Province following the establishment of government (and later,
private) schemes not only made possible the absorption of a
substantial number of returned emigrants, but also apparently
resulted in an acute shortage of labour during the early
1920s. Less than three decades following the enactment of the
colonial land settlement and registration policy in riverain
Sudan, however, the long term effects of the colonial land
tenure started to be severely felt by the new generation of
Northerners. The land owned privately by the small farmers
could not support all their male children; and the latter had
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to	 seek alternatives to secure a living. The colonial
educational policy which undoubtedly favoured, at least
initially, Northerners who were the choosen group to assume
positions of skilled workers and low ranking government
officials, helped to solve partly the problem of labour
surplus by its stimulation of emigration. But with the
promotion of education in the other regions the colonial
government started to plan and carry out policies by which
that emigration could be curbed. Thus following his visit to
the Northern Province in 1938, the colonial Deputy Civil
Secretary wrote	 in his report to the Civil Secretary
(Henderson, 1952:lO4ff) that:
The emigration fever for Shaigiya (soldiers,
police, officials, merchants) and Danagla
(merchants and servants) is strong and we
probably could not recall the myriad truants
now outside, but we could at least (by
re-cultivation of basins) keep the strong
youth from emigration, 	 especially when
elementary	 education	 in non-riverain
provinces causes keener competition outside.
The Deputy Civil Secretary of 1938, Sir Douglas Newbold,
K.B.E., became Civil Secretary in the following year
(MacMichael, n.d., p. 31); and in his six years in office he
was instrumental in promoting elementary education in most
regions around the country (cf. Perham, 1952). But though the
'emigration fever' of Northerners continued, increasing areas
of "government land subject to no rights" were brought under
crop as the colonial government started to dispose of land on
lease to those 'natives' capable of developing it.	 As
explained	 by El-Haj Bilal (op. cit., p. 76), although
government land "was theoretically accessible to all", access
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in practice depended on the investor's social, and even more
importantly, financial position as the decisive criteria for
land allotment. Nevertheless, as tenants were settled in these
schemes, the allocation to private investors did realize the
colonial design of rehabilitating th landless, not only in
the Northern Region but throughout northern and central
riverain Sudan where landownership was institutiona1ize.. As
described by Omer M. Osman (1958:40):
The gross area under (private) pump schemes
in the whole country increased from 38,000
acres in 1925 to 180,000 in 1944, and by
1956 the number of pump-schemes had exceeded
1,500 irrigating 625,000 acres. The
expansion in the Blue Nile Province has
moved at a more rapid pace..
In discussing the policy of government to rehabilitate
landless Sudanese, I must stress that in a few cases the
government did dispossess holders who were cultivating land. I
have already mentioned the case of the Nuba and how the land
allocated to them was actually seized from 'Arabs' and
'Fellata'. Whether or not the two groups were compensated
through allotment in other areas is difficult to specify.
However, what is certain is that whenever 'compensation' was
possible, the administration seems to have been unequivocally
keen to grant it. The Nubians who lost their land in 1905 as a
result of the elevation of the Aswan Dam were thus brought
under the so-called 'Alternative Livelihood Schemes' (cf.
Bolton, 1948:193); as were the White Nile Arabs, who lost a
large part of their agricultural land with the construction of
Gebel Awlia Dam in the vicinity of Khartoum (cf. Abbas Ahmed
Mohamed, 1980). One extreme case in which the colonial
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administration kept its promise for compensation concerns the
conflict between the Hadendowa of the Red Sea Hills and the
Kassala Cotton Company over the allotment of tenancies in the
Gash Scheme (cf. Henderson, 1952:38 et passim; Hassan Mohamed
Salih, 1976:161-187).
The policy of the government not to recognise free-holding
in the Tokar and Gash Deltas, which were categorised as
"government-owned land subject to no right t', was explained
earlier. But as pointed out by Hassan Mohamed Salih
(1976:161):
The Gash flood used to water a strip of land
of a width varying from half a mile up to
three miles. The Hadendowa used to clear and
utilize some parts of this naturally flooded
area	 for	 cultivation	 of	 durra... In
addition, a native system of 	 channels
(shaiyotat; sing. shaiyote) had been
developed to lead water to irrigate more
areas beyond the natural flood limits. The
term shaiyote was applied both to the-
channel itself and to the plot irrigated by
it... Traditionally the irrigated area was
divided among different lineages of the
Hadendowa, each with its own shaiyote. The
cultivation of the shaioyte was organized
and supervised by the sheikh of the lineage
who co-ordinated the labour for clearing the
channel every year.
Though the Hadandowa were denied private landownership,
the names of all shaiyote-holders were registered by the
administration and when the Kassala Cotton Company was given
the concession in the Gash delta to establish an irrigation
scheme in 1923 preference in tenancy allotments was accorded
to registered shaiyote-holders. As it turned out, the
Hadendowa who took over tenancies were interested in grain
rather than cotton cultivation and for this reason the Company
wished to exclude them and to allocate
	
tenancies	 to
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'Northerners', and West Africans settled in the region. The
ensuing conflict of interest, in which the colonial District
Commissioner supported the Hadendowa, was so intense that the
whole issue had to be referred to the central administration
at Khartoum. Failing to strike a ' compromise, the central
government relinquished the concession and transferred it to
the Sudan Plantations Syndicate of the Gezira Scheme. Though
some Hadendowa later agreed to sub-let their tenancies to the
settlers, many others continued with the scheme. But though
the colonial administration did allow the Hadendowa to
cultivate the dura they were interested in, the colonial
design of promoting primary export production in the Gash
Delta was actually further entrenched. "Thus every tenant was
entitled to have two feddans of dura for each ten feddaris of
cotton" (Hassan Mohamed Salih, op. cit., p. 176).
Leaving aside the intentions of Newbold to "humanize
administration" (cf. Perham, 1952), the political expediency
in the apparent identification with 'peasants', but without
jeopardizing the colonial design to promote primary export
domestic production, has articulately been expressed by
Newbold himself (Henderson, 1952:73) in a letter to Mr. Frank
Cottrell dated 16 Feb. 1935 in which he has referred to the
case of the Kassala Cotton Company and maintained that:
This country is based on the peasant, not on
the financier. "It was only when he felt
himself in alliance with the peasant", said
Tolstoy of some Russian D.C., "that he began
to direct him"... Was the Kassala Cotton
Company in alliance with the Hadendowa? No,
and it crashed in spite of Liverpool and
Khartoum. Might is not always Right and I
know that Righeousness will win if it has a
few allies, but as you say we must know what
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we're after. I think I do, and so do you.
Well, let's yell it from the house-tops
(original emphasis).
PROTECTION OF SMALL-HOLDERS
The British colonial administration not only sought the
rehabilitation of the landless, but also the protection and
conservation of small-holdings in the face of attempts by
speculators to expropriate land in those regions where
individual landownership was recognised. As described by
Mohamed Hashim Awad (1971:222):
At first speculators confined their interest
to the riverain land of the Northern
Province, which is adjacent to Egypt. There,
Greek and Syrian immigrants began to
practise some of the familiar techniques by
which poor landowners are expropriated. They
might have succeeded in achieving their goal
had not the local administrator acted
swiftly enough to prevent land from changing.
hands..	 - -
In order to check speculation and the dispossession of
small-holders, the colonial administration enacted a series of
laws regulating the transfer of titles. As early as 1905, the
consent of Government to sale of land was required; and
although the Native Disposition of Lands Restriction Ordinance
of 1922 facilitated transfer of titles among natives "of the
same locality", the ban on acquisition by "outsiders"
(expatriates as well as Sudanese from other regions) was left
intact throughout the colonial period.
The protection provided to domestic producers also
concerned the strict monitoring of the interaction between the
small producers and the merchants. In this regard the colonial
administration enacted a series of ordinances of which the
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most significant were the Regulation of Prices Ordinance
issued in 1914 (and amended in 1919, 1920 and 1922) and the
Stocks Declaration Proclamation of 1919 (cf. Mohamed Yousif A.
El-Mustafa, 1983:157 et passim). In accordance with the
former, the colonial administrators at local levels were
authorized to fix the "maximum prices of any one or more of
the foodstuffs or articles of prime necessity" in their
districts, while the Stocks Declaration Proclamation was
intended to monitor the supply situation and, ultimately, to
check artificial shortages and/or the developing of 'black
marketing' by traders. Further protection was provided by the
enactment of The Gezira Land Ordinance of 1927, which
prohibited seizure of crops grown by tenants in settlement of
debts unless there was the written consent of government to
the initial transaction. This protection was later extended to
other regions by the enactment of Article (6) of the Civil
Justice Ordinance of 1946 which stipulated the prohibition of
shail (pre-harvest mortgage).
In emphasizing the colonial policy to protect
small-holders, I must stress that these measures were intended
to prevent speculation and dispossession of small-holders more
than to "exclude" capitalists from investment in agriculture.
As I explained earlier, all interested capitalists (local as
well as foreign) were allotted schemes in "government land
subject to no rights".
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DIFFERENTIATION
In the foregoing discussion of aspects of the design,
implementation and consequences of the policies affecting
domestic agricultural production in colonial Sudan I have
deliberately focused my discussion more on 'domestic
production' than on 'domestic producers'. The main reason
behind this is my wish to provide a clear statement of the
nature of the transformations that have taken place within the
so-called 'traditional sector'. Had the focus been on the
domestic producers, I would have found it very difficult to
present that account, precisely because the 'domestic
producers' are not a homogeneous mass. All along I have
assumed a significant aspect of the transformation from
subsistence to primary export domestic production, viz., the
process of differentiation. As I shall demonstrate in this
section, this omission does not flaw my conceptualization of
the transformations that have taken place within the domestic
form of agricultural production as a	 form of labour
subj ection.
The processes of capitalist differentiation that result in
the formation of a rural bougeoisie and a rural proletariat in
agrarian communities have generated considerable controversy,
not least because of misplaced abstractions (cf. Mustafa
Babiker, 1984b). Prominent among these is the tendency to
conceptualize the	 'rural	 population'	 (particularly	 in
peripheral	 social	 formations) as being, by and large,
'basically' homogeneous. As such researchers set out to
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investigate the "causes" and "factors" that have set into
motion 'differentiation processes'. Postulates such as hard
work, achievement, exceptional soil fertility, etc., are
accordingly treated as key concepts to explain the fact that
some sectors of the rural population are observed to be
'better-of' than others (cf., e.g., Roseberry, 1976). Without
denying in any sense the roles of 'hard work', advantageous
'political' connections, etc., in effecting 'differences'
between individuals and/or groups, we have to be cautious not
to conflate two related, but significantly different, types of
'differences' (or, to be more specific, processes) which the
concept of 'differentiation' denotes. These two processes are
quantitative and qualitative differentiation respectively (cf.
O'Brien with Salah El-Din, 1979:l7Off).
Quantitative differentiation relates to the resources at
the disposal of individuals, and the differences thus obtained
between individuals can be measured through the collection of
quantitative (statistical) information on the "possessions" of
individuals. To this extent, quantitative differentiation can,
at least as a conceptual possibility, produce as many
'classes' (or categories in classifying people in terms of
resources) as there are individuals to be compared.
The second, and sociologically more significant form of
differentiation is qualitative differentiation which can be
conceptualized through an analogy with zero-sum-games; all
that one individual (or 'class' of individuals) has acquired,
another has lost. That is to say, qualitative differentiation
is relational, and as the relational concept of 'father'
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incorporates in its definition those of 'mother' and
'daughter' and/or 'son', it is likewise with qualitative
differentiation: the 'leader' denotes the presence of the
'led'; the 'employer' the 'employee', and so on.
The	 link	 between	 quantitative and qualitative
differentiation under capitalism is that wealth (or
quantitative differentiation) can be taken over to underpin,
as cause and effect, qualitative differentiation. Wealth
becomes	 'capital',	 which	 produces	 further	 'wealth'
(surplus-value). The concept of capital is also relational (it
incorporates	 in	 its	 definition	 the	 concept	 of
"capital-producing", surplus-value-generating labour); and
capital is itself a social relation (binding together the
capitalist and labourer) or, to say the same thing, it is
distinct from wealth or quantitative differentiation though it
presupposes and generates wealth.
The point in highlighting aspects of quantitative and
qualitative differentiation is that in pre-colonial Sudan the
aggregate of domestic producers (as distinct from other strata
comprising rulers, traders and holy-men, etc.) were
qualitatively undifferentiated, although in terms of resources
significant quantitative differences could have obtained among
them. Factors such as hard work, size of the productive
membership of domestic units (i.e. producer-consumer ratio),
etc., accounted for such quantitative differentiation. But to
effect the transition from quantitative to qualitative
differentiation in the context of subsistence production in
pre-colonial Sudan entailed the deposition of a ruler (or the
1L1.3
formation of a 'new community') for a peasant to become a
ruler; or to have access to 'sacred knowledge' to become a
holy-man. The positions of qualitative differentiation then
available (particularly those of rulers and holymen), however,
had to be very limited in number to be qualitatively as such.
Even when such banal constraints did not hold, as in the case
of traders, the domestic producers were severely constrained
by the overall logic and orientation of subsistence
production. In other words, although, conceptually speaking,
peasants could convert whatever 'wealth' they had into
mercantile capital, the viability of such a conversion was
made very difficult by the subsistence orientation of
production processes; as all the basic subsistence
requirements were either produced directly by. those who needed
them, or procured through local level barter. - (as in the
complementarity of cultivators and nomadic pastoralists),
opportunities for traders to involve themselves in the
distribution of "lowly subsistence goods" were very limited
and almost exclusively confined to periods of crop failure in
a region. The only form of trade that was viable enough in
pre-colonial Sudan was long distance trade in luxury items
oriented, mainly though not exclusively, towards the needs of
those (rulers and holymen) who commanded a purchasing power
through their appropriation of agricultural surpluses. Long
distance trade, however, required an amount of wealth to be
converted into merchant-capital which only a few, 'very rich',
'peasants' could afford to mobilize. As a result of this, the
majority of riverain peasants who became (hardy) petty traders
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during the Funj and Turco-Egyptian colonial periods were
forced to do so more by virtue of their impoverishment than by
their accumulation of wealth (cf. Burckhardt, 1819; Pallme,
1844; O'Fahey and Spaulding, 1974). In asserting this, it is
not my wish to contend that in pre-cOlonial Sudan 'well-off'
peasants had no alternative but to continue as 'peasants'
until they accumulated sufficient resources to enter into long
distance trading in 'luxury' goods. I wish rather to point out
that entry into long distance trade was not readily accessible
to all 'well-off' peasants. 'Moderately' well-off peasants,
however, had two main alternatives to enhance their wealth. In
riverain regions, wealth was mostly mobilized to purchase
slaves, who were then deployed in the expansion of
agricultural production, whereas in the rainlands agricultural
surpluses were mostly converted into livestock (cf. Spaulding,
1979a).	 -
With the imposition of monetarization and
commercialization at the turn of this century, the fetters
imposed upon qualitative differentiation were simultaneously
undermined. Basic to this process was the emergence of a need
for cash to pay taxation. To meet this need, domestic
producers had only two alternatives: either to surrender some
of their products (cash-cropping and sale of animals) or to
seek wage employment (sale of labour-power).
The commoditization of labour opened a world of
opportunity to those 'peasants' who possessed enough resources
to engage wage labourers. In other words, like the already
qualitatively	 differentiated	 strata	 ('tribal	 chiefs',
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merchants, etc.), 'rich peasants' benefited from the
predicament of those domestic producers who had no surpluses
to surrender in exchange for cash and who were consequently
driven to seek wage employment. In short, it was 	 the
incroporation of domestic producers into the world market
which has set into motion the process of qualitative
differentiation whereby some (few) peasants were enabled to
engage wage labourers and, largely via trade, to effect the
transition to become capitalists, while others (now indeed the
majority) were being slowly, but persistently, forced to seek
wage employment.
The process of qualitative differentiation was likewise
instigated among nomadic pastoralists by the imposition of the
cash tax. But downward differentiation for nomads is not
confined to semi-proletarianization (seasonal wage labour
migration), as it may also lead to sedentarization. This is
particularly true of those small herding units which could not
afford to release a member to seek wage employment and which
as a result had to sell an animal to obtain cash. Animals in
pastoral production systems, it should be stressed, represent
both the basic means and the primary product of production; as
such the compulsory sale of animals is of the same order as
dispossessing cultivators of their land. Obviously it is in
those small herding units in which the number of animals is at
a minimum for the viability of nomadic pastoralism that loss
of a few animals results in sedentarization (cf. Haaland,
1969; 1972). The sedentarization at the turn of the century of
sections of the pastoral Kenana Arabs is a good case in point
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(see Gruenbaum, 1978; O'Brien, 1980; 1984b). Upon
sedentarization, these ex-nomads have come to experience the
same differentiation process to which cultivators in general
are subjected.
The differentiation process among cultivators and
pastoralists is still unfolding. However, insofar as the
primary processes of capital accumulation in the Sudan have,
from their inception, been dependent on domestic agricultural
production; and insofar as the colonial administration has
carried out policies to preserve the volatile resilience of
domestic	 production,	 the	 realization	 of	 the	 full
potentialities of the differentiation process was severely
constrained during the colonial period. The upward
differentiation of the few strategically positioned domestic
producers which enables them to become capitalist of course
continues to be unfettered. But the downward differentiation
has assumed the form of semi-proletarianization, which is the
consequence partly of the 'subsistence sphere' and partly of
constraints inherent in the operation of wage labour markets
in the country which limit the opportunities available for
thoroughly proletarianized domestic producers. In Chapters
Four and Five I will assess in detail aspects of the
constraints inherent in the operation of the urban wage labour
market; and in the rest of this chapter I will attempt to
illuminate aspects of the semi-proletarianization process and
the course in which it has recently been intensified.
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THE FORMATION OF THE SUDANESE WAGE LABOUR FORCE
As I have already argued, the main concern of the colonial
administration during its first decades was the stabilization
of domestic agricultural producers in the context of their
incorporation into the international capitalist system. To
avoid the disruption of primary export domestic production in
the	 so-called	 'traditional	 sector',	 the	 colonial
administration resorted to the importation of unskilled
labour, particularly from West Africa, to redress the shortage
in the massive building and other projects necessitated by the
establishment of the new administration. Notwithstanding the
stabilization policies, the formation of a local wage labour
force started with the establishment of British colonial rule.
The first sections of the Sudanese population to be fully
proletarianized were the 'landless' from the riverain regions
and the former (and run-away) slaves. The institutionalization
of private landownership in the riverain regions continued to
exacerbate the problem of the 'surplus population' and, as a
result of this, large sections of the new generations of
northerners were forced to migrate to the other parts of the
country in search of alternative means to secure their
livelihood. The colonial policy to promote education in the
North contributed to the emergence of northerners as the core
of the semi-skilled labour force, while quite a number of
'highly educated' northerners managed to establish themselves
in clerical, administrative as well as professional positions.
The proletarianization of domestic producers likewise
started with the establishment of colonial rule. Up to around
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1925, however, the participation of domestic producers in the
wage labour market was partial, sporadic and a function of
factors such as the need to pay taxes, crop failure, etc (cf.
O'Brien, 1980; 1983a; 1984a; 1984b; 1984c). This limited
involvement was underlain not only by the colonial
stabilization policy and the resistance of domestic producers
to the loss of their autonomy, but also by the lack of
significant opportunities for wage employment in the country.
The larger part of the labour demand in the first decade of
colonial rule thus originated in urban construction,
particularly in those cities which, like Khartoum, were
completely destroyed in the course of events towards the end
of the 19th century (cf. Chapter Four). With the 'drift' of
former (and run-away) slaves to the cities, some 'big farmers'
started to engage impoverished domestic producers as wage
labourers (cf. McLoughlin, 1966). But with the establishment
of the Gezira Scheme in 1925 the colonial administration
started to take measures in order to widen the scope of
involvement of the rural domestic producers in the wage labour
market, albeit in such a way that the stability of domestic
production in the so-called 'traditional sector' would not be
undermined.
I have explained how the labour process in the large scale
irrigated schemes was based on tenant-farmers. As initially
envisaged, tenants were expected to work within the framework
of the domestic form of production and (together with their
families) provide the necessary labour for primary export
production.	 As	 it	 turned out, large sections of the
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tenant-farmers failed to meet all the labour requirements,
especially during the cotton-picking season. The presence of
the West African Fellata served to redress a large part of the
labour shortage in the Gezira Scheme (cf. Duff ield, 1980;
1981; 1983; O'Brien, 1980; Barnett; 1983). Still, during the
cotton-picking season each year there was an urgent need for
more labour and Sudanese domestic producers had to be
recruited.
In accordance with the stabilization policies, the
colonial administration sought to induce a pattern of seasonal
wage labour migration rather than to set into motion processes
of wholesale dislocation of domestic production in the
so-called traditional sector. The measures undertaken to
induce migration were thus confined to widening the need for
cash. But, as noted by O'Brien (1980; 1983a; 1984b), the
responses of domestic producers to this need varied from
community to community as well as from one domestic unit to
another within the same community. These variations stemmed
from differences in their respective value-systems as well as
in their internal division of labour and the mechanisms for
the maintenance of patriarchal authority, etc. (cf. idem.).
In communities where a high value was placed on autonomy,
and no stigma associated with hard work, the main response has
been further expansion in cash-cropping, "through extending
and intensifying the working day, and the working season"
(O'Brien, 1984b:138). In such communities, involvement in wage
labour migration was, and to a large extent continues to be,
sporadic and largely a function of crop failure or of
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occasional demand for large sums of money (to finance
marriages, etc.). The exception in these communities are units
with unfavourable consumer-producer ratios and which do not
have sufficient resources to deploy wage labour for expansion
in cash-cropping. In other communities, especially those of
former pastoralists, increased involvement in seasonal wage
labour migration has been the response.
Variations between communities are likewise observed in
relation to the pattern and destination of migration. As
O'Brien (1983 a:27). says;
Whether the migration for seasonal labour
..was in family groups or by individual
adult men depended to a great extent on the
traditional division of labour in each
group, and secondarily on the location of
their homes ... Groups which practised a
strict seclusion of women .. generally kept
women and children at home and sent only
adult men out in search of wage labour,
usually in sorghum and sesame harvesting,
unless cotton picking was available much
closer at hand.
Noting the different responses to the stimulation of cash
needs, the colonial administration started to provide
'incentives' to stimulate semi-proletarianization rather than
intensification of cash-cropping. To attract the White Nile
Arab pastoralists, for example, tenants were allowed to grow
fodder, which the herds of pastoralists would consume in lieu
of part of the wages for cotton picking. The colonial
administration for a brief period instructed 'tribal chiefs'
(Sheikhs, Omdas, Nazirs) in districts abutting the Scheme to
direct their tribesmen to migrate in what virtually
constituted a form of forced labour; but very few villagers
complied with the system (Mohamed El-Awad Galal El-Din,
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1978:9lff). By 1943, the time of rural tax collection in areas
of potential labour supply was shifted from the end of the dry
season (May-June) to the beginning of the cotton-picking
season (January-February) "in order to ensure that peasants
and pastoralists were relieved from their cash at the most
opportune time", and consumer goods in short supply were made
available in the Gezira to attract migrants (O'Brien,
1983a:19 ). An elaborate system of labour recruitment, known as
the Cotton-Picking Campaign, was also adopted, and hundreds of
thousands of pounds were spent in 'propaganda' to attract
small farmers as well as in 'incentives' to those who
undertake recruitment in the areas of labour supply (Mohamed
El-Awad Galal El-Din, 1978:96ff). Many 'supervision
committees' were thus formed in order to tour villages in the
immediate vicinity of the Gezira and as far as Kordofan
Province. In the course of these tours villagers were given
'loans' to entice them to travel to the Gezira Scheme. Railway
fares to the Gezira (particularly for those coming from
Western Sudan) were not only reduced during the picking
season, but, in times of severe shortage, were abolished
altogether as the Railway Department was often instructed by
the colonial administration to provide free (one way) travel
warrants to prospective cotton-pickers in the relatively
distant regions (cf. ibid.; O'Brien, 1983a).
Though the Gezira Scheme was the largest source of demand
for seasonal unskilled labour migrants in colonial Sudan, it
must be stressed that the stimulation of seasonal labour
migration was neither confined to northern and central Sudan
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nor oriented to attract migrants to the Gezira Scheme alone.
Through the offering of appropriate incentives the colonial
administration also succeeded in stimulating seasonal labour
migration in virtually all parts of the country, including the
South. The colonial Governor of Equatoria Province thus
reported to the Civil Secretary (EP/37.B.1., dated 30.4.1946)
that:
An experiment is shortly to be tried in Jur
River District of selling fines cattle to
labourers as well as Chiefs, Police Elders,
etc. It is hoped that this will lead to a
gradual demand for work as it did in Western
Nuer where labour is plentiful and all
voluntary.
Despite resort to such policies, relatively few Sudanese
peasants and pastoralists were attracted to the wage labour
market. The colonial problem of labour shortage (particularly
during the cotton-picking season in Gezira) was never
definitively solved; and on occasions of extreme shortage the
colonial government had to conscript school children and
troops to obtain the required labour force (cf. Omex.M.
All, 1974.:3Off.). Indeed it was not until the achievement of
flag Independence that seasonal labour migration by Sudanese
peasants and pastoralists started to accelerate.
PROLETARIANIZATION IN POST-COLONIAL SUDAN
In considering the main post-colonial developments within
the domestic form of agricultural production, it should be
emphasized that the emergence of a 'national' administration
has not undermined the processes of the colonial-type trade
economy. Expansion in primary export production is still
153
viewed as 'development t . But whereas during the colonial
period an integral aspect of the imposition of primary export
production was the conservation of the domestic form in the
so-called 'traditional' sector, during the first two decades
of the post-colonial period conservation policies were almost
totally abandoned. As a result of this, the continuity of
domestic production has become dependent almost exclusively on
the willingness and/or ability of domestic production units to
maintain their 'autonomy'. This reproduction has for large
sectors of domestic producers proved very difficult to achieve
without regular resort to seasonal labour migration.
The processes that resulted in the acceleration of
semi-proletarianization in post-colonial Sudan are several and
complex, and can only be outlined here. Though some of these
processes are 'nationwide' and apply to all domestic producers
in the country, others are specific either to particular
regions or to particular groups.
Major among the 'nationwide' processes has been the
relaxation of the constraints which the colonial
administration imposed upon traders in their interaction with
domestic producers. The widespread incidence of shail and
other forms of debt-relations at exorbitant interest rates
(which sometimes exceed 200%); and the emergence of 'black
markets' in rural areas in particular (whereby goods normally
in short supply in cities can easily be obtained, albeit at
double 'off ical prices', in villages) are well-documented in
micro-studies from all parts of the country (cf. Mohamed
Hashim Awad, 1966; Apaya, 1971; Barnett, 1977; El-Haj Bilal
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Omer, 1979; Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed, 1980; idem. and Mustafa
Abdel	 Rahman,	 1979; O'Brien, 1977; 1980; Salah El-Din
El-Shazali Ibrahim, 1980; Mohamed Yousif A. El-Mustafa, 1983;
Mustafa Babiker, 1984a). The unfettered monopoly and monopsony
status enjoyed by traders led to, on the one hand, a sharp
decline in proceeds from cash crops accruing to the domestic
producers and, on the other, a steady increase in prices of
goods furnished by merchants. Over and above the role of
unchecked 'exploitation' by merchant-capital, there are also
varied processes particular to specific communities which have
contributed to the dislocation of domestic production. The
rapid post-colonial expansion in large scale irrigated schemes
(Managil Extension, New Haifa, Rahad, etc.) as well as in
mechanized rainfed farming (Gedarif region in eastern Sudan,
Agadi-Grabeen and Dali Mazmoum complexes in south-eastern
Sudan, Renk area in the South, and Habila in the Nuba
Mountains, etc.), for example, was achieved primarily through
marginalization of nomadic pastoralists (cf. Abdel Ghaffar M.
Ahmed, 1973; O'Brien, 1980), and marginally through
dislocation of sedentary cultivators (cf. Khalid Affan, 1978;
Ibrahim Kursany, 1983). The ensuing competition over
pasturelands has in many regions adversely affected small
herders, who consequently are increasingly driven towards both
sedentarization and more regular involvement in seasonal
labour migration.
'Capitalist' agriculture is not confined to the large
scale mechanized schemes, and in the Continental QQZ zone
(stabilized sand dunes) another process of dislocation is
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taking place. In this zone the availability of permanent water
supplies, which vary greatly from one place to another, is the
most crucial factor influencing population settlement and
movement (cf.'Mustafa Babiker, 1984a:8). In pre-colonial times
the population of this zone consisted largely of nomadic
pastoralists,	 but	 the	 British	 colonial administration
encouraged the settlement of sections of the nomadic
population by drilling bore holes. In Kordof an Province, for
example, former nomads were settled in Urn Ruwaba district (cf.
O'Brien, 1980) and En Nihud district (cf. Mustafa Babiker,
1984a). It is worth noting that, in the absence of permanent
water supplies, sedentary cultivation is made possible by the
hallowing of tebeldi (Acacia) trees, which are then used to
store water during the rainy season, and the cultivation of
water melons, the luice of which is used instead of water when
the stored water supply is exchausted. With population growth
in the region and drought, the 'water question' has become
more serious than ever before. Every summer the villagers in
thirsty areas experience severe hardship in securing water. As
a result of this, whole villages had to be abandoned during
the season; and those villagers who decide to stay have to
depend on traders, who have come to realize lucrative profits
through transport of water to the villages. In the context of
this seasonal hardship, the population tended to be attracted
to sites where new bore holes	 are dug.	 During the
Post-colonial	 period, however, drilling has consistently
favoured the 'tribal chiefs', in whose de facto "own land"
bore	 holes	 are usually dug (Mustafa Babiker, personal
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communication). As domestic producers in thirsty areas move
into the sites of newly-dug bore holes, they find there is no
'unclaimed' arable land to cultivate, and for this they are
forced into land rental, share-cropping arrangements as well
as wage employment (which often involves migration).
Concurrently, the depopulation of thirsty villages and the
consequent abondonment of their 'fertile land have provided the
'resourceful' strata (merchants, administrators, etc.) with
opportunities for groundnuts farming. This is made possible
through the financial ability of these strati to transport
water into the abandoned sites and to deploy Southern (Dinka)
unskilled migrants either as wage labourers or as
share-croppers (ibid.). A similar process of dislocation has
likewise been experienced in Um Ruwaba District of Northern
Kordofan where the growing generations are continually being
driven out as wage labour migrants as commercial farming by
merchants and 'tribal chiefs' has taken over all available
unoccupied fertile land in the vicinity of villages (cf.
Mohamed El-Awad Galal El-Din, 1978; O'Brien, 1980).
Proletarianization processes are by no means peculiar to
the so-called 'traditional sector'; and the communities of
tenants in the 'modern' irrigated schemes are known to be
breeding grounds f or generations of migrants. In view of the
fact that the large scale irrigated schemes constitute the'
major source of demand for unskilled labour in the Sudan
because of the failure of tenants to meet all the labour
requirements, it might appear paradoxical to observe
proletarianization processes among tenant communities. But as
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Barnett (1977; 1983) has noted, tenants are not only a highly
differentiated group, but also one which experiences a severe
crisis of social reproduction (cf. O'Brien, 1984a). Unlike the
rainlands where, depending on availability of water, the new
generations may be stabilized in domestic agricultural
production, in the irrigated schemes the tenancies not only
are limited in number, but
	 also cannot be divided (in
inheritance) below a certain limit (half tenancy).
Possibilities for 'fragmentation' among the poorer sections of
the tenantry were virtually totally exhausted in the late
1940s. In such a context, the deployment of the labour of all
family members by a tenant with two or more sons would
maintain the household for only a brief period in the early
stages of its developmental cycle. As the sons grow up, they
find it imperative either to stay in their respective units
and receive a labourers' wage (which means a decline in their
living standards) or to seek alternative employment. In other
words, in case all the sons of a tenant are to be mobilized,
there will be no tenancies for them when they grow up and
establish their own families, while the income from a single
tenancy would not suffice to meet all the requirements of an
extended family.
The crisis of social reproduction in tenant communities is
not merely a post-colonial development. It was indeed
recognized during the colonial period, and the colonial
government sought to overcome it through the promotion of
educational services in the Gezira whereby the descendants of
tenants were to become 'more competitive' in their search for
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alternative careers. In spite of a dramatic post-colonial
expansion in educational services in the Sudan in general and
the Gezira in particular (cf. Chapter Three), there is still a
severe competition over enrolment into higher education; and
only a small percentage of the descendants of tenants are able
to lead careers in professional and administrative positions.
The majority, who end up as 'drop-outs', are consequently
driven into the wage labour market as semi-skilled and
unskilled workers. In the particular case of Nueila village in
the Gezira Scheme, for example, Barnett (1983:369) has found
out that of a 442 male population aged 16 years or more around
"22.6 per cent ... had at some time left the village in search
of work". It is important to note that, by virtue of the
strength of their union, the Gezira tenants, are generally
better placed than their counterparts in the other irrigated
schemes (especially those smaller pump-schemes inthe private
sector -cf. Taisier M. Ahmed Au, 1983). Nevertheless in the
context of the exorbitant increase in the costs of production
and a dramatic decline in productivity since 1973/74 (cf.
Mohamed Yousif A. El-Mustafa, 1979:72 et passim), and of the
differentiation process taking place within the Gezira
tenantry, many needy tenants have become thoroughly
proletarianized (cf. O'Brien, 1984a; Barnett, 1983).
The intensification of the processes of
semi-proletarianization in the decades since flag Independence
coincided with a rapid expansion in large scale (irrigated and
rainfed) agricultural schemes which generated substantial
opportunities for seasonal agro-labour (cf. Mohamed El-Awad
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Gala! El-Din, 1978; O'Brien, 1980; 1983a; 1983b; Taisier M.A.
All, 1982; 1984; Shepherd, 1983). It was indeed because of
this expansion that during the first two decades of flag
Independence the government was concerned more over the
shortage of agro-labour than over the consequences of the
destabilization of the so-called 'traditional' domestic
producers.
As the dislocation of domestic production has become more
pronounced during the 1970s; and as in the context of the
amounting economic crisis the Sudanese government has started
to take note of the steady deterioration in primary export
production in the so-called 'traditional sector', new measures
started to be taken. From 1975 onwards, the Sudan has come to
experience	 a	 revitalization of 'stabilization policies'
implemented through both national and international
initiatives in the form of 'developmental schemes'. Of the
attempts to 'develop' traditional agriculture are those in the
Nuba Mountains (by the German government, GTZ), Geissan in
Southern Funj (USAID), the so-called "Western Savannah
Development Project" (IERD, 0DM, USAID), and the Ingessana
Hills District Development Project (locally financed?). The
main goal of these 'developmental schemes' is to promote an
expansion in areas under crop through the provision of (free)
tractor services for the ploughing operations. In all schemes,
however, the service is offered almost exclusively to a small
number of incipient capitalists ('entrepreneurial peasants'),
who command sufficient resources to deploy wage labourers.
Rather than rehabilitate domestic production, these 'develop-
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mental schemes' seem to enhance further the process of
differentiation and to provide more wage employment
opportunities for domestic producers inside their own
villages.
The most serious attempt to rehabilitate small farmers is
probably the one launched by the Agricultural Bank of Sudan
(with the backing of the World Bank) in Northern Kordofan
Province (see Abdel Magid Khogali M. Ahmed, 1984:55-62). This
has been an attempt to eliminate shall in which exorbitant
rates of interest are borne by small farmers. According to
Abdel Magid (ibid.), the experimental phase started in 1977 in
the Um Ruwaba District (extended to El-Obeid District in 1980)
whereby the Bank would advance loans to the small farmers at
very low interest rates (initially 7 to 9 percent, but later
increased to 12 per cent per annum). But The Bank does not
deal directly with individual peasants. It requires that
'agricultural cooperatives' be formed in each village, and
loans are given to the cooperative which, in the presence of
Bank officials, is to distribute the cash among the individual
members. The loan is given on the understanding that the
villagers would cultivate cash crops and would hand over their
crops to the Bank which undertakes its marketing. The prices
the crops fetch are claimed to be much higher than what
village traders normally give to villagers. But the way this
scheme is carried out, and its implications for small farmers
need to be studied and analysed systematically.
In noting the recent attention accorded to the
rehabilitation of the so-called 'traditional farmers', it
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should be stressed, the government is not jeopardizing in any
way productivity in the large scale schemes. But this is not
solely because because in no way could these 'developmental
schemes' decelerate semi-proletarianization. Indeed, even if
these schemes did manage to decelerate seasonal wage labour
migration by rural Sudanese, the supply of labour to the large
scale schemes will not be affected. This should be so due to
the steady influx of refugees into the Sudan, especially from
Eritra, which is to some extent a product of the recent
legislation stipulating relatively favourable provisions for
refugees (e.g. allotment of land to be cultivated). Refugees
are settled almost exclusively in areas abutting large scale
(irrigated and rainfed) agricultural schemes (cf. UNHCR/ILO,
1983).
INTRA-RURAL WAGE LABOUR MIGRATION
As maintained earlier, at the turn of the century the
larger part of the opportunities for wage employment were
found in urban areas, and rural-urban wage labour migration
was the main form of wage labour migration in the country.
With	 the	 establishment	 of	 'modern' pump-schemes, and
especially since 1925 when the Gezira Scheme started
operation, the demand for agro-labour increased dramatically,
and migration by semi-proletarianized domestic producers has
become more intra-rural than rural-urban. The post-colonial
expansion in large scale agricultural schemes (both irrigated
and rainfed), boosted further the demand for agro-labour.
Though no data or rough estimates are available, it is
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nevertheless quite safe to assert that well over 80 per cent
of the demand for unskilled wage labour in the Sudan
originates in rural agriculture. O'Brien (1983a:16) has noted
the difficulties in estimating the numbers of seasonal
migrants in the Sudan, and contended that "between 1.5 and 2
million seasonal labourers, mostly peasants and pastoralists
for the rest of the year, work in weeding or harvesting
operatings in state and private plantations annually". It is
worth noting that during the cotton-picking season of 1973/74
the Gezira Scheme alone employed around 542,000 seasonal
labourers (cf. Mohamed El-Awad Galal El-Din, 1979a:105). One
may well assert that during the agricultural season there are
sufficient employment opportunities in rural areas to absorb
all domestic producers looking for employment.
The terms and conditions of employment as well as the
composition of the labour force vary between irrigated and
rainfed schemes. In rainfed agriculture the main operations
are harvesting and threshing of sorghum and sesame. These
operations are very demanding, and for this reason the labour
force involved consists almost exclusively of young
able-bodied male migrants. In the irrigated schemes, which
constitute the largest source of demand for seasonal unskilled
migrants, the bulk of the demand relates to cotton picking,
which is a relatively undemanding operation in which children
over the age of ten as well as old people can attain the same
productivity levels as able-bodied male and female adults.
Unlike the rainfed schemes, then, the workforce in irrigated
agriculture consists of family groups. But as noted by O'Brien
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(1983a:27)
Whether the migration f or seasonal labour
..was in family groups or by individual
adult men depended to a great extent on the
traditional division of labour in each
group, and secondarily on the location of
their homes ... Groups which practised a
strict seclusion of women .. generally kept
women and children at home and sent only
adult men out in search of wage labour,
usually in sorghum and sesame harvesting,
unless cotton picking was available much
closer at hand.
Until the mid-1970s, variations between the rainfed and
irrigated schemes were observed in relation tothe wages paid
to labourers; and wages in the rainfed schemes were said to be
up to 50 per cent higher than in the irrigated schemes (ibid.;
Mohamed El-Awad Galal El-Din, 1978:lO4ff). Nevertheless,
because all family members over the age of ten could
participate in cotton picking in the irrigated schemes, the
net returns for the domestic units migrating to tha irrigated
schemes were usually higher than what accrued to units which
sent out only its adult male members to the rainfed farms.
With the deepening of the economic crisis during the 1970s,
however, able-bodied men from groups that used to participate
in cotton picking started to migrate to the rainfed schemes so
that only women, children and old people continued to migrate
to the irrigated schemes (cf. Mohamed El-Awad Galal El-Din,
1978). The result of this has been a steady increase in wages
for cotton-pickers and a general tendency for wage rates to
equalise between the two segments of the agricultural wage
labour market (cf. O'Brien, 1983a; 1984b).
The differences that obtained in wage rates between
irrigated and rainfed schemes were not solely a reflection of
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the differential composition of the workforce. They were
equally the consequence of the method by which wage rates are
determined in the Gezira Scheme -a method which not only kept
wages for cotton-pickers at the lowest possible level, but
also helped maintain low and stable wage rates for unskilled
labour throughout the national economy as I shall explain in
the course of my analysis of the urban wage labour market. As
noted by Nigam (1977:156),
The responsibility for the payment of wages
to the picking labour is that of the tenants
though they get an advance for this purpose
from the Gezira Board which is later charged
to the "Joint Expenses" Account. The payment
is made both in kind and cash -the tenants
provide some sort of shelter, and some food.
The practice in this respect varies from
tenant to tenant and there is no check
whatsoever as to how much is paid or not
paid to the pickers by the individual
tenants.
It is indeed exceptional for tenants to channel through
all the advances provided by the Gezira Board as in the
negotiations with labourers each tenant seeks to retain at
least a portion of these advances for him/herself (cf.
Barnett, 1977; O'Brien, 1984a). This is particularly true of
that majority of tenants who are needy and in debt to village
merchants. For these tenants, the advances are, at least in
part, badly needed to meet current consumption requirements.
This decentralization of wage determination has served to
maintain exceptionally stable, albeit depressed, wage rates
for picking labourers between 1945 and 1975. According to
Nigam (1977:156),
It is understood from the Gezira Board that
wage rates have not increased much during
the last decade, and over the last 20 years
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have increased by about 3% a year which does
not even cover the rise in prices.
That the seasonal cotton pickers continued to accept such
low wages is of course underlain by the fact that they are not
a thoroughly proletarianized wage labour force. They are
semi-proletarianized domestic producers; and a large part of
their consumption requirements is satisfied within the
'subsistence-sphere' of the domestic form of agricultural
production. Not all unskilled labourers in the
	 Gezira,
however, are seasonal migrants; and quite a number (mainly of
West African extraction) constitute a thoroughly
proletarianized workforce settled in "labour camps" within the
Scheme area. But even in the case of these 'local' labourers,
wages are not a precise description of what they earn as many
needy and/or elderly tenants usually enter into share-cropping
arrangements with labourers. Through these arrangements,
share-croppers, who are otherwise fully proletarianized wage
labourers, manage (together with their dependents) to
cultivate subsistence or cash crops. In other words, through
these arrangements fully proletarianized labourers have been
brought back into the orbit of domestic agricultural
production. According to Barnett (1983:335), sharecropping
arrangements constitute no new development in the Gezira, but
their incidence has increased considerably in recent years to
the extent that in a 1982 survey it was found that "almost 100
per cent of labour camp households were found to have
sharecropping arrangements with tenants".
166
RURAL-URBAN WAGE LABOUR MIGRATION
The focus on the operation of the agricultural wage labour
market and/or intra-rural wage labour migration is deliberate;
but it is not solely because the rest of the thesis focuses on
the urban wage labour market. It is also because the number of
semi-proletarianized domestic producers undertaking rural-
urban migration is very small compared to the numbers of
intra-rural migrants. I should hasten to add here that I am
referring specifically to the semi-proletarianized domestic
producers rather than the fully-proletarianized 'landless'
strata from riverain regions (the new generations of
'Northerners' as well as the descendants of tenant-farmers).
But even when these thoroughly proletarianized elements are
taken	 into	 consideration,	 rural-urban unskilled labour
migration nevertheless remains small compared to intra-rural
wage labour migration.
	 - -
The	 low	 rate	 of rural-urban migration among
semi-proletarianized domestic producers should not be
construed as the simple consequence of "lack of sufficient
opportunities" in the towns. Returned migrants of course
provide some 'information' and 'clues' as to what could be
expected in urban areas; but it is a mistake to assume that
the domestic producers in rural Sudan are well informed about
the opportunities available in urban areas or that they do not
recognize the uncertainties involved.
The point to be stressed is that the semi-proletarianized
domestic producers show high selectivity as to the destination
of their migration; and the decision concerning whether or not
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to migrate to an urban area is not made solely on the basis of
'information'. Prospective migrants with different
soclo-economic characteristics indeed show varied responses to
the same piece of information. Thus in her analysis of the
"causes" that led to the migration of squatters in Khartoum
North, Fahima Zahir (1972:234 et passim) has noted how "two
brothers confronted by the same situation may take different
decisions as to whether to stay in the rural areas or move to
the big town". Insofar as the determinants of migrant
selectivity in the Sudan are yet to be systematically
documented and analysed, the discussion to follow can only be
tentative, and is heavily influenced by, or based on, partial
observations derived from my research among three particular
groups: the Kababish Arabs (nomadic pastoralists in Kordofan
Region), the Zabarma (West African sedentary cultivators
living along the banks of River Rahad in Kassala Province) and
the Jok Gor 'Ingessana' of south-eastern Sudan
(agro-pastoralists in the Blue Nile Province). To a lesser
extent, moreover, I have made use of information obtained in
interviews with unskilled self-employed tertiary workers in
Greater Khartoum (cf. Chapter Six).
Available evidence, fragmented as it may be, suggests
that, over and above the presence of contacts (kinsmen or
fellow-villagers) in a town whereby • prior arrangements to
receive prospective migrants are made, the dynamics of migrant
selectivity rest with the interplay of two main sets of
variables relating to (a) the characteristics of migrants and
(b) the timing and duration of expected migration. The first
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set of variables	 concerns	 the personal	 and	 social
characteristics of the prospective migrant which include age,
level of education, marital status and/or number of
dependents, type of original occupation (farming or herding),
the region in which he/she lives, eta. The second set of
variables pertains to the season during which migration is to
be undertaken, the objective behind migration (or amount of
money wished to be earned) and the length of the period
intended to be spent away, etc.
Generally speaking, there are two critical '
 distinctions in
the assessment of migrant selectivity. The first is between
young and old, and the second is between farmer and
pastoralist. Old farmers (i.e. 30 years and over) are usually
married and have dependents for whom they have to provide,
whereas young unmarried men from the poorer domestic
production units in farming communities often tend to
participate only partially in the productive activities of
their respective units. During the agricultural season, both
old and young farmers migrate to the schemes, but the former
are likely to spend only brief periods (up to four weeks) in
migration because they need to attend to their own farms,
while the latter usually work for relatively longer periods
and often spend the whole season as agro-labour. In this
respect it is important to note that although needy farmers
migrate to the schemes where there is a guaranteed demand for
their labour power, the wages received do not suffice to cover
all the consumption requirements of a household. Consequently,
cultivation	 of	 food	 crops	 is	 indispensable	 for
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semi-proletarianized farmers with dependents. However, a few
young farmers, typically 'drop-outs' from the educational
system, show a tendency to refrain altogether from
participation in agriculture and to lead their way into urban
wage and/or self-employment. Like the dispossessed riverain
Northerners, these 'drop-outs' tend to stay in urban areas for
as long as possible and, by virtue of their education, they
are often able to find 'permanent' wage employment.
For herders, on the other hand, the agricultural (i.e.
rainy) season is the period when least laboui is required in
units as pastureland is rich and watering of animals is at its
easiest. Units with 'labour surplus' often release some of
their adult males to migrate to the schemes. Though during the
dry season activities become very demanding to herding units,
migration to the irrigated schemes by the whole unit is common
among pastoralists with relatively small herds in areas
abutting schemes. This is so because of the availability in
the schemes of both fodder and water for the herds. In cases
of serious losses of herds, impoverished pastoralists have
three alternatives: wage herding, sedentarization as farmer or
wage labour migration. The first is to work for others as a
paid herder receiving wages in both cash and kind (animals);
through the animals paid, a wage herder starts rebuilding his
own herd. This option is typically followed by young unmarried
(and sometimes married) men who have no dependents to provide
for. Married pastoralists with many dependents may tend to
settle as cultivators, and the few animals remaining from
their herds may be attended by close relatives. The third
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option is to engage in long term migration with the (often
unattainable) hope of accumulating sufficient savings to build
up another herd. Though during summer such migrants usually
work in towns, during the agricultural season they tend to
migrate to the agricultural schemes. • The low, but secure,
wages in the agricultural wage labour market thus attract not
only the semi-proletarianized producers residing in the
countryside, but also quite a large section of the young
unskilled migrants living in the towns.
It is often mistakenly assumed that the dry season is a
slack season for domestic producers in the rainlands and for
this wage labour migration tends to be accelerated during
summer. This, I believe, is a poorly founded assertion. This
is so because, for pastoralists, it is the season when labour
is most needed because the watering of herds becomes a very
tedious and demanding activity and because the poor pastures
necessitate the dispersion of animals over a wide area in
grazing. Likewise farmers undertake several tasks during the
dry season, and in addition to clearance of fields in
preparation for the coming agricultural season, they also have
to carry out construction and/or maintenance of houses,
repairing of furniture and, in thirsty areas in both clayey
and Qoz areas, help in fetching drinking water (through
digging of wells, fetching of water from distant places,
etc.). For' rainland farmers who also have access to small
plots of land along the banks of rivers (jirruf), summer is
the season for horticulture. Because of these activities,
hardy producers faced by a demand for cash usually stay in
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their villages and engage in 'income-generating activities'
such as rope-making, charcoal making, wood cutting, etc. and,
additionally, resort to shall from traders. The exception is
when travelling to towns does not involve long distances.
Young unmarried farmers, however, are more likely to undertake
long distance travel to towns in order to accumulate savings
to finance marriages, but in such cases migration is likely to
extend to more than six months. But in cases of long term
migration it is quite common for young migrants to re-enter
the agricultural wage labour market during the rainy season.
In spite of the steady decline in the wages paid to
agricultural labourers, the overwhelming majority of the
semi-proletarianized domestic producers continues to migrate
to the agricultural schemes. Even during summer (between March
and June), when the demand for agricultural labour is at its
lowest, only a small percentage of domestic producers in need
of cash may decide to migrate to towns in search of
'income-generating opportunities'. The majority of needy
domestic producers would indeed borrow money or take goods on
credit rather than migrate to towns. Notwithstanding the
intensification of the processes of proletarianisation during
the post-colonial period, the number of unskilled rural
migrants living in urban areas has remained small. But, in
noting this .
 I am not solely stressing the point made by
Gilbert and Gugler (1983:58) that "The stream that appears
formidable at the urban end constitutes only a small
proportion of the rural population". As I shall argue in the
next chapter, the unskilled labour force in urban Sudan in
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general, and Greater Khartoum in particular, represents only a
small percentage even of the urban population.
NOTES
1. The distinction between sedentary cultivators and nomadic
pastoralists has often been over-emphasized to the extent of
viewing the two as bearing 'distinct' cultures, forms of
political organisation, etc. But though at present it is
generally true that there exist some 'administrative'
distinctions, the separation between the two is a relatively
recent development that started under Turco-Egyptian colonial
rule. Thus it is important to stress that up to the early
decades of the 19th century, nomadic and sedentary populations
in a region often consisted of one and the same 'group' or
'tribe'. But insofar as pastoralism during the Funj period
constituted the single most important vehicle for accumulation
of wealth in rainland Sudan, the distinction between pastoral
nomads and sedentary cultivators was basically underpinned by
disparities in resources. However not only nomadic
pastoralists possessed more wealth, but it was also from among
the affluent nomads that the rulers (of both the nomadic and
the sedentary populations in a region) emerged. The process by
which nomadic pastoralists in the Sudan have been relegated to
the status of a 'relic' from the past has articulately been
pointed out by Spaulding (1979a). Halaand (1969; 1972),
moreover, has considered the role of 'nomadization' as an
economic career among the sedentary populations in Darfur and
pointed out how even in present-day Sudan the processes of
nomadization and sedentarization are underlain by processes of
differentiation. Thus while affluent farmers investing in
livestock may find it imperative to pursue nomadiz.tion,
impoverished pastoralists are pushed towards sedentarization
as farmers.
2. Mohamed Hashim Awad (1971) has presented an interesting
account of the "evolution of landownership in the Sudan" since
the ancient Meroitic kingdom (1000 B.0 - A.D. 400). But
although his account of the ancient land tenure system is very
informative, his analysis of the measures undertaken by the
British colonial administration has grossly mystified aspects
of British colonial policy which effectively laid the
foundations of 'peripheral capitalism' in the Sudan as I shall
soon explain.
3. Up to the Muslim conquest of Egypt in A.D. 640, the
Christian monarchs of Makuria and Alawa of present-day
northern riverain Sudan enjoyed what seemed to be exclusive
ownership of land within their domains. As Muslim traders
started to infiltrate into the Christian kingdoms of Sudan,
some began to buy land from Nubians (most probably, not
perhaps exclusively, the king's representatives). According to
Yusuf Fadl Hassan (1973:38):
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This development angered the Nubian king who
saw in it a latent danger. He claimed that
"his subjects and his slaves" who cultivated
those lands as serfs, had unlawfully sold his
domains to the Arabs. The matter was raised
with al-Mamun [the Caliph, 813-833) on his
visit to Egypt in 216/831 and he referred it
for settlement to the governors a.nd notables
of Aswan. The Arab owners incited the Nubians
to reject the king's claim and to deny that
they were his slaves. The sale of land was
confirmed and the dispute was closed.
Mohamed	 Hashim	 Awad (1971) contends that this verdict
encouraged more Nubians to sell land to the Muslim traders and
had thus laid the foundations of individual private
landownership in riverain Sudan. Though this assertion can not
be rejected altogether, land transactions could have been
possible only in the extreme north of Nubia where the
Christian monarchs could not maintain effective control owing
to the presence of the Muslim troops in Aswan. Indeed, this
was the case in the intial transaction disputed which took
place in the north of Bajrash, near Aswan (cf. Yusuf Fadi
Hassan, op. cit.). El-Haj Hamad M. Kheir (1982:162) notes that
by the time of al-Mas'udi's visit in about A.D. 943, "the
landed property of the Muslims was located only in the land
adjacent to Aswan". In the other parts of Nubia, Muslim
settlers not only faced the opposition of monarchs in
conducting land transactions, hut also they did not need to
buy land at all in order to have access to wealth and power.
As Mohamed Hashim himself notes (p. 215), the adherence of the
Nubians to the matrilineal system of sucession enabled the new
settlers to usurp political and economic power from the Nubian
royalty by marrying the daughters and sisters of the Nubian
nobles.
4. In using the term 'tribe' I refer to what Talal Asad
(1972) defined as a 'structure of inequality' in the
composition of groups. In this respect Abdel Ghaffar (1979)
has provided a useful conceptualization of the processes by
which 'tribes' emerged in rainland Sudan as agglomerations of
small kin-groups from diverse origins affiliated to other such
small groups which managed to establish themselves as
'power-centres' through control of some strategic resource
(water sources, pastureland, etc.). These small kin-groups,
however, were in a state of constant mobility within and
across regions affiliating or dissociating themselves from the
power-centres, which were themselves changing. With the
incorporation of rainland Sudan into the Funj kingdom of
Sennar (1504-1820), the position of the power-centres was
further consolidated as they came to constitute the nucleus of
'tribes', which served as administrative units. According to
Spaulding (1979a), a 'tribe' in the Funj period constituted a
"group of people to whom the Sultan, directly or through
subordinates, according to customary law, delegates the right
to exploit the agricultural resources of a specific area of
land". The head of the "power-centre" in each tribe was thus
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endowed with authority over both nomadic pastoralists and
sedentary cultivators who lived within his dar (homeland).
Despite the stabilization of what had formerly constituted a
fluid group organisation, the Funj monarchs did play the
different "power-centres" within a tribe against each other to
serve the purposes of the monarch. But although titles to dars
were endowed to, or withdrawn from, a power centre, the
composition of the 'tribes' themselves showed relative
stability. When the Turco-Egyptian colonial administration was
established, a new system of administration was set up. The
colonial administrators assumed direct control over sedentary
populations, and the former 'power centres' were left to
administer their 'tribes' (which came to be defined as
consisting of 'nomads' only). With the success of the Nandist
Revolution (1885-1898), virtually all power centres lost their
powers over nomads. Thus though a few of these 'ruling castes'
rose to prominence as leaders in the Mandist Ansar Army,
others (e.g. Sheikh Salih of the Kababish, Madibbou of the
Rizaigat and Abu Sin of the Shukria) attempted to oppose the
Khalifa and were ruthlessly pacified. When the British
colonial administration (1898-1955) attempted to introduce
Native Administration (the Sudanese version of 'Indirect
Rule'), enormous difficulties were encountered in finding
"tribal institutions", of a political nature, to foster, and
there were no sufficiently strong figures to act as tribal
Nazirs, or paramount chiefs (cf. Ja'faar M.A. Bakheit,
1974:28). This difficulty, it should be stressed, was not
encountered only among the so-called "stateless or acephalous
societies" (Nuer, etc.), but in all except one of the
provinces of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (cf. ibid.).
5. In his memorandum to the Marquess of Salisbury (the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Her Britanic
Majesty's Government, 1898), Lord Cromer has made the point
that it was a matter of much importance to settle the future
political status of the Sudan in order to deal with the
Europeans intending to settle there rather than with the
native Sudanese. According to Cromer (cf. Mekki Abbas,
1951:161), "The purely native requirements are, in fact, very
simple":
A light system of taxation, some very simple
forms for the administration of civil and
criminal justice, and the appointment of a
few carefully selected officials with	 a
somewhat wide discretionary power to deal
with local details, are all that for the time
being necessary
The policy envisaged by Lorder Cromer later assumed the status
of "first principles" for the personnel of Sudan Political
Service. Thus in a letter by Newbold (cf. Henderson, 1952:53)
in which he referred to the problem of the unemployed in
Omdurrnan in 1927, it has been maintained that:
There is no specific remedy; but in all
problems which defy solution, you cannot fail
if you get back to first principles, cheap
grain, low taxes, picked staff with selective
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promotion, no clogging ordinances against
private enterprise or land purchase, no
flourishing of power or wealth by the ruling
Britishers, rather an unobtrusive rule based
on explained [in situ] decisions in the
office and incorruptible private lives out of
office..
6. According to MacMichael (n.d., p. 31):
Newbold, Sir Douglas, K.B.E.; born 13 August,
1894. Educated at Uppingham and Oriel
College, Oxford (Scholar).
Service: Kordofan, 1920-23; Deputy Assistant
Civil Secretary (Administration), 1924-25;
Red	 Sea,	 1926-28;	 Nomad	 (Beja)
Administration, 1929; Kassala (Deputy
Governor, Beja), 1930-32; Governor, Kordof an,
1933-38; Deputy Civil Secretary, 1938-39;
Civil Secretary, 1939-45. Died at Khartoum,
23 March, 1945.
Publications: Various articles in
Geographical Journal, Antiquity, Sudan Notes
and Records, etc.
Order of the Nile, 4th Class, 1929. O.B.E.,
1933, Order of the Nile, 3rd Class, 1935.
C.B.E., 1938. K.B.E., 1944.
7. In his analysis of British colonial administration among
the Nuer (1900-1930), Digernes (1978) has pointed out how the
"solitary British administrator on the ground was by and large
his own policy maker and that his administrative behaviour and
practice was primarily and essentially a response to the
environment in which he found himself". But though this is
generally true in the sense that different contexts had to be
approached differently, it is by no means valid to assert that
the varied 'measures' undertaken by local level administrators
did not conform to overall colonial policy. For an informative
exposition of local level measures in Western Sudan,
particularly in Dar Fur, see Abdel Rahman Abbakar Ibrahim
(1 984)
8. According to MacMichael (op. cit., p. 39):
Robertson, Sir James, K.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.,
K.B.E.; born 27 October, 189. Educated at
Merchiston and Balliol College, Oxford; Class
II, Litterae Humaniores...
Service: Blue Nile, 1923-25; White Nile,
1926-31; Fung, 1931-34; Kordofan, 1934-36;
White Nile, 1936-39 (Sub-Governor, White Nile
Sub-Prov., 1937); Deputy Governor, Blue Nile,
1939-40; Assistant Civil Secretary, 1941-42;
Deputy Civil Secretary, 1942-45; Civil
Secretary; 1945-53. Retired, 1953.
Appointed Hon. Fellow of Balliol College,
Oxford, 1953; Chairman British Guiana
Constitutional Commission, 1953-54; Director,
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Uganda Coy Ltd., 1954-55; Governor-General of
the Federation of Nigeria, 1955- [to 1960].
M.B.E., 1931. Order of the Nile, 4th Class,
1934. K.B.E., 1948; K.C.M.G., 1953; G.C.V.O.,
1 956.
Quotation is from a letter which Sir James wrote from Soda (in
the Ingessana District) deposited at Sudan Archives, Oriental
Library, Durham University (Box 532/1i1-7).
9. Dick, John Henry; born 1908. Educated at Charterhouse and
Trinity College, Oxford. Service: Khartoum, 1931; Berber,
1931-34; Fung, 1934-35; Palace, 1935-36; Upper Nile, 1936-40;
Civil Secretary's Office, 1940; Northern, 1940-44; Equatoria,
1944-45; Blue Nile, 1945-49; Kassala, 1949-55. Retired, 1955
(cf. MacMichael, op. cit., p. 61). Quotation is from a
two-page extract from his diary bearing the title "TRADE"
deposited at Sudan Archives, Oriental Library, Durham
University (Box 400/1).
10. In the course of a field research in villages along Rahad
River in 1976, I learned in an interview with one old man in
the village of El-Obeid (not the capital of Kordofan) that
around 1930 the British imposed a ban on cotton cultivation by
the villagers in the area. The cotton was cultivated to supply
the local textile industry on which the inhabitants depended
for their clothing. All exchanges were in the form of barter.
Upon imposition of the ban, which was accompanied by
'expeditions' to observe that no cotton was cultivated inside
household enclosures, the villagers had to rely on
manufactured cloth provided by the local merchants. The
imported cloth provided was more expensive, but less durable,
than the local cloth. At the time I had the wrong impression
that the ban was specific to areas abutting the Gezira Scheme.
As pointed out by Hassan Abdel Aziz Ahmed (1975:93), the ban,
which was stipulated by the Sudan Cotton Ordinance of 1921,
was in fact nation-wide. Hassan has also pointed out that, in
addition to its durability and ease of spinning, the local
cotton was "drought-resistant".
11. Put simply, the extraction of absolute surplus value is
characteristic of labour-intensive production processes where
further capital accumulation is made possible through the
intensification of production with the same level of
development of productive forces (i.e. through a lengthening
of both the working day and the working season). The
extraction of relative surplus value, on the other hand, is a
characteristic of capital intensive production systems in
which further accumulation is made possible through the
progressive revolutionisation of the productive forces (i.e.
through adoption of higher productivity techniques and
technology). For a further discussion of the distinction
between the two forms of extraction of surplus value see
Mandel (1976) and O'Brien with Salah El-Din (1979).
12. Dr. J.D. Tothill was the Director of Agriculture in Uganda,
where he was involved in the 'introduction' of cotton as a
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cash crop. He was appointed by the colonial government in the
Sudan (1939) as Director of Agriculture and Forests. One of
his tasks in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan was to survey the
possibilities of agricultural 'development' in Southern Sudan,
and he made an extensive tour of Equatoria Province, the
Southernmost part of the country, following which he submitted
his proposals (cf. Reining, op. cit., pp. 141ff).
13. Abdel Magid Khogali M. Ahmed (1984:19) has compared the
prices paid to the domestic producers in rural Kordofan with
the export prices at Port Sudan and maintained that:
it is clear that the market margin between
prices at Port Sudan and the average prices
at El-Obeid auction market is about 100%, in
spite of the fact that no processing is
carried out to gum arabic and it is exported
raw. [...] the implicit taxation rate ranges
between 30%-35% of the export price parity at
El-Obeid.
14. The Memorandum sent by Lord Cromer to the Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs together with the text of the
Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1899 can be consulted in Mekki
Abbas (1951:57ff). One of the main features of the Agreement
is the denunciation of the system of capitulations through ten
of its twelve articles.
15. The administration of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, headed by
the Governor-General, was undertaken by Sudan Political
Service (SPS), a body of highly-educated British
administrators recruited from among the best graduates of
British Universities, especially of Oxford University (cf.
MacMichael, op. cit.). MacMichael (p. 1) has quoted Lord
Cromer, who was instrumental in the initial formation of SPS,
that in order to "carry out successfully an imperial policy",
it was necessary to obtain a cadre of "active young men,
endowed with good health, high character and fair abilities
not the mediocre by-products of the race, but the flower
of those who turned out from our schools and colleges". The
allegiance of administrators was to the Governor-General, and
this helped create an identification with, and commitment
towards, the Sudan and Sudanese (even though both were
distorted insofar as the 'colonial situation' was taken for
granted). The connection between the Governor-General and the
British Government (or Foreign Office) was initially through
the British Consul-General in Cairo.
16. The Zeidab Scheme started in 1905 as a concession to the
American capitalist, Leigh Hunt, who originally proposed to
provide the necessary labour through encouragement of the
immigration of Afro-Americans. Around two hundred Black
Americans came to the Sudan, but as some of them died, the
others demanded to be taken back to the United States. For
more details on the Zeidab, on whose tenancy model the Gezira
Scheme was later established, see Hassan A/Aziz Ahmed (op.
cit.).
CHAPTER THREE
THE DYNAMICS OF GROWTH IN GREATER KHARTOUM
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It is to ground-nuts that ... [Kaolack] owes
its whole existence; its entire cosompolitan
population -of middlemen and brokers,
dealers in cloth, lorry-drivers,
	 garage
proprietors, hotel keepers, marabouts,
jobers of all descriptions, officials, bank
clerks, domestic servants, labourers and
dockers: a town so concentrated upon
ground-nuts that it forgets to think about
itself, or even for the present to become a
real town at all (Richard-Molard, 1954,
cited by Gugler & Flanagan, 1978:30).
The aim of this chapter is to present an account of the
process of population growth in post-colonial Greater
Khartoum. In doing so, however, my objective is not solely to
pursue further the critique of Sudan urban studies presented
in the Chapter One, but also to provide background information
on the dynamics of population growth in the context of the
processes of peripheral capitalist urbanism which, as I shall
demonstrate in Chapters Four and Five, is indispensable to any
attempt to understand the operation of the urban labour market
in the country. Though the main focus of the chapter will be
on aspects of population in Greater Khartoum, comparative data
on three other 'large' Sudanese cities, Port Sudan, Wad Medani
and El-Obeid, will be considered to corroborate the wider
relevance of the analysis presented. (1)
The central point which the present chapter sets out to
show is that the post-colonial process of rapid population
growth in Greater Khartoum - and indeed in all 'large'
Sudanese cities- cannot be legitimately construed as a
consequence of an increase in the urban wage labour force. In
asserting this it isof course not my wish to deny aspects of
the post-colonial increase in the urban manual labour force in
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the conurbation; but I shall argue that far greater growth has
taken place among the 'non-wage earners' (businessmen, civil
servants and professionals, etc.), and also among categories
that are not considered as "earners" at all (i.e. house-wives,
children, students, etc.). Thus when 'increased migration" is
accepted as the single most important factor behind population
growth, it should be recognized that these other groups have
contributed greater numbers than wage labour migrants.
As the returns of the National Censuses do not give the
social characteristics of migrants in Greater Khartoum, the
attempt to determine the exact magnitude of migration by
different categories posits a formidable task. In examining
the census data on the growth of the 'economically non-active
population' to shed light on migration by 'non-earners', for
example, it is difficult to avoid the risk of mystification as
a large proportion of these 'non-earners' may indeed be
'Khartoumites' rather than migrants. In order to minimise
errors deriving from aggregation of Census data, I will
attempt, whenever possible, to refer to other evidence on
categories of migrants. As the full detailed returns of the
1983 Census are not yet made available, I deal mainly with
aspects of growth in the intercensal period 1955/56-1 973.
Before considering the magnitude of the increase in the
different categories of the population in Greater Khartoum, I
should briefly point out the conspicuous lack of reference in
the literature to the role of the progressive extension of the
municipal boundaries of the Three Towns in boosting the
population total
	 f or	 the conurbation,	 although the
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'redefinition' of 'rural inhabitants' as 'urban dwellers' as a
result of the extension of urban boundaries has been mentioned,
in passing, by two scholars dealing with population growth in
other Sudanese towns (Mohamed El-Hadi Abu-Sin, 1980; Mohamed
Yousif A. El-Mustafa, 1981; 1983). But the extention of the
conurbation's boundaries has not only 'redefined' large
numbers of 'rural dwellers' (as in the cases of the 'original
inhabitants' of Halfaya, Kadaru, Shajara, Kalakia, etc.), but
has also 'swallowed' at least two 'towns': Shambat (in
Khartoum North) and Burn (in Khartoum); the returns of the
First Population Census of 1955/56 listed Shambat and Burn as
'towns' in their own right with total populations of 6,665 and
2,023 respectively. The preliminary results of the 1983 Census
give the population of Shambat as 48,536 and that of Burn as
41,051. Both 'towns', however, have for long been incorporated
into the boundaries of the Three Towns; and their respective
populations naturally contributed to the rise of the total for
the conurbation. It is worth noting here that though the
massive growth of these two former towns between 1955/56 and
1983 was partly a consequence of natural growth among the
'original inhabitants', each 'town' also received substantial
numbers of migrants. Insofar as the Census data do not take
into account the effects of the extension of boundaries, the
treatment of the 'original settlers' and their descendants in
the analysis of intercensal population growth poses a serious
difficulty. This should be so because these 'original
inhabitants' may be treated either as 'migrants', thereby
inflating the rate of immigration, or as 'Khartoumites',
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thereby exaggerating the rates of natural growth in the
intercensal period. Recognition of this difficulty constitutes
a call for more research into the rates of fertility and
migration in Khartoum, but my present concern is simply to
highlight some of the problems encountered in my own work.
THE INCREASE IN NON-EARNERS
In discussing the increase in the 'non-earning' population
of Greater Khartoum, it is necessary to note at the outset the
limitations of official statistics on female participation in
the labour force. Women working at home, preparing traditional
bread (kisra) or sewing clothes, etc., are not normally
enumerated as 'workers'. But the lack of alternative data
leaves me no option but to use official statistics; the
figures on female participation I present below should
therefore be treated with caution.
The evidence on migration of non-earners may be approached
through an assessment of the returns of the two Censuses of
1955/56 and 1973 on the rate of participation in the labour
force in Greater Khartoum (cf. Table 3:1). Out of a total
population in the Three Towns of 245,735 in 1955/56, only
85,777 (or 34.9%) were listed as 'gainfully employed'. By
1973, however, the total population had increased to 784,294
and the 'economically active population' to only 251,532 (or
32.07%). In other words, despite the enormous intercensal
increase in the total population of Greater Khartoum, the rate
of participation in the labour force had actually declined.
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Data on the other large cities likewise show evidence of
declining rates of participation. In El-Obeid the rate fell
from 35% in 1955/56 to 27% in 1973 (cf. Table 3:2), while in
Port Sudan and Wad Medani the relevant percentages are 41% and
32% for 1955/56, and 35% and 28% for 1973 respectively (Tables
3:3 and 3:4).
The population increase since 1973 has been equally
dramatic. The preliminary returns of the Third National
Population Census indicate that by 1983 the 'day population'
of Greater Khartoum was in excess of 2.7 million while by
night the total dropped to around 1.34 million; but we shall
have to wait for the detailed results of the 1983 Census to
know whether the rate of participation in the labour force has
declined even further. In this respect I should also stress
that between 1973 and 1983 Greater Khartoum witnessed the
influx of very large numbers of refugees, especially
Eritrians; and in the assessment of population growth in the
intercensal period 1973-1 983 this influx should be taken into
account otherwise the rate of rural-urban migration would be
inflated. In 1973 the entire expatriate community in Greater
Khartoum amounted to 24,850 people, and of these only 2,440
were listed as "Ethiopians" (cf. Table 3:5). By January, 1979,
however, the number of registered refugees in Khartoum was
40,000 (cf. Table 3:6). Though no precise figures are
available on the number of refugees arriving at Greater
Khartoum since 1979, in view of the escalation of the war in
Eritrea and of the exodus prompted by drought it is almost
beyond doubt that the influx in recent years has been even
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Table 3:5
Population By Nationality For Selected Towns (Both Sexes)
NAr1ONALITY G. KHAR[OUM
Sudanese	 759,219
Foreigners:	 24,850
Egypt	 6,976
Chad	 4,522
C.A. Renublic	 123
Other African
C. Syria&Iraç
Saudi Arabian
Yn
India
Pakistan
Other Asian
Greece
Other Europ.
Other Nation.
Not Stated	 225
PORT SUIY'N WAD ME11NI KOSTI
	
129,444	 98,549	 60,946
	
3432	 8,036	 4,321
	
315	 227	 198
	
211	 170	 59
	
11	 -	 2
	
3	 5	 3
	
-	 2	 -
1	 I	 -
137
65.404
6	 44	 60	 --
O	 4	 2
0	 -	 -
'5	 97	 24
6	 77	 24
('I
Source: Preliminary Returns of the 1973 Population Census
Table 3:6
Refugees in Selected Sudanese Towns, Jan. 1979
7 OF
URBAN CENTRE	 NO. OF REFUGEES TOTAL
Port Sudan and Tokar	 55,000	 24.4
Kassala	 40,000	 17.8
N. Haifa, Girba, Aroma, Basunda, Doka, Hawata & Mafaza 60,000 	 26.7
Hassaheisa, Sinnar, Kosti and Wad Medani 	 30,000	 13.3
Greater Khartoum	 40,000	 17.8
Source: Commissioner of Refugees, Khartoum, as quoted by Amin Au
Omara, 1982:l82.
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greater.
Furthermore, in the assessment of the declining rates of
participation between 1955/56 and 1973 it should be clear that
I am not suggesting that this was wholly due to immigration.
But unless we assume that a large majority of Khartoumites are
'economically non-active", quite a significant proportion of
the growth in the 'non-earning' population can only be
explained as a result of immigration, especially by children
and females. But though it is generally recognised that around
"45 per cent of the population" of Greater Khartoum is
comprised of people "in the age-group 17 years and under" (El-
SayedEl_Bushra,1979:301),Very little attention has been paid in
the literature to the role of migration by children in urban
population growth. Likewise has been the case with female
migration. In one of the few works touching on female and
child migration (Mahmoud Khidir Rizgalla, 1980)., the analysis
refers to the Sudan as a whole, and the conclusion of this
study is that;
..migration is most common among males aged
20-24 years, followed by males aged 25-29,
30-34, and 35-39. Women in all these age
groups migrate much less. But whereas the
level of migration falls markedly with age
among men, the level does not vary a great
deal among various adult female age
categories. If anything, the level of
migration of older females is higher than
that of younger adult women. Not
surprisingly, the very lowest levels of
migration are among children (ibid, p.421).
Child migration is of course tied to migration by parents
and/or adults; but as we do not have information about the
social characteristics of 'migrant households' it is very
difficult to explain the dynamics of	 child migration
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precisely. As it is my contention, which I shall corroborate
below, that the majority of the conurbation's 'economically
active' adult population (which includes large numbers of
migrants)	 consists	 of	 businessmen,	 bureaucrats	 and
professionals rather than of wage workers, it is not
far-fetched to relate child migration to migration by the
relatively more affluent strata. But the increase in the
'economically non-active' population is not solely a
consequence of growth of the child population, and I would
draw attention to migration by females and post-secondary
students in particular. Needless to stress, I do not treat
these two 'forms' as mutually exclusive (i.e. "students"
represent both sexes).
THE INCREASE IN THE FEMALE POPULATION
It is unfortunate that no statistics, or even rough
estimates, are available on the increase of female migration.
A major reason for this is that all studies on migration to
Greater Khartoum have focused almost exclusively on male
unskilled wage-labour migrants, most of whom are either
unmarried or unaccompanied by their wives upon arrival. The
result of this has been a gross under-estimation of the role
of female immigration in the process of urban population
growth. Thus it is typical to find in the literature to find
assertions contending that:
Male migration into the Three Towns has been
more effective than that of females, as
large numbers of young men of employable age
usually leave their villages to seek work in
nearby towns.. In the Sudan,.. traditional
social patterns seem to impose restrictions
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on female migration. In a traditional Muslim
community the place of women is at home, but
whether the spread of female education will
alter the situation or not has still to be
seen... (El-Sayed El-Bushra, 1979:300).
The assertion concerning the "deep rooted religious
restrictions" on female migration is very controversial,
precisely because it assumes the prevalence all over the
country of the culture and/or religious beliefs of the
so-called 'Arabs' of northern and central Sudan. As far as I
can gather, no attempt has been made to study the pattern of
female migration among other groups (e.g. Southerners). From
casual observation, however, I know that many young (western)
Nuba women working in urban areas are sometimes members of
unaccompanied 'female gangs'. Even in the case of muslim
communities, moreover, it is also observed that many Baggarra
young girls migrate, on their own, from villages and/or camps
in search of work as house-maids in nearby towns (especially
in El-Obeid).
Though Mohamed El-Awad Galal-El-Din (1978:124ff) tends to
subscribe to the dominant view concerning the constraints on
female migration in the Sudan, he nevertheless provides some
evidence of increased female migration. Thus elsewhere he
notes (1980a:438ff) that the "sex differential" in Greater
Khartoum has decreased in recent years; but he stops short of
fully accounting for the magnitude of female immigration which
has resulted in this decrease. Such explanation as he gives,
moreover, seems to reduce female migration to a consequence of
wage labour migration. In this respect he points to the policy
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of allocating plots of land in Third Class Areas to migrants
and considers this to have been "a positive encouragement for
migrants to bring their families to the city.." (ibid.). This
analysis, however, fails to consider the implications of
migration by businessmen, bureaucrats and professionals, for
the increase in female immigration. This omission may be
highly significant, not only because these 'established
migrants' are resourceful enough to have their wives and/or
dependants with them even when they are not allocated plots,
but also because they are commonly allocated even larger plots
in First and Second Class neighbourhoods, and are, in
addition, provided loans to build houses on these plots.
Though very little is known about the social characteristics
of female immigrants, it does therefore seem highly doubtful
whether female migration can be accounted for solely as
consequence of wage-labour migration.
In spite of the lack of data on the dynamics of female
immigration, the growth of the female population in Greater
Khartoum is substantiated by the returns of the Three National
Censuses. Table (3:1) clearly corroborates two very important
points. The first point concerns not only the relative
stability of the sex ratio in the period 1955/56 to 1983, but
also how, since 1973, the rate of increase in the urban female
population has exceeded the rate of increase in the urban male
population. Between 1955/56 and 1973, the total population of
Greater Khartoum increased by 219.2%, while the male and
female populations increased by 223.1% and 214.2%
respectively. Between 1973 and 1983, however, the female
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population increased by 73.1% while the male population
increased by only 69.9% (giving a total increase of 71.3%).
Unless we assume that natural growth in Greater Khartoum
between 1955/56 and 1983 was primarily of females, the only
explanation is that immigration , by females has at least been
proportionally equal to that by males.
Though data for 1983 on the sex distribution of the
population in El-Obeid, Port Sudan and Wad Medani are not
available, the returns of the first two censuses suffice to
make the point (See Tables 3:2, 3:3 and 3:4). Of these three
cities, it is only Wad Medani which showed a slightly higher
rate of increase among males than among females between
1955/56 and 1973; the male population increased by 115%, while
the female population by 109%. In El-Obeid and Port Sudan, on
the other hand, female populations had higher rates of
increase. In El-Obeid females increased by 75% and males by
only 67%, while in Port Sudan the rate of increase among
females was a dramatic 197% whereas among men the rate was
142% only.
The second point concerns the contribution of the increase
in the female population to the 'growth of the economically
non-active population between 1955/56 and 1973. In 1955/56,
the total female population in the conurbation was 110,407 and
of these only 6,389 females, or 5.78%, were reported as
'gainfully employed'. By 1973, the total female population in
the Three Towns reached 381,655, but only 18,992 females, or
4.98%, were listed as 'economically active'. The rate of
female participation in the urban labour force likewise
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declined in the other three large Sudanese cities. In El-Obeid
it fell from 7.2% to 5.8%, while in Port Sudan and Wad Medani
the rate fell from 7.1% to 6.9% and from 5.8% to 3.2%
respectively. It is interesting to note that, with the
exception of Wad Medani, the proportion of females in the
labour force in the cities considered has actually increased.
In other words, the decline in the rate of participation among
males was greater than among females. But in view of the
increase in the student population in the large Sudanese
cities to which I now turn this should not be surprising.
GROWTH IN THE STUDENT POPULATION
Generally speaking, the literature on Sudanese
urbanization has tended to under-emphasize the impact of the
expansion in secondary and post-secondary education upon the
process of rapid urban population growth in post-colonial
Sudan in general and Greater Khartoum in particular. The
contributions by Mohamed El-Awad Galal El-Din (particularly
1978; 1980a), however, stand as exceptions. In this respect,
Mohamed El-Awad (1980a:440) maintains that
Although migrants to Greater Khartoum are
distinctly better educated than the people
living outside the conurbation, they are far
less educated than those born in the
Khartoum area. The position of the
university-educated population is, however,
different as many migrants come to the
capital specifically to attend university,
while the capital clearly offers the widest
range and largest number of openings for
professional men and women.
Again, however, Mohamed El-Awad overlooks how substantial
this "university-educated t' migrant population is. This is
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curious because elsewhere (1978:124ff) he notes how
wage-labour migration has resulted in an "imbalance in the sex
ratios in Greater Khartoum". He quotes the returns of the
Second Census of 1973 to show how this imbalance is especially
marked in the age-groups 15-19, 20-24, 25-30 and 30-34 for
which the masculinity ratios in 1973 were 129, 155, 160 and
164 resectively. Following this line of argument, Mohamed
El-Awad goes on to discuss the "adverse implications" for the
countryside consequent on the loss of its able-bodied youth
who migrate to Greater Khartoum in search of employment.
That there is an imbalance in the sex ratio for the
age-group 15-34 in Greater Khartoum is of course not in doubt.
To assert that this imbalance can be accounted for primarily
by wage-labour immigration, however, is questionable. My
conviction is that a very substantial section of the immigrant
male population in the age-group 15-35 is actually comprised
either of students or of recent graduates employed in
government departments and private concerns.
The dramatic increase in the number of students between
1955/56 and 1973 is indeed particularly relevant in explaining
aspects of the decline in the rate of male participation in
the labour force in Greater Khartoum. As shown in Table (3:1),
the rate of male participation dropped from 58.7% in 1955/56
to 53.18% in 1973, while the proportion of males in the labour
force fell from 92.6% to 92.4%. Owing to lack of data on
immigration by pre-university students, however, in the rest
of this section I will confine the discussion to immigration
by post-secondary students as a factor in the conurbation's
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rapid population growth.
Firstly, it is worth noting that, although during the
decades since flag Independence the Sudan has experienced a
dramatic increase in educational services at all levels, the
rate of expansion in post-secondary education has been even
more impressive. In 1955 there was only one university college
in the country in addition to a handful of non-university,
post-secondary, institutes. At present, however, there are
five universities (and more are planned) and one university
college while ttno less than 15 [more institutes] were added in
the immediate post independence period" (Mohamed Omer Beshir,
1977:32). In the five year period between 1969/70 and 1973/74
alone, the number of students registered in post-secondary
education increased from 11,437 to 19,901 (cf. Table 3:7). By
1981/82, the number amounted to no less than 32,784 (cf. Table
3:8). It is also worth noting that, until the early 1970s,
post-secondary educational institutions in the Sudan were
exclusively confined to Greater Khartoum. Notwithstanding the
establishment of Juba and Gezira Universities outside the
conurbation, Greater Khartoum still accommodates over 31,000
post-secondary students, who comprise over 94% of all students
in higher education in the country (cf. Table 3:8). Indeed, it
is this heavy concentration which has rendered the university
student population such a formidable political force in the
country.
Though I could not find exact figures on the proportion of
migrant-students in the conurbation's universities and other
post-secondary institutions, from my own experience, and for
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social and economic reasons which I cannot consider here, it
can be safely estimated that at least 80 per cent of the
31 ,337 post-secondary students in Greater Khartoum were born
outside Khartoum. In an unpublished survey of first year
students entering Khartoum University in 1977/78, John Tait
found that 40% were from the Gezira Province alone (cf.
O'Brien, 1984a:225).
Notwithstanding the relatively significant increase of
female students in higher education in recent years, the
masculinity ratio for post-secondary students in Greater
Khartoum by 1982 was still 256 (cf. Table 3:8). In view of
this, it seems erroneous to ascribe the lower overall
masculinity ratio of 155 for the population in the age-group
20-24 years in 1973 to wage labour migration, especially as
the Second National Census quoted by Mohamed El-Awad (1977a:3l)
shows that this age-group constituted 10.25% of Greater
Khartoum's total population of 784,294 in 1973. The number of
post-secondary students in Greater Khartoum for that year was
19,901 (cf. Table 3:7), or approximately 25% of the 80,390 men
and women comprising the population in that age-group.
Moreover, it should be stressed that the presence of these
migrant-students does not cease with their graduation. As I
shall soon explain, the large majority of graduates is
actually employed in the capital.
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GROWTH AMONG THE 'NON-WAGE' EARNERS
From the foregoing discussion it should be clear that
wage-labour migration cannot be considered the prime factor
underlying population growth in the conurbation. The 'prime
factor' is, on the contrary, the growth of elements that do
not participate at all in the urban labour force. In the rest
of this section I attempt to substantiate the contention that
even when it comes to growth in the "economically active
population", the wage-labour force cannot be held solely, or
even mainly, responsible. In particular, I draw attention to
the increase in the numbers of professionals, bureaucrats and
members of the different fractions of the capitalist class.
GROWTH AMONG THE SAIIARIAT
It is common knowledge in the Sudan that, starting with
the process of Sudanization of top government posts in the
late 1940s/early 1950s, there has been a rapid increase in
government employment. Of special • relevance to the present
discussion, however, is the growth in public 'classified
employees', which category does not cover skilled and
unskilled manual workers who are regarded as 'unclassified
government employees'. Table (3:9) gives an overview of the
increase in the number of 'classified staff' over a number of
years covering both the colonial and immediate post-colonial
periods. Between 1946 and 1956, total 'classified employment'
increased from 7,660 to 12,127. Though those recruited into
the civil service during the colonial period were not
exclusively Sudanese, it is almost certain that the entire
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increase during the last decade of colonial rule was Sudanese.
The increase in the numbers of Sudanese in 'classified
employment' between 1953 and 1956 (cf. Table 3:10) clearly
bears witness to this. Following flag Independence, moreover,
virtually no expatriates were taken into the civil service.
The increase in the number of 'classified staff' since
1963/64 has been more dramatic than in the earlier period of
Sudanization. In the five year period from 1963 to 1968 alone,
the number of 'classified staff' was increased by more than
one third, from 25,042 to 39,769 (cf. Abdel Rahman E. All
Taha, 1976:124; also see; Aguda, 1972:335). In 1968, moreover,
an Unemployment Relief Fund was especially created to provide
salaries for the increasing numbers of secondary
school-leavers and university graduates who were taken on as
'temporary' employees in government. According to Mohamed Omer
Beshir (1977:48), these school-leavers and graduates had to be
employed on a 'temporary' basis through the Fund because they
were considered unqualified "to fill vacancies existing on a
permanent basis". When the Fund was effectively abolished in
1974, however, more than 19,000 people employed through it had
to be absorbed into 'permanent' positions in the various
government departments (cf. Mohamed El-Murtada Mustafa &
Khalid Aff an, 1977:206). The recruitment of school-leavers and
graduates of course continued after 1974; but owing to
stringent budgetary considerations in the last few years a
limited problem of 'educated unemployment' started to emerge
in Greater Khartoum (although this is now being offset by
opportunities in regional governments in the Sudan as well as
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by emigration to the oil-rich Arab countries).
The point in considering aspects of the increase in the
number of 'classified staff ' is that the bulk of 'classified
employees' are not only found in the large urban areas in the
country, but also particularly concentrated in the conurbation
of Khartoum. According to Salih El-Arifi (1971:133), the
returns of the First National Population Census indicate that
in 1955/56 the eight largest Sudanese cities jointly had;
69.4	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 professional
non-technical group composed of high-school
teachers, senior civil-service men and
university professors. The Khartoum Complex
alone had roughly 55 per cent of the total
of this group. The professional-technical
group, which includes doctors and engineers,
was represented by 73.2 per cent in the
eight centres and by about 58 per cent in
the Khartoum Complex alone. The same was the
case with the senior clerical group, which
showed a heavier concentration than the
junior clericals...Many senior clerical
personnel were concentrated in the Khartoum
complex, which possessed 42 per cent of the
total; the major centres together had 64.9
per cent of the total.
'Classified	 employees'	 have	 always	 constituted a
significant sector of the 'economically active' population in
all 'large' cities in the country. As shown in Table (3:11),
even prior to post-colonial expansion, 'classified employees'
(i.e. administrators, professionals, clerks) and personnel of
the protective services accounted for no less than 19% of the
economically active population of Khartoum in 1955/56. In
spite of the rigid centralization which undoubtedly boosted
the proportion of the 'classified staff' and personnel of the
protective services in the 'gainfully employed' population of
Greater Khartoum, the proportion in the other large Sudanese
r97397
263
73
22
7
1
8
4
11
5
5
4
4
4
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Table 3:11
The Distribution of the Gainfully Emplyed Popul-
ation in Greater Khartoum by Occupation (Both
Sexes), 1955/56
uccupationai iroup
1. Shop Owners
2. Owners of Large Industrial Undertakings
3. Workshop Owners
4. Animal Owners
5. Professional & Semi-Professional
6. Managerial (Industry & Commerce)
7. Senior and Junior Clerks
8. Protective Services
9. Skilled Personal Services
10. Semi-skilled & Unskilled P. Services
11. Metal Industries Craftsmen
12. Woodworking Craftsmen
13. Building & Kindred Craftsmen
14. Textile Craftsmen
15. Light Industries Craftsmen
16. Other Craftsmen
17. Machinery Operatives in Transport
18. Other Machinery Operatives
19. Labourers except Farm Labourers
20. Farm and Forestry Workers
21. Unknown & Unproductive Occupations
TOTAL
Source: Compiled from Tables (9.11)
Planners Supplement, vàl. 1, 1955/56
Government, 1 961).
4
4
3
1
11
1
	
7180	 8
	
85775	 100
and (9.13) of Town
Census (cf. Sudan
6168
570
6687
3758
9661
4455
4399
3570
3666
3577
3619
2171
5502
849
9824
807
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cities showed no stark variation in 1955/56. In El-Obeid the
two categories constituted 14% of the 'gainfully employed'
population (Table 3:12), while in Port Sudan and Wad Medani
they constituted 13% and 14% respectively (cf. Tables 3:13 and
3:14).
Furthermore, it is my strong impression that the
proportion of 'classified employees' in the economically
active population in present-day Khartoum is at least equal
to, if not greater than, what it was in 1955/56. I could not,
however, find any recent figures to corroborate this
contention. Nevertheless data for 1973 that include neither
public 'manufacturing' employees nor military personnel
suggest that public employment in Greater Khartoum accounted
for 60,000 (or approximately 24%) of the 251,532 economically
active population (cf. ILO, 1976:365). Given that in Khartoum
there are only a few ministries, government departments and
non-industrial public corporations that employ more
wage-earners than salariats (e.g. the Ministry of Construction
and Public Works, the Mechanical Transport Department, the
Stores and Ordnance Department, the Water and Electricity
Corporations and Sudan Railways), it seems no over-estimate to
maintain that at least two-thirds of public employees in
Greater Khartoum are 'classified staff'. This estimate, it is
worth noting, is very modest in view of the pattern of
concentration of 'classified employment' in Greater Khartoum
and of the fact that in the sole reference to the proportion
of 'classified staff' in total government employment in the
Sudan as a whole (in 1962), the salariats were roughly half
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Table 3:12
The Distribution of the Gainfully Emplyed Popul-
ation in EL-Obeid by Occupation (Both Sexes),
1955/56
cupational Group
1. Shop Owners	 1912
	
10
2. Owners of Large Industrial Undertakings	 25
3. Workshop Owners	 4
4. Animal Owners	 26
5. Professional & Semi-Professional
	
706
	
4
6. Managerial (Industry & Commerce)	 42
7. Senior and Junior Clerks 	 839
	
4
8. Protective Services	 1116
	
6
9. Skilled Personal Services 	 2592	 . 13
10. Semi-skilled & Unskilled P. Services 	 1500	 8
11. Metal Industries Craftsmen	 613	 3
12. Woodworking Craftsmen 	 400	 2
13. Building & Kindred Craftsmen
	
556	 3
14. Textile Craftsmen	 554	 3
15. Light Industries Craftsmen	 1051	 5
16. Other Craftsmen	 325	 2
17. Machinery Operatives in Transport	 1331	 7
18. Other Machinery Operatives	 77	 -
19. Labourers except Farm Labourers 	 1755	 9
20. Farm and Forestry Workers	 23	 -
21. Farmer	 2790	 15
22. Shepherds	 334	 2
23. Unknown & Unproductive Occupations 	 573	 3
TOTAL	 19144	 100
Source: Compiled from Tables (9.11) and (9.13) of Town
Planners Supplement, vol. 1, 1955/56 Census (cf. Sudan
Government, 1961).
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Table 3:13
The Distribution of the Gainfully Emplyed Popul-
ation in Port Sudan by Occupation (Both Sexes),
1955/56
cupational Group	 Number
1. Shop Owners
2. Owners of Large Industrial Undertakings
3. Animal Owners
4. Professional & Semi-Professional
5. Managerial (Industry & Commerce)
6. Senior and Junior Clerks
7. Protective Services
8. Skilled Personal Services
9. Semi-skilled & Unskilled P. Services
10. Metal Industries Craftsmen
11. Woodworking Craftsmen
12. Building & Kindred Craftsmen
13. Textile Craftsmen
14. Light Industries Craftsmen
15. Other Craftsmen
16. Machinery Operatives in Transport
17. Other Machinery Operatives
18. Labourers except Farm Labourers
19. Farm and Forestry Workers
20. Farmers
21. Shepherds
22. Fishermen & Hunters
23. Unknown & Unproductive Occupations
TOTAL	 2
Source: Compiled rom Tables (9.11) and (9.13) of Town
Planners Supplement, vol. 1, 1955/56 Census (cf. Sudan
Government, 1961).
	1 838
	
11
6
6
	
788
	
5
	
1 05
	
1
	
935
	
6
	
547
	
3
	
2048	 13
	
863	 5
	
545	 3
	
721	 4
	
702	 4
	
740	 5
	
1171	 7
	
598	 4
	
804	 5
	
881
	
2
	
2174
	
14
	
136
	
1
	
708
	
4
72
7
50
	
1 5945
	
1 00
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Table 3:14
The Distribution of the Gainfully Emplyed Popul-
ation in Wad Medani by Occupation (Both Sexes),
1955/56
Occupational Group 	 Number	 % I
1. Shop Owners
2. Owners of Large Industrial Undertakings
3. Animal Owners
4. Professional & Semi-Professional
5. Managerial (Industry & Commerce)
6. Senior and Junior Clerks
7. Protective Services
8. Skilled Personal Services
9. Semi-skilled & Unskilled P. Services
10. Metal Industries Craftsmen
11. Woodworking Craftsmen
12. Building & Kindred Craftsmen
13. Textile Craftsmen
14. Light Industries Craftsmen
15. Other Craftsmen
16. Machinery Operatives in Transport
17. Other Machinery Operatives
18. Labourers except Farm Labourers
19. Farm and Forestry Workers
20. Farmers
21. Shepherds
22. Fishermen & Hunters
23. Unknown & Unproductive Occupations
TOTAL
Source: Compiled .from Tables (9.11) and (9.13) of Town
Planners Supplement, vol. 1, 1955/56 Census (cf. Sudan
Government, 1 96]L).
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the total public employees in the Sudan (cf. Table 3:15).
Since 1962, however, the increase in 'classified employment'
has been far greater than in 'unclassified employment', and
while 'classified employees' tend to concentrate in Greater
Khartoum and other large urban areas, 'unclassified' workers
constitute a majority in rural, and small urban, areas. It is
worth noting in this respect that El-Sayed El-Bushra (197682)
claims that (in 1973?) Greater Khartoum accounted for 50% of
physicians in the country.
Furthermore, despite the regionalization policy adopted in
recent years by the government, there is little reason to
assume that the pattern of concentration of 'classified staff'
in Greater Khartoum has changed. It is relevant to note that
through the regionalization policy the tasks of many of the
central ministries in Khartoum were drastically reduced to the
extent that the "bulk of the staff in Khartoum could be
transferred to the regions" to meet their considerable new
staffing requirements (Moharir, 1984; also see Beshir Omer
Fadlallah, 1984). All regional governments in the country,
however, are said to be acutely under-staffed at present. In
this respect Moharir (1984) notes that
as the experience of implementing regional
government in Sudan so far shows,
[transferring staff from Khartoum].. is not
an easy task, partly due to the built-in
resistance of the civil servants used to the
facilities of the capital.
Given my contention concerning the preponderance of
'migrant-students' in post-secondary education, a large
section of the 'classified employees' in Greater Khartoum may
indeed be comprised of migrants.
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Furthermore, though a majority of technical and
non-technical professionals is employed by government, quite a
number of them are also found as employees or self-employed
persons	 in the private sector. Employment in insurance
companies and banks, for example, i almost exclusively of
non-wage earners. The exact number of all the salariat groups
in Greater Khartoum in 1973 is difficult to estimate, but
probably constituted over 25% of the total economically active
population (Cf. Table 3:16).
Before turning to assess aspects of the growth of the
capitalist class, I should at least give weight by assertion
(because corroboration is difficult) to the significance of
military employment in Greater Khartoum. Though I do not have
any recent figures or estimates on this form of public
employment (which is not included in the statistics quoted
above), it is common knowledge that it is indeed
'substantial'. All that can be advanced in this connection is
a mere speculation, but it seems probable that over a third of
the 65,000 strong People's Armed Forces are actually stationed
(with their families) in Greater Khartoum. But even a very
conservative estimate of 10,000 'employees' in the military
for 1973 would boost the ratio of 'non-wage employees' to 40%
of the economically active population of Greater Khartoum. It
is worth noting here that this percentage does not cover
employees in the Police Force, the Prisons Department and the
State Security Organization.
24.1
13.2
10.5
5.7
1.8
0.3
0.3
3.2
0.1
0.0
0.2
4.1
0.0
0.8
0.2
0.8
0.0
2.7
3.1
5.5
3.0
1.6
1.7
5.5
0.4
3.1
0.4
0.8
1.8
0.2.
2.3
0.4
0.8
0.7
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.1
0.0
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Table 3:15
Categories & Scales of Government Employees (7),1962
CATEGORY/SCALE	 7 OF TOTAL
Manual employees:
Croup I (unskilled)
Group II (semi-skilled)
Group III (semi-skilled)
Group IV (skilled)
Group V (skilled)
Group VI (skilled)
Group VII (supervisory)
Clerical employees
junior, Class 1
2
3
4
5
Senior, Class 6
7
8
9
10
Semi-professional and
technical staff
Scales group 1 (1)
2 (4)
3 (1)
4 (1)
5 (3)
6 (5)
7 (1)
8 (6)
9 (1)
10 (6)
1.1 (3)
Administrative and prof -
essional staff
Scales group 1 (1)
2 (6)
3 (5)
4 (3)
5 (1)
6 (3)
7 (3)
8 (1)
9 (2)
10 (3)
_______-	 11 (3)
Source: ILO, 1962:35-6, as quoted by Abdel Rahman E. A.
Taha, 1976:132-3.
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IMMIGRATION BY THE BOURGEOISIE
It is beyond the purpose of this section to consider the
question of the origin, development or role of the Sudanese
bourgeoisie (cf. Fatima Babiker Mahmoud, 1984; Mohamed Yousif
A. El-Mustafa, 1983; El-Haj Bilal Omr, 1979). It suffices to
make the point that subsequent to the undermining of the
status of virtual monopoly which a few foreign, mainly
British, companies and individual capitalists used to enjoy
during the colonial period, the Sudanese bourgeoisie has
increased rapidly (cf. Mohamed Hashim Awad, 1966?; Taj
el-Anbia A. El-Dawi, 1972; Mohamed Yousif A. El-Mustafa, 1983;
Fatima Babiker Mahmoud, 1984).
The growth of the 'dependent' local bourgeoisie during the
last decade or so has been accelerated out of all proportion
to its growth in former decades. The processes underlying this
rapid growth are several and complex, and can only be outlined
in a very general manner here. Most significant of these
processes is the expansion in large scale mechanized rainfed
farming. This was particularly after the impetus given to
mechanised farming during the 1970s by the sharp rise in the
price of oil-seeds and the increase in demand for sorghum in
neighbouring countries. This expansion contributed to a
significant increase in the ranks of the 'big merchants' and
the agricultural bourgeoisie (who, it is worth noting, are
also largely merchants). The shortages in imported consumer
goods consequent on the problems of the balance of payments in
the Sudan has also augmented the growth of the commercial
bourgeoisie by opening opportunities for black-marketing.
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Another factor is the inflow of capital from outside Sudan.
This is partly a consequence of the emigration of Sudanese to
the Gulf, and of the return of some with sufficient capital to
allow them to enter the ranks of the bourgeoisie. With the
adoption of an 'open door polidy' in 1973, and especially
since 1977, however, the Sudan has also experienced an inflow
of foreign capital, especially from Arab countries, which
seems to have been the prime factor behind the emergence of
the 'new rich' in the country. Speculation on the role of the
Faisal Islamic Bank in the promotion of capital accumulation
among members of the Muslim Brotherhood is a case in point.
Last but not least, there is the "factor of corruption",
through which an increasing number of state functionaries have
managed to accumulate capital (cf. El-Wathig Kameir and
Ibrahim Kursany, 1984; Fatima Babiker Mahmoud, 1984).
Unfortunately, however, no precise statistics, or even rough
estimates, are available on the size of the capitalist class
in the Sudan as a whole.
As in the case of professionals and bureaucrats, the
bourgeoisie is concentrated in the large urban areas in
general and Greater Khartoum in particular. And the 'big
merchants' and industrialists are almost exclusively
concentrated in Greater Khartoum. In 1967, for example, over
80% of the large commercial establishments, around 73% of the
'modern' industrial establishments, and approximately 80% of
all banking activities were concentrated in Greater Khartoum
(cf.	 Mohamed	 El-Awad	 Galal El-Din, 1978:120; El-Sayed
El-Bushra, 1980:275).
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The concentration of capitalists in Greater Khartoum is
not a 'coincidence' and most of the 'big' businessmen in the
Sudan are not 'Khartoumites' by birth. Far from this being the
case, their concentration is largely a result of the
persistent migration of individual capitalists (and the
transfer of capital) into Greater Khartoum from all over the
country (cf. Fatima Babiker Mahmoud, op.cit. pp. 118ff).
Migration from Western Sudan, where the number of merchants
engaged in export trade in oil-seeds and gum arabic has
increased dramatically during the last decade or so, is
particularly significant in understanding the current increase
in the number of 'big merchants' in the conurbation. Though
the amenities of Khartoum may partly account for the
immigration of capitalists (especially the agricultural
bourgeoisie), the main factors underlying the concentration
are directly related to the requirements of the process of
capital accumulation.
The large majority of capitalists in Greater Khartoum
consists of merchants (importers, exporters, wholesalers and
retailers). For the importers and exporters, whose activities
are directly tied to foreign trade, proximity to the various
government departments concerned with licensing,
	 custom
clearance, etc., is imperative. Owing to the exclusive
concentration of the administration of foreign trade in
Khartoum, the presence in the conurbation of virtually all
importers and exporters is hardly surprising. For these
importers and exporters, as well as for the wholesalers who do
not deal directly with the international trading centres,
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Greater Khartoum is the best point of redistribution (and
collection). The strategic location of Greater Khartoum as the
"nodal point of all national routes., and., the most
accessible urban area in the country by river, rail, road and
air" (El-Sayed El-Bushra, 1980:270) is of course crucial in
this respect. For the presence of retailers, the status of the
conurbation as the largest consumption centre hardly needs
emphasis. No wonder, therefore., that "shop-owners" have always
constituted a significant segment of the 'economically active
population' in Greater Khartoum.
As early as 1955/56, "shop-owners" in the Three Towns
numbered 7,397, or approximately 9 per cent of the 85,777
'gainfully employed' population (cf. Table 3:11). By 1973, no
less than 24,482 were listed by the Census as "employers"
and/or "own-account workers" in the 'sector' comprising
wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels (cf. Table
3:16). Assuming that there were 1,482 restaurant and hotel
owners in Khartoum (the number of hotels is definitely less
than ninety), wholesalers and retailers would still account
for 23,000, or over 9 per cent, of the economically active
population in 1973. The proportion of businessmen in the
'economically active' population in other major towns is often
even greater. In 1955/56, they constituted 9.9% in El-Obeid,
6.5% in Port Sudan, and 11.5% in Wad Medani (cf. Tables 3:12,
3:13 and 3:14 respectively). By 1973, moreover, their
proportion either remained the same or increased; in El-Obeid
they accounted for 11.3% (Table 3:17), while in Port Sudan and
Wad Medani the relevant percentages are 9.6% and 11.5%
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respectively (Tables 3:18 and 3:19). The proportion of
migrants among the wholesale and retail traders in each of
these cities, however, is difficult to estimate.
Until the detailed returns of the 1983 Census are made
available, it will be scarcely possible to assess accurately
the increase in the commercial bourgeoisie since 1973. It is
worth noting, however, that in 1973 the 'open door policy' was
still in its infancy, and the current dramatic growth of the
capitalist class was just starting. The records of the Tax
office in Greater Khartoum, however, are of some help in
estimating the present number of the 'big merchants'.
According to the Tax records for 1983, at least 4,908 licensed
merchants paid their Business Profit Tax (which is not
applicable to small shop-owners who pay a fixed annual fee for
licence). Given the skills of the commercial bourgeoisie in
delaying, as well as in evading altogether, payment of the
Business Profit Tax (cf. Mohamed Yousif A. El-Mustafa,
1983:147ff), it may safely be estimated that there are at
least 6,000 'big merchants' in Greater Khartoum. Corroboration
of this estimate can be found in the register of the Khartoum
Chamber of Commerce which indicates that the number of members
had reached 4,000 by the beginning of 1984. Very few, if any,
retailers join the Chamber whose members are almost
exclusively importers, exporters and/or wholesalers.
A further, but relatively smaller, fraction of capitalists
in Greater Khartoum consists of industrialists. According to
the register of the Employers 1
 Union, the membership, which is
exclusive to big industrialists, had reached 400 by the
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beginning of 1984. In this respect, the concentration of
industrialists in Greater Khartoum is not solely a consequence
of the fact that the Conurbation represents both the best
redistribution centre and the largest single market for their
products. For those "luxury products" in which the Sudan was,
until	 recently,	 said	 to	 be	 "self-sufficient", 	 i.e.
refrigerators, air-coolers and car-batteries (Africa
Contemporary Record, 1979/80), Greater Khartoum is virtually
the sole market. It hardly needs emphasis that the market for
these products	 is	 found almost exiusively among the
Khartoum-based commercial bourgeoisie, professionals and
bureaucrats, whose incomes, though not directly comparable,
are much higher than are those of the 'ordinary Sudanese' in
other parts of the country.
As the case with the professionals and bureaucrats, the
exact size of the capitalist class in Greater Khartoum is
difficult to determine precisely. Though interpreting Table
(3:16) with the assumption that all "employers" are
capitalists of some sort might be helpful, the category "own
account worker" complicates matters as many of these may be
petty commodity producers in the so-called 'urban informal
sector', and the figures should therefore be approached with
caution. Recognizing this difficulty, I would consider as
"capitalists" only those "own-account workers" in the two
'sectors' comprising "Wholesale and Retail Trade" and
"Finance, Insurance, etc.". This would give us a conservative
estimate of 27,148 "businessmen", or approximately 11% of the
conurbation's 'economically active' population in 1973.
222
CONcLUS ION
In the foregoing discussion I have attempted to
corroborate the contention that the increase in wage labour
migration cannot be conceived as the prime factor behind the
process of population growth in post-colonial Khartoum. To
establish this I considered the available evidence on the
increase of three main groups: (1) the 'nonearners 1 , among
whom women and post-secondary students were given special
consideration; (2) the 'classified' government employees, and
(3) the capitalists.
The increase in the number of 'non-earners' was shown to
be the most significant factor in the population growth of
post-colonial Khartoum. Thus, while between 1955/56 and 1973
the economically active population increased from 85,777 to
251,532, the number of 'non-earners' increased during the same
period from 159,958 to 532,762. Female and child immigration
and post-secondary education were identif led as the three main
factors underlying the growth in the 'non-earners'. Lack of
information on the nature of female and child immigration,
however, places constraints on our understanding of the
factors which have stimulated its acceleration in recent
years.
The returns of the First and Second Population Censuses do
not show the proportion of wage labourers in the urban labour
force in Greater Khartoum and it is therefore difficult to
determine the precise magnitude of the increase in the wage
labour force. Through a discussion of the expansion in
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government 'classified employment' and the growth in the
capitalist class, however, I have attempted to show the
significance of salariats and businessmen in the composition
of the urban labour force. In 1955/56, these two categories
accounted for over 30% of the labour force in Greater
Khartoum. Though the returns of the 1973 Census are more
difficult to interpret these two groups (including military
personnel) probably accounted for over 50% the total
economically active population. In this respect, however, it
should be noted that the other 50% does not consist only of
wage labourers, but includes "self-employed' petty commodity
producers and traders, some of whom may be characterised as
incipient capitalists employing wage labourers in the
so-called 'urban informal sector'. Total wage employment in
Greater Khartoum in 1973 probably accounted for less than 40%
of the 179,391 persons whom the Census returns list as
"employees" (cf. Table 3:16). That the wage labour force in
the conurbation accounted for less than 30% of the urban
labour force, however, is hardly surprising. As I shall
demonstrate in the next two chapters on the operation of the
labour market in Greater Khartoum, this is indeed a basic
feature of the pattern of peripheral capitalist urbanism,
whose functioning is tied to the colonial-type trade economy,
and whose activities demand only a relatively small urban
manual labour force.
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NOTES
1. The initial draft of this chapter provided the framework
for a section in a paper presented to the Sudan Research
Workshop, 3-5 July 1984 at the ISS, The Hague (Salah El-Din
El-Shazali Ibrahim, 1984a).
CHAPTER FOUR
THE OPERATION OF THE LABOUR MARKET IN COLONIAL KHARTOUM
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the cities in question have grown on the
basis of the fact that they administer and
tax the primary exports produced by their
hinterland economies. Indeed they often
began life to perform this role, and this
clearly grows in scope as the quantity of
such exports	 is	 increased	 (Bienefeld,
1 979:40)
With	 the notable exception of	 the preliminary
	
contributions of Mohamed El-Awad Galal 	 El-Din	 (notably
1980a:425-32) and El-Wathig Kameir (1980b:41-48), the question
of the emergence and expansion of the urban wage labour market
in the Sudan has generally escaped attention. But it is worth
noting that the pioneering contribution by McLoughlin (1970)
adopts what can be called a 'historical approach' in the study
of the conditions of the labour market in the Three Towns
(1900-1950). The currently popular (pre-war/ post-war)
periodization of the development of the urban labour market
has indeed initially been formulated in that contribution.
Unfortunately insofar as McLoughlin has focused solely on the
question of the balance between supply and demand and wage
rates in the labour market as described in colonial official
reports, his 'historical' approach actually differs very
little from the synchronic approaches found in the literature.
They all overlook the implications of the processes of
"underdevelopment" in the Sudan for the operation of the urban
wage labour market.
The periodization suggested by McLoughlin, and which was
subsequently adopted by Mohamed El-Awad (1973; l974a; 1978;
1979 a; l980a) and El-Wathig Kameir (1980b), conceptualizes the
development of the urban labour market in the Sudan in terms
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of the destination of rural wage labour migration in the
country. Accordingly, it is argued that prior to the Second
World War wage labour migration in the Sudan was mainly
intra-rural directed towards agricultural employment, in which
remuneration was higher than in urban areas. In consequence,
labour shortages were not uncommon in Sudanese cities in
general and Greater Khartoum in particular. Since the end of
the war, it is asserted, the shortage in urban labour has
changed into a large surplus to the extent that the colonial
government had to refer migrants in Greater Khartoum to the
agricultural regions and/or their places of original domicile.
Mohamed El-Awad Galal El-Din (1974a:20 explains the emergence
of this 'labour surplus' with reference to the "revisions and
increases" in urban wages in the period between 1948 and 1968.
In Chapter One I discussed the flaw in postulating income
differentials as the cause of rural to urban wage labour
migration, and I do not intend to repeat here aspects of the
conceptual confusion regarding the process of
proto-proletarianiation underlying that form of migration.
What is important to note in relation to that periodization is
that it distracted the attention of both Mohamed El-Awad and
El-Wathig from pursuing the analysis of the "intra-urban"
processes of peripheral urbanism which govern the operation of
the urban wage labour market, although the basic elements for
the construction of such an analysis have tacitly been touched
on in the course of their accounts. The central objective of
this chapter is to redress, at least in part, aspects of this
lacuna.
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THE LABOUR MARKET IN 1 9TH CENTURY SUDAN
In considering the question of the emergence of an urban
wage labour market in the Sudan, it is worth noting that there
is some evidence concerning the exitence of a small market
for skilled wage labour in 19th century urban Sudan. The
skilled workers involved were almost exclusively expatriates
(mainly Egyptians) brought to the country by the
Turco-Egyptian colonial administration (cf. Stevenson, 1966).
The smallness of the wage labour market and its confinement to
skilled labour was mainly due to the role played by slave
labour in 19th century urban Sudan.
In almost all Sudanese towns during the 19th century,
slaves figured as a sizable section of the urban population;
and the preponderance of slave labour in the undertaking of
unskilled, mainly domestic, tasks effectively precluded
dispossessed 'free Sudanese' from entering the urban wage
labour market. In the particular case of Khartoum the
slave-population constituted over half the total population in
the city well after the slave trade (as opposed to slavery)
had officially been banned by the Turco-Egyptian colonial
administration. Lieut. Col. Stewart, who accompanied General
Gordon in the 'evacuation' mission, gave a figure of 50 to 55
thousands for the total population of Khartoum in 1883, and of
these around two-thirds were said to be "slaves" - an estimate
corroborated by Powers who reported in the Times that the
number of "registered slaves" in Khartoum in the same year was
27,000 (cf. ibid., p. 17). By the time the British colonial
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state was established, however, virtually no form of urban
labour was available. The expatriate skilled workers seem to
have left the Sudan prior to the establishment of the Mandist
State. Though the conditions of the urban slave population
during the Mandist era are far from clear, many of them seem
to have been (liberated and) recruited into the Khalifa's
army, from which large numbers apparently escaped to Egypt.
According to 'Mohamed Omer Beshir (1974:56ff), it was largely
these deserters who formed the six Sudanese battalions which,
together with 12 Egyptian battalions, invaded the Sudan in
1898. For the undertaking of manual tasks in colonial Sudan,
thus, an urban wage labour force had to be created and this,
in turn, led to the emergence of full-fledged urban wage
labour markets. The demand for manual labour at the inception
of British colonial rule was enormous. Since the larger part
of this demand related to the undertaking of the process of
urban reconstruction, however, a brief account of the
conditions of urban areas at the turn of the century is in
order.
THE ERA OF URBAN DESTRUCTION
When the British colonial administration was established
in 1899, the majority of urban centres in the Sudan were in
ruins and virtually depopulated. With the exception of the
drastic depopulation of Omdurman in 1898, however, the
conditions of Sudanese urban areas at the turn of the century
cannot be ascribed to the British invasion. They were, rather,
the cumulative outcome of the turmoil which characterized the
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larger part of the period from 1821, when the Turco-Egyptian
troops invaded the kingdoms of the Sudan, to 1898, when the
'Anglo-Egyptian' troops 'reconquered' the Sudan.
The first incidents of urban destruction took place at the
inception of Turco-Egyptian colonial iule. With the collapse
of the Funj Kingdom (cf. O'Fahey & Spaulding, 1974), Sennar,
the capital, was simply evacuated and left to decay as the
colonial administration moved its capital, first to Wad Medani
and, eventually, to Khartoum. El-Obeid town, which was the
capital of Al-Musabba'at chieftaincy, was destroyed in the
course of the invasion in 1822 (cf. Born, 1980:153).
Instigated by the murder of Ismail Pasha at Shendi in 1822,
moreover, the punitive campaigns of the Dafterdar in 1823
reduced to ruins the once flourishing urban centres of
Al-Metamma, Shendi, and Al-Damir (cf. Hill, 1970:5ff). But
Born (op.cit.) points out that the impact of the
Turco-Egyptian colonial period upon the process of
urbanization in the Sudan was not wholly, or even largely,
negative. Many of the towns and cities of present-day Sudan
(Khartoum and Wad Medani to mention two of the most important)
had originally emerged during that period when numerous
administrative and military stations were established to run
the country. The practice of the Turco-Egyptian administration
to keep a large following of irregular troops (composed mainly
of Magharba from North Africa), and the tendency of the
colonial administrators to retain the services of large
numbers of slaves, seem to have boosted the urban population.
The Turco-Egyptian colonial administration did not last
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for long; and by 1881 the Mandi was already active recruiting
supporters for his revolution against the 'Turks'. The initial
successes of the Mandists in the West, which culminated in the
fall of El-Obeid and Bara in 1883, resulted in the destruction
of virtually all government buildings in the two towns as well
as their partial depopulation. With the establishment of the
Mandist State, El-Obeid was to deteriorate further. In this
respect Born (op.cit.) has quoted Gleichen (1905:177) that;
..the Khalifa (had) laid practically the
whole of Kordofan waste at various times,
when the province was re-occupied in
December, 1899, all the large towns and most
of the villages had ceased to exist.. At
El-Obeid there was not a single soul, and
nothing was left of the old city but a
portion of the Mudiria [the provincial
headquarters] buildings..
With the fall of Khartoum in January 1885, the capital of
the Turco-Egyptian administration was virtually completely
abandoned as the Mandi decided to stay with his troops at
Omdurman, across the White Nile from Khartoum. The Mandi died
shortly after the fall of Khartoum, and a year later his
Khalifa ordered the demolition of all buildings in the
deserted city to provide material for the construction of
Omdurman (cf. El-Sayed El-Bushra, 1976:33ff).
Furthermore, though the northern Sudanese towns were not
affected by the events during the initial stages of the
Mandist Revolution, the establishment of the Mandist State
nevertheless resulted in their decline. In this respect we
have to take into consideration the consequences of the
disruption in both administration and commerce. The tendency
of the Khalifa to have the army concentrated at Omdurman
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resulted in a drastic reduction in the population of all towns
that had formerly been stations for troops and their
following. Likewise the disruption of long distance trade
resulted in a further depopulation of•those towns in which a
sizable section of the inhabitants had formerly been dependent
on commerce for their livelihood. Many of the expatriate
merchants who dominated trade during the Turco-Egyptian
colonial era had actually escaped from the country prior to
the fall of Khartoum; and those who remained behind were
reduced to "begging prisoners" at Omdurman (cf. Rehfisch,
1967). The final days of the Mandist State also witnessed the
destruction of Shendi and Al-Metamma, which were harried by
Mahmoud Wad Ahmed and his Ansar patrols.
At the time of the 'reconquest', therefore, Omdurman was
the one and only urban centre of any significance. Within a
period of less than two decades, the Mandi's capital developed
from a small fort of 240 persons in 1884 into a large city
whose population could safely be estimated at around 150,000
(cf. El-Sayed El-Bushra, .1976:34). Some historians believe
that at its highest the population of Omdurman approximated
400,000 (cf. Fadwa Abdel Rahman A. Taha, 1978). Subsequent to
the heavy losses incurred by the 50,000 strong Ansar army at
the battle of Karari (north of Omdurman), however, even
Omdurman experienced a drastic reduction in the size of its
population. Conservative estimates of the losses of the Ansar
give a figure of over 11,000 for the dead, and over 16,000 for
the wounded. The remnants of the defeated Ansar, led by the
Khalifa, started their 'holy emigration', which resulted in a
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further depopulation of the city. Those who remained behind in
Omdurman after the battle of Karari were either women,
children and severely wounded Ansar, or elements that had
opposed the Mandists (e.g. prisoners). I could not, however,
find any figures for the population of' Omdurman subsequent to
Karari but prior to the entry into the city by the
Anglo-Egyptian troops. Figures for 1905 show a total of 39,916
inhabitants comprising 9,807 men, 15,395 women, and 14,714
children (Governor-General, 1906:644; McLoughlin, 1970:108).
These figures, it is important to stress, relate to a time
when	 the British	 colonial	 administration was firmly
established in the northern and central regions of Sudan.
Beside colonial administrators and troops, they probably
included the wage labour migrants, whom the colonial
government had induced to come to the Three Towns (see below).
THE SOURCE OF LABOUR DEMAND
In addition to the labour needs of the various departments
of the British colonial administration, the process of urban
reconstruction required a further and much larger demand for
labour. In cases like Khartoum and El-Obeid, the whole city
had to be rebuilt from scratch. A relatively smaller demand
originated in commerce which, following the reconquest, was
being consolidated (cf. El-Haj Bilal Omer, 1979; Mohamed
Yousif A. El-Mustafa, 1983). Owing to the virtual
non-existence of a wage labour force at the inception of
British colonial rule, the decision of the newly established
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colonial administration not to use slave-labour effectively
meant that the Sudan was virtually devoid of any form of
manual labour that could readily undertake manual tasks in
urban areas. The abolition of slavery in urban areas indeed
resulted in a specific demand for unskilled wage labour for
the undertaking of the domestic services formerly carried out
by slaves.
The initial response of the colonial administration to the
question of labour was "strongly against the importation of
foreign labour on a large scale until every effort has been
made locally to adjust supply and demand" (Consul-General,
1905:15). It was only for skilled tasks that the colonial
government initially relied on imported (Egyptian, Greek and
Levantine) skilled labourers, some of whom were soldiers
(idem., 1902:17 et passim). A Labour Bureau was accordingly
established in '1905 to register all landless and unemployed
persons, especially in the riverain districts where private
landownership had been instituted, and to "mobilise them to
meet the pressing labour demands of government and private
contractors" (McLoughlin, 1970:108-9). The 'pressing nature'
of this demand, and the concern of the colonial government not
to destabilize domestic agricultural production in the course
of meeting it, were pointed out in 1907 by the colonial
Governor-General of the 'Anglo-Egyptian' Sudan (1907:16) who
reported to London that;
In the present stage of development of
Soudan the building and other construction
works are bound to be considerable, and
demand an amount of labour which is hard to
supply without prejudice to the agricultural
expansion of the country, which is of such
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paramount importance to develop.
THE EMERGENCE OF THE WAGE LABOUR MARKET IN KHARTOUM
The scale of the building and other infra-structural
construction tasks was particularly' large in the case of
Khartoum, where by 1900 the rebuilding started and over 5,000
wage labourers were said to be directly employed by the
building industry (El-Wathig Kameir, 1980b:41). By 1902 the
"majority of the working population" in Khartoum Province was
reported to be "engaged in building, quarrying and
brick-making" (Consul-General, 1902:22). In this respect it is
worth noting that the reconstruction process was not confined
to the building of government offices and houses. Government
offices and houses were indeed largely completed by 1902
(El-Sayed El-Bushra, 1976:35), while the construction boom
actually continued up to around 1910. In addition to the
building of houses for the "natives" and business elements,the
building boom concerned major infra-structural projects such
as the building of the Military Hospital (completed in 1904),
the construction of the electricity station and the extension
of electricity supply (supply commenced in 1907), the building.
of a new market-place and the construction of roads in the
centre of Khartoum (completed by 1908 and 1912 respectively),
the building of the river wall in Khartoum (completed in
1905), and the construction of the Blue Nile Bridge (completed
in 1910).
The first unskilled wage labourers in Khartoum were
ex-slaves, dispossessed Northern Sudanese and West Africans
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(cf. McLoughlin, 1970:106). Up to 1908, however, the supply of
labour was far below the demand, and ex-slaves seem to have
constituted the most significant section of the unskilled wage
labour force in the Three Towns. Reporting on the operation of
the labour market in the capital in 1908, the Governor-General
(1908:70) maintained that;
The demand for labourers necessitated by the
inception of the public works and buildings
essential to the establishment of a system
of civilised Government attracted, from the
agricultural districts, a large number of
slaves, to whom the advent of the new
Government had given freedom. The urgent
nature of this demand, coupled with the
impetus given to private enterprise by the
ensuing land boom, set up competition and
wages rose immediately to a rate that the
native agriculturalist could not afford to
pay.
Though the policy of mobilizing local labour did succeed
in inducing increasing numbers of ex-slaves and landless
northerners to migrate to Greater Khartoum, the problem of
labour shortage continued. El-Wathig Kameir (1980b:42)
explains part of this shortage with reference to the fact that
"the majority of Northern Sudanese migrants were circulating,
rather than permanent, labourers". Not all workers, however,
were 'seasonal migrants', and ex-slaves in particular seem to
have settled permanently in Greater Khartoum. But even these
'permanent settlers' were apparently willing to work only for
as long as their immediate needs could be met. According to
the Governor General (1909:71);
It is often not sufficiently realised that
Sudanese, even in Khartoum, the most
expensive town in the Sudan, can live on
nine or ten pia8tres a month or even less
when dura is cheap. The result is that a man
needs only work for three or four days in a
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month to make his living, and he is
generally spared even this minimum by the
generosity of the regular labourer. There
are however a certain number of these
regular labourers..[but when their) numbers
are not sufficient, Government Departments
and private employers of labour compete with
each other and the price of labour is
raised. This does not, for the reason above
stated, attract the mass of idlers living in
the houses, but only has the result of
taking the regular labourer from one
employer to another.
The enactment of the Vagabonds Ordinance was undoubtedly
intended to draw this "idle" ex-slave population into the
labour market (Mohamed Yousif A. El-Mustafa, 1983:39ff). As
soon as they came out in search of 'permanent employment',
however, the ex-slaves seem to have been encouraged by the
colonial regime to withdraw from the wage labour force in
order to join the army or, in the case of young descendants of
former slaves, to go to schools. The corroboration of this
last contention has been offered by Martin (1970) who makes
several interesting, but often brief, references to the way in
which the colonial regime has 'favoured' 	 the	 ex-slave
population.	 His account concerning the preponderance of
ex-slave students in enrolment to the Cadet School in
Khartoum, to which only the graduates of Gordon Memorial
College were eligible, is particularly illuminating.
The point of immediate concern is that the urgent nature
of the demand for labour in the building industry in Khartoum
seems to have had detrimental effects on the ability of the
various government departments to recruit new workers, or even
to maintain in employment those who had already been
recruited. This was apparently a consequence of the
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differences in the system of remuneration between the two
sectors. Unlike the system of fixed monthly wages adopted in
the various government departments, remuneration in the
construction industry was based on piece-rates. As it turned
out, workers generally preferred th latter not only because
they could determine the pace and intensity of their work, but
also because whenever they had earned 'enough' they could
cease working altogether for sometime. In 1906 the colonial
administrators became anxious as the
Regularly paid servants, such as gardeners,
conservancy men, etc. etc., were all leaving
permanent employment to take on piece-work,
for which they can get Pt. 5 to Pt. 6 per
diem. The result is disastrous in the
extreme to Government services with fixed
working budgets and no margins for extra
expenditure. I	 cannot,	 therefore,	 too
strongly urge the postponing of such
government buildings etc., as are not
urgently required to a more opportune
moment, as the result is not only reflected
in much higher contracts, but in the higher
wage bills of every labour-employing service
(Governor-General,	 1906:645;	 quoted	 by
McLoughlin, op.cit.).
The relatively high remuneration levels in the building
industry also affected the supply of domestic labour required
to meet the demand of colonial administrators and expatriate
business elements. The scarcity of "good laundry-men" seems to
have been particularly acute (ibid.). Rather than being solely
a problem of supply of unskilled labour, however, the shortage
in domestic servants was also a consequence of the tendency of
employers to retain only the services of men with "good
character" and from known background (to reach them in cases
of theft from employers). The recruitment of domestic servants
was exclusively through the Labour Bureau, which kept a
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register with the names of those who passed the screening
requirement. According to Martin (1970:219ff), the "Bureau
officials put themselves to very considerable trouble in
making their inquiries.. [about] the very heterogeneous and
often questionable individuals who offer themselves for
registration upon the lists kept".
ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF LABOUR
The initial attempts of the colonial administration to
entice dispossessed peasants and ex-slaves to come to Greater
Khartoum proved no solution to the labour shortage problem. In
the context of the policy to conserve the domestic form of
agricultural production in rural Sudan, the adoption of the
classical method of dispossessing farmers in order to drive
them into the wage labour market was out of consideration.
Alternative sources of unskilled labour supply had to be
secured. The alternatives found were (a) prison labour and (b)
imported labour.
PRISON LABOUR
The utilization of prison labour was part of colonial
policy from the inception of the British colonial state in the
Sudan. As early as 1902, it was reported that "prisoners make
their own clothing, and also a good deal in the way of
carpentering, chain-making, etc. (Consul-General, 1902:22).
Owing to the inability of government departments to recruit
wage workers because of competition from the building industry
prison labour was heavily deployed. The extensive use of
240
prison labour in the first decade of colonial rule seems to
have aroused the concern of private entrepreneurs, who saw in
it a threat to the process of private capital accumulation.
Evidence of this concern was mentioned by Mr. Coutts, the
colonial Asst. Civil Secretary, Prison and Police Section (cf.
Governor-General, 1906:451-52), who in 1906 maintained that;
I do not think I can be said to interfere
with private enterprise, but the work is
entirely confined to, firstly, the provision
of gaol requirements, and secondly, the
manufacture or repair of articles required
by Government Departments, and of articles
such as are used by officers or Government
officials in carrying out their official
duties.. Our industries at Khartoum include:
Tailoring, Carpenting, Tinsmith's shops,
Laundry, Brick-making, Brush [straw mats]
and rope-making, Rope sole for shoes and all
leather work (saddlers and shoe-makers) is
now undertaken by this shop.
Through the training of young prisoners under the
instruction of Egyptian soldiers a very small class of
Sudanese artisans was created, but the number of young
prisoners was very small (ibid).
The problem of supply of labour to government departments
did not continue for long. As the colonial government started
to encourage imported labour to settle in Greater Khartoum
from 1908 onwards (cf. below), and as the land boom started
slowly to subside, manual workers in Greater Khartoum seem to
have turned increasingly to the more secure tpermanentu
employment in the public sector. There is indeed absolutely no
reference in official colonial reports to any difficulties in
securing the labour requirements for government services. As a
result of this, the extensive utilization of prison labour to
meet the requirements of government departments was
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drastically reduced; and most of the articles formerly
furnished by prison workshops started to be produced by
wage-labourers in the Stores and Ordnance Department, which
was established in Khartoum North.
Though prison labour was gradually excluded in the
undertaking of skilled tasks (except for handicrafts and
wood-work, which continue up to the present), the deployment
by the colonial government of prison labour in unskilled tasks
was hardly decreased. In almost all tenders concerning the
construction of public buildings in urban areas throughout the
colonial period, for example, the terms were such that the
private contractor should provide the building material and
the necessary skilled labour, while the colonial Prisons
Department would provide the pool of unskilled labourers. As I
shall explain later, as late as 1949 prison labour was heavily
deployed to undertake the demolition of houses in the old
Deims ("native lodging areas") of Khartoum.
The significance of prison labour, and its impact upon the
urban wage labour market in colonial Sudan, has been described
in muted terms by the Governor of Kordofan Province
(Henderson, 1952:54) who maintained in 1933 that;
Yes, R. is a keen gardener and uses hosts of
prisoners. I send him about 50 every three
months. But, although prison labour is
uneconomic and notoriously inefficient, it
is quite legitimate to use it on public
works, e.g. gardens, forests, etc. True it
cuts out some unemployed, but government is
very hard up and must do all the economies
it can. Probably much of this work could not
be done at all (I know this is so in
El-Obeid)	 if	 prisoners were not used.
Moreover, what are they to do otherwise?
As I shall explain in more detail later, the statement of
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the Governor of Kordofan not only corroborates the use of
labour at a time when there was no shortage in wage labour,
but also posits the evidence of the continued use of prison
labour in the period of the depression of the 1930s, when
there was mass unemployment in many urban areas in the
country.
The extensive deployment of prison labour in the first
decade of colonial rule could not, however, provide all the
additional labour required, especially in private enterprise.
To meet the requirements of the private sector in Greater
Khartoum importation of labour was imperative.
IMPORTED LABOUR
It was maintained earlier that the colonial government had
to import skilled labourers, especially from Egypt, owing to
the virtual lack of skilled labourers in the country. Though
by 1908 the colonial government started to train young
Sudanese, expatriate artisans and skilled workers continued to
constitute a majority of the skilled labour force up to the
1940s. A major factor contributing to this effect is that in
the mid-1920s the Sudan witnessed a "heavy immigration" from
Asia Minor by skilled workers, Greeks and Armenians in
particular	 (McLoughlin, 1970:113). As late as 1935 the
composition of the wage labour force in large scale
construction projects showed the dominance of expatriates in
the ranks of skilled and semi-skilled labourers. In the
particular case of Gebel Aulia Dam in the vicinity of
Khartoum, where an average of 8,500 persons were employed,
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statistics for May 1935 show that "there were 4,431 Egyptians
(many of these were skilled and semi-skilled, and trained in
earthwork), 552 Sudanese artisans and clerks, and 4,572
Sudanese labourers (idem, p. 115). The dominance of skilled
immigrant workers was likewise noticeable in Sudan Railways,
which up to the present constitutes a pocket for a large
number of the descendants of the first immigrants.
The importation of skilled labour meant large wage
differentials between skilled and unskilled labour during the
colonial period (cf. Sa'ad El-Din Fawzi, 1955). Not all
imported labour, however, was given high wages; and the
importation of unskilled labour had no such implication. On
the contrary, imported unskilled wage labour not only served
the policy to conserve domestic agricultural production, but
also helped reduce the wage rates for unskilled labour in
general. This was particularly the case because imported
unskilled workers, especially the West Africans, were willing
to work despite the move by the colonial administration to
depress the "wage rates to their lowest possible level"
(Duffield, 1983:49).
In Chapter Two I considered aspects of the colonial policy
to encourage and facilitate Nigerian immigration to the Sudan.
What is of interest is that prior to 1907 the number of West
African ('Fellata') immigrants was relatively small to affect
the operation of the urban wage labour market in Greater
Khartoum. According to the Governor General (1908:71);
There is ... an increase in the number of
Fellatas.. who are settling temporarily in
Omdurman. These make good labourers and are
willing to work for reasonable wages, but
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their numbers do not at present affect the
supply of labour throughout the country.
From 1908 onwards West African immigration increased
considerably, and the 'Fellatas' started to emerge as a solid
core of the unskilled labour force in urban Sudan. The number
of West Africans who arrived in Greater Khartoum during the
last seven months of 1908 alone was in excess of 5,000 (cf.
McLoughlin, 1970:110). Insofar as West Africans are known to
migrate as families, this last figure might have included some
children who were too young to participate in the labour force
(West African women as well as children over six are known to
participate). Nevertheless, it could be safely estimated that
at least 3,500 of these 5,000 immigrants were 'economically
active'. In view of the fact that the wage labour force in the
whole of Khartoum Province in 1905 was estimated at around
3,500 workers (cf. Governor General, 1905:95), while in the
early part of 1908 the urban wage labour force in the entire
Sudan was said to be less than 6,000 (Governor General,
1908:70), the role of West African immigrants in solving the
problem of the labour supply in Greater Khartoum cannot be
over-estimated. Despite his failure to accord full recognition
to the impact of West African 	 immigration,	 McLaughlin
(1970:110) has nevertheless posited the evidence of a
substantial drop in daily wages. In his summary of official
reports for 1908 McLoughlin started his assessment of 1908 by
maintaining that;
Wages fell slightly in the Three Towns
during 1908, at least in the "Winter Period"
(when little •cultivation goes on); wages
averaged Pt. 4 for men and Pt. 3 for women
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Noting the arrival of the West African immigrants during the
later months of the year, McLoughlin concluded his summary of
the conditions of the labour market in 1908 by quoting the
Governor-General (1908:557) that;
Piece work is the most profitable and the
most popular, a man being usually able to
earn 9 to 10 piastres per diem while, as the
cost of living to him is under 1 piastre per
diem, it enables him after a week's work to
spend three in leisure.
What McLoughlin does not seem to notice is that in
"falling slightly" during the winter months, wages actually
dropped by more than 50% by the end of the first year of large
scale immigration by West Africans. The labour markets in
other towns were likewise affected by the arrival of West
African immigrants. The role of immigrants in solving the
shortage in unskilled labour for the undertaking of tasks
relating to the gum trade in urban Kordofan is a good case in
point.
In Chapter Two I pointed out how the imposition of cash
taxes resulted in increased gum tapping by small farmers and
pastoralists around the central Savannah region of the Sudan.
Though the volume of gum exported was steadily increasing year
after year during the first decade of the century, the gum
trade experienced an unprecedented boom with the
operationalization in 1912 of rail transport to El-Obeid, the
capital of Kordof an Province. This was particularly so as a
larger volume of gum than had formerly been possible could be
transported easily. In consequence, gum exports "jumped in a
single year by almost 40%, from 14,000 tons in 1911 to 19,000
tons in 1912" (Fatima Babiker Mahmoud, 1984:35). Kordof an
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Province has always been the major gum-producing region in the
Sudan, and its capital, El-Obeid, is the largest gum market in
the whole world, a status the city started to gain at the turn
of the century and which was never challenged since 1912 (and
despite the relative decline of El-Obeid as the commercial
centre of Western Sudan subsequent to the extension of the
railway to Nyala in Darfur in the early 1960s).
Up to 1911, the gum markets in western Sudan used to
experience considerable difficulties in securing the unskilled
labour required for the cleaning, sorting, and packing in
sacks of the gum as well as for porterage. This was so because
the local supply of labour was drawn almost exclusively from
the local small farming and pastoral communities. Farmers and
pastoralists used to take up wage employment during the dry
season in order to meet their cash demands (initially to
discharge taxes), and to return back to their fields and/or
herds during the wet season. Because of this seasonal
involvement in wage employment, shortages in the supply of
unskilled urban labour in western Sudan were not uncommon.
During the wet season of 1910, for example, the urban labour
supply in Kordofan was reported "to be almost nil"; and
labourers had to be sent from Greater Khartoum to redress the
situation (McLoughlin, 1970:112). From 1912 onwards, however,
increasing numbers of West African immigrants were encouraged
to settle in the railway towns of Kordofan, and to meet the
bulk of the province's requirements for unskilled urban labour
(see Duffield, 1980; 1983).
Though West African immigrants provided the bulk of
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imported unskilled labour in colonial urban Sudan, importation
was not entirely confined to them. In the case of Port Sudan,
where stevedoring has always been a source of substantial
demand for unskilled labour, for example, Egyptian and
Yemenese workers seem to have had a virtual monopoly over the
unskilled tasks at the docks up to 1931 (cf. Martin, 1970:220;
Lewis, 1980:547).
Thus within the span of only one decade of
capitalist-colonial rule the Sudan started to experience the
emergence and expansion of what could be described as an urban
wage labour market. The involvement of "local labour" in the
newly established market, however, was initially marginal. As
will be discussed in the next section, the grounds upon which
the urban wage labour market was founded were very volatile,
arid by the time an increasing number of Sudanese started to
look for wage employment, the newly created urban wage labour
force was to find itself largely redundant.
THE SATURATION OF THE URBAN LABOUR MARKET
The heavy importation of unskilled labour not only helped
meet the demand for urban labour in colonial Sudan in such a
way as to avoid the disruption of domestic agricultural
production, but also served to saturate the urban wage-labour
market, especially in Greater Khartoum. The 'labour surplus'
situation in Greater Khartoum enabled employers in 1913 to
bring daily wages down to an average of Pt. 3.5 to Pt 4. As
from 1914 onwards official colonial reports ceased to refer to
wage rates for female labourers, it may also be assumed that
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the abundance of unskilled labour resulted in the progressive
exclusion of women from the wage labour market. It was not
until after Independence when a relatively rapid expansion in
manufacturing industry took place that women seem to have
re-entered the wage labour market (cf. Chapter Five). By 1915,
the British colonial administration had not only abandoned its
initial policy to mobilize "local labour", but also issued
instructions to "government inspectors to try to induce
run-away slaves to return to their 'employers' [i.e. masters]"
(Mohamed El-Awad Galal El-Din, 1980a:426). Likewise, from 1912
onwards official reports were hinting at the status of
Khartoum as an important source of unskilled workers, and
labourers were regularly sent from there to other regions in
the country, including agricultural districts in the Northern
and Kassala Provinces, in order to redress labour shortages
and/or help bring down the average daily wage of unskilled
workers (cf. McLoughlin, 1970:llOff). In the context of the
decline in the demand for manual construction wage labour in
Greater Khartoum, an increasing number of unskilled workers
seem to have joined the army of the domestic servants, who
probably constituted the largest category of unskilled
wage-workers in Greater Khartoum during the second decade of
colonial rule. A majority of the domestic servants was
comprised of Nubians, who were one of the first Northern
Sudanese groups to be affected by the scarcity of
'privately-owned' land following the imposition of the
colonial land tenure system (cf. Chapter Two).
By the end of the first decade of colonial rule, many of
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the migrant workers turned to self-employment in petty
commodity production, petty trade, and personal services. Some
of these workers were allocated sites and/or stalls in the new
central market in Khartoum. According to the Governor-General
(1910:456);
A totally new place has been made, and the
market divided up into first, second, and
third-class plots according to situation.
Separate buildings for the meat, fish and
vegetable markets will be erected by
Government and the stalls leased at a
monthly rental.. Certain areas have been
reserved for future developments and special
places	 marked	 out	 for	 blacksmiths,
washer-men, anagerib-makers, etc.
	 Special
blocks or parts of blocks are allotted for
various	 trades	 (such	 as	 carpenters,
leather-workers,	 tailors,	 etc.) of the
smaller merchants	 in the	 third-class
quarter.
The redundancies in the construction industry seem to have
resulted in an appreciable increase in the numbers of
'self-employed' workers, especially in the services sector. As
a result of this, and probably in order to check the potential
severe competition among these 'self-employed' workers, the
colonial authorities started to issue special liences to
"carters and lorrymen", "porters and messengers", "shoeblacks"
and "donkey boys" as well as the women brewing merissa and
busah (cf. Martin, 1970:533). Unlike the annually renewable
licences given to craftsmen and petty traders, who pay
Trader's Tax, however, the special licences for the former
categories were to be renewed monthly after the payment of a
fee varying with the type of activity. The monthly fees ranged
from a low of Pt. 2 for "shoeblacks" to a high Pt 130 for
merissa-sellers, who seem to have been doing very well. The
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others all paid Pt. 10 monthly (ibid).
Despite the attempts of the colonial administration to
evict redundant workers from Khartoum, migration into the
conurbation continued. But it was not until 1919, when the
construction of Gebel Aulia and Makwar dams started, that
Greater Khartoum actually needed a flow of unskilled labourers
from other parts of the country (as well as from Egypt).
By the time work at Gebel Aulia started, the processes of
monetarization and commercialization had already been firmly
entrenched in most parts of the Sudan. Thus whereas cash was
initially required to discharge taxes, in the context of the
destruction of local industry and the imposition of markets
for imported goods the cash demands of the domestic producers
were steadily growing to meet consumption requirements.
Domestic producers could of course obtain additional cash
through the intensification of cash-cropping. Given the
labour-intensive techniques of agricultural production, and
the necessity of producing	 food crops,	 however,	 the
opportunities for expansion in cash-cropping were very
limited. As a result of this, increasing numbers of Sudanese
(over and above those from the northern riverain regions,
which were the initial sources of migrant labour) started to
look for wage employment, especially during the dry season.
Owing to the virtual lack of agricultural wage employment in
Western and Central Sudan (the Gezira Scheme was established
in 1925), and the saturation of the urban labour markets in
the west (the role of West African labour), the inception of
work at Gebel Aulia attracted many migrants.
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Owing to lack of funds, work at Gebel Aulia had to be
stopped in 1921, and most of the migrants who had been
attracted by the prospects of employment at the Dam found
themselves unemployed. As a result of this, the supply of
labour in Greater Khartoum continued to exceed the demand
throughout the 1920s. The inception of infra-structural work
at the	 Gezira	 Scheme	 (construction of
	
Sennar	 Dam,
canalisation, building of offices and houses for
administrators and field inspectors, etc.) seem to have
mitigated the effects of the slump in Khartoum, and with start
of cotton production the Gezira was to become the most
important centre for seasonal wage employment. But the
conditions of the wage labour market in Greater Khartoum were
soon to worsen under the effects of the depression of the
1930s which hit the Sudan by lowering cotton prices. In this
respect McLoughlin (op.cit.) has quoted the Annual Report of
Khartoum Province (Sudan Government, 1931:121) that;
The commercial element in the Three Towns,
natives and foreign, suffered severely as
the result of general economic depression,
and trade was stagnant. Many artisans and
labourers were thrown out of employment and
a certain amount of relief work had to be
provided for the poorer classes of
labourers. Every possible effort was made
not only to prevent outsiders drifting into
the Three Towns in search of work, but to
send unemployed persons back to their
villages of origin.
Between 1930 and 1934 redundancies among wage labourers as
well as clerks continued. According to McLoughlin (1970:115),
the ample supply of wage labourers in Greater Khartoum in
1931/32 brought wages down to Pt. 3, and gave the colonial
administration the "opportunity .. to revise the rates of pay
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for servants engaged through the servants registry and to put
them on a more reasonable basis". In 1933, moreover, Sir
Douglas Newbold (Henderson, 1952:53) asserted that in Greater
Khartoum there were some 7,000 "unemployed servants" on the
register of Khartoum's District Commissioner; "several hundred
unemployed effendia [clerks]"; a "host of detribalised
artisans ..out of jobs"; in addition to "the small but
difficult group of axed native officers". Elderly craftsmen in
Greater Khartoum confirmed in interviews that during the 1930s
many unemployed workers were willing to join the self-employed
craftsmen as unpaid hands (or apprentices?) in return for
maintenance.
The deterioration in employment opportunities and/or
remuneration in Greater Khartoum and the other urban areas in
the 1930s stimulated a further drift by workers from towns to
the agricultural districts, especially the Gezira Scheme.
According to Mohamed El-Awad Galal-El-Din (1980a:428), "many
urban residents - as well as migrants from rural areas - were
earning higher wages picking cotton in Gezira than they could
command in towns..".
A VOLATILE REGENERATION
Following four years of unemployment and general hardship
for unskilled migrants in the Three Towns, the resumption of
work at Gebel Aulia, which absorbed between 7,000 and 10,000
workers, heralded a regeneration of the wage labour market. By
June 1934 the conditions in the labour market apparently
improved to the extent that the colonial administrators in
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Khartoum were of the opinion that the problem of unemployment
was virtually completely solved.
The outbreak of the Second War resulted in a considerable
expansion in opportunities for wage employment, and
substantial numbers of workers were consequently attracted to
Khartoum. Apart from the Sudan Defence Force into which
thousands of Sudanese were recruited for service in North and
East Africa, public employment of wage workers in Greater
Khartoum increased dramatically. The colonial Stores and
Ordnance Department in Khartoum North, for example, reported
to the Civil Secretary in June 1945 that its employment in
that year was some 1,200 per cent above the pre-war figure
(File CS/SCR/37.C.1).
The wartime disruption of sea-borne trade also resulted in
the generation of a demand for labour in 'modern'
manufacturing industry. In this respect Fatima Babiker Mahmoud
(1984:53) maintains that;
Under wartime conditions, the British
colonial authorities found it necessary to
establish industries in order to supply
goods which could no longer be imported.
Thus in 1942 the War Supply Department was
forced to set up a Local Industries
Investigation Committee to advise on the
industries that should be established in the
country to utilise local materials and to
relieve the country of the need to rely on
imports during the war. As a result of this,
a number of enterprises, such as oil mills,
soap factories, confectionaries, syrup and
squash, spinning and weaving plants were
started.
Owing to its position as the largest single market in the
country, Greater Khartoum came to accommodate most of these
industrial establishments, which further boosted the wartime
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demand for labour.
Furthermore, the outbreak of the Second War coincided with
the introduction of commercial lorries in the Sudan. In
addition to the wartime demand for labour in the public sector
and manufacturing industry urban areas started to witness
the initial emergence of a steadily growing demand for labour
in the transport sector. Yet despite the substantial increase
in the demand the labour supply in the Three Towns throughout
the war years continued to be sufficiently ample, and wages
were maintained at fairly low and stable levels compared to
remuneration in agriculture (cf. Mcloughlin, op.cit.).
The relative abundance of wage labour in Greater Khartoum
during the war years was apparently a consequence of increased
wage labour migration. However it is worth noting in this
respect that the wartime conditions were themselves factors
underlying the intensification of the proletarianization
process. This was particularly so because of the disruption
of foreign trade which adversely affected the level of
earnings from cash cropping.
TUE DISASTER OF PEACE-TIME
It is perhaps one of the ironies of the labour market in
Greater Khartoum that the labour force could benefit more from
war than from peace, as the wartime regeneration of the wage
labour market in Greater Khartoum proved to be short-lived. As
soon as the Second War ended, public employment in the Three
Towns was drastically cut down. Likewise the resumption of
foreign	 trade	 resulted	 in	 redundancies	 in the
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newly-established manufacturing industries, which collapsed
owing to their "inability to compete on an equal footing with
imports" (Fatima Babiker Mahmoud, op.cit).
Furthermore, the demobilization of the Sudan Defence Force
served to accentuate the problem of urban unemployment.
According to McLoughlin (1970:116), the colonial
administrators were of the opinion that "Many men were
unsettled as a result of having seen military service in more
distant places, and headed to the city when they found their
farm too small a world for them". An abnormal Nile flood in
1946 further complicated the situation as it induced an exodus
from the devastated districts, especially from the Northern
Province, to the Three Towns (ibid.).
In order to avert the consequences of mass unemployment at
a time when the anti-colonial movement was reaching its peak
while the trade unions were waging an effective struggle to
improve the conditions of workers, the colonial administrators
started to devise schemes to evict unemployed workers from
Khartoum. One way of doing this was through referral to
villages of origin. This method was particularly preferred by
the Director of the Stores and Ordnance Department who, in
reporting to the Civi Secretary the discharge of 115 artisans
and ancillary workers in June 1946, maintained that;
For the future I would forecast, over any
rate the next six months, an average monthly
reduction of 80- 100 men. Once they are
discharged, it seems that there will be
little chance of offering them re-employment
at any time. In this connection I have
recently put up a scheme to Financial
Secretary which aims to get men, who are
discharged in such circumstances back to
their place of domicile...
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Another method of evicting redundant government workers was
transference of workers to other regions where more workers
were needed. In December 1945, for example, the Forests
Department "hired nearly 1,000..[men] for work in the Gedaref
area" (Sudan Government, 1 945:143; McLoughlin, 1970:116).
Both methods of getting rid of "labour surpluses", however,
were not confined to discharged soldiers and redundant
government workers. They were, rather, part of a wider system
of rigid control over the urban wage labour market devised by
the colonial Civil Secretary in 1943 in search of an efficient
method to "decide allotments of labour to competing demands"
(File	 CS/SCR/37.C.1) that aimed, inter alia, to meet part of
the labour requirements of the Gezira Scheme (cf. Chapter
(2)Two).
The years 1945-1949 witnessed the re-emergence of urban
unemployment as well as the decline in wage rates for casual
unskilled workers in Greater Khartoum. Thus, while wartime
daily wages were 12 piastres or more for unskilled labourers;
and despite the post-war inflation that resulted in a decline
in real wages (cf. Chapter Seven), the Commissioner of
Khartoum reported in June 1946 that "As a result of
demobilisation of Sudan Defence Force soldiers, unskilled
labour was available at 7 to 10 PT. per day" (File
CS/SCR/37.C.1). As with the unemployment situation in the
1930s, however, post-war mass unemployment in Greater Khartoum
did not persist for long, and by 1949 the building industry
was to give rise to yet another massive, and short-lived,
demand for manual labour in Greater Khartoum.
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THE DAWN OF INDEPENDENCE
According to Mohamed El-Awad Galal El-Din (1980a:429),
between 1949 and 1954 Greater Khartoum experienced "an
unprecedented building boom ..[as] a major effort was made to
build new deims to replace the old deims in which squalid slum
conditions had developed" (also see Sa'ad El-Din Fawzi, 1954).
The building operations required such a large workforce that
by 1949 the colonial administrators were content that the
"continued building activity ensured that none but the
work-shy needed to find himself unemployed" (Governor-General,
1949:165/6).
The scale of the demolition and building operations was
massive. By 1954 some 5,855 houses including shops were
demolished (see Arthur, 1954), and around 8,000 new houses
were built (see Sa'ad El-Din Fawzi, 1954). The enormous demand
for unskilled wage workers stimulated by the building boom not
only solved the problem of mass unemployment, but also
apparently resulted in a shortage of unskilled wage labourers
in Greater Khartoum. Given the reports concerning the
elimination of unemployment, the evidence of the shortage can
be found in the fact that "in the first two years the
demolition of houses was carried out by jail gangs" rather
than by unskilled wage labourers (Arthur, 1954). But this
shortage was soon redressed as the building boom continued to
attract many rural migrants, especially Southerners and Nuba.
By 1951 the number of migrants seems to have increased to the
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extent that the colonial authorities started to 'complain'
about the drift into Greater Khartoum by people who were
"under the impression that the streets [were] paved with gold"
(Mohamed El-Awad Galal El-Din, 1980a:430).
With the completion of the building operations in the new
deims in 1954, a larger than ever before construction labour
force in Greater Khartoum found itself redundant. As things
stood at the time, there was virtually no chance whatsover of
absorbing even a small sector of them in wage employment. Even
the opportunity to join the ranks of the self-employed
craftsmen and petty traders was apparently difficult. This
seems to have been the case as the numbers of petty commodity
producers had increased to the extent that by the early 1950s
the colonial government could no longer tolerate their
presence in the central market in Khartoum. By 1953 a new
market place, Sug Al-Sajana, was opened in Khartoum South, and
all the craftsmen and petty traders were transferred to it.
Unlike the case with the previous 'labour-surplus situations',
the unemployed construction workers were not evicted from
Khartoum. Though no official reports that could help explain
this new shift in colonial labour policy are available, any
such explanation would necessarily touch on the process of
rapid 'political' change, which the Sudan was then undergoing.
The era of 'formal' capitalist colonization was approaching
its close; the process of 'Sudanizing' top government
positions was well under way; and the transitional 'national'
administration, which was set up in	 1953,	 was	 being
consolidated in preparation for the smooth transfer of power
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from colonial to national rule. Though these changes hardly
affected the peripheral capitalist basis of Sudanese urbanism
which persists right to the present, they were nevertheless to
influence the wage labour market in urban Sudan in general and
Greater Khartoum in particular (cf. Chapter Five). In the rest
of this chapter, I intend to recapitulate the implications of
peripheral urbanism for the operation of the wage labour
market in colonial Khartoum.
PERIPHERAL URBANISM AND THE WAGE L)BOUR MARKET
At the beginning of the present chapter I explained how
the Second War has been viewed as the 'watershed' between the
alleged two 'epochs' of the history of the urban labour market
in the Sudan. In view of the foregoing account of the wage
labour market in colonial Khartoum, however, this view has
proved to be poorly founded, though the steady increase in the
urban wage labour force is beyond doubt. In this section I
attempt to outline the factors behind my dissatisfaction with
the pre-war/post-war periodization, and to highlight, in
retrospect, the interconnectedness of the processes governing
the urban wage labour market in colonial Khartoum with the
structures of peripheral capitalism in the Sudan.
The first point to emphasize concerns the periodization
suggested in the literature. In this respect it is important
to stress the fact that, throughout the colonial period, the
wage labour market in Greater Khartoum was characterized by
oscillation between labour-shortage and labour-surplus
situations. At the inception of British colonial rule, there
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was an enormous demand for labour while a wage labour force
was virtually non-existent in the country. The colonial
government accordingly made considerable efforts to mobilize
"local labour", and to import labour from beyond the
boundaries of Sudan, in order to solve the shortage in urban
labour. By 1910 the problem of shortage in the labour supply
to government departments and commercial enterprises in
Greater Khartoum was solved once and for all. By 1912,
moreover, a labour-surplus situation evidently appeared in
Greater Khartoum; and throughout the second decade of colonial
rule the conurbation figured as an important reservoir of
labour to be sent to the other parts of the country. In 1920
another substantial demand for labour appeared in the Three
Towns, and large numbers of rural Sudanese were consequently
attracted to the capital. A year later the demand shrunk,
unemployment surfaced and a labour-suplus situation re-emerged
once more. But up to the outbreak of the Second World War the
wage labour market in Greater Khartoum could not absorb all
those seeking employment; and agro-employment in the Gezira
Scheme appeared to be the only alternative for wage-labourers.
The wartime increase in government and private employment not
only helped ease the situation, but also provided employment
for more migrants arriving in Greater Khartoum. As soon as the
war ended,	 public employment was reduced and the
recently-established manufacturing sector collapsed. The
result was yet another labour-surplus situation in the
immediate post-war years. In short, from the inception of
British colonial rule up to 1954 there were frequent changes
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in	 Greater Khartoum	 from	 'labour	 shortage'	 and/or
'full-employment' to 'labour-surplus' and/or 'mass
unemployment' situations, and vice versa. To this extent, and
provided that the assertion in the literature concerning the
"change" from a pre-war shortage into a post-war labour
surplus is corroborated,	 (and,	 in	 view of	 rampant
unemployment in Greater Khartoum in the years immediately
preceding the war, corroboration seems impossible), the
"change" from a "pre-war shortage" to a "post-war surplus"
should be viewed as only one instance in the series of changes
that took place during the colonial period.
The recurrence of the 'feast or famine' type of employment
situation in colonial Khartoum leads directly to my second
point, which relates to the question of both the externality
and volatility of the larger part of the demand for wage
labour in colonial Khartoum. In this respect, however, it
should be stressed that the oscillation in the wage labour
market described above was not a manifestation of the cycles
of full-employment/mass unemployment inherent in the
functioning of the capitalist mode of production. These latter
cycles are consequences of periodic crises of over-production,
which necessitate redundancies until new or renewed avenues
for capital accumulation and, by extension, investment and
employment, are found. In virtually all periods of substantial
demand for wage labour in colonial Khartoum, as in periods of
large scale redundancies, the changes in the demand for labour
were totally external to the basic avenue of capital
accumulation in colonial Khartoum, viz., import-export trade.
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This point is of such paramount significance to our
understanding of the peripheral capitalist nature of Sudanese
urbanism that it should carefully be recapitulated.
In defining the concept of peripheral capitalist urbanism
I have maintained that the basic activities underlying the
rise of cities in colonial Sudan were commerce and
administration, both of which were founded upon the basis of
primary export production and the colonial-type trade economy
(cf.	 Chapter	 One). In the context of the progressive
intensification of primary export production (and the
consequent increase in commercial traffic), and the further
consolidation of the British colonial administration, the
relatively small demand for labour in commerce and
administration was not only fairly stable, but also steadily
growing. By the time the colonial era came to its close, thus,
the government was the largest employer in urban Sudan (a
status which has never been challenged). Though a section of
government workers was employed in services departments
(sanitary services, gardening, etc.), the majority was
employed in activities directly connected with the servicing
of the colonial-type trade economy. The approximately 46,000
government railwaymen comprised the single largest group of
government workers. It is indeed no surprise that the struggle
for the establishment and recognition of trade unions in
colonial Sudan was initiated and led by these railwaymen (cf.
Chapter Seven).
At the inception of British colonial rule there was of
course a shortage of labour in both government departments and
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commerce; but within a few years that problem was solved and
no diffulties were thereafter encountered in securing the
required labour force, which virtually experienced no
redundancies. The only exceptions to this generalization are
(a) the period of the depression in the 1930s during which
commercial employment was apparently affected, and (b) during
the Second War when foreign trade was disrupted, but public
employment was temporarily increased owing to external,
"Imperial", considerations.
With the exception of the war years, it was massive
building and other infra-structural construction projects that
constituted the main, and by far the largest, source of demand
for labour in colonial Khartoum. Likewise, the larger part of
the redundancies resulting in the labour-surplus situations
originated in the construction sector. Once the role of
construction employment in the operation of the wage labour
market in colonial Khartoum is recognized, and its
implications are investigated, a basic contradiction in the
formation of the urban wage labour market would readily be
understood. Basic to our understanding of this contradiction
is the recognition of the status of the construction sector in
the 'urban economy'.
The building industry is not only an 'auxiliary' sector
that, in all places and at all times, is intended to service
and support other, more 'basic', activities (commerce and
administration in the case of Sudanese urbanism), but also one
which is characterized by frequent, and often considerable,
fluctuations in production schedules. Owing to the particular
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experiences of 19th century urban Sudan, however, what ought
to be an auxiliary sector at the inception of British colonial
rule turned out to be the source of the greater part of the
demand for urban unskilled labour to the extent of undermining
the flow of labour to the activities it was expected to
support (the competition with government departments over
recruitment of wage labourers). In the initial process of
urban reconstruction in colonial Khartoum, as in the
construction of Gebel Aulia Dam and the building of the new
deims, however, the construction operations were transient.
Each time the operations were completed, massive unemployment
was to follow, and the colonial regime was to start devising
ways for the eviction of unemployed construction workers, whom
it had originally helped bring to Greater Khartoum through,
inter alia, the manipulation of the monthly labour returns
reported by province governors and heads of departments
throughout the country.
The contradiction in the initial emergence and later
expansion of the wage labour market in colonial Khartoum is
that while a wage labour force had to be created in order to
meet the demand originating in the construction sector, the
larger section of that labour force was intended to be
temporary, and to live in the city only for as long as the
construction operations would last. This was evidently the
case as the colonial regime expected and, whenever necessary,
forced redundant construction workers to leave Greater
Khartoum. In other words, the process underlying the
recurrence of labour surplus situations in colonial Khartoum,
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far from being the consequence of structured periodic crises
of over-production and accumulation, was, rather, the outcome
of the contradiction between, on the one hand, the realities
of the creation of an urban construction wage labour force
and, on the other, the transience of the larger part of the
demand resulting in the creation of that labour force.
The transience of construction employment in colonial
Khartoum touches on the particular configuration in colonial
Khartoum of two basic features of peripheral capitalism
characterizing the structures and processes of the Sudanese
economy at large. These features are (a) the disarticulation
of sectors in the economy and (b) the treatment of wages as
"costs" to be kept at the lowest possible level which
effectively results in the severance of the 'critical link'
between the capacity of producers to produce and their
capacity to consume (cf. Chapter Two). A brief discussion of
the role of construction employment in colonial Khartoum would
illucidate some of the ways in which these two features were
reproduced at the level of the 'urban economy'.
Generally speaking, the question of disarticulation of
sectors in colonial Khartoum can be approached by pointing out
the lack of 'linkages' between levels of employment in the
different avenues of capital accumulation in the urban
economy. The "linkages" referred to here are such as those
observed	 in central capitalist economies, in which the
construction sector could be, and on occasions was,
deliberately used to generate employment, to raise the level
of demand (purchasing-power) in the internal market and,
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consequently, to stimulate growth in the economy as a whole,
especially in manufacturing industry. This, clearly, is the
ABC of Keynesian economics, and the basis of the call to
increase public spending (via the construction sector in
particular) during periods of recession, when unemployment
becomes rampant, the purchasing power in the internal market
decreases, and the crisis of over production and capital
accumulation seems otherwise insoluble. One of the
preconditions for the success of this approach in solving the
problems of unemployment and capital accumulation in central
capitalist economies, however, is the presence of a critical
link between the capacity to consume and the capacity to
produce, or what economists denote by the "multiplier effect"
concept. That is to say, wages in central capitalist economies
figure as a crucial source of demand in the internal market.
As a result of this, the expansion in construction employment
with its addition to the total wage bill would induce an
increase in the demand for goods in the internal market. The
latter increase would in its turn generate an increase in
manufacturing investment and employment, and boost further
employment in commerce. All of these increases would feed back
by stimulating further construction employment through the
increase in demand for housing, and so on and so forth. But
this kind of "multiplier effect" in central capitalist
economies is effective only in the short-run (given the
presence of a competitive labour-intensive manufacturing
industry and/or relatively high import duties). This is
particularly so because as long as the orientation of the
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production process is towards the realization of surplus-value
and capital accumulation, the crises of over-production are
inevitably to follow.
The point in the foregoing discussion is to stress the
point that this kind of "multiplier effect" has been severely
constrained in all peripheral capitalist economies (cf. Samir
Amin, 1974a). This is so because wages are treated solely as
"costs" to be kept at as low a level as possible in order to
sustain the profitability of the colonial-type trade economy.
In all periods of substantial construction employment in
colonial Khartoum there were virtually no implications for
employment in those sectors of the urban economy in which the
most significant processes of capital accumulation took place.
There were, however, some significant implications for petty
commodity production as I shall soon explain.
The avenues of capital accumulation in colonial Khartoum,
as maintained earlier, were largely directly linked to the
colonial-type trade economy, viz., import-export trade,
banking, insurance and transport in addition to real estate
and the construction industry. Throughout both the colonial
and neo-colonial periods, however, it has been the
import-export trade which constituted the primary vehicle for
capital accumulation in urban Sudan (cf. Fatima Babiker
Mahmoud, 1984:33-38 et passim; Mohamed Y. A. El-Mustafa,
1983:l4Off). The rise and fall in construction employment had
virtually no implications for either export or import trade.
The argument concerning export trade is a simple one.
Insofar	 as it deals in primary products (cotton, gum,
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oil-seeds, livestock, etc.) produced in the countryside, and
oriented towards external markets, the export trade has always
been the most disarticulated of sectors, and remains most
'insensitive' to what takes place in the other sectors of the
urban economy. In no way, therefore, could the increase, or
decrease, in the size of construction employment in colonial
Khartoum have had implications for employment in export trade.
In asserting this, it is not my wish to deny that export trade
might have some detrimental implications for the internal
market. The increased exportation of meat, grain, and fruits
in recent years, and the consequent rise in the local prices
of these products, is a good case in point.
Unlike export trade, import trade is tsensitivel to
fluctuations in the level of the internal purchasing-power. In
other words, the increase, or decrease, in the size of
construction employment in colonial Khartoum of necessity
affected the level of demand for imported goods in the city.
We should be careful, however, not to exaggerate the magnitude
of these effects as far as employment in import trade is
concerned. Though the precise effects of the increase in
construction employment are yet to be investigated and
established, it is my strong impression that the effect of
fluctuations in construction employment on the level of
employment in import trade in colonial Khartoum could only be
minor. At best, the effect concerned the generation of a few
opportunities in retailing in those neighbourhoods where
retail shops had previously been lacking, and in which
'migrant' construction workers came to live. The assumption
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here is that in those neighbourhoods where retail shops had
already been in business, shopkeepers would manage to cope
with the increase in demand without expanding existing
employment. At the higher levels of import trade, however, no
increase in employment could have obtained, precisely because
Greater Khartoum was the seat for almost all importers, and
the majority of wholesalers, in colonial Sudan. In other
words, as the Three Towns were the main centre from which
virtually all imports were distributed all o yer the country,
the increase in demand for imported goods induced by the
expansion in construction employment could constitute no
significant increase to the total volume of imports already
handled in the city. It is worth noting here that though
import trade was a 'little sensitive' to fluctuations in the
internal purchasing-power, and as such was in a sense 'more
articulated' than export trade, import trade was nevertheless
the most accentuated manifestation of the disarticulation of
sectors in colonial.Khartoum. This feature of import trade may
be better appreciated in view of the fact that an increase in
internal demand tended to boost the colonial-type trade
economy, and to further the dependency of the Sudan upon
manufactured imports, instead of inducing the emergence of a
local 'modern' manufacturing industry, which remained
virtually non-existent throughout the colonial period, except
for the brief wartime years.
In contrast to the situation in those sectors in which the
most significant capital accumulation processes were taking
place, petty commodity production seem to have benefited a lot
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from the increase in the numbers of wage earners. Though I
have no figures to back this assertion, in view of the
difficulties in promoting productivity in petty commodity
production there are good reasons to believe that an
appreciable expansion in the level of its employment did take
place. These difficulties, it is worth noting, stemmed not
only from the inability of the majority of petty producers to
initiate viable capital accumulation processes to buy better
tools and equipment, but also from the fact that even when
sufficient capital could be found, the introduction of
capital-intensive technology would increase the costs of
production to a level beyond what the wage-earners could
normally afford (not to speak of competition on the part of
imported manufactured goods). The colonial official reports on
arrangements for craftsmen and petty traders indeed indirectly
corroborate the steady increase in the number of petty
commodity producers and traders. Thus whereas the colonial
administration initially planned to accommodate these
craftsmen and traders in the central market of Khartoum,
within three decades it found it necessary to establish a new
market at the periphery of Khartoum and to transfer all
craftsmen, and some petty traders, to it (some of the petty
traders who deal in vegetables and fruits, etc. are still
operating in Khartoum Central Market). In addition to these
'established' producers and traders there were also others
whose activities depended on wage earners. The women preparing
and/or selling cheap food, local beer (merissa) and spirits
(araki), are a good case in point. To this extent, then, we
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may well conceive of a "multiplier effect" in the
interrelations between wages and these so-called 'informal'
activities.
The contention that the growth in the wage labour force in
colonial Khartoum has resulted in an expansion in 'informal
employment' should not, however, be taken to mean that the
whole of the so-called t urban informal sector' is entirely, or
even largely, oriented towards wage-earners. As I shall
explain in more detail in Chapter Six, a very significant
proportion of the demand for the products and services of
these self-employed workers originates with elements other
than wage-earners (i.e. administrators, professionals,
businessmen, etc.).
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NOTES
1. The initial draft of this chapter provided the framework
for a paper presented at a conference on State, Capital and
Transformation in the Sudan, held at the School of
Development Studies, University of East Anglia (Norwich),
16-19 July 1984 (Salah El-Din El-Shazali Ibrahim, 1984b).
2. In April 1943 a circular from the colonial Civil
Secretary (37.C.1 dated 4.4.1943) informed Province
Governors and Heads of Departments that the Civil Secretary
"had been appointed as the competent authority to decide
allotments of labour to competing demands ... [and]
entrusted with the task of obtaining information about
demands for labour and correlating them".
As from May 1944, detailed "Labour Monthly Returns" from
each province started to reach the Civil Secretary, who in
his turn recirculated the information to all other
provinces. In addition to the pre-existing arrangements
between province and departmental labour authorities, the
new system provided the colonial administration with a
mechanism to transfer 'labour-surplus' from one province to
another, and especially to the Gezira Scheme. File
(CS/37.C.1-1) at the Archives of the Labour Department
contains the correspondence between the CS and Province
Governors. The way the system operated may be grasped from
the first case in which the Monthly Labour Returns were
manipulated.
On 1st June, 1943, Mr. F.D. Corfield, District
Commisioner, Central District, Kordofan Province, sent
to the Civil Secretary, through Governor Kordofan, the
Monthly for May (CD/37.D.1). Quoting statistics on the
situation in El-Obeid, Mr. Corfield maintained that
there "are approximately 300 Western Labourers
available and surplus to normal requirements". On June
11, 1943, the correspondence reached Khartoum. On 3rd
June, 1943, the Assistant Governor, Blue Nile
Province, wrote in his Monthly Labour Returns
(BNP/37.A.2) that "unskilled labour should be directed
to the Gezira area to meet the planting requirements
next month. Next month there cannot be too many". On
receiving the latter on , the Assistant Civil
Secretary wrote to the Civil Secretary "Do you think
we might ask Gov. Kordofan to push the 300 men at
[El-Obeid] .. to the Gezira?" (dated 12.6.43). The
Civil Secretary (in Red Pencil) wrote "yes" (dated
15.6.43). On 16th June a letter (CS/37.C.1-1) to
Governor Kordofan was sent in which the Civil
Secretary maintained "There is likely to be
considerable labour shortage in the Gezira at the
beginning of July for both planting requirements and
Irrigation Department excavation work.
If the 300 surplus men mentioned by you are still
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available perhaps you could persuade them to go to the
Gezira.
Will you please arrange direct with Governor Medani
if anything can be done".
CHAPTER FIVE
THE OPERATION OF THE LABOUR MARKET IN POST-COLONIAL KHARTOUM
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The political status of the nation seems to
have had little influence beyond affecting
the rate and form of surplus extraction.
Under foreign rule most administration was
concentrated in the colonial capital; after
independence new forces occupied the same
positions and maintained control of the
primate centres (Gilbert and Gugler,
1983:41).
This chapter continues the analysis of the operation of
the wage labour market in Khartoum begun in the previous
chapter, and sets out to assess the main developments in the
intra-urban processes during the post-colonial period. Its
central objective is to develop the view that, notwithstanding
the achievement of flag Independence, the operation of the
labour market in Greater Khartoum is still governed by the
processes of peripheral capitalist urbanism, which remain
virtually the same as those of the colonial period. As
explained in Chapter Two, successive national governments not
only left intact the basic orientation of the Sudanese economy
towards primary export production, but also contributed a
great deal to the further entrenchment of the colonial-type
trade economy in the Sudanese social formation.
In emphasizing the continuity of the colonial-type trade
economy,	 I	 do not of course deny several significant
developments, within the parameters of the peripheral
çpitalist pattern of Sudanese urbanism, in the operation of
the urban labour market. The post-colonial increase in the
size of the manual labour force consequent on continuing
proletarianization is probably the most obvious manifestation
of change. Not once during the post-colonial period was there
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a shortage of unskilled urban labour. Changes are likewise
observed in the sources of wage employment; whereas the
building industry has in recent decades lost its position as
the leading source of employment for unskilled urban workers,
manufacturing employment has grown out of all proportion to
its size during the colonial period. Notwithstanding these
'quantitative' changes, however, the processes of peripheral
capitalism continue to underlie Sudanese urbanism. Commerce
and administration are still the 'basic' urban activities; the
main spheres of urban capital accumulation remain tied to the
colonial-type trade economy (cf. Mohamed Y.A. El-Mustafa,
1983; Fatima Babiker Mahmoud, 1984); and, in spite of the
relative post-colonial expansion in manufacturing industry,
disarticulation of sectors is still a prominent feature of the
economy.
With the perpetuation of the processes of peripheral
capitalist urbanism, the constraints that impinge upon the
labour-absorptive capacity of the main avenues of urban
capital accumulation have simultaneously been carried over
into the post-colonial period. As a result, increasing numbers
of manual workers in Greater Khartoum have found it imperative
to resort to various forms of self-employment in petty
commodity production, petty trade and the personal unskilled
services. In 1973, for example, some 50,000 to 60,000 jobs, or
25 to 30 per cent of total employment in Greater Khartoum,
were in the so-called 'urban informal sector', or outside
government and the main spheres of urban capital accumulation
(ILO, 1976:388).
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Closely related to the continuing increase in the number
of self-employed workers are the conditions of the urban
manual labour force following the abandonment of colonial
practices of monitoring, and intervening in the operation of
the wage	 labour market.	 Unlik the British colonial
administration, successive national governments did not,
before September 1981, attempt to evict apparently 'redundant'
workers from the conurbation. Though wage labour migration is
above all else the consequence of proletarianization (cf.
Chapter One), the relaxed attitude of the post-colonial state
has undoubtedly been a factor in the increase of the urban
manual labour force.
In considering the proliferation of self-employment among
manual workers, I shall examine aspects of the way in which it
is related to population growth in Greater Khartoum. I shall
argue that, by providing these employment opportunities, the
process of population growth is increasingly asserting itself
as the major source of demand for unskilled labour and, as a
result of this, is progressively assuming the crucial role
which the construction industry played in the operation of the
wage labour market during the colonial period. In contrast,
however, the demand generated by the population momentum is
not transient; and it is this persistence of demand which has
drawn so much attention to the manifestations of the hitherto
overlooked,	 but as yet largely misconceived peripheral
capitalist foundations of the processes
	 governing the
operation of the urban wage labour market.
Owing to the lack of comprehensive official or other
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reports, it is difficult to describe precisely the operation
of the wage labour market in Greater Khartoum since flag
Independence in 1956. In my attempt to reconstruct the main
post-colonial developments I have found it illuminating to
adopt a three-phase periodization; and my account is pursued
in terms of these phases. But before outlining these phases I
should stress that I do not imply any significant
discontinuity in the operation of the labour market. The three
phases exhibit similarities in many of their basic features,
of which the abundance of wage labour in general, and
unskilled labour in particular, is the most significant. My
intention is, rather, to concentrate on the specific
feature(s) that acquired special prominence during each phase,
although evidence of its (their) presence can be found in all
three. These phases are:
(1) The immediate post-colonial phase, from 1956 to
around 1963. This phase may be characterized as one
of general improvements in the conditions of the
wage labour market as numerous employment
opportunities were created, especially in 'modern'
manufacturing industry. Despite all allegations
concerning the post-colonial 'drift' of migrant
wage labourers, there was no significant wage
labour migration to Greater Khartoum during this
phase.
(2) The second phase covers the period from around
1964 to 1969. During this phase there was a
significant increase in the number of migrants, but
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the expansion in wage employment was apparently
approaching its limits. Industrial investment was
declining, but the effects of population growth
were starting to crystallize in the form of other
employment opportunities, especially in intra-city
transport, food industries and personal services.
(3) The third phase stretches from 1969 to the
present. During this period employment in 'modern'
industry virtually stagnated, but the population
momentum provided numerous opportunities. Owing to
a steady deterioration in the living standards of
all sections of the urban manual labour force, this
phase also witnessed the emergence and acceleration
of	 large scale wage-labour emigration to the
oil-rich Arab countries. Though skilled labour is
apparently	 becoming	 scarce,	 the relative
intensification of the proletarianization process
taking place in the context of exhorbitant rates of
inflation and, coupled with drought, has guaranteed
an ample supply of unskilled workers.
THE POST-COLONIAL PERIOD (1956-1963)
As a result of wholesale redundancies in the construction
industry following the completion of the New Deims in 1954,
and of the decision of the colonial administration not to
evict unemployed construction workers, it seems likely that,
on the eve of Independence, Greater Khartoum was witnessing
yet another 'labour-surplus situation' (cf. Chapter Four). But
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the magnitude of this surplus is difficult to estimate. In
view of the unprecedented boom which the Gezira Scheme
experienced during the Korean War in the early 1950s, it is
probable that this labour-surplus situation prevailed during
the summer months only. My assumption here is that the
increase in wages for cotton-pickers in the Gezira Scheme
attracted some unskilled workers. Whatever the situation on
the eve of Independence may have been, in my attempt to
collate the scanty available information, I have developed a
strong impression that between 1956 and 1963 Greater Khartoum
witnessed virtually no unemployment among manual labourers.
The improvements in the conditions of the labour market
during the immediate post-colonial years were not solely a
consequence of a regeneration in the wage labour market in
Greater Khartoum. An equally important factor was the
initiation of a construction boom in the provinces which
temporarily helped limit wage labour migration into the
conurbation, and also, apparently, attracted quite a number of
skilled and semi-skilled construction workers living in the
capital.
THE POST-COLONIAL DIVERSION
As I have maintained earlier, in their search to 'develop
the country, successive national governments made considerable
efforts to promote a dramatic expansion in primary export
agricultural production, especially through the establishment
of large-scale irrigated schemes. Though this orientation is
still present in current government plans (the Rahad Scheme is
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the salient example), the larger part of the expansion in
irrigated agriculture actually took place during the first
eight years after Independence. In addition to. the numerous,
relatively small pump-schemes (see, e.g., Omer Osman, 1958;
Taisier M. A. All, 1982), this early period also witnessed the
establishment of the Managil Extension in the Gezira Province
and the New Haifa Scheme in Kassala Province. Likewise
numerous major infrastructural projects were implemented
between 1958 and 1964. The most important among these projects
were the building of the Khashm el-Girba and ErRosairess Dams,
the extension of rail transport to Darfur (Nyala Line) and.
Eahr E1-Ghazal Provinces (Wau Line), and the construction •of
the Khartoum-tMadani highwãy
The concurrent demand for wage labourers generated by
these early 'developmental schemes' was enormous. In the case
of the New Half a Scheme alone, for example, the tasks to be
undertaken were the construction of Khashm el-Girba Dam,
canalization in the scheme, and the building of two new towns
(New Halfa and Khashm el-Girba), in addition to 24 villages
intended to accommodate the Nubians to be transferred from
Northern Sudan. In each of these villages, between 250 and 300
houses, a primary school and other public places were built
(Sorbo, 1977:5).
The construction boom provided opportunities for large
numbers of skilled and unskilled workers, and many unskilled
workers were apparently able to qualify as skilled and
semi-skilled workers. For the redundant construction workers
in Greater Khartoum, this massive demand changed their
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situation overnight. For the proto-proletarianized small
farmers and pastoralists, on the other hand, the prospect of
assured construction employment during the dry season acted as
a magnet. As a result of this, not only was wage labour
migration to Greater Khartoum apparently drastically slowed,
but the flow of seasonal unskilled migrants to the Gezira and
other agricultural districts was severely disrupted. The
shortage of seasonal migrants in Gezira reached its climax in
1963, when the first military junta had to bring in troops and
pupils to help redress the situation during the cotton-picking
season (See Omer Mohamed Ali, 1974:30).
THE POST-COLONIAL REGENERATION IN KHARTOUM
At the very time that the provincial construction boom was
under way, the wage labour market in Greater Khartoum
experienced a regeneration of its own. Part of this expansion,
of course, took place in the sphere of import-export trade,
into which the first national government actively encouraged
the entry of Sudanese businessmen (Mohamed •Yousif A.
El-Mustafa, 1983:191). In 1959, for example, the government
decided to reserve 30% of all import quotas for "first-time
importers", while in 1960 the Sudanese Commercial Bank was
established to finance the "national" merchants, who used to
complain about the bias of the foreign-owned commercial banks
(see Mohamed Hashim Awad, 1966:42). As virtually all importers
were stationed at Khartoum, it is beyond doubt that the
immediate post-colonial years witnessed a relative expansion
in commercial employment.
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New employment opportunities were likewise opened during
this early period in the sphere of intra-conurbation transport
services. These opportunities, it is worth noting, were not
solely the result of pressure caused by population growth. A
more important factor was the •
 replacement of the
capital-intensive tram service, which dominated the internal
transport network in the Three Towns during the colonial
period, by buses and taxis. However the increase in wage
employment in the import-export trade and the internal
transport sectors was apparently far smaller than what it was
in the public sector and in 'modern' manufacturing industry.
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
In Chapter Three I explained how the achievement of flag
Independence boosted further the growth in public employment,
which received its initial impetus in the
	 Sudanization
process. New ministries and government departments were
established, while the already existing departments were
expanded. Though the main increase in public employment was in
the ranks of 'classified staff', many manual workers were also
recruited as skilled workers, machinery operators, drivers,
guards, messengers and general labourers. Likewise, the
establishment of post-secondary institutions (which all have
student-hostels) gave opportunities for a limited number of
workers to be recruited as guards, cooks, room-attendants and
gardeners.
A further increase in public employment was generated
through the transformation of the Sudan Defence Force into a
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full-fledged army whereby a large number of unskilled (but
literate) workers were recruited. Starting with the rise of
the first military junta in 1958, moreover, there has been an
increasing tendency for military personnel to be concentrated
in Greater Khartoum in particular. By' 1980 the People's Armed
Forces are said to have given employment to over 65,000
persons, of whom at least 50,000 were recruited from among
manual workers, farmers and pastoralists. Unfortunately, I
could not find any figures or estimates on the numbers of
workers recruited into 'unclassified' public employment during
the immediate post-colonial years.
THE EXPANSION IN MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT
It is not my purpose here to consider' in detail aspects of
the emergence of manufacturing industry in the Sudan, or the
role assumed by the post-colonial state in its expansion
through both the provision of concessions to prospective
industrialists (cf. Mohamed Hashim Awad, 1966; 1970; Au Ahmed
Suliman, 1973; Naseem, 1977; Awad Abdel Mageed, 1981;
Fateh-el-Rahman Abdallah E1-Sheikh, 1981) and direct public
investment (cf. Sadig Rasheed, 1974; 1977; Sayed M. Nemeiri,
1977). One point does need emphasizing and this is that
throughout the colonial period manufacturing industry was
virtually non-existent. At Independence the total number of
'modern' industrial establishments in the entire country was
said to be around 40 (cf. Fatima Babiker Mahmoud, 1984:59),
and of these the most important were cotton-ginning plants
intended to service the colonial-type trade economy (cf. Omer
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M. Osman & All Ahmed Suliman, 1969; Mohamed Yousif A.
El-Mustafa, 1983). But as the fetters of formal capitalist
colonization were broken, the first national government
promulgated The Approved Enterprises (Concessions) Act of
1956, which gave an impetus to industrial investment.
According to El-Sayed El-Bushra (1980:271), the 1956 act was
intended to
encourage investment in the industrial
sector both rom home and abroad by offering
protection, and in many cases subsidies, to
the newly created industries. The government
promised manufacturers considerable
reductions in taxation and import duties on
imported materials, machinery, and spare
parts, together with reduced rates in
transport, and power, and the provision of
land for industrial development at nominal
prices. The authorities gave assurances to
foreign investors that they would be able to
transfer profits and capital and that a fair
compensation would be paid in case of
nationalization of enterprises, and
expatriates were assured that they would be
allowed to transfer savings.
Though the concessions which the Act provided were
obviously considerable, the local capitalists found them far
less lucrative than the potential rewards from foreign trade
and irrigated agriculture. In the first three years after
Independence the • Act attracted only a handful of investments
that were largely foreign-owned; and it was not until 1959,
when cotton prices declined considerably, that a few local
capitalists started to invest in industry (El-Wathig Kameir,
1980b:5lff), By the end of the first decade of Independence,
however, virtually all of the private industrial
establishments in the country were under the control of
Sudanese capitalists, although in some establishments
	 a
286
proportion of the capital continued to be foreign-owned. The
control by the so-called leading Sudanese industrialist,
Kuwaiti-backed Khalil Osman, is a good case in point.
The rate of private industrial investment in the first
three years after Independence was aparently far short of the
expectations of the military junta who assumed power in 1958.
The junta accordingly launched their plans with provisions to
establish six factories and a tannery with an investment
amounting to LS 30 million. According to Sadig Rasheed
(1977:84), the reasons for the state venture were explained
partly in terms of "the large size of investment" (as with
sugar production), and partly with reference to "the lack of
interest and hesitation" on the part of the private sector.
Through	 increased private and public industrial
investment, the first decade of flag Independence witnessed
the emergence of around 185 new 'modern' industrial
establishments (El-Sayed El-Bushra, 1980:271). As a result of
this, the share of industry in the GDP increased from "a mere
1%" on the eve of Independence (Sadig Rasheed, 1977:83) to
over 7% in 1965/66 (Fatima Babiker Mahmoud, 1984:59).
Similarly, industrial employment increased from 12,257 in
1955/56 to 21,960 in 1965/66 (ibid.). The larger part of the
growth in the share of industry in GDP and employment
originated in 'modern' manufacturing industry.
My reason for assessing aspects of the growth of 'modern'
industry i that most of the factories established during the
first decade of Independence are located in Greater Khartoum.
According to Mohamed El-Awad Galal El-Din (1978:122), between
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1956 and 1965 Greater Khartoum witnessed an industrial
investment of around 31.7 million Sudanese pounds which
provided employment for 12,185 persons. Though the period
1960-1 964 witnessed the initiation of relatively substantial
public industrial investments outside Greater Khartoum ( Sadig
Rasheed, op.cit.), the pattern of concentration of industry in
the conurbation was only slightly affected. By 1967, for
example, Greater Khartoum accounted for over 73 per cent of
all manufacturing industry in the country, and about 75 per
cent of the entire Sudanese modern industrial workforce
(El-Sayed E1-Bushra, 1980:275).
THE ABUNDANCE OF LABOUR
In spite of the emergence of a substantial demand for wage
labour both inside and outside Greater Khartoum during the
immediate post-colonial years, the supply of unskilled wage
labour in the capital was ample. As a result of this, neither
the first national, parliamentary democratic government
(1956-1958), nor the first military junta (1958-1964), found
it necessary to intervene in the operation of the urban wage
labour market by inducing migration into Greater Khartoum
and/or increasing wage rates. Quite a significant section of
the skilled labour force in the newly-established factories,
however, consisted of expatriates, who were apparently sent by
the manufacturers to "train" local workers (Au Ahmed Suliman,
1 974 : 97ff).
The relative abundance of unskilled wage labour seems to
have resulted in a lack of interest on the part of industrial
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employers in the development of a 'durable' relationship with
their unskilled wage workers. With the exception of the
personnel of the Protective Services (the Police and the Army)
and the relatively scarce skilled workers and machinery
operators, the wage workers recruited into both government and
industry during the first decade of Independence seem to have
been engaged largely on a 'temporary' and 'casual' (as opposed
to 'permanent') basis. According to Kannappan (1977a:98),
The criteria for entry into permanent
employment in the modern sector include
various rules of thumb.., prior experience,
and of course various kinds of certificates
concerning formal preparation. Many of the
well-established and prestigious employers
insist on elementary education for new
recruitment to permanent payroll even for
the lowest category manual jobs. They defend
the practice on the ground that literate
workers adapted better to modern employment,
literacy helped workers to read elementary
instructions, improved their chances of
being upgraded, etc.
On the eve of flag Independence the rate of literacy in
the Sudan was less than 10 per cent, and virtually all schools
were concentrated in urban areas (ILO, 1976:123). In spite of
considerable expansion in education since 1956, the rate of
literacy in present-day Sudan hardly exceeds 25%. The majority
of unskilled labourers in government and industry, especially
the rural-born among them, therefore find it virtually
impossible to graduate to the status of 'permanent' employees.
THE BEGINNING OF THE 'DRIFT' (1964-1969)
As the post-colonial provincial construction boom subsided
by 1963/64, the skilled and semi-skilled construction workers
found themselves redundant and, as a result of this, began to
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return back to the large urban areas in general, and Greater
Khartoum in particular. Likewise increasing numbers of
proto-proletarianized small farmers and pastoralists started
to migrate to the Three Towns and other large cities,
especially during the dry season when no agricultural
employment is available. It is important to note that the
extension of rail transport to Western and Southern Sudan made
the trip to Greater Khartoum relatively easy. Increased
migration to Greater Khartoum by "Westerners" in particular,
however, was said to be partly the consequence of party
politics. In this connection Fahima Zahir (1972:228) has
pointed out that councillors and planners in the capital were
of the opinion that
the drifting and concentration of tribal
groups from the Western Provinces in the
outskirts of the Three Towns has been
politically motivated by the tJmma Political
Party and the affiliated religious sect, the
Ansar, which had only recently used its
followers to exert pressure in times of
political crises and political unrest.
MODERN INDUSTRY
By the time of the influx of wage-labour migrants, the
rate of expansion in manufacturing employment was declining
rapidly. Though I could not find precise figures on the new
wage-employment	 opportunities	 generated	 by	 'modern'
manufacturing industry between 1964 and 1969, it seems
unlikely that they totalled more than 5,000 as only a few,
relatively small factories were opened between 1965 and 1969.
One of the largest of these factories, the Modern Match
Factory (opened January, 1965), initially employed only 160
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workers and office employees (the workforce was later
increased with the installation of a second factory that
started production in 1971, and total employment reached 365
by 1977, see El-Wathig Kameir, 1980b:125ff).
Some critics might contest my assessment of the declining
rate of industrial investment in the capital by emphasizing
the growing number of "local" industrial capitalists in
Greater Khartoum during the 1960s. I do not deny the relative
increase in the number of "local" industrialists, but I would
stress that most of them did not actually initiate new
industries; for the most part they took over establishments
that had formerly been owned by foreign capital. The
'Sudanization' of the two largest industrial employers in
Khartoum North, the American (now Sudan) Textile Factory and
the Japanese (now Khartoum) Textile Factory demonstrates that
the entry of "local" capital into industry does not
necessarily result either in the emergence of new industries
or in increased industrial employment.
The tendency of local industrialists to take over already
established concerns does not mean that no new industrial
investments were initiated since 1965; but none of these new
investments was in large scale industrial establishments,
which apparently have ceased to emerge in Greater Khartoum
since 1963. Thus virtually all the large industrial
establishments (i.e. those with 500+ workers) in present-day
Khartoum • were actually opened during the immediate
post-colonial period (1956-1963). The Sudan Textile Factory,
which alone employs over 6,000 persons, Khartoum Textile
291
Factory, BATA Shoe Factory, Haggar Tobacco Factory, the Glass
Factory and the Blue Nile Brewery (which was recently closed
in keeping with the Islamicization process), to name the most
important, were all established during that early period.
Probably over 60% of the latour force in 'modern'
manufacturing industry in present-day Khartoum is employed in
industries established before 1965.
The decline in expansion of industrial employment during
the later part of the 1960s was not solely the result of the
decline i,n the rate of industrial investments. The relatively
high capital intensity and the general under-utilization of
capacity ir 'modern' industry in the Sudan are also important
factors constraining expansion of employment within existing
industrial establishments.
CAPITAL INTENSITY
In	 their	 explanation of the inability of 'modern'
manufacturing industry to absorb the growing urban manual
labour force in Greater Khartoum, many scholars have singled
out the tendency of industrialists to employ capital-intensive
technology as the prime factor. Mohamed El-Awad Galal El-Din
( 1980a:432), for example, has noted that;
an investment of less than eight million
pounds in the manufacturing industries in
the period 1956-60 led to the employment of
4,093 persons, while an investment of nearly
24 millions in the period 1960-64 absorbed
only 8,092. In other words, while the amount
invested increased by three times or more,
the number of new jobs created increased by
less than double.
Naseem (1977:7lff), on the other hand, has noted how in
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the three year period 1968-1971 the average capital-labour
ratio in the manufacturing sector increased by about 40%, from
ES 1,603 to ES 2,295. He has further pointed out that this
increase was not solely the consequence of the emergence of
new, more capital-intensive industries, but also of the
adoption of more capital-intensive techniques within existing
establishments, and added that:
This assertion is well illustrated by the
metal products industry group where the
number of employees in 1971 fell to 3,303
(from 3,601 in 1968-69) but the value added
rose from ES 1.430 million to ES 3.303
million [misprint?] thus raising the value
added per employee by over 50 per cent
(ibid).
On the basis of these figures, Naseem (ibid.) is tempted
to assert that the capital-labour ratio in Sudanese industry
is several times what it is in similar industries in both
Pakistan and the United States (but the figures he quotes for
these two countries are for 1962/3 and 1955 respectively). A
similar conclusion has also been advanced by Au Abdel Gadir
Ali (1977) who, in his assessment of the elasticity of
substitution, has attempted to compare the Sudanese case with
findings on the Philippines, Argentina and Nigeria (but also
with figures relating to an earlier period). Ali Abdel Gadir
claims that, with the exception of the textile industry, all
industries in the Sudan have an elasticity of substitution
greater than unity, which suggests a relatively high capital
intensity. Likewise Medani Mohamed Ahmed (1983:103) points out
that "capital-labour ratios have risen by 91.6%, 73.27%, 19.4%
and 102% for the chemical, textile, food and metal industries
respectively during the period 1970-1973".
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Comparisons of capital-labour ratios in different
countries in different years, or for the same country over a
number of years, can of course be very misleading because
normally no account is taken of the effects of inflation. But,
notwithstanding the generally low wages of workers in the
Sudan (cf. Chapter Seven), there is nevertheless good reason
to believe that the concessions provided by the government to
prospective industrialists have virtually "made the price of
capital cheaper" than of labour (Ali Abdel Gadir Ali,
1977:132). According to Medani M. Mohamed Ahmed (op.cit., p.
106) the concessions providing;
accelerated depreciation allowances, liberal
loss carry-overs, custom exemptions, .. are
all geared to motivate and encourage capital
intensity rather than labour intensity. The
[exemptions from Business Profit Taxi.. are
[also] biased and non-neutral between labour
and capital factors of production.
El-Wathig Kameir's study of the (private) Modern Match
Factory (1980b:125ff) has perhaps documented' the classic
example of the adoption of more capital-intensive technology
in an existing industrial establishment in the Sudan.
El-Wathig has noted that wages in this
	 factory were
"appreciably" lower than in public sector factories.
Nevertheless, when the Modern Match Factory installed a second
plant that started production in 1971, the new "plant was
highly capital intensive and most of the production process
was automated. The total work force in this [new plant]
was 40 workers who produced as much as 141 workers had done in
the old factory" (idem., p. 126).
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The consequences of the high capital-labour ratios in
Sudanese industry are not confined to the constraints imposed
upon labour absorption capacity. An equally detrimental, but
often overlooked, aspect of high capital intensity is that its
relatively small labour force tends to be composed of three
categories. The first two categories, which constitute a small
percentage of the labour force, consist of (a) high-level
manpower (engineers, management, accounting personnel, and so
on) and (b) semi-skilled wage labourers. The third, and by far
the largest, category consists of unskilled wage earners. This
point has been succinctly stated by Arrighi (1970:228/9):
Capital-intensive techniques will not only
require less labor for each level of output,
but they will also require a different
composition of the labor force than
labor-intensive techniques, as they make
possible the division of complex operations,
which would need skilled labor, into simple
operations that can be performed by
semiskilled labor.
As I shall demonstrate later in this chapter, such a
pattern of heavy reliance on semi-skilled and unskilled
workers has had serious implications for the stabilization of
the 'modern' industrial labour force in the Sudan. In other
words, because of the low levels of skill required in
capital-intensive industry, employers have consistently been
reluctant to provide appropriate incentives (especially in the
form of wages, cf. Chapter Seven) to stabilize their wage
labour force, and it is this reluctance which underlies the
phenomenon' of 'replenishment recruitment' into factories (cf.
below).
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CAPACITY UNDERUTILIZATION
In	 addition to its high capital-intensity, Sudanese
industry is also characterized by relatively high rates of
capacity underutilization, which constrains further the
potential of employment generation in existing industries.
According to Ghosh (1983:60), a "survey carried out by a World
Bank team in 1981 estimated that over two-thirds of the
factories surveyed operated at below 50% capacity". Many
scholars have considered aspects of this underutilization,
which is more often than not conceived as a consequence of
"technical factors". Problems of transport, skilled manpower,
foreign exchange, etc., have accordingly been emphasized (see
Naseem, op.cit.). Though there undoubtedly are many "technical
problems" besetting Sudanese industry, underutilization of
capacity seems to be underlain by much more than these
technical factors. The contributions of Mohamed 1-lashim Awad
(1966; 1970) and Mohamed Yousif A. El-Mustafa (1983) have
convincingly substantiated the relevance of the peculiar
"mercantilist character" of industrial investment in the Sudan
for the understanding of capacity underutilization.
Mohamed Hashim Awad (1966:35ff) has for long emphasized
the role of protection afforded by the industrial concessions
acts in encouraging the emergence of a pattern of industrial
monopoly in the Sudan. The provisions stipulating restrictions
on imports, for example, have eliminated competition in the
local market and consequently enabled industrialists to
increase prices and to lower the quality of products. Mohamed
Hashim contends that this monopolistic tendency is true even
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in the presence of several factories producing the same
commodity (e.g. the soap industry), precisely because
industrialists tend to divide the national market among
themselves rather than compete with each other.
Mohamed Yousif A. El-Mustafa (1983:272ff), on the other
hand, has pointed out that, through their ability to establish
monopolies, Sudanese industrialists have in effect tended to
generate profits through the control of the market rather than
through a progressive revolutionizing of production. In
keeping with this tendency, he argues, many industrialists
have wilfully opted to operate their industries below maximum
capacity, precisely because such underutilization
perpetuates the shortage of goods and allows
the owners to behave as merchants -i.e. to
ensure a high rate of commodity turn-over,
and in turn to keep to a minimum (or even to
eliminate) costs of storage, distribution
and advertisement. It also leads, of course,
to the rise of prices in the black market
(idem., p.278).
Despite the limited expansion in industrial employment
between 1965 and 1969, however, the high rates of turn-over
among factory workers provided opportunities for some of the
migrants 'drifting' into Greater Khartoum (see below).
THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
One at least equally important source of attraction for
migrants towards the mid-i 960s was the construction boom which
Greater Khartoum experienced after 1961/62, when plots of
residential land in all Three Towns were allocated to citizens
at nominal prices. Probably over 70% of all extensions that
emerged in Greater Khartoum between 1955 and 1970 (see Map 4)
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were actually built during the 1960s, The most important of
these extensions were;
(a) Khartoum: the New (First Class) Extension,
Khartoum Two Extension (2nd Class), and the Third
Class Extension (Imtidad Al-Talta).;
(b) Omdurman: Al-Mahadiya (3rd Class) and Um-Badda
(3rd Class).
(c) Khartoum North: El-Safia (First Class), Al-Mazad
(2nd Class), Kober (3rd Class), and Al-Sha'biyya (3rd
Class)
As expected, the influx of redundant construction workers
into Greater Khartoum resulted in a drop in the daily wages of
both skilled and unskilled labourers (Omer Mohamed Au,
1 974:59ff).
Though the construction boom in Greater Khartoum briefly
subsided by 1966, further allotments of plots kept up the
momentum of employment in the construction industry right up
to the present. As a result of these later allocations, the
Third Class 'town' of Al-Sahafa has emerged in Khartoum, while
Um-Badda and Al-Thawra in Omdurman have expanded considerably.
However the most conspicuous feature in the continuing
construction boom in present-day Khartoum is the proliferation
of First Class extensions. Al-Riyad (pop. 10,053 in 1983) and
Taif ttowris in Khartoum, Kober extension and Al-Mughtaribeen
("Emigrants") Neighbourhood in Khartoum North, and El-Neil
'town' in Omdurman, are the most important of these First
Class Extensions.
In 1973 construction "employees", who consist almost
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exclusively of wage earners, accounted for 11,446 persons, or
over 6 per cent of the total number of ts employees hl in Greater
Khartoum. Despite its relative significance in the wage labour
market, the construction industry has ceased to be the primary
source of wage employment for migrants. Given its seasonality
(work virtually comes to a halt during the rainy season) and
the heavy resort to casual employment in the industry, the
construction workforce shows a relatively high degree of
circular migration (cf. El-Wathig Kameir, 1980a; 1980b).
ThE SPHERES OF EXPANSION
The growth in import-export trade and related activities
continued throughout the 1960s (cf. Fatima Babiker Mahmoud,
1984:38ff), and this created employment for a relatively small
section of the manual labour force in Greater Khartoum (mainly
as porters and transporters of goods). The bulk of new
employment opportunities in the period 1965-1969 was
apparently generated in those sectors which were rapidly
expanding as a result of population growth: intra-conurbation
transport, restaurants, petty commodity production and petty
trade.
Furthermore, the appreciable increase in the numbers of
the bourgeoisie and 'classified staff' in Greater Khartoum
(cf. Chapter Three) enabled a section of unskilled migrants to
secure employment as domestic servants, while a further
segment of migrants found openings in unskilled personal
services: especially as shoe-shine and car-wash boys.
The magnitude of the influx of wage labour migrants to the
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capital between 1964 and 1969 is difficult to estimate, not
least because of the relatively high degree of circulation of
migrants (see Fahima Zahir, 1972:233ff). But throughout this
period there was a mushrooming of squatter settlements,
especially near industrial areas here factory workers built
the first shack huts to reduce accommodation and transport
costs (idem; Mohamed El-Hassan Abdel Hafeez & Salah M.
El-Mowag, 1972; Bedri Omer Elias & Hassan Yassin Bedawi,
1972). Virtually all unskilled wage migrants to arrive in the
Three Towns between 1956 and 1969 lived in these 'cardboard
villages'. Official estimates of the population in squatter
areas in the Three Towns in 1969 give a total population of
around 30,000, but all researchers believe that the actual
figure was higher.
In spite of the relatively substantial numbers of
squatters, there is no evidence of widespread unemployment, as
surveys among resettled squatters corroborate. The social
survey carried out by the Department of Social Affairs in 1972
(Mohamed El-Hassan Abdel Hafeez & Salah M. El-Mowag,
1972:210), for example, found that "of the employable persons"
in a sample of 4,430 migrants "under 10% were without jobs and
most of those employed work as domestic servants and guards".
It is relevant to note here that squatters did not appear to
complain about their employment conditions. This would seem to
have been because, while the problem of 'educated
unemployment' was apparently reaching crisis limits during the
late 1960s (cf. Chapter Three), the main concern of squatters
was evidently over the extension of services, for the
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attainment of which they showed a high degree of
organizational skills (see Fahima Zahir, op.cit.). Although
some squatters were apparently self-employed, the large
majority consisted of wage workers. A survey of over 20,000
ex-squatters, who were resettled in E1-Hag Yousif village in
the vicinity of Khartoum North, thus found out that;
the majority of them work in governmental,
semi-governmental and private enterprises.
About 30% work in the Khartoum North
Spinning Factory. A few others work as
traders in the area... (Bedri Omer Elias and
Hassan Yassin Bedawi, 1972:218).
THE LIMITS OF INDUSTRIAL EXPANSION (1969-1984)
In the previous section I have maintained that by the time
the 'drift' of wage migrants into Greater Khartoum started to
accelerate, the rate of expansion in 'modern' industrial
employment was apparently slowly approaching its limit.
According to the returns of the Second Population Census, by
1973 there were 32,210 "manufacturing employees" in Greater
Khartoum, and "total manufacturing employment" was 43,545 (cf.
Table 3:16). These figures, however, cover employment in both
'modern' and 'informal' manufacturing industry, and for this
reason should be viewed with caution. On the basis of its
1973/74 Household Survey in Greater Khartoum, the ILO Mission
(1976:379) gives a conservative estimate of around 5,000 for
'informal manufacturing' wage employment (total 'informal
manufacturing employment' was said to be 8,800). These
estimates suggest that total 'modern' industrial employment in
Greater Khartoum in 1973/74 accounted for no more than 34,745
persons, and of these only 27,210 persons were said to be
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"employees". In other words, in 1973 the proportion of
employees in 'modern' manufacturing industry constituted less
than 11% of the total number of "employees" in the
conurbation. It is worth noting that not all employees in
'modern' industry were wage workets (i.e. they included
management, professionals, clerical employees, and so on).
Very little is known about expansion in manufacturing
employment since 1973/74. A recent official report contended
that by 1978/79 "total manufacturing employment" in Greater
Khartoum had reached 46,785 (Sudan Government, 1982), but it
is impossible to state whether the approximately 5,000 new
employment opportunities created between 1973 and 1979 were in
'modern' industry or in petty commodity production (so-called
'informal manufacturing and repair'). Though the latter is
known to be under-enumerated, it is beyond doubt that it has
expanded dramatically over the last decade. Unlike the
so-called 'informal tertiary activities', which do not require
special skills (cf. Chapter Six), entry to petty commodity
production usually involves periods of apprenticeship of
varying duration. A few industries, such as tailoring, do not
normally require more than one year of apprenticeship; but
car-mechanics and carpenters need an apprenticeship period as
long as four to five years. It is worth noting that the
expansion in petty commodity production has partly been
achieved at the expense of the so-called 'formal sector', as
many skilled and semi-skilled workers have withdrawn from wage
employment in public and private large scale industry to
self-employment (cf. Ghosh, 1983).
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What is of interest is that though the expansion in
'modern' manufacturing employment, which Greater Khartoum
experienced between 1956 and 1963, may rightly be
characterized as one of the most important developments in the
history of the operation of the urban wage labour market, a
full-fledged industrialization process has not materialized.
Likewise, while official statistics tend to emphasize the
position of Khartoum as the most important industrial centre
in the country, it should be stressed that the form of
industrialization experienced in the conurbation since 1971 is
a virtual mockery of the process.
THE DECLINE OF KHARTOUM AS A CENTRE FOR MODERN INDUSTRY
In considering the decline of Greater Khartoum as a centre
that attracts industrial investment it is worth noting that
between 1969 and 1973 the private sector hardly initiated any
new industrial investments anywhere in the Sudan. This was
mainly a reaction to the 1969 coup staged by the
self-professed "socialist" Free Officers led by Numeiri. The
wholesale nationalization and confiscation measures undertaken
by the regime in 1970 deepened further the fears of
capitalists. Though since July 1971 the regime evidently
started to retreat from its initial "socialist" programme (ef.
Chapter Seven),and progressively allied itself to the local
bourgeoisie as well as to international finance capital and/or
multinational corporations (Wohlmuth, 1983; Kok, 1983), it was
not until 1973 that private investors (both local and foreign)
started to reinvest in 'modern' industry side by side with the
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public sector.
The expansion in 'modern' industry in the Sudan since 1973
is apparently more dramatic than the expansion during the
immediate post-colonial years. But probably over 90% of these
recent investments are located outside Greater Khartoum. The
Economic Survey 1979/80 (Sudan Government, 1980: 176ff), for
example, lists under "Prime Developmental Projects" some 14
public industrial concerns employing around 25,790 persons;
but none of these concerns is located in Greater Khartoum (cf.
Table 5:1). The public concerns established between 1976 and
1981 include neither the public factories established by the
first military junta in the 1960s, nor the recent "mixed"
industrial investments (largely joint ventures between the
public sector and foreign capital), such as the giant Kenanah
Sugar Scheme (which alone is said to have given employment to
around 15,000 persons, see Wohlmuth, 1983:197) and the Red Sea
Tannery. The public sector industrial investments in Greater
Khartoum since 1973 seem to be confined to two plants.
Oesterdiekhoff (1983:183) mentions, in the course of his
discussion of public industry in the Sudan, a new spinning
plant employing 670 workers to be located in Khartoum North,
while the publicly-owned White Nile Tannery in Khartoum
started production in 1974 (Sudan Government, 1980:37).
Nevertheless the point remains valid that public industrial
investment is essentially oriented towards the provinces.
Likewise private industrialists started to invest in the other
urban areas (notably Port Sudan, El-Obeid and Nyala). Of the
few 'modern' industrial concerns established by the private
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sector in Greater Khartoum during the last decade or so, Saeed
Food Factory (which employs 500 unskilled workers) is the
largest.
Notwithstanding the official rhetoric concerning the
extension of "development" into the pxovinces, it should be
stressed that the public and "mixed" investments are
exclusively directed towards agro-based industries, especially
textile and sugar production, that are at least partly
export-oriented. Likewise private investors found it more
feasible to install oil-mills in production areas (El-Obeid,
Nyala and Nihud) or at Port Sudan. The location of
agro-industries in areas of raw material production obviously
cuts out the relatively high costs of transporting raw
material. This, it is worth noting, is not a new development
in agro-industry in the Sudan. The first large scale
industrial concerns, established under colonial rule, were the
ginning factories located in the Gezira, while the sugar
factories opened during the post-colonial period (the first of
which was established in 1962/63 at Geneid) have always been
located near their sugar plantations.
Furthermore, even in the case of those consumer-oriented
industries which are not agro-based, Greater Khartoum
apparently no longer possesses the locational advantages that
attracted industrial investments during the immediate
post-colonial years. Before 1959, transport facilities in the
country were far poorer than at present, while Greater
Khartoum itself was the sole significant market for consumer
goods. Since 1960, however, not only have transport facilities
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improved, but also the process of rapid urban growth has
resulted in the creation of relatively significant markets for
consumer products in the other urban centres. These
developments warranted the establishment of industrial
concerns in the provinces to capture the rising demand. As a
result of this, oil-mills, soap factories, mineral-water and
ice plants are proliferating outside Greater Khartoum. It is
interesting to note that the existing factories in Greater
Khartoum (though largely operating below maximum capacity)
produce greater quantities than what the conurbation's
population demands.
Despite the dramatic expansion in 'modern' industry in the
provinces, official statistics continue to exaggerate the
primacy of Greater Khartoum as an industrial centre. A recent
official report (Sudan Government, 1982:4) accordingly pointed
out that by 1978/79 the conurbation of Khartoum accounted for
58% of all large-scale industrial establishments (with 25+
workers), and 30% of small establishments (with less than 25
workers). These numbered 198 and 1,858 respectively. But these
statistics can be very misleading because, in being based on
the absolute number of establishments, they tend to mystify
aspects of the size of the labour force, contribution to value
added and production, and so on. Thus it must be stressed
that, though the public industrial concerns located in the
provinces are relatively few in number, they are far larger
than the private industrial establishments concentrated in
Greater Khartoum. Unfortunately, all I could find in this
respect is a reference to the situation in 1970/71 which
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claims that:
While manufacturing establishments in the
public sector account for only about 27% of
the total number of establishments, they
contribute more than 51% of total
production, 53% of total value added, 51% of
total employment, and 50% of total wages.
Capital invested	 in public	 industries
accounts for 59% of the total capital
investment in manufacturing industry (Sayed
Nemeiri, 1977:89).
These percentages, however, not only do not reflect the
recent dramatic expansion in public industrial investment, but
also distort the actual magnitude of public industry during
that relatively early period. This is mainly due to the
temporary inflation of the share of the public sector in
manufacturing industry between 1970 and 1973 consequent on the
nationalization and confiscation of a majority of the large
scale private industrial concerns in Grater Khartoum (which
have since been largely re-privatized). But though it is
difficult to determine with precision the position of Greater
Khartoum in the context of the recent change of industrial
location in the Sudan, it is nevertheless the case that the
magnitude of employment in the above-mentioned 14 public
factories established between 1975 and 1980 alone is equal to
over 55% of total manufacturing employment in Greater Khartoum
in 1979. When we take into account employment in the earlier
public and private factories outside Greater Khartoum, as well
as the recent "mixed" and private investments, the share of
the conurbation in the national 'modern' industrial labour
force may be as low as 20%.
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THE MOCKERY OF MODERN INDUSTRY
As previously maintained, in drawing attention to the
change in the location of industry, I do not deny the fact
that some industrial investments were initiated in Greater
Khartoum since 1971. That the Three Towns still account for
the majority of industrial establishments in the country is
usually taken as the indicator of continued industrial
investment, albeit in small scale establishments. With a
handful of exceptions (notably El-Roubi's Car Batteries
Factory and the German Normandi plant assembling television
sets), however, virtually all of these recent industrial
establishments are concerned with food processing, and over
90% of them are by no means 'factory-like'.
The results of the latest (1978/79) Industrial Survey of
Khartoum Province (Sudan Government, 1982) are illuminating in
this respect. Of a total of 2,056 industrial establishments
enumerated by this survey, no less than 1,172 establishments,
or around 57% of all establishments, consisted of food
processing industries (oil-mills, sweet factories, flour-mills
and bakeries) employing 15,242 workers, or 32.6% of the
conurbation's total manufacturing labour force. Flour-mills
and bakeries	 alone	 numbered	 1,089 establishments, or
approximately 53% of the conurbation's total 	 industrial
establishments, and provided employment for only 5,819
persons, or just over 12% of the conurbation's industrial
labour force in 1978/79. By virtue of the proliferation of
bakeries and flour-mills between 1971 	 and	 1978,	 food
processing	 industries figured as the leading branch of.
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manufacturing industry in Greater Khartoum in 1979 (in 1971
they were second to the textile industry). Obviously the
impetus for the continuing expansion in food processing
industries in general, and flour-mills and bakeries in
particular, rests exiusively on the •momentum of population
growth in the conurbation. It is worth noting that there are
restrictions on inter-provincial transportation of flour and
bread; and each province is allocated its flour quotas
directly by the rationing authorities.
REPLENISHMENT RECRUITMENT IN 'MODERN' INDUSTRY
Despite the virtual stagnation of modern industry in
Greater Khartoum since 1971, manufacturing employment has
nevertheless continued to play a relatively significant part
in the operation of the labour market by virtue of the pattern
of 'replenishment recruiting' into factories. The excessively
high turn-over rates among the industrial workforce are the
main factor behind the phenomenon of replacement recruitment.
Some recent contributions (e.g. Ghosh, 1983; Mohamed
El-Murtada Mustafa, 1983) attempt to attribute the high
turn-over to the recent emergence and acceleration of
emigration to Arab countries (cf. below). But The instability
of the industrial workforce seems to be a phenomenon that
accompanied	 'modern'	 manufacturing industry	 from	 its
inception. The practice of industrialists engaging unskilled
labourers •on a 'temporary' and 'casual' basis is as
responsible as "emigration" (which is only a manifestation of
destabilization) for the turn-over of the workforce.
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The first systematic study touching on the question of
labour turn-over and absenteeism among industrial workers in
the Sudan was undertaken by All Ahmed Suliman (1971; 1974),
who considered the effects of labour turn-over and absenteeism
on the cost of production in two textile factories in Khartoum
North in 1967/68. Though Au Suliman does not name the two
factories, it is common knowledge that the Sudan Textile
Factory and Khartoum Textile Factory are not only the two
factories which dominate the textile industry in Greater
Khartoum right to the present, but also the largest industrial
employers in the conurbation which together employed around
9,000 persons, or approximately 20% of the entire industrial
labour force in 1973.
All Suliman (1974:105/6) has convincingly refuted the
allegation concerning the costs of labour turn-over (which at
most do not exceed 6%) in increasing the retail prices of
locally produced cloth (which are higher than those of
imported manufactures), but his conclusion that "the textile
labour force in Greater Khartoum is more stable than its
counterparts in Egypt and India" (the rates quoted for the
latter two countries are for the 1940s and 1960-1963
respectively) has in effect tended to mystify the magnitude of
turn-over. Though Ali Suliman has not referred to the absolute
numbers of workers in these two factories during the period
under study, the rates of turn-over he has quoted (1974:lO2ff)
suffice to corroborate my contention about the significance of
replenishment recruitment even prior to the emergence of wage
labour emigration.
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The average monthly turn-over rates for the two factories
for 1967 and 1968 are, respectively; (a) 3.65% and 2.8% for
unskilled labourers; (b) 3.3% and 14.5% for the semi-skilled
workers and; (C) 1.8% and 2.6% for the skilled workers. (The
high turn-over rate for semi-skilled workers in 1968 is said
to be a consequence of internal transference within one
plant). Of particular interest are the rates of turn-over for
unskilled labourers. When calculated for the whole year they
show that the turn-over rates among unskilled workers in the
two years were 43.8% and 33.6% respectively. In other words,
during the two-year period under study the rate of turn-over
among unskilled workers exceeded 75%. Even with a very
conservative estimate of 5,000 unskilled workers in the two
factories, replenishment recruitment ought to have provided
opportunities for around 3,750 unskilled job-seekers	 in
1967/68. The rates of labour turn-over in the smaller
establishments are believed to be higher (cf. Au A. Suliman,
1974:106).
The turn-over rates quoted above are not the outcome of
seasonal fluctuations in the supply of labour. As Ghosh
(1983:98) has pointed out, employers did not
appear to face any seasonal variations in
difficulty of hiring labour. Rather, this
turnover seems to be a form of "urban
nomadism" with workers going from employer
to employer within the urban area. The other
main labour market with which this turnover
interacts is the international one - it
could be possible to link some of the
turnover with labour emigration.
The acceleration of emigration in recent years has
undoubtedly boosted further the turn-over rates among factory
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workers. In a survey carried out in 1982 Ghosh (ibid., p. 162)
has thus found that in the Sudan Textile Factory alone "1,000
workers leave every month", while in the Saeed Food Factory
"80 per cent of the unskilled workforce of ' 500 leave within 3
months". But large as the turn-over rates quoted above are, it
is my conviction that they do not cover the entire unskilled
industrial labour force, as many unskilled workers are known
to be engaged on a 'casual' (day to day) basis. In his study
of the Modern Match Factory (which, like the Sudan Textile
Factory, is owned by the Gulf International Corporation)
El-Wathig Kameir (1980b:159 ) points out that workers who are
employed "on a casual basis are paid per day ... they are not
officially registered in the Personnel Department..". The
number of casual workers in these factories is difficult to
estimate; but the widespread resort to 'casual' and
'temporary' employment in the so-called 'formal sector',
especially in manufacturing industry, is beyond doubt (cf.
Chapter Seven). Therefore in spite of the relative decline of
industrial investment in Greater Khartoum 	 since	 1969,
manufacturing industry has continued to provide ('transient'?)
employment for relatively large numbers of 'drifting'
unskilled migrants as a result of the pattern of replenishment
recruitment. But very little is known about the unskilled
workers withdrawing from factories and workshops. From partial
observations they seem to go in three directions: (a) to
continue living in Greater Khartoum, but to change to
self-employment in the so-called 'urban informal sector' or
wage employment in another establishment, (b) to emigrate to
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the higher paying Arab countries or, (c) to take the journey
back to rural areas, either to their villages of original
domicile or in search of wage employment in agriculture. The
proportion of workers going to each destination is unknown.
THE POPULATION MOMENTUM
The effects of population increase in present-day Greater
Khartoum are not confined to expansion in 'bread manufacture'.
Besides giving rise to the illusion of continuing
manufacturing investment, the population momentum also
progressively generates increased demand in all spheres of
social and personal consumption, especially in the spheres of
housing, transport, restaurants, electricity and water, and,
of course, imported manufactured goods. Employment levels in
all these spheres have undoubtedly increased dramatically
since 1973; but we have to wait until the full detailed
returns of the 1983 Census are made available to determine the
precise magnitude of the increase. From fragmented evidence,
the increase seems considerable. I have already pointed to the
continuing construction boom underlain by increased demand for
housing in Greater Khartoum. It is worth noting in this
respect that instead of the former policy of periodic
allocations of residential plots (every five to six years),
since 1975 there has been continuous allocation. Nevertheless,
the "housing question" in Greater Khartoum seems to be worse
than ever; and the steady increases in house-rents have
ensured the continuity of real estate as a sphere of capital
accumulation which is not paralleled elsewhere except in
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mechanized rainfed farming and import-export trade. A major
consequence of this continuing building boom has been the
sustenance of increased construction employment.
The population momentum has also generated a dramatic
expansion in tertiary activities (trade and social and
personal services). In Chapter Three I noted the recent rapid
growth of the commercial bourgeoisie in Greater Khartoum, but
some of this growth is caused by the •increased demand for
consumer commodities in the conurbation. One manifestation of
this increase has been the steady proliferation of 'modern
grocers', which sell a wide range of imported consumer goods
(mainly canned food) to residents in First and Second Class
neighbourhoods. The increase in the demand arising from growth
among the poorer sections of the urban population, on the
other hand, has contributed to the mushrooming of 'popular
markets' in the outskirts of Khartoum as well as to the
proliferation of street and/or petty trading. But as I shall
explain in more detail in Chapter Six, the services of the
latter are not oriented exclusively to the demands of the
poorer classes, but also of the better-off strata.
Furthermore, the population momentum has given rise to a
substantial demand for a wide range of social and personal
services, which have provided employment for thousands of
people ranging from high-level professionals (physicians,
engineers, lawyers, and so on) to semi- and unskilled tertiary
workers. Ghosh (1983:164) points out, for example, that "the
State Electricity Board in Khartoum alone employs over 14,000
people". If this is correct and, given the extension of
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electricity supply to numerous new residential neighbourhoods,
it seems likely, it would, in effect, mean that employment in
the Central Electricity Corporation in Greater Khartoum has
increased by over 300% during the last decade. In 1973 total
employment in the 'sector' comprising "Electricity, Gas and
Water" accounted for 5,791 persons (cf. Table 3:16).
The increase in employment levels in the intra-conurbation
transport services seems to be even higher. According to the
ILO Mission (1976:379), in 1973/74 there were 3,853 taxis,
1,333 box-cars (pick-ups used as 'mini-buses') and 1,043
buses. During the peak of the annual Vehicle Licensing Test
(equivalent to M.O.T Test) in January 1983, the Traffic
Superintendent of Khartoum claimed in a television interview
that Greater Khartoum had 12,000 taxis and 6,000 buses (the
number of pick-ups, which has increased considerably since
1974, was not mentioned). Excluding employment in pick-ups,
and working with a low estimate of one person per taxi, and
two (i.e. driver and ticket conductor) per bus, the
intra-conurbation transport service seems to have generated
well over 17,000 new employment opportunities since 1974. In
numerous cases taxis and buses are driven by more than one
driver on a shift basis. In view of the fact that in 1973
total employment in the 'sector' comprising "Transport,
Storage and Communications" was 25,008 (cf. Table 3:16),
employment in the internal transport service alone is likely
to have more than quadrupled in the decade 1973-83. Equally
dramatic increases are believed to have taken place in
unskilled personal services -i.e. shoe-shining, car-washing,
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laundry-work, and so on (cf. Chapter Six).
A conspicuous feature of the operation of the wage labour
market in Greater Khartoum in the years since 1969 has been
the appreciable increase in farming employment. Rather than a
'ruralization' of the urban population, this expansion in
agricultural employment is largely the consequence of an
increased demand for vegetables, fruits, dairy products,
poultry and fish in the conurbation. The contribution of Karar
Abbadi and Mohamed Mirghani A/Salam (1976) on aspects of
production and marketing of fruits and vegetables in Khartoum
Province is illuminating in this respect.
Agriculture as such is of course no new activity in
Greater Khartoum, especially in the former 'rural' areas
incorporated into the municipal boundaries of the Three Towns.
In these former villages, small free-holders cultivate, and
supply the urban population with, a wide range of vegetables
(e.g. tomatoes, potatoes, purslane, jews mallow and onions).
Karar and Mohamed contend that since the Second World War
larger 'gardens' producing fruits (oranges, grape-fruits,
lemons) as well as vegetables and fodder started to emerge on
both government and privately-owned land. In 1974, the total
irrigable areas "amounted to about 51,350 feddans, 23,610
feddans being freehold and 27,740 feddans being Government
land" (idem., p.5), and it can be safely maintained that
government land is allotted almost exclusively to capitalists
able to install pumps. Insofar as irrigation depends on pumps,
it may also be argued that most of the "schemes" established
on government land are a phenomenon of the last two decades or
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so. This is accounted for in rather muted terms by Karar and
Mohamed (idem, p.6) who maintain that:
It is interesting to note that [out of a
total of 1,135 pumps reported in the survey]
10.5% ..were bought before 1960 and 45.1%
bought between 1960-1970; only 355 pumps
[i.e. 31.3%] being bought after 1970 [i.e.
between 1971 and 1974].
With the growth of the urban population during the last
decade, the increase in the private farms, especially ones
that are well-irrigated, has apparently been considerable, and
growing numbers of investors are turning to dairying, fish
culture and poultry production. The magnitude of wage
employment in these farms is difficult to estimate; but I
learned that members of certain groups from Darfur and
Kordof an Regions have developed a pattern of annual wage
labour migration to these farms on which they work on a casual
basis. When the "Street-Cleansing Campaign" was first staged
in 1981, I was told by reliable informants that "several
hundred" of casual agricultural labourers were rounded up by
troops at Shambat, which is one of several agricultural zones
in Greater Khartoum, and in course of his fieldwork among
domestic producers in Dar Hamar in Northern Kordofan Province,
Mustafa Babiker Ahmed was informed that many Hamar migrate to
Greater Khartoum each summer specifically to work as casual
agro-labour (personal communication).
EMIGRATION
Due to relatively high rates of inflation that have not
been accompanied by commensurate pay increases (cf. Chapter
Seven), the Sudan has experienced the emergence and
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acceleration of large scale emigration to the higher paying
Arab countries. At present emigration is directed to
oil-exporting countries (especially Saudi Arabia, Libya and
the United Arab Emirates) as well as to the Yemen Arab
Republic, which faces manpower shortages due to emigration by
its nationals. Though at its inception in the early 1970s mass
emigration was largely confined to the highly-educated and/or
skilled sections of the Sudanese labour force, since 1977 the
rate of semi- and unskilled labour emigration has increased
considerably (Mohamed El-Awad Galal El-Din, 1979b). In his
survey of Sudanese emigrants in Saudi Arabia, where around 60
per cent of emigrant Sudanese are said to be working, Abdalla
Al-Sharief Al-Ghoul (1982:4) thus found that there was:
a change in the occupational structure of
emigrants as during the last decade the
[Sudanese] government allowed large numbers
of unskilled labourers to leave the country.
Thus while in the early years most of the
emigrants were in professional and technical
occupations, ..the rate of emigration by
ordinary workers and clerical employees is
rising (My translation).
Au Abdalla All (1980), on the other hand, has noted "the
massive flow of Sudanese migrants into the YAR especially
after mid-1978" (p.3) and pointed out that the "disturbing
feature is that 63% of the total sample [of 250 emigrants] are
farmers and workers" (p.12).
The magnitude of emigration is difficult to estimate.
Official stat-istics for 1981 show that the number of Sudanese
working abroad totalled 330,260, but it is common knowledge
that only a small proportion of Sudanese emigrate through the
official channels (i.e. official secondment and/or contracts
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through the Labour Department) on the basis of which these
statistics are compiled (cf. Ghosh, 1983:76). In a sample of
500 emigrants in Saudi Arabia, Abdalla Al-Ghoul (op.cit., p.5)
encountered only around 32% who had come through official
channels (secondment or after resigning jobs in the Sudan),
while 67.7 had come through unofficial or illegal channels,
i.e. 24.3% as pilgrims who eventually settled; and around 37%
through private contracts, having left Sudan during their
annual leaves (ibid., p.5). Likewise in his survey of 250
Sudanese emigrants in the Yemen Arab Republic All Abdalla All
(op.cit.., p. 24) found that
only 13 (or 5%) reported that their jobs
were secured through the labour office in
Sudan; 10 (4%) by official secondment and
the rest through private contracts (18%),
visiting a relative in YAR (45%) and by
other means (28%)..
Recognizing that under-reporting is common in official
statistics, Ghosh (op.cit., p.76) estimates the number of
Sudanese working abroad as ranging between 1.1 and 1.6
million. It can safely be concluded that they are certainly
not fewer than 750,000. It is likewise beyond doubt that at
least 60% of these emigrants were originally agro-pastoralists
and/or wage workers in the Sudan. In a country in which the
entire 'economically active population' in 1977/78 was
estimated at about 5,148,000 (Mohamed El-Murtada Mustafa,
1983:280), the effects of such emigration in depleting the
country of its labour force, especially the professional and
technical elements, hardly needs emphasis. Though I am least
anxious about the continuity of the present patterns of
primary export domestic production, it should also be pointed
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out that the increase in emigration by farmers and
pastoralists would promise the demise of primary export
production, which is the main pillar of capital accumulation
in the Sudan (though the recent resettlement of refugees in
agricultural regions as agro-labour undoubtedly helps redress
the situation in the large-scale irrigated and rainfed
agricultural schemes).
As far as the wage labour market in Greater Khartoum is
concerned, emigration, massive as it may be, has hardly
affected the supply of unskilled labourers, whose numbers have
increased considerably since 1973. The number of
'self-employed' unskilled workers arrested in the course of
the Street-Cleaning Campaign clearly corroborates this
assertion. Many of the rural Sudanese 'drifting' to Greater
Khartoum, however, seem to be 'transient' and stay in the
capital only as long as is necessary to arrange for emigration
or, in the numerous cases where this proves difficult, until
their resources (including 'patience') are exhausted before
returning to the countryside. But the abundance of unskilled
labour is not solely the consequence of the relative
intensification of proletarianization processes in rural
Sudan. There has also been a massive influx of refugees since
1975; and official sources contend that by 1980 the number of
refugees in the conurbation of Khartoum was 40,000 (cf.
Chapter Three). Though the supply of unskilled labour
apparently. exceeds the demand for wage labourers, emigration
seems to have boosted further the rates of turn-over in both
the public and the private sectors.
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The most significant consequence of emigration in the
operation of the wage labour market in Greater Khartoum is
said to be the accentuation of the problem of high rates of
turn-over among skilled workers. According to Ghosh, some
factories reported a rate of turn-over of 50% per annum among
skilled workers, and he claims that only the "high paying"
subsidiaries of multinationals, or "those companies who
require the type of skilled labour which is not in demand in
the oil-exporting countries", have been able to induce the
stabilization of their skilled workforce (idem., p.97). In
spite of this assertion, Ghosh himself points to the relative
abundance of skilled labourers in industry by describing the
"growing practice" of local industrialists to
employ double the number of skilled workers
required to run certain crucial machines or
perform other important tasks that directly
affect the level of production (idem., p.
87)
The public sector is hardest hit by the shortage of
skilled labour, but this is not solely the result of
skilled-labour emigration. It is also the consequence of the
progressive tendency for skilled workers to withdraw from
government employment and to establish themselves as
"own-account" petty commodity producers. The emigration of
"own-account" skilled workers, especially of mechanics,
carpenters, plumbers and drivers, has provided substantial
opportunities for the lowly-paid government skilled workers.
The presence of some skilled Eritrian refugees has to some
extent mitigated the effects of skilled labour emigration, and
in	 certain occupations,	 such as truck-driving and
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brick-laying, Eritrian refugees are increasingly becoming a
majority of the workforce (Ghosh, op. cit.). But refugees are
recruited mainly in the private sector; and because they
usually accept low wages, they are often preferred to 'local
labour' by private employers. It is xceptional, however, to
find refugees working in the public sector, despite the
government's statements on the right of "registered refugees"
to work. It seems that the combined effect of the low wages
for skilled workers and of the insistence of government
departments on employing "nationals" accentuates the problem
of skilled labour shortage in government employment.
CONCLUS ION
In this chapter I have attempted to trace the main
post-colonial developments in the operation of the wage labour
market in Greater Khartoum, showing that the immediate
post-colonial years (1956-1963) experienced relative
improvements in the conditions of the urban wage labour market
compared to the last two years of colonial rule. I have
suggested that these improvements were consequences of the
emergence of a substantial demand for wage labourers both
inside and outside Greater Khartoum. The dramatic expansion in
urban wage employment, especially in government and
consumer-oriented manufacturing industry, absorbed large
numbers of manual workers in the conurbation, while the
provincial construction boom helped slow the rate of
rural-urban migration. By the time rural-urban wage labour
migration started to accelerate towards the mid-1960s, the
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expansion in wage employment in 'modern1 manufacturing
employment in Greater Khartoum was apparently reaching its
limits. Since 1971, Greater Khartoum started to loose its
status	 as	 the most significant centre for industrial
investment in the country; and it ks only food-processing
industries, especially flour-mills and bakeries, which
continue to flourish as a result of the increased demand for
bread. Nevertheless, the excessively high turn-over rates
among factory workers, and the resultant pattern of
replenishment recruitment, have served to retain the relative
importance of manufacturing employment in the wage labour
market.
The virtual stagnation of manufacturing industry has had
no serious implications for the rapidly growing unskilled
labour force in Greater Khartoum which has found several
alternative sources of employment. A limited set of
alternative opportunities was generated within the public
sector: in community services, poor though they are, in the
People's Armed Forces, and in other regular services. But the
larger part of employment opportunities for manual workers in
present-day Greater Khartoum developed as a result of
population growth, and especially of increases in the
bourgeoisie and 'classified staff'. The population momentum
has led to a dramatic expansion in all spheres of social and
personal consumption, and this has given scope for the
employmentof large numbers of skilled and unskilled manual
workers. I considered aspects of the increase in the demand
for consumer-goods, housing, electricity and intra-conurbation
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transport services, and pointed out how this steadily
increasing demand has generated relatively substantial
employment opportunities.
Not all the opportunities generated by the population
momentum, however, were in wage emplo'ment; and many unskilled
labourers established themselves as 'self-employed' tertiary
workers (e.g. shoe-shine and car-wash boys, laundry-workers,
porters, petty traders). But this view of the nature and
origin of the dramatic expansion in the various forms of
unskilled tertiary self-employment contrasts sharply with the
conventional conception - in the Sudan as in other
underdeveloped countries - which insists that the only form of
'productive'	 employment	 is wage employment and that
'self-employment' is mainly a manifestation of
under-employment, misemployment and/or disguised unemployment.
The conventional conception implies a perverted view of the
causal relation between various forms of unskilled tertiary
self-employment and population growth: instead of viewing
expansion in tertiary activities as arising out of the demand
for services consequent upon population growth - particularly
among the bourgeoisie, bureaucrats and professionals
(including the military) - the conventional view takes the
prime factor in urban population growth as unskilled wage
labour migration by people who, because of the lack of wage
employment opportunities, have to "invent" activities to earn
their living. To paraphrase Birkbeck (1979:161), scholars and
policy-makers have been more interested in the fact that
'self-employed' unskilled workers are not wage workers than in
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looking at why they are 'self-employed', and how their
activities can only be performed on the basis of various forms
of self-employment; what they "have failed to do is to stop
and look at the reality of the situation" (ibid.).
Of central interest is the fact that the proliferation of
unskilled tertiary self-employment (as opposed to unskilled
tertiary wage employment) is the consequence of several
complex factors; some relate to the fact that the 'viability'
of some unskilled tertiary activities, car-washing and
shoe-shining in particular, depends on their being both highly
labour-intensive and cheap. These features tend to discourage
involvement by prospective large-scale investors, who would
wish to organize any activity on the basis of a wage labour
process. However, in certain unskilled tertiary activities
there are possibilities for the institution of wage labour as
the form of labour subjection. Laundry-work, which is
undertaken' by both "own-account" workers as well as by
laundries engaging workers on the basis of piece-rates, is a
good case in point (cf. Chapter Six). In the case of petty
and/or street trading, on the other hand, the proliferation of
various forms of 'self-employment' has been fully in keeping
with the interests of the commercial bourgeoisie, who find in
petty trading an efficient means for distributing stocks,
which are often wholly advanced on credit and/or 'out-working'
arrangements'. Thus 'self-employment' may often turn out to be
little more than a concealed form of wage employment.
Furthermore, the conventional wisdom which emphasizes the
distinction between wage- and 'self-employment' also fails to
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note that on close assessment there is no good evidence of
significant differences between the two forms of employment,
especially for unskilled manual workers. But little systematic
work has been done comparing the conditions of 'self-employed'
workers and wage labourers in the public and private sectors.
This is unfortunate in view of the known high rates of
turn-over among wage workers and of the constant circulation
of workers between wage- and 'self-employment'. It seems that
the views of scholars and policy-makers on the operation of
the urban wage labour market in the Sudan - as probably
elsewhere in underdeveloped countries- are based more on
assumptions and assertions than on detailed assessment of the
terms and conditions of employment for the different sections
of the urban manual labour force. As a contribution to
redressing the balance for the Sudan, I attempt in Chapter Six
to assess aspects of the conditions of unskilled tertiary
'self-employed' workers in Greater Khartoum. On the basis of
that assessment, I shall in Chapter Seven turn to aspects of
the conditions of wage workers and, in the process, compare
them with those of 'self-employed' tertiary workers. These
chapters will corroborate my contention concerning the lack of
significant differences between wage- and 'self-employment'
for manual workers in general, and unskilled labourers in
particular.
CHAPTER SIX
ASPECTS OF TERTIARY SELF-EMPLOYMENT IN GREATER KHARTOUM
328
Causes of widespread unemployment and under-
employment in the Third World are now well
known. During the 1960s, capital-intensive
development strategies in both agriculture
and industry failed to generate sufficient
employment opportunity for all those
entering the labor force. As a result,
millions have come to survive by crowding
into relatively unproductiv, low-paid
service jobs... they swell the ranks of
growing armies of unemployed or marginally
'self-employed' who stay alive by inventing
jobs in the interstices of the economy
(Chaney, 1979:204).
In this chapter I present and analyse the findings of my
research into aspects of unskilled tertiary 'self-employment'
in post-colonial Greater Khartoum. Though I seek to highlight
the varied roles assumed by unskilled 'self-employed' tertiary
workers in the context of the processes of peripheral
urbanism, my main objective is to provide an overview of the
conditions of self-employed tertiary workers. Particular
attention will accordingly be paid to aspects such as previous
occupation(s), migration history, factors facilitating, or
inhibiting, entry to unskilled tertiary self-employment, work
conditions, level of income and frequency of employment. As
the data analysed in this chapter were obtained through
informal unstructured interviews supplemented by partial
observations, I cannot present quantitative analyses or
comparisons of the conditions of different unskilled tertiary
workers. The chapter attempts to compensate for this by the
extensive use cases intended to illuminate variations.
The chapter starts with an overview of unskilled tertiary
activities in Greater Khartoum. Following the overview are two
main sections in which I consider the conditions of workers in
unskilled	 personal	 services	 (car-wash	 boys	 and
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laundry-workers) and street/petty traders respectively. In the
final section I discuss the main points reached and their
implications for analyses of the urban wage labour market in
the Sudan.
AN OVERVIEW OF UNSKILLED TERTIARY ACTIVITIES
In Chapter One I pointed out how policy-makers,
administrators and some scholars tend to view the increase in
the numbers of unskilled 'self-employed' tertiary workers in
post-colonial Greater Khartoum as a symptom of a
'hyper-urbanization' 	 situation	 in	 which	 tertiary
self-employment is said to conceal forms of disguised
unemployment, underemployment and misemployment. This view is
often corroborated by reference to the observation that
virtually all recent unskilled migrants who fail to find wage
employment appear to seek 'refuge' in some form of tertiary
self-employment.
In apparent contrast to the official line, the ILO Mission
to the Sudan is critical of those who view the activities (or
is it enterprises?) comprising the so-called 'urban informal
sector' as a homogeneous entity, which is either wholly
productive or wholly unproductive. The Mission (1976:375/6)
accordingly asserts that
Our understanding of the informal sector
would be enhanced if we viewed it as a
heterogeneous, multi-dimensional or
multi-layered phenomenon, with each layer
possessing different attributes and,
therefore, playing divergent economic roles.
Thus, it may be possible to discover the
existence of productive and profitable
informal activities, side by side with
stagnant and unproductive pursuits...
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In keeping with its view, the Mission (ibid., pp. 376ff)
presents a four-category typology of 'informal sector
activities' in Greater Khartoum based on place of work,
licence and capital requirements, degree of skill and
experience needed to run the business together with future
prospects (defined in terms of the aspirations of the people
in each category). At one extreme, we are told, there is
category (1), where the enterprise is well-established and has
a fixed place of operation. A licence is required but not
easily obtainable and the capital requirements are relatively
high. The business needs a high degree of experience and is
usually prosperous and the owner's ambition is to remain in
it, and expand it, if his means allow. At the other extreme,
Category (4) is composed of hawkers, vendors, shoe-shine and
car-wash boys and the multitude of other individuals doing all
sorts of jobs characterized by long working hours, low
productivity and low income. Very little or no capital is
required for entry into this category. The Mission further
contends that the majority of people in this bottom category
are waiting to obtain jobs in the 'formal sector' (as casual
labourers), while a few make it in the informal sector and
graduate into a higher status category. Between these extremes
there lie two other categories: Category (2) consists of those
who are "established but just managing", and Category (3) of
those who are "struggling to survive". Though individuals in
this last category would like to make progress in their
informal sector careers, the Mission asserts that "they do not
always succeed [and that this] results in a relatively more
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frequent job movement to and from the informal sector" (idem.,
p.376).
The Mission (1976:381ff) gives a "casual estimate" of
42,000 to 47,000 for the labour force in the 'informal
services and commerce sector' in Greatr Khartoum in 1973/74.
This estimate suggests that employment in 'informal services
and commerce' in 1973 accounted for around 18 per cent of
total employment. However, we have to take into account that
this estimate does not consist wholly of the so-called
'redundant workforce', but in addition includes licensed and
relatively "well-established" enterprises run by licensed
retailers, laundry-shop owners, etc. By excluding the "upper
categories" (One and Two) we may obtain a more realistic
approximation to the number of self-employed unskilled
tertiary workers, consisting overwhelmingly of street traders.
The number falling in Category (4) in 1973/74 was estimated by
the Mission as between 7,000 and 12,500, while Category (3)
workers in Khartoum city alone were estimated at around 1,000
(3,500 workers in the conurbation as a whole if we follow the
Mission's extrapolation), which gives a grand total ranging
from a low of 10,500 to a high of 16,000 persons in 1973/74.
But this total seems to be an underestimate as it was based on
estimates of workers in central and peripheral markets and
therefore did not cover tertiary workers operating in
residential areas (laundry-workers, cleaners, etc.). Though it
is virtually impossible to estimate the number of
self-employed tertiary workers in present-day Khartoum, there
can be no doubt that it constitutes a relatively significant
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percentage (around 25%?) of the urban unskilled labour force.
In its policy prescriptions the ILO Mission (idem., pp.
387/8) accords particular attention to the problems of
category (3) and (4) tertiary workers. Recognizing the crucial
role played by pedlars and vendors in the provision of goods
and services to "the mass of low-income consumers in both
urban and rural areas", it accordingly recommends that
the authorities	 recognise	 the present
non-licensed activities in Category II and
III as legitimate and useful
	 economic
activities: they should lift restrictions on
the granting of licences, levying only
nominal fees. The problem of having too many
operators should be left to market forces to
sort out. With regard to IV activities, we
doubt the wisdom of requiring licences, at
least in those cases where such activities
do not present exceptional health or
security hazards. If they do, we do not of
course recommend the relaxation of standards
(idem., p.388).
In spite of its sympathy, and of the irreconcilability of
its recommendations with the 'official line', the ILO Mission
nevertheless subscribes to the 'hyper-urbanization view'
concerning the relative destitution of what it characterizes
as Category (3) and (4) workers compared to the conditions of
workers in the so-called 'formal sector'. But it is important
to note that the Mission actually explains this destitution
not in terms of the 'redundancy' of the 'low grade informal
workers', but as a consequence of official harrassment and the
lack of 'linkages' with the so-called 'formal sector' (cf.
Chapter One). Likewise, by noting the "frequent movement" of
Category (3) and (4) workers between the so-called formal and
informal sectors, theMission implicitly emphasizes the role
of tertiary self-employment as a refuge for the 'reserve
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industrial army'.
Nothwithstanding the differences between the
'hyper-urbanization view' and the 'informal sector concept',
both approaches are flawed by a number of misconceptions
regarding tertiary self-employment among unskilled manual
workers in Greater Khartoum. I believe the basic flaw stems
from the tendency to focus exclusively on whether unskilled
tertiary activities should be discouraged (through official
harrassment and/or eviction of workers) or encouraged (through
the extension of credit to informal enterprise, abandonment of
official 'favouritism' to the formal sector, etc.). In taking
this this view I do not of course denounce the
policy-orientation of these contributions; I simply wish to
stress that, in the haste to formulate prescriptions,
advocates of both approaches have failed to scrutinize two
main points essential to the understanding of unskilled
tertiary self-employment.
The first point concerns the explanation of the dynamics
of the proliferation of tertiary activities. In this regard it
is unfortunate that scholars have based their explanation
almost exclusively on the predicament of individual
participants seeking to earn a living, to the virtual
disregard of the structural determinants, i.e. the demand for
such services as have given scope for the emergence of
tertiary self-employment. In order to redress this bias, my
analysis seeks to relate the proliferation of unskilled
tertiary self-employment to population growth. I shall explain
that unskilled tertiary workers fulfil two main functions.
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Firstly, through the provision of unskilled personal services
(e.g. laundering, car-washing, shoe-shining, and petty trade),
they contribute to the reproduction of the 'general welfare
and comfort' of the affluent urban classes (the capitalists,
bureaucrats and professionals together 'with their dependants).
Secondly, through the provision of cheap commodities and
services as well as through the extension of credit to wage
workers, they contribute to the maintenance of a generally low
wage level in the 'urban economy'. The view I wish to develop
is that the demand underlying the recent proliferation of
unskilled tertiary activities rests more with the affluent
classes than with the wage earners, and that just as the
growth of the capitalists, bureaucrats and professionals can
be traced to the processes of peripheral urbanism, so can the
proliferation of tertiary employment.
The second point relates to the valuable contribution of
the "petty commodity production approach" discussed in Chapter
One and thus to the issue of the linkages, or the
"articulation", between the various forms of 'self-employment'
and the wider 'urban economy' in general and 'big business' in
particular. Though the ILO Mission (op.cit., p.386) recognizes
the crucial role played by the. "small one-man .. commercial
establishment" in the distribution of goods in urban and rural
areas around Sudan, it places its emphasis exclusively on the
"low-income consumers" receiving the services and goods. As as
a result, it tends to mystify aspects of the role of
petty/street traders
	 in	 furthering commercial
	 capital
accumulation. Special reference will accordingly be made to
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the many and complex relations binding petty traders to
wholesalers. But I shall first consider aspects of the
conditions of workers pursuing unskilled personal services.
UNSKILLED PERSONAL SERVICES
One significant consequence of the post-colonial growth of
Greater Khartoum has been the generation of a progressive
increase in demand for a wide range of skilled and unskilled
services, which continue to provide employment for thousands
of people ranging from high-level manpower (physicians,
lawyers, engineers, etc.) to unskilled personal and domestic
workers (house-servants, nannies, car-wash and shoe-shine
boys, prostitutes, etc.). But, although certain personal
services, such as hair-dressing, are utilized by members of
all classes, the members of the different classes are rarely
served by the same personnel and/or establishments. Such
'segregation' is true even in health services. Thus, while the
poor have no alternative but to attend the free out-patient
clinics at state hospitals (where the service is very poor),
the more affluent see the same consultants in private evening
surgeries, where much better care and attention are provided.
It may be noted, in passing, that the fee charged by
consultants for a 10-15 minute appointment - ES 20 to ES 30-
is virtually the equivalent of the standard minimum monthly
wage for manual workers. In the particular case of
hair-dressing, the type of service, and the way it is given,
vary with both the sex and class of the client. Affluent men
frequent 'good-class' licensed saloons in which only one or
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two persons are served at a time, while such poor as can
afford any service - and many cannot- would go either to a
barber working under the shade of a tree or, at best, to
relatively crowded popular saloons (typically in a peripheral
market).
Except for a few services, however, the demand by members
of different classes diverges dramatically. The poor normally
seek a limited range of services provided by popular
'restaurants' (often kiosks with customers eating on
straw-mats), fortune-tellers, native-doctors and prostitutes
(cf. Fahima Zahir, 1972:237). The more affluent, on the other
hand, demand a wide range of services: domestic services,
car-washing, shoe-shining, porterage, prostitution, etc.,
which provide 'income-generating' opportunities for relatively
large numbers of unskilled and semi-skilled tertiary workers.
The recent proliferation of self-employed workers in the
unskilled personal services is more a response to the demands
of the affluent than of the poor. For ecesxpLe, car- stt,
shoe-shining, queue-standing, and laundry-work are almost
exclusively performed for the bourgeoisie and 'classified
staff'. Moreover, unlike the services provided by
fortune-tellers and native-doctors, who are held in high
esteem, virtually all unskilled personal services rendered to
the affluent classes are stigmatized as 'menial' and
'slave-like' by many Sudanese groups. And, because of this
'cultural' -degradation, many migrants from certain parts of
the country shun these activitiesY 1 But in spite of this
stigmatization, the supply of workers to undertake these
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activities is ample. Though many unskilled personal workers
are highly mobile and take up any activity (car-washing,
house-cleaning, queue-standing, etc.) on a 'casual' basis in a
strategy for 'survival by any means' and/or whenever an
opportunity arises, there is a 'hard core' of workers in each
service which is relatively stabilized. To illustrate the
dynamics of the proliferation of such tertiary activities, and
the conditions of self-employed tertiary workers, I consider
the cases of car-wash boys and launderers.
CAR-WASH BOYS
To appreciate the conspicuous increase in the numbers of
car-wash boys in Greater Khartoum, it is relevant to note that
due to sand-storms, dust and mud, cars 'need' to be washed at
least twice every week (for the relatively well-off, even
daily). The capital-intensive washing services attached to
fuel-stations charge ES 5.00, while the self-employed car-wash
boys ask for a maximum of ES 1.00 on the 'spot market' (in
which clients are 'casual', as for example in public parking
places). 2 Except on the occasion of normal lubrication
servicing, car owners usually resort to the cheaper service
provided by the boys. With the large increase in the number of
cars, therefore; the opportunities for car-wash boys have
developed very maikedly.
In Chapter Five I drew attention to the increase in the
numbers of buses and taxis over the last decade; but the
increase in private passenger cars during the same period was
even more dramatic. According to Ghosh (1983:156/7), the total
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(commercial and non-commercial) vehicle fleet in the entire
Sudan in 1973 numbered 68,000, but by 1979 it had increased to
127,000; and "60 per cent of the increase was accounted for by
passenger cars, mostly registered in the Khartoum area..". In
January 1983, the number of licensed private passenger cars in
Greater Khartoum was 65,000, which is approximately equal to
the total vehicle fleet in the entire country a decade
earlier. From casual observation, it seems conservative to
estimate that between 1969 and 1983 the number of private cars
in Greater Khartoum increased by 500%. The opportunities for
car-washing have thus increased by the same proportion.
On first impression, entry to car-washing seems to be
constrained solely by its cultural stigmatization. The only
'assets' required are a brushing broom, a bar of industrial
soap, a bucket or open gallon (and access to water), and two
or three pieces of cloth. These items cost less than two
Sudanese pounds, so that car-washing is one of several
alternatives open to apparently 'desperate' people. But the
car-wash 'world' in Greater Khartoum is not entirely a
'jungle' in which boys compete with each other; as viewed by
its 'core' labour force, it is a highly organized activity in
which 'connections' with low-ranking employees (e.g.
Municipality guards, gate-keepers at government departments
and other large public and private concerns) are central to
its operation in certain zones. Quite a number of car-wash
boys, especially the relatively young boys who have engaged in
the activity for some years and who intend to continue with
it, tend to work in 'gangs'. Some of these 'gangs' constitute
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'partnerships', while others are merely 'alliances'. From
partial observation it is clear that working in a
'partnership' or an 'alliance' of three to four boys provides
each boy with a measure of security against 'aggressive
competition' on the part of others in the 'spot market'. But
whereas 'alliances' are formed by otherwise independent
car-wash boys, 'partnerships' enable the 'partners' to
increase efficiency through a 'technical' division of labour
(one boy washing tyres and plastic mats, another cleaning the
car body, a third drying, etc.). Though most car-washers are
young men under 20 years old, I have encountered a few over 30
years old who had engaged in the same work for relatively long
periods of up to 15 years in some cases. None of these adults,
however, was part of a 'partnership' or an 'alliance'. The
following cases illustrate some of the variations in car-wash
'careers'.
CASE (1)
Jim'a was born in Wau city (Southern Sudan) around
18 years ago. His mother died in Wau when he was one
year old; and as his father was working in a
shoe-factory in Khartoum North, he, together with
his brother and sister, continued to live in Wau
with a younger sister of the deceased mother. The
father used to spend his annual holiday in Wau and
he also sent them money each month. When 12 years
ago his brother and sister first joined his father,
who remarried, Jim'a stayed with his aunt at Wau,
where he learnt to read and write at a khalwa
(Koranic school), but six years ago he came to
Khartoum to join his father and siblings.
When Jim'a came to Khartoum, his father wanted him
to become an apprentice at a carpenter's workshop in
Khartoum North, and Jim'a spent over a year in
apprenticehship earning 25 plasters and one meal
daily. One da Jim'a quarrelled with a senior
carpenter at the workshop, who insisted that the
apprentice be sacked. A few days later Jim'a found
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work with a welder in return for a daily breakfast
and ES 2.00 each Thursday. He worked for the welder
for two years, but was one day found drunk by his
father, who ordered him to find another place to
live. The owner of the workshop was at the time
looking for someone to guard his car at nights due
to numerous car-thefts in the area, and Jim'a began
sleeping in the car parked outside the house.
Through 'living' in the car, Jim'a came to be known
to many people in the neighbourhood. But shortly
after that Jim'a decided to look for another job.
"Welding", he said, "makes the eyes red, and does
not allow one to work". He was offerred a job at a
bakery in the same area, and ceased working with the
welder, though he continued to sleep in the latter's
car. His employment at the bakery, however, did not
last for long, and after two months he was sacked
with three other workers ("because there was no need
for them in the bakery"). For some weeks he failed
to find another job but, through his "established
contacts" in the neighbourhood, he found several
'income- generating opportunities'.
Initially Jim'a worked as a house-servant, for a
monthly wage of ES 25, for one of his 'friends'. But
the job was not to his liking and he started to work
as casual labourer in the neighbourhood. Whenever
one of his 'friends' (men and women resident in five
blocks of the neighbourhood) needed car-washing,
laundering, house-cleaning or litter disposal at a
nearby dump, Jim'a was usually the first to be
approached. Over the past two years, casual
labouring around the neighbourhood thus became his
main occupation, except for two months during which
he was re-employed at the bakery. Jim'a obtains all
his meals free, and he has a monthly income of ES 35
from washing the cars of seven regular clients. His
additional income from car-washing for 'casual
clients' and other activities varies considerably
from day to day, but his average daily income over
the ten days when I followed his activities closely
was ES 1.70 ranging from a low of 85 piastres to a
high of ES 3.00.
CASE (2)
Hamad is 18 years old. He was born in a village in
Darfur, where he completed his primary education
five years ago. Hamad's father, a small farmer, has
2 wives, 8 sons and 5 daughters. Hamad is the third
brothers. His older brothers completed high school
education. One works as a vegetable seller in a
peripheral market in Khartoum North; but wanted to
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emigrate but failed and was at the time of interview
hoping to be appointed as a receptionist at a hotel
in Khartoum. The other brother is a student at a
post-secondary institution in Khartoum. Hamad's
younger brothers attend schools: two are secondary
school students (both at Nyala, one at the Technical
School and the other attending evening classes at an
academic school), and three are at primary schools.
Two of the sisters are married, and the other three
are under school age.
After completing his primary education, Hamad
passed his examinations and was accepted in a junior
secondary school at a town far away from his
village. Though it is a boarding school, Hamad was
accepted as an 'external student' and therefore he
had to look for private accommodation. As he did not
have relatives in that town to live with, and as his
father could not afford to pay for his accommodation
and maintenance, the outcome was that he had to give
up his education. He subsequently lived in Nyala for
one year working as a messenger in a wholesale shop
for a monthly wage of ES 6.00, but was not
satisfied. When his eldest brother completed
secondary education three years ago and moved to
Khartoum in search of work, Hamad decided to
accompany him. Initially both brothers worked as
vegetable-sellers, but Hamad wanted to follow a
technical career. Two years after his arrival in
Khartoum, a relative of his father (a bus-driver)
introduced him to the owner of a workshop for car
repairs, and Hamad has since become an apprentice.
He is expected to complete three years in
apprenticeship before qualifying as a mechanic, but
after that he expects to earn at least ES 45 weekly.
As an apprentice he earns only 75 piastres daily
plus breakfast.
Hamad's needs in Khartoum are few; free
accommodation is offered by his uncle, and the
related bus-driver gives him a free lift each
morning and evening. But as he and his elder brother
have to send money every month to their father and
brothers, to whose education the two are dedicated,
Hamad seeks work in the evenings and on Fridays as a
car-wash boy in the central market in Khartoum
North. His average weekly income from car-washing is
around ES 10. Jointly, the two brothers send ES
20-30 pounds monthly to their family, and they also
give ES 5.00 to their brother pursuing higher
education in Khartoum. Like other 'casual' car-wash
boys in central markets, Hamad complained about
official- harrassment. From casual observation,
however, harrassment by Police and Municipality
seems to be mainly, if not exclusively, directed to
'casual' car-wash boys
	
rather	 than to	 the
'more-established', 'full-time' car-washers.
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CASE (3)
Hassan (19 years), Musa (18 years), Haroun (16
years) and Abakar (15 years) were all born in a
village in Darfur where they completed their primary
education. Hassan and Abakar are full siblings; Musa
and Abakar are sons of their father's brother and
father's sister respectively. All four failed '
 to
obtain the necessary requirements for enrolment to
junior secondary schools. One after the other they
came to Greater Khartoum, where they live in the
house of one of their uncles who works as a guard in
a ministry. The first to arrive in Khartoum was
Hassan, who, with the help of his uncle, found work
in the refreshment kiosk attached to the ministry
where the uncle works. His main job was to bring
back glasses from the offices to the kiosk, to wash
them, and to take them back to the offices on order.
In addition to a daily meal, Hassan received 35
piasters per working day (i.e. 175 piasters per
week). But as daily transport cost him 20 piastres,
he was discontented with his work. As he became
known to officials in the ministry, he decided to
give up work at the kiosk to wash the cars of his
'contacts': He would simply come to the car park
outside the ministry each morning and ask officials
whether they wanted their cars washed. When Haroun
and Musa arrived three years ago, Hassan persuaded
them to join him as 'partners', and instead of
confining their operations to that ministry, the
'gang' extended its activities to two additional
neighbouring government departments. In this
expansion they were helped by guards who were
friends of their uncle. When Abakar arrived just
over a year ago, the operations of the 'gang' had
developed to the extent that he was easily
incorporated as a 'partner'; and they have
established a fairly precise division of labour.
Abakar and Haroun wash the tyres and plastic mats,
Musa dusts carpets and seats and washes the car
body, while Hassan dries the car body and cleans
wind-screens.
CASE (4)
Adam (20 years), Mohamed (17 years) and Abbas (16
years) -are members of a 'gang' operating in the
central market of Khartoum. Though unrelated, all
three were born in neighbouring villages in the
Southern Funj (south-eastern Sudan), where the
youngest attended, but did not complete, primary
education. The other two attended khalwa only. Adam
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was the first of the three to come to Greater
Khartoum, where he has lived for nearly six years,
though he goes back to his village at least once a
year to see his relatives. Adam was brought to
Khartoum by a trader who has a shop in Adam's
village but whose family live at Omdurman. By
agreement with Adam's parents, the trader wanted the
boy to work as a servant in his pmdurman house. An
agreed monthly wage of ES 10 was to be given to the
parents in the village; but Adam was also to receive
"pocket money" (ES 3 per month in addition to ten
piastres daily) plus free accommodation,
maintenance, and (used) clothing. Hassan worked for
the trader for around two years, but felt that he
had been "enslaved" for little money. He wanted to
give up work as a servant, but was not sure whether
he could survive in Greater Khartoum. Nor did he
want to go back to live permanently In the village
after 'experiencing life' in the capital.
During his stay at the trader's house, Adam used
to go each evening to the cinema, and in this way
made friends with a number of young men, among whom
Awad (Nuba) was an 'established' car-washer at
Omdurman central market. Adam told Awad of his
'enslavement', and the latter ecouraged him to leave
the trader to work as a car-washer. Adam did leave
the trader's family, and for six months the two
friends worked together, but the proceeds were not
shared equally. Adam received only a quarter of the
net proceeds, "because most of the cars (they]
washed belonged to Awad's regular clients", but Adam
also had free accommodation as he lived with Awad,
who had a small room in a shared house. Though still
friends, Awad and Adam terminated their
'partnership', and for seven or eight months Adam
was employed as a car-wash boy at the lubrication
section attached to a petrol station. In addition to
two meals a day, his weekly wage was £S 5 of which
he saved one pound. He also often received tips from
clients, and the station became his residence as he
was allowed to sleep in the office (there was a
guard at the station). After a series of quarrels
over shares in tips with another car-wash boy in the
same station, the manager sacked both. By then it
was over a year since Adam had last seen his
relatives, so he bought some gifts and travelled
back to his village where he stayed for two months.
During the course of this visit, Mohamed told Adam
that he wished to run away from work in the fields
and go to Khartoum. Being 'old friends', Adam
informed Mohamed of the day he planned to return and
promised not to tell any one about the plan.
On arrival at Khartoum, the two friends had no
place to go to, and for for several weeks they slept
outside the Grand Mosque, where there is a beggar
colony. But when they started to work together
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washing cars in the central market, they met a young
man (a mechanic) from their district who arranged
for them to live in a shared house at Haj Yousif
(Khartoum North). It was in this house, in which
they still live, that the two friends met Abbas over
nine months ago. Abbas had come to Khartoum with one
of his cousins (a bus ticket conductor) who lived in
the house, but had no work and was taken as
'partner' by the two friends.
'Self-employment' in car-washing in Greater Khartoum is
progressively becoming a form of 'concealed' wage employment,
albeit one in which the 'core' of the workforce is not only
highly rewarded but also certainly more stable than the
unskilled labour force in the conurbation's 'modern'
manufacturing industry. But this is not due to a shortage of
car-washers because of their cultural stigmatization; it is
rather due to the fact that car-wash boys rarely depend solely
on the fluctuating and insecure incomes earned on the
competitive 'spot market'. To eliminate insecurity,
'full-time' car-wash boys usually enter into 'contracts' with
a core of clients in particular areas (part of a central
market, Khartoum University, a certain ministry or government
department, etc.) whereby daily cleaning is undertaken for £S
5.00 to ES 10.00 per car per month. In interviews with 20
car-wash boys, organized into six 'gangs', I gathered that the
average number of 'secured' cars per boy is 9, and the average
'secured' monthly income around ES 70. The level of earnings
by car-wash boys not affiliated to 'gangs' is generally lower,
though in two out of the eleven cases I encountered the
average income was higher than that of 'gang' boys. Five
'independent' car-washers reported monthly 'secured' incomes
varying between £S 50 and ES 60, but two (both over 25 years
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old) reported 'secured' incomes of ES 75 and ES 82
respectively. One of the latter has 10 'contracted 1 cars to
wash, the other has 12. While these figures cannot be claimed
as strictly representative, they are interesting in the light
of the latest revision of the wage structure in the Sudan
(Nov. 1983), according to which the Standard Minimum Wage was
raised to ES 35.80 only (cf. Chapter Seven). Likewise, it is
interesting to note that at the time when petty traders and
other 'self-employed' unskilled workers were being 'swept
away' by the Street-Cleaning Campaign, a majority of
'committed' car-washers were helped by their regular clients
to obtain Identity Cards by providing 'headed letters'
certifying that the boys were either messengers or general
labourers in this or that government department.
The incomes of 'full-time' car-washers quoted above do not
represent total earnings. After cleaning their 'contracted'
cars, the boys normally compete on the insecure 'spot market',
where they often earn more than needed for their daily
expenses. Though it is difficult to determine precisely a
'casual' car-washer's average daily income on the 'spot
market', it is rarely less than ES 1.00.
As my observations among car-washing 'partnerships' were
constrained by lack of their confidence, I could not acquire
much insight into the intra-gang relations. Nevertheless, I
developed the impression that these relations are far from
symmetrical with 'defenders' of a 'gang' perhaps appropriating
the labour of the 'defended'. This kind of information is much
needed to determine whether car-washing gangs represent arenas
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for a process of differentiation whereby older boys invoke
kinship and regional ties for the recruitment of gang members,
ostensibly as 'partners', but in effect as piece-workers. A
further aspect that remains to be illuminated concerns the
payments which I suspect these gangs make to Municipality
guards, police, gate-guards at government departments, and so
on, in return for the permission to operate in and/or enter
into the zones where clients park their cars.
LAUNDRY-WORK
Self -employment for laundry-workers remunerated on a
piece-rate basis has proliferated in recent years at the cost
of a decline in employment opportunities for domestic
servants. This is mainly the consequence of the relatively
substantial reduction in the real incomes of white-collar
workers, professionals and administrators (cf. Chapter •Seven)
who formerly could afford house-servants, but who, with a
dramatic increase in wages demanded by the servants, are now
unable and/or unwilling to engage domestic servants on a
monthly basis. In 1975, the average wage for a domestic
servant was around £S 12. By 1983 the most inexperienced
domestic servants were paid no less than ES 40 a month for the
first three (probational) months, after which they would
insist on a wage increase, and an experienced house-servant
demanded up to ES 100. Furthermore, the cost of a
house-servant is not confined to his/her wages, but includes
two meals (three meals if he/she is 'resident') at a time when
food prices in Greater Khartoum are increasing at exorbitant
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rates. Resort to the service of 'casual' labourers, who come
once or twice every week to do all 	 the laundering,
house-cleaning, etc., has therefore become a feasible
proposition insofar as it cuts up to 50% of the costs of a
monthly-paid servant.
The service of 'casual' launderers is even cheaper than
that provided by the licensed laundry-shops found in
residential neighbourhoods. But Unlike the laundry-shops,
which accept any number of pieces, 'casual' launderers rarely
accept less than two dozen pieces. In some cases they do
accept smaller quantities, but they also either get an
additional assignment such as cleaning the house, or seek to
wash for two or three neighbouring houses. As clothes are
dried under the sun, it takes up to two hours between washing
and ironing. On average, 'casual' laundry-workers charge
around ES 1.20 per dozen.
In interviews with 12 'full-time' laundry workers, 11 of
whom formerly worked as domestic servants and one being a
recent migrant, I gathered that they themselves find it more
rewarding to work on a piece-rate basis. Besides having the
two meals in the house(s) where they undertake the day's work,
each usually earns around ES 130.00 a month (usually working
six days a week). Like the car-wash boys, launderers tend. to
have regular clients, but though no 'discounts' are offered,
they often undertake the service on credit for 'trusted'
clients, and settle accounts monthly. The case of Robin is
typical of 'full-time' laundry-workers.
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CASE (5)
Robin, who is around 25 years old, was born in
Southern Sudan. He came to Khartoum four years ago,
but before that he had migrated for three years to
the rainfed agricultural schemes in Renk and
Southern Funj. Robin did not like migration to the
schemes; in addition to the hard work in the
schemes, the scheme operators used to make execuses
in order not to pay all the wages due to workers.
One of Robin's kinsmen, James, who had lived in
Khartoum for many years, told him on one of his
visits home about opportunities in Khartoum, and the
two, with four others from a neighbouring village,
left home together. All six joined a group of
kinsmen and fellow-villagers living in a shared
house in Kober (Khartoum North), and four days after
their arrival Robin found work a house-servant in
the same (3rd class) neighbourhood. On arrival,
Robin was neither fluent in Arabic nor very good
with ironing clothes, and because of this he was
paid only £S 17 month. The family he worked for were
"good people", and after six months his monthly wage
was increased to £S 25. But Robin left Khartoum
after eight months to see his relatives. He spent
one and a half months at home, and on his return to
Khartoum found that the family he had worked for had
employed another of his kinsmen. The family wanted
to re-employ Robin, but the latter refused to have
his relative sacked. Instead, he found work in a
house in Kober First Class extension for ES 35 per
month, but maintained contact with the family he
first worked for, as he often came to see his
relative during the day.
The second house Robin worked at was very big, and
sweeping the floor each morning and afternoon was
not easy. Also there were ten people in the house
and thus many clothes to wash. Though his wage was
increased to ES 45, the work was too much for him.
So when kinsmen from home visited him, he often
asked them to help him with the washing. He wanted
to leave the family, but they then raised his wage
to ES 50, and agreed to take on a young boy to help
him; so '
 he stayed and brought one of his nephews
(around 14 years old) to take the second job for a
monthly wage of ES 12.
Six months after Robin's return, the relative who
was employed by the first family left for the South
on a visit. The family asked Robin to bring them
another servant, but all his kinsmen were either
working or back home. Robin agreed to sweep the
floor of the house and to launder the family's
clothes every Sunday (when not working for his other
employer). While washing clothes on the following
Sunday, Robin was also asked by a female neighbour
to the family whether he could come and launder for
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them as well. Though he agreed to wash the clothes
that evening, he told the woman he could not iron
them until the following evening; the woman agreed.
From then on, he started to receive calls for
evening work as well. Working during both day and
evening was very difficult, and he soon found he had
to choose between being a house-servant or a
'fulltime' casual launderer. Realising that he
could earn more by becoming a casual launderer for a
number of regular clients, he decided to stop
working as a house-servant. But each time he went on
a visit to the South, would on his return have
difficulty in finding regular clients. This forced
him twice to being a house-servant for brief periods
until he established other regular clients. At
present, he launders regularly for four houses.
Not all launderers, however, work on a full-time basis;
and in addition to Jim'a (Case 1 above) I encountered five
(Dinka) engaged in laundering as a secondary occupation. All
five, who had previously worked for periods of up to three
years as house-servants, were working as 'temporary' unskilled
labourers at a factory in Khartoum North. They joined the
factory, through help from a "cousin" who works as an
accountant there, about two months before my interviews with
them. Before then they had been on a visit to the South, but
on their return could not find employment as house-servants
for nearly two weeks. After joining the factory, all five were
offered work as house-servants, but they turned the offers
down.
At the factory all five are required to work on
different shifts during the week, but they prefer working on
night shifts (10 p.m. to 6 a.m) in particular as it enables
them to take on laundry work during the day (from 9 a.m to 5
p.m). On average, they find three days each week to work as
launderers, but they also sometimes undertake laundry-work in
the afternoon and evening (3 p.m to 6 p.m.), especially when
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no over-time work at the factory is available. Their monthly
income from laundry-work averages around ES 60 each while
their monthly wage is ES 29 plus a daily meal, but they also
earn over-time pay reaching up to ES 12 pounds a month. Three
out of the five insisted that they considered laundry-work as
their "main" occupation and that if they they had to choose
between the two occupations, laundering would be their first
preference. The reason given for working at the factory is the
insecurity of being a 'full-time' launderer when they know
that there are already four 'full-time' launderers in the
neighbourhood where they live. They also told me that working
as casual launderers in neighbourhoods other than their own is
not easy because the residents there do not know them. The
network of their residential group is confined to the two (1st
and 3rd Class) neighbourhoods of Kober.
STREET AND PETTY TRADING
It is usually very easy for any one to start as a petty
trader. In some cases, virtually no capital is required.
Scavenging empty bottles, jars and tins, may in cases of
absolute destitution furnish a prospective petty trader with
'stocks' for sale. A bucket full of ice-cold water and a glass
- at a total cost of less than ES 2.00- suffice to start a
'mid-day business' in a central market and other crowded
public places (e.g. central bus-stations, hospitals, and the
Nationality & Immigration Department), especially during the
hot dry summer months. For other 'lines' of petty trade, the
starting capital may be as low as ES 2 to 3. As petty trade is
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not stigmatized in the ame way as unskilled personal
services, it tends to attract a host of people.
QUANTITATIVE DIFFERENTIATION
The ease of entry to petty trade should not, however, be
allowed to blur the high degree of 'quantitative
differentiation (cf. Chapter Two) among petty traders. Thus,
while the starting capital of a small vegetable, onion or
fruit seller in a peripheral market maybe as only ES 4 to ES
5, the stocks are usually of the lowest grade and the 'source
of supply' typically a 'more established t
 petty trader in the
same market, whose own stocks may well be over ES 200. Some
onion sellers, whose stocks are not as perishable as
vegetables and fruits and who can therefore buy and store in
bulk, may keep stocks of up to 15 sacks of onions worth over
ES 1,000.
Quantitative differentiation among petty traders handling
manufactured (mainly imported) goods is even greater. In this
respect a distinction must be drawn between sellers of
cigarettes and sellers of other manufactured goods (nail
clippers, combs, tooth-brushes, popular perfumes, mirrors,
flash lights, slippers, sandals and shoes, ready-made clothes,
etc). Cigarette selling may be started with stocks as low as a
packet of 10 or 20 cigarettes, though it is more usual to
start with a stock of 200. An established cigarette seller,
however, operates with stocks of over a thousand cigarettes
and keeps more than one brand. The stocks are either carried
around in a portable tray or displayed in a fixed stall
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situated in front of a shop or restaurant. Cigarette sellers
operating with a fixed stall usually also sell tumbak, or
snuff.
The starting capital for the lowest grade seller of other
manufactured goods may be as low as ES 4 or 5. The range of
stocks kept, however, varies considerably. The lowest grade
vendor, pedlar or hawker may operate with stocks comprising a
dozen each of nail clippers, combs and safety pins, or a pair
of shoes and/or sandals. A more 'affluent' low-grade pedlar
may carry stocks comprising a dozen home-sewn gowns or one or
two china, pottery or glass tea and/or dinner sets.
A majority of these low-grade traders are young boys under
18 years old. Established petty traders of manufactured goods,
usually over 25 years old, keep stocks of at least ES 200
though the value of the goods may in some cases be worth as
much as ES 1,000. Such traders usually have some form of
'fixed assets', ranging from a cheap portable tray or a fixed
stall (worth around ES 30) to the easily guardeà mobile
wheel-stall (ES 120) or a donkey (ES 60?) with the stocks kept
in sacks. A fairly recent introduction is the horse-cart for
which overhead costs may be over ES 300. The goods carried on
carts are mainly household utensils (tumblers, tea pots,
cutlery, trays, tea and dinner sets, etc.). The circulating
capital of traders operating with horse-carts may reach ES
2000, but as credit is normally extended to regular clients,
the value of stocks on the cart would usually be under ES
1,000.
The 'ideal' transition from petty trade to retail proper
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is effected through the establishment of a corner-shop in a
residential neighbourhood, but due to the limited number of
such shops the majority of petty traders seek to graduate
through operation from a licensed booth in one of the 'popular
markets' in Greater Khartoum. The number of petty traders who
may find opportunities for sufficient accumulation to graduate
to the ranks of the commercial bourgeoisie is of course
extremely limited, but the exceptional success of a few former
petty traders, who are multi-millionaire businessmen at
present, seems to inspire a majority of petty traders.
THE COMPOSITION OF STREET TRADERS
The relative ease of entry to street/petty trading often
attracts people on a 'casual' or 'temporary' basis. Besides
the 'hard core' of petty traders who are relatively committed
to their career (see below), at least three other categories
of street trader can be distinguished. The first, and perhaps
smallest category consists of recent migrants whose original
objectives in coming to the capital did not include working'
there. These usually came to arrange for emigration to the
oil-rich Arab countries, to attend a relative who fell ill,
etc., but after a relatively prolonged stay in the conurbation
their resources were exhausted and, consequently, they began
to look for means of maintaining themselves. Emigrant workers
returning to the Sudan on visits are also sometimes
encountered as vendors. These have often brought with them
relatively large quantities of such things as shoes and
watches to sell 'wholesale', but because retailers offered
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them depressed prices, they decided to deal directly with the
consumers. Though the involvement of this group of casual
traders is normally transient, a few may find a long term
career in petty trade in Greater Khartoum. The way Mustafa
came to establish himself as onion-seller illustrates this.
CASE (6)
Mustafa is around 60 years old. He was born in Urn
Ruwaba district (Kordofan Province) where he
attended khalwa and later tended the village-based
herd of goats and sheep belonging to his family.
When he completed learning the whole Quraan at the
age of 15, he participated in rainfed farming with
his father. From the proceeds of cash crops over
"several years", he bought a camel with which he
used to carry the produce from farm to home and,
also, to transport the crops of other farmers. In
1947 he joined a village trader in a partnership,
and a year later he established his own retail shop
in the village. In the same year he married, and now
has 7 sons and 6 daughters. Two of his sons (one a
bus-driver aged 22 and the other a vegetable-seller
aged 20) are with him in Khartoum, while his eldest
son is a lorry driver in the Southern Funj. A fourth
son, who completed high secondary education, works
in a government department at El-Obeid, while four
daughters and three sons (one of whom is married)
are in the home village (2 of the daughters are
married and live with their husbands in Urn Ruwaba
town).
In 1960 Mustafa moved to Um Ruwaba town, where he
opened a street-corner shop, but after two years he
incurred considerable losses. The losses were partly
the result of his credit policy as many creditors
defaulted, and partly because of the relatively high
cost of maintaining his family back in the village
and financing the education of his children. In 1963
he closed the corner-shop and went to Darfur to
bring stocks of local marakeeb (sing. markoub; shoes
made of cattle hide) which he did for about three
years. Trade in marakeeb was not very profitable,
however, and he decided to change. He moved to the
Southern Funj, where his eldest son is a lorry
driver, and started to sell dried fish to
agricultural labourers at the al-Mazmoum rainfed
schemes, and to buy wild okra (weika) and transport
it to Kosti. He continued in this dried fish and
okra trade for nearly 12 years.
When Mustafa first moved to Urn Ruwaba, he kept
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returning to his village during the rainy season to
cultivate his farm. As he had many 'mouths' to feed,
the size of his family constituted a drain on his
capital, and cultivating food crops was a cushion
against complete impoverishment. In 1978 he had to
leave the Southern Funj for Khartoum because one of
his sons (who is now in El-Obeid) was ill in
hospital. On arrival in Khartoum .he had ES 250, but
in one month he spent ES 95 on medicine for his son
and another ES 40 for his own maintenance. His two
Sons working in Khartoum gave him £S 30, but as he
knew he had to stay for at least another month, and
also had to send money back to his family, he
started to worry about running out of funds. So he
decided to work; and through the network of his son
who is a vegetable-seller he started to trade in
onions in Khartoum. His initial investment was ES
15, and each day he realized a net profit of around
ES 2. But one day the Municipality guards raided the
market, and he had to abandon his stocks to escape
arrest. On his return th stocks were gone. His sons
advised him to look for a site to rent, and they
found one at the peripheral market near the house
where the father lived with his two sons. Mustafa
pays 20 piastres rent per day for the one sq. meter
site, and another 5 piastres for the Muncipality
guard. As the house was so near to the site, Mustafa
started to buy larger and larger stocks. A failure
in the onion harvest in 1978 helped him to realize
400% profit from stocks originally valued at ES 150.
This was a considerable boost for business, and he
has since decided to stay with his two sons in
Khartoum, though his sick son was discharged from
hospital and, after convalence, was able to secure
employment through help from their local MP. Mustafa
has become an 'established' onion-seller, and
managed to attract many regular clients. Though he
does extend credit to a few trusted customers, he is
careful not to re-live the experience of his shop at
Urn Ruwaba. He has also gained the respect of other
petty traders, and is in charge of the rotating
credit association in the market (cf. below). He now
buys stocks of ten to fifteen sacks of onions, and
while his daily turn-over averages around ES 50, his
net daily profit (after expenses for meals) is
around ES 8. He no longer cultivates his village
farm, which is attended by one of his unmarried
sons, but he returns on brief visits to the village
at least twice each year. He also sends money to his
family monthly.
The second category of street trader consists of elements
oscillating between wage- and self-employment. Many casual
unskilled construction and other (e.g. manufacturing) workers
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take on petty trading when they fall ill or when they are
sacked upon completion of a contract, etc. Cigarette selling
at Kober (peripheral) Market in Khartoum North, for example,
is particularly popular with casual construction workers out
of employment. Though there were constant changes in the
personnel of cigarette sellers in the different peripheral
markets during the periods of my fieldwork, their number at
Kober market in particular ranged between 2 and 4 during the
day and 6 and 9 during the evening. Virtually all these
sellers had previously been employed at, and continue to
reside in the building sites not far from the market. The case
of Maiwal illustrates this pattern of casual involvement.
CASE (7)
Maiwal was born in Tonj in Southern Sudan. He
first came to Khartoum with a group of young men
from his district four years ago. As many of his
kinsmen and fellow-villagers in Greater Khartoum
were employed as casual construction workers, Maiwal
was helped in securing employment at building sites
in Haj Yousif. Each year he returns home, and
returned from his last visit six months ago, when he
found work at building sites in Haj Yousif with a
daily wage of ES 2. Four months after his return,
Maiwal fell ill and was unable to continue as a
construction labourer. He invested ES 30 from his
savings and bought 400 cigarettes (Benson & Hedges
Special Filter, the most popular in urban Sudan). He
sells each cigarette for 8 piastres (realizing a
profit of ES 1.00 per packet of 200). His average
daily profit is ES 1.00, but sometimes more. Maiwal
contends that if it were not for cigarette-selling,
he would have run out of money and would have had to
return to the South. At present, however, he not
only finds money to meet daily expenses, but also
manages to stay in Khartoum where there are better
medical services. He told me that as soon as he
recovers he will again seek employment as a casual
construction labourer.
The minimum daily profit registered by two of these casual
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cigarette sellers over a period of two weeks was 50 piastres
for one day, but four reported a high of £S 2.50 for two
successive days. From partial observation, the level of daily
profit for each seller seems to depend on three factors: (a)
availability of stocks, which wholesalers and retailers often
decline to provide in attempts to create artificial shortages,
(b) the number of sellers in the market and, (c) whether
stocks are sold in packets of ten or per cigarette, the latter
method enabling the realization of double the margins procured
through the former. In spite of the fluctuations in income and
insecurity involved in procuring supplies, the casual sellers
claimed that if it were not for cigarette selling they would
have to "eat" their savings during spells of unemployment and
would have been forced to think of returning to the South.
The third category of casual traders consists of
'part-time' traders, or people with other 'main' occupations
in Greater Khartoum. These are usually the 'more established'
permanent manual and white-collar government workers who
venture into petty trading as a secondary occupation during
their spare time in the evenings and/or during their annual
leave. This involvement is particularly conspicuous around
Muslim feast days, when the urban population make the bulk of
their annual purchases of clothes, shoes, etc. It is worth
noting here that such a seasonal involvement of government
employees in petty trade is usually a case of
commission-selling of stocks on behalf of a (related?)
wholesaler and/or retailer who provides stocks 'on credit'.
But it should be stressed that the involvement of government
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employees in secondary occupations is not confined to petty
trading. Skilled workers, for example, are known to engage in
'moon-lighting', sometimes even during official hours, while
manual and clerical government employees owning cars usually
seek to get a licence to convert their cars into taxis.
THE CORE OF PETTY TRADERS
A prominent feature of the composition of petty traders in
Greater Khartoum as well as other Sudanese cities is the
dominance of one or two main 'ethnic' and/or regional groups
in a certain line of petty trade. Cigarette traders carrying
trays around Greater Khartoum, for example, are drawn almost
exclusively from a certain 'tribe' from western Sudan. Trade
in other manufactured goods is dominated by, though by no
means exclusive to members of a group drawn from certain
districts in the Gezira Province. Though the vegetable and
fruit trade shows a relatively higher degree of ethnic and
regional diversity than other lines of trade, it nevertheless
appears to be particularly attractive to people from Shendi
District and rural Khartoum (East and West of the Nile
Districts).
As explained by Mohamed Yousif A. El-Mustafa (1983:176ff)
in Hassaheissa, the concentration of petty traders with a
common ethnic and/or regional background in a certain line of
trade has nothing to do with either the innate characteristics
of the commodity being traded or the subjective inclinations
of the members of the group. In the case of the petty traders
from rural Khartoum and Shendi encountered in vegetable and
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fruit trade, for example, the 'secret' of concentration is
that they are drawn from nearby districts in which these
products are grown. Established links with producers, who are
often kinsmen, are what tend to generate concentration. For
the 'Western' boys distributing cigarettes, on the other hand,
concentration is dictated by considerations of security and
mutual trust. Though all Western boys I encountered refused to
be interviewed, it is clear that the cigarettes they handled
were largely smuggled into the country. Legally imported
cigarettes bear a special label. Reliable 'Western' sources
have informed me that most of these boys are in fact only
'commission sellers', who usually receive stocks on credit
from a supplier who buys in cartons of 10,000 cigarettes each.
For all categories of petty trader, particularly those dealing
in manufactured goods, ethnic and regional specialization
bears directly on the progress of business in at least four
ways:
Firstly, members of the same ethnic and/or regional
background have much more in common than with other
urban dwellers, and they consequently tend to form
residential groups. Residence is normally in shared (and
crowded) houses (up to five persons per room), which
cuts the cost of accommodation. Likewise, by sharing the
cost of meals at restaurants, members of the group
manage to spend less in maintenance than what would
otherwise be needed.
Secondly, by associating with a group of three or more
in the process of trading, the individual trader is
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offered a measure of security against violence on the
part of customers and thieves. While engaged in
haggling, moreover, an unlicensed trader among
associates would not be distracted by the necessity of
watching out for the raids launchd by the authorities
as his associates would raise the alarm on the slightest
sign of threat.
Thirdly, a large group, or a number of smaller ones, may
start a rotating credit association, whereby each member
contributes a monthly (or daily/weekly) sum to be given
to one of the members. The pooled money may be used in
several ways. It can augment capital, settle outstanding
debts, or, as in the case of traders with dependents•
outside Khartoum, simply sent back home.
Fourthly, by associating with a group a new member is
usually introduced to wholesalers, who may then allow
him 'preferential treatment'. In dealing with
wholesalers, moreover, members of a group manage to
place larger orders, which often entitle them to
wholesale prices (as opposed to retail prices charged
for smaller orders).
The 'core' of the workforce in each line of petty trade
largely consists of members of these dominant ethnic and/or
regional groups. By "core" I simply mean those who have stayed
in petty trade for a period of at least six months and who
want to continue in it. 'Casual' petty traders normally tend
to stay for shorter periods and would either leave Khartoum or
manage to find wage employment, especially in the form of
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'replenishment recruitment' in 'modern' manufacturing industry
(cf. Chapter Five).
Furthermore, while a few members of the core in each line
of trade are relatively 'well-established' and aspire to
become retailers, a majority are 'hardy' pedlars and hawkers
striving either to save a couple of hundred pounds to graduate
to a higher category, or simply to maintain the status
(i.e. to earn just enough in order not to consume capital).
But the distinction between 'established' and 'hardy' petty
traders should not be exaggerated. Both categories lead
virtually identical life-styles characterized by frugality and
deprivation. In accordance with kinship and regional
affiliations, azaba (single-men) residence groups are normally
formed by traders drawn from all grades. (Many of the older
and relatively more established traders are married, but
virtually all their wives and children live back home). Azaba
groups also share maintenance expenses, although due to
exorbitant increases of food prices members of a group now
find it cheaper to eat at popular restaurants than to cook
their own meals (as was the case with "bachelors bands" during
an earlier period, cf. Mohamed Yousif A.	 El-Mustafa,
1983:189).
The minimum 'viable' capital to induce continuity in petty
trade varies with the type of commodity handled. In this
respect, all petty traders tend to deal in commodities that
are cheap and with a relatively high turn-over. The small
capital deployed by all categories of petty traders is of
course	 the major	 factor	 behind this tendency. Milk,
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vegetables, fruits, cigarettes and a few 'mass consumption'
manufactured goods are consequently the most popular
commodities. Established fruit and vegetable sellers generally
demand lower capital than traders of manufactured goods, while
cigarette sellers commonly require the least. Variations in
the size of 'viable capital' are related to turn-over,
perishability of goods and, for the unlicensed majority,
security.
Significant variations in turn-over are observed between
different commodities as well as for the same commodity in
different locations. Foodstuffs and cigarettes have the
highest levels of turn-over. For both commodities, moreover,
potential demand is generally greater at central than at
peripheral and popular markets. In the absence of adequate
cold-storing facilities, vegetables and fruits are easily
perishable and because of this traders tend to keep their
stocks down to what they think can be sold in a day or two.
Onions differ from vegetables in that some types of onion can
be stored for up to six months so that onion-sellers generally
seek to deploy part of their capital in buying and storing to
take advantage of the seasonal variations in both supplies and
prices. For sellers of cigarettes and other manufactured goods
perishability is not a consideration, and keeping a relatively
large stock is generally held to be advantageous for the
business.
In the case of cigarette sellers, a large stock not only
means cutting both transport and time costs to be incurred in
the procurement of new supplies when a relatively smaller
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stock is sold out, but also ensures continuity in business in
the context of the frequent shortages in supplies in the
market. Cigarette-sellers are often organized in networks
distributing smuggled stocks, and only a few 'independent
sellers' find access to such stocks. When no supplies can be
obtained from wholesalers and retailers, alternative sources
are frequently sought through 'contacts' at Khartoum
International Airport (mainly porters and customs guards) who
buy duty free cigarettes from, or through, passengers.
For traders of other imported items, stocks are preferred
not only in relatively large quantities to last over a week,
but also of a wide range. Petty traders pointed out three
factors for this preference. Firstly, it saves the time and
transport costs which would otherwise be incurred in
re-stocking. Secondly, it sometimes entitles petty traders to
wholesale prices; hence a number of traders usually join
together in buying stocks. Thirdly, it ensures a level of
sales much higher than would be possible through keeping a
limited range of stocks.
For all categories of 'established' unlicensed petty
traders operating in public places, the element of security
against raids constitutes the decisive factor in terms of how
much of their capital is deployed in any single day.
Unlicensed vegetable sellers generally operate with a maximum
limit of ES 20, while those with permits keep stocks of up to
ES 100. Onion-sellers with permits may retain daily stocks of
over ten sacks, while unlicensed onion-sellers depend on the
former for supplies and buy stocks of ES 5-10 at a time.
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Cigarette-sellers with stalls keep stocks of ES 300 or more,
but pedlars carrying trays rarely operate with more than ES
100 worth of stocks, while the lowest-grade cigarette-vendors
operate with a maximum of ES 30. Pedlars of manufactured goods
carry stocks of around ES 40 maximum, but wheel-stall traders
require much more than that. The minimum stocks for the latter
are worth around ES 250, but in numerous cases the value of
stocks may reach up to ES 1,000. Though wheel-stall operators
are apparently the most vulnerable, they seem to cope quite
well with their insecurity through payment of bribes (see
below). The more stocks a wheel-stall trader keeps, the more
he seems assured against raids. None of the wheel-stall
traders, however, wanted to 'incriminate' other people. A
closer view into the backgrounds of 'core' of petty traders
and how they manage their business may be - obtained from the
following cases.
CASE (8)
Talha, who was born in a Gezira village, is 17
years old. He completed his six-year primary
education three years ago, and joined his father,
who is a tenant in the Gezira Scheme, in the
half-tenancy the family cultivates. He does not like
work in the tenancy because the rewards are small.
Ten months ago he decided to invest the ES 30 he had
saved from the de facto wage paid to him by his
father in petty trading at Khartoum, where his older
brother, a wheel-stall trader, lives with a group of
young men from the district. He started by trade of
lady's gowns and children underwear sewn by
house-wives. His brother introduced him to three
women sewing clothes. The women obtain cheap cloth
for the gowns from retailers, but for children's
underwear they use refuse from textile factories
sold by dealers for around ES 1.00 per 5 Kg. Taiha
initially invested ES 8.25 pounds by buying 4 gowns
for ES 7 and 20 items of underwear for ES 1.25. He
carried the clothes, and together with three young
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pedlars from his district, started peddling at the
inter-city bus station where he worked all morning
and most of the afternoon. As the traffic started to
subside by 3 o'clock, Taiha and the other boys
walked to Khartoum Civil Hospital. It took Taiha
nearly four days to sell all his stocks for ES 16,
but as his daily expenses were around ES 1.50 for
meals and rent (he paid a monthly rent of ES 6), his
net profit in the four days was less than ES 2.00.
For this reason he decided to change to manufactured
goods, and obtained discounted stocks from his
brother. Since then Talha has been peddling such
goods as nail clippers, key rings, combs and
tooth-brushes. He usually keeps stocks worth £5
20-30 and his average net daily profit (deducting
food and accommodation expenses) is in the range of
50 piastres to ES 1. Talha has savings amounting to
ES 80 pounds, which are kept by one wholesaler in
the Arabic Market, and he hopes to graduate to
wheel-stall trading in the near future.
I met Talha several times at al-sough al-Shaa'bi
as well as at his residence. One evening he gave me
the following account of his day:
"I woke up around five o'clock as it was my turn
to make morning tea. The whole group of 15
living in the house share the expenses of tea,
sugar, dehydrated milk and charcoal. By six I
was at al-Sough al-Shaa'bi, which is not far
from the house. Between 8 and 12 o'clock the
inter-city traffic is at its highest, and I make
most sales during that period. I sold goods for
ES 6.50 this morning. At mid-day I and four
other pedlars joined my brother to have our
mid-day meal. Each day one of us buys the meal,
and today it was Saddig's turn; he is my second
cousin. My brother wanted to go to central
Khartoum to see a relative about a driving
licence my brother wants to get, and for this
reason he asked me to attend his wheel-stall. He
took a pick-up to central Khartoum and returned
around two hours later. In the meantime I sold
£S 4 worth of goods from my brother's stocks,
and ES 2 worth from my own. At three o'clock I
took a bus to the Civil Hospital, but until
seven I sold goods for ES 1.00 only. On other
days I have usually sold more. With the three
boys we had our evening meal at a popular
restaurant near the Hospital, and I took the bus
back home around 8 O'clock. My sales today
totalled ES 9.50, and I made ES 2.50 pounds in
gross profits. Today's net profits (ES 1.50) are
average, but occasionally I net ES 5.00. This
week is 'average' because it is the last week of
the month. Next week people will receive their
pay, and they will surely buy more. Two days ago
I had the lowest gross profits during the last
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seven days, only 25 piastres. But yesterday my
net profits were 130 piastres."
CASE (9)
Ahmed was born around 35 years• ago in a Gezira
village, where he completed his primary education.
Ahmed is married, and his wife and four children
live with his father in the village. His eldest
child, a son, is 12 years old; and two of the
children attend primary schools at the village.
Upon the completion of his primary education,
Ahmed joined his father in work at the tenancy. At
the age of 19, Ahmed abandoned the tenancy and
started to sell vegetables in a town not far from
the village. Two years later he married, but did not
not have a child for three years. At the age of 27
he learned to drive an old tractor which his father
bought, and up to the present he drives the tractor
and ploughs rainfed farms for cash during July and
August each year.
After the birth of his second child, Ahmed knew he
had to earn more money than he earned from the
vegetable trade and his share in the tractor fees.
For this he thought of migration. A group of
co-villagers were living at Nyala town in Darfur,
and some of them told him about the good trading
opportunities there. So eight years ago he travelled
to Nyala and joined his fellow-villagers. Less than
two months after arrival at Nyala, however, Ahmed
realized that he was incurring losses. He had left
home with £S 150 but, after nearly two months in
trade in manufactured goods, he ended up with ES 100
only, although he had not sent any money to his wife
during that period. Ahmed subsequently decided to
travel to Khartoum, where his older brother and many
other relatives work as petty traders. After a brief
visit to his family at the village, Ahmed came to
Khartoum for the first time just over seven years
ago.
Upon arrival in Khartoum, Ahmed had only ES 70
left from his capital. With the help of his brother
and the relatives he came to live with, Ahmed
established a small stall and started trading
manufactured goods at al-Sough al-Shaa'bi. His
initial stocks were valued at around 40 pounds.
After four years Ahmed managed to accumulate ES 350
in savings, and so he was able to buy a wheel-stall,
which at the time cost only ES 60 (dost in 1981 was
ES 120). As there were many wheel-stall traders at
al-Sough al-Shaa'bi, Ahmed and his brother decided
to move to a peripheral market in Khartoum North,
where they are still operating. The two brothers now
live with another group from their district in the
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same neighbourhood in which the peripheral market is
located. Ahmed's business has expanded rapidly since
he acquired the wheel-stall, and his stocks are
currently valued at around ES 700. He and his
brother operate in the open space at the peripheral
market on a permanent basis, and for this they have
managed to cultivate good relations with many
residents. Though Ahmed keeps a wide range of goods,
a large part of his stocks consists of items
demanded by women (popular perfumes, nail polish,
purses and purse-mirrors, underwear, etc.). A few
regular female customers often take goods on credit,
but Ahmed rarely extends credit beyond a limit of ES
3 to 4 to any one customer, and the maximum total
credit he offers is around ES 50-75. Most of the
credit transactions are conducted during the two
slack periods of the month (between the 8th and
13th, and the 22nd and 29th), when cash sales may
fall to ES 5-10 a day. For roughly one week after
workers receive their fortnightly wages, however,
sales shoot up to ES 40-50, of which gross profits
are around ES 10. On average, Ahmed nets around £5
50 each month (after deducting his expenses and the
money he sends back to his family).
Every three months or so Ahmed goes back to the
village for one or two weeks to see his family, but
he sends them money more frequently through
relatives and friends. During these visits, as well
as during the two months he spends working with the
tractor, Ahmed enters into arrangements with a
relative or fellow-villager to take charge of the
wheel-stall. More often than not the latter is a
young 'hardy' pedlar, and in return for looking
after the business is given a percentage (20-30 per
cent) in gross profits. As the wheel-stall continues
to be based at the same peripheral market, Ahmed's
brother monitors closely the progress of business,
receives revenues each day and takes charge of
re-stocking.
Ahmed does not keep records of his daily sales and
expenses, but every two weeks or so he makes an
inventory of stocks and calculates his net profits.
Except when a highly demanded item is sold out from
all four wheel-stall traders at the market and
immediate re-stocking becomes necessary, Ahmed
re-stocks twice a month only. In addition to his
brother and the other two wheel-stall traders, Ahmed
is joined by five other traders (2 wheel-stall
traders and 3 peddlers) in buying stocks from a
wholesaler in Khartoum. Ahmed keeps all his revenues
with him, but when he nets ES 100 or more over and
above stocks of ES 800, he deposits £5 100 in his
savings account at a bank in Khartoum North. Ahmed
hopes to accumulate enough savings to establish a
shop in one of the popular markets, but he does not
think he will be able to do so in the next two
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years.
Furthermore, Ahmed asserted that all his stocks
were bought for cash, and that he always preferred
not to buy goods on credit from wholesalers. He
added that the reason for this preference is that
petty traders taking goods on credit are often
charged the same retail price as the final consumer
buying from retailers, and, this affects
competitiveness vis-a-vis retail shops. But for the
sake of stocking a wide range of items many starting
wheel-stall traders do find it necessary to take
goods on credit.
DISINCENTIVES IN PETTY TRADE
In spite of the ease of entry to petty trading, then, not
all those who enter the activity do, or even intend to
continue with it. My very rough estimate is that around 50 per
cent of those encountered in petty trading are operating with
very low capital (under a hundred pounds) and that the
majority do not intend to stay in it. As I explained earlier,
for a significant number of participants petty trade is viewed
as a transient activity to be pursued until another more
secure and/or rewarding form of employment is found, or until
the necessary documents and visas for emigration are obtained.
For those who have another job but take on petty trading as a
secondary activity, it is considered as an alternative to
emigration, or a means to supplement meagre incomes in the
context of a decline in real wages.
Besides the vital requirement of belonging to the 'right'
group, there are other disincentives contributing to the
desire of low-grade petty traders to seek alternative sources
of income. These disincentives stempartly from the insecurity
of turnover and severe competition from other petty traders,
and partly from the more fatal insecurity associated with the
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fact that petty-trading without a licence is prohibited by the
Municipality. To protect licensed traders, the Muncipal
authorities, often in conjunction with the Police, organize
'raids' against unlicensed petty traders. According to the
Municipality regulations, any one caught trading illegally
should stand trial in court and be fined. For a first arrest,
the fine is ES 10; and for the second arrest the fine is ES 10
and the goods will also be confiscated, while the trader
stands the possibility of imprisonment.
These laws render the bottom grades of petty traders very
vulnerable in the event of a campaign against them. A
ten-pound fins may practically mean the loss of a substantial
portion of the capital they own. The upper-grade traders, in
contrast, not only can bear the fine for a first arrest, but
can also reconcile and 'neutralize' those intending to arrest
them for a second time. They often prefer to pay the
Municipality guards a fine equal to, and sometimes higher
than, the ten pounds paid to the court. (The maximum monthly
salary a guard receives is ES 50). By this means they manage
to escape the threat of having their goods confiscated and
avoid imprisonment as well. Even for the upper grades (i.e.
those with stalls, wheel-stalls, etc.), however, bribes may
not achieve the desired effect each time, especially when
campaigns headed by high-ranking officers are launched. Since
the 'Street Discipline Campaign' was first launched in
September 1981, the raids have become much more frequent and
not only have Police officers started to participate
regularly, but also officers from
	 the	 State	 Security
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Organization, the Prison Department and Armed Forces. Instead
of the former ten-pound fine for first arrest or even the
arbitrary confiscation of goods, with the launching of the
Street-Cleaning Campaign not only are all stocks of unlicensed
petty traders confiscated, but traders are also arrested, may
stand trial and, if they are found to be 'migrants', may
eventually be referred to their original places of domicile.
Many of the established petty traders seem to have advance
warning about the timing of raids, On two occasions in 1982 I
was present when raids were launched in a peripheral market.
None of the five 'most established' unlicensed petty traders
operating with wheel-stalls, and whom I already knew, was
present in the market when the troops came and cordoned it. I
believe it was more than a coincidence that these five
traders, who live in the same house, absented themselves by
chance each time a raid was launched. I could not, however,
establish the source, or the cost of their information. In the
campaigns I observed in that market, six of the smallest
traders of manufactured goods were caught and stocks of around
ES 400 were confiscated, and 15 managed to escape by running
into nearby houses or to shops whose owners they knew.
In cases of confiscation of goods, traders from the
established 'groups' do not normally face difficulties in
re-stocking as they are helped by members of their groups. An
amount of money equivalent to the loss is sometimes collected
in small donations from relatives and fellow-villagers in all
Three Towns; and in some cases the donation may be in the form
of goods. Whether traders from other groups are also helped by
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their relatives (by finding employment for the impoverished
traders in the occupation in which the group 'specializes'?)
is unknown.
SECURITY AND LICENCES
Not all unlicensed petty traders are threatened by the
raids. There are at least two categories of unlicensed petty
trader who seem to be more secure than others: traders
operating in their own residential neighbourhoods and traders
who operate with horse-carts. Those in the first group, which
consists exclusively of female traders, sell a limited range
of goods demanded by women, mainly the traditional sari-like
tob. None of the nine women traders I encountered depended on
the local market in Greater Khartoum for supplies. The
traditional source of supply used to be Shendi District, where
an old-established local textile industry is based. Virtually
all women traders with a long record of service are originally
from that district. In recent years, however, emigration to
the Arabian Peninsula has opened new sources of supply, as
many emigrants started to bring with them, or send with
others, suit-cases full of clothes, particularly the British
and Swiss manufactured tobs like those found in the local
markets. Though some of the contents are distributed among
members of the family and close relatives, most of the tobs
are actually intended for sale, a task undertaken by the wife,
mother or sister of the emigrant. It is worth noting here that
sending goods is regarded by emigrants as a better alternative
to remitting cash to support their dependents.
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The price of a tob charged by women traders (depending on
type, this may be between ES 60 and £S 150) is usually
slightly higher than the price at the local market; but since
payment is usually in monthly instalments (normally over a six
month period), buyers welcome the deal. The fact that both
seller and buyer are usually residents of the same
neighbourhood and/or in close interaction with one another
ensures a high degree of security against default. Since all
their transactions are conducted inside houses, these women
traders stand almost no risk of being caught.
Operators with horse-carts, on the other hand, are
exclusively men who were originally licensed as horse-cart
drivers and as such considered part of the 'transport sector'.
Unlike the women traders, these operators do not confine their
activities to any one residential neighbourhood. They are
actually the most mobile of petty traders, but, owing to
restrictions on horse-carts crossing bridges, their activities
are confined to only one of the Three Towns. Though these
operators insist on cash transactions with casual customers,
they usually have a core of regular clients to whom they
extend credit. According to two operators, the rate of default
is around 10 per cent, and because of this they ask for prices
that are up to 10-15 per cent higher than in the market.
Despite their mobility, these traders are very rarely stopped
or questioned by the authorities. When they are, I was
informed, they can always claim that they are delivering goods
belonging to a licensed corner-shop retailer, and they often
carry with them invoices from wholesalers bearing names of
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licensed retailers. Such 'protection' by wholesalers is not,
however, extended to the young boys carrying tea and dinner
sets.
Furthermore, though not all petty traders are unlicensed,
the requirements for a 'permanent' licence or 'temporary'
permit disqualify some 90 per cent or more of the petty
traders in Greater Khartoum, particularly on the grounds that
each should have a 'permanent place' of business. As the
requirements differ for vegetables/fruit sellers and traders
of manufactured goods, I shall first deal with the former.
VEGETABLE- AND FRUIT-SELLERS
For vegetable and/or	 fruit	 sellers,	 the minimum
requirement for legal trading is a one square meter plot in a
verandah at a peripheral market and a certificate from the
Municipal Health Officer. Upon access to these requirements, a
temporary permit may be given by the Municipality and in
return traders have to pay five piastres each day. However the
number of such sites is extremely limited. Though the number
of vegetable traders at peripheral markets varies considerably
from day to day, in observations in two markets the number
working without permits was roughly double that of traders
with permits (the latter numbered 29 in one market and 15 at
the other). A few of the petty traders with permits are the
original allotees, but a majority are either close relatives
or tenants paying rent. The case of Mustafa (Case 6 above)
gives an overview of the conditions of tenants, and the cases
of Fatima, Ballah and Abdel Rahman give further insight into
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some aspects of the conditions of the other categories of
vegetable-sellers.
CASE (10)
Fatima is around 55 years old. She was born in the
same "native lodging area" in the neighbourhood
where she now lives and works as a vegetable-seller.
She was divorced over 30 years ago, but continued to
live with her three children (two sons and a
duaghter) in a house owned by her former husband.
The latter, who in addition to working in his farm
by the Nile had a small shop, used to give Fatima
and the children money each Friday. The father of
the children died four years after divorce, and the
children inherited the house and 25 Egyptian Pounds
("which were real money then"). Fatima decided to
save LE 20 by buying gold ornaments, and kept LE
5.00 to meet the family consumption requirements.
After several months living off the inheritance, she
thought it would be better if she started trading in
the neighbourhood. Not long before Independence, she
sold one LE 1.00 worth of gold, and invested 25
piastres in vegetables and fruits. "Goods at that
time were very cheap, and people used to buy
vegetables and fruit for a whole family for one
piastre, and small families even bought for half a
piastre [i.e. 5 rn/ms coin, which was recently
widrawn 1".
Though Fatima did not accumulate profits, she
earned enough to maintain her three children and to
send the two Sons to primary schools. Upon
completing primary education, the older son joined
the workshop of a neighbour as an apprentice and
later became a car-mechanic. He is now married and
lives with his wife and three children (2 daughters
and a son) in a house originally allotted to Fatima
at Haj Yousif Extension (Khartoum North). The
younger son was apprenticed to a builder, and is now
an "own-account" skilled builder living with his
wife and five children (3 daughters and 2 sons) with
his mother. The daughter, who did not attend school,
is married and lives in an independent house with
her husband (who works as carpenter and owns a
workshop) and six children (4 sons and 2 daughters).
During the period of the first military government
(1958-64), the "native lodging area" in which Fatima
lives was incorporated into the city plan as a site
for a new 3rd Class extension. But Fatima and many
other residents refused to abandon their homes; and
up to the present the authorities have still not
settled the dispute over the small plots below the
300 sq. meter minimum required for registration. Due
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to the uncertain outcome of the dispute, the
"native-lodgers" have declined to rebuild their
homes with expensive materials, and for this reason
the houses in the 'native lodging colony' remain
rather conspicuous amidst the brick-houses of the
3rd Class extension (not to mention the mushrooming
two-storey villas in the same neighbourhood).
With the allocationof plots in •the new extension,
a peripheral market was also established in the
neighbourhood, and a small verandah for 5 vegetable
and fruit sellers was built. Fatima and 23 other
male and female petty traders were not allotted
plots in the new market, but they continued to trade
in the open space behind the new market. Two of the
five licensed vegetable sellers complained about the
activities of the unlicensed traders and took them
to court. The court ordered the unlicensed traders
to cease operating at the peripheral market, and 18
of them were fined 50 piastres each (Fatima was not
fined). One of the unlicensed traders, Awad (still
in the market), did not want to give in after the
trial and asked the other traders to bring along
their dependants to march to the office of the
Military Governor of Khartoum. The traders, who were
accompanied by over 200 children, submitted a
written appeal to the Governor requesting licences
that would enable them to maintain their dependants.
On receiving their appeal the Governor phoned the
Municipality officials and instructed them to give
temporary permits to all 24 unlicensed traders. The
site was surveyed and 1 sq. meter plots were
allotted to each of the traders, who were requested
to obtain the annually renewable Health Certificate
and to pay five piastres each morning to the
Municipality. On these 'temporary sites' the traders
constructed makeshift shelters, which were blown
down several times by winds. With the consent of the
Municipality, the traders were then allowed to
construct, through self-help, a permanent verandah
with corrugated iron. Each trader paid ES 25 for the
purpose. Several of the original allotees, however,
ceased to trade either because they were too old to
work or because they ran short of capital.
Fatima usually keeps stocks, of around ES 30-40
pounds, bought from the central market, but she does
not have to go every morning as with seven other
traders she devised a shift arrangement whereby two
of them fetch stocks for all eight. She prefers to
buy stocks for cash, because this enables her to buy
from the dealer who sells cheapest. As all vegetable
traders in the market commonly run short of money to
pay cash for stocks; and as dealers would either
refuse to extend credit or charge high prices, the
traders formed a number of rotating credit
associations in the market.
These associations are not 	 confined	 to
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vegetable-sellers, but include other petty traders
(fruit-sellers, wheel-stall traders and the women
selling kisra). But as the formation of rotating
credit associations presuppose trust among members,
only traders with a long standing in the market are
usually accepted. Fatima is invOlved in two
associations and in each she has one full share
(some members have more than one share, others have
half shares). The first association consists of 20
shares of 50 piastres each day, and the
contributions are kept by another woman trader who
every fifth day gives ES 50 to one member (or two
members in cases of half shares). The second
association, in which contributions are distributed
daily, has 22 shares of ES 2 daily. Though in both
associations there is agreement about the rotation,
in cases of urgent need a member may ask the trustee
and, subject to the consent of the share-holder(s)
in whose turn the request is made, the contributions
are then given to him/her.
Fatima contends that these associations spare all
members the need to take supplies on credit from
dealers but, in addition to augmenting capital, the
contributions are also partly used to meet current
consumption requirements (e.g. clothing for family)
and many traders with dependants outside Khartoum
send the collective contributions to their home
areas. Fatima rarely fails to pay her contributions,
as her daily profits are normally in the range of ES
6.00 to ES 8.00 during the first and third week each
month. During the second and fourth weeks, however,
turn-over slows down, and the average daily net
profits fall to ES 2.00 to 4.00 pounds.
Case (11)
Ballah was born in a village along the Blue Nile
not far from Khartoum North. He is 32 years old,
married and has five children (the eldest, a
daughter, is 11 years old, and four of his children
attend schools). Ballah lives with his father's
sister in Khartoum North, but his family lives in
the village, where he visits them twice or three
times every week.
Ballah completed his primary education but, as he
failed his final examinations, he joined his elder
brother who had a retail shop in the village. He
worked with his brother for 4 years after which he
came to Khartoum to trade in ready-made clothes sewn
by his aunt and her daughter. After seven months,
and with the help of two of his brothers, Ballah
bought a wheel-.stall and started to trade in
manufactured goods at the Arabic market in Khartoum.
In 1969 a friend (from the Northern Province)
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established a kiosk at one government department on
the outskirts of Khartoum and, being short of
capital, proposed a partnership with Ballah. The
latter, in consultation with his brothers, agreed
and for this he sold his stocks and assets. At the
kiosk the partners served tea, coffee and food to
the employees. The partnership lasted for 4 years
and it was during this period that Ballah married
one of his female relatives. Though working in
Khartoum, Ballah lived at the village and commuted
each day to his kiosk. In 1975 he decided to
establish a restuarant of his own in a peripheral
market in Khartoum North. In the first six months
Ballah incurred large losses (ES 600) and had to
close the restaurant in which he employed 6 workers.
Again with the help of his brothers, he started
wholesale trade in vegetables, and began to bring to
clients in Khartoum North vegetables grown by his
fellow-villagers. Such trade, however, is considered
illegal as the Muncipality regulations stipulate
that all vegetables brought to Greater Khartoum
should pass through the Central Vegetable and Fruit
Market at Soba (a suburb of Khartoum) to be
auctioned (ostensibly to 'protect' producers from
'exploitation', but actually to enable the
Municipality to tax produce).
In 1976 the authorities intercepted, and
confiscated, a consignment being transported from
the village to Khartoum by a commercial lorry; and
Ballah had to start again almost from scratch.
Ballah's father's sister, who is widowed and has
one married daughter living with her, lives in
Khartoum North and owns a small place in a self-help
built verandah in a peripheral market adjacent to
where she lives. As his aunt wanted to retire and
was thinking of renting the site, Ballah decided to
settle at Khartoum North as vegetable-seller. He
gets his supplies from the market of Khartoum North
to which he goes once or twice a week (as part of a
rotation among sellers to cut transport costs). The
daily purchases which he makes average ES 25 to ES
30 in tomatoes, and between ES 15 and ES 25 for
other vegetables (pursiane, black-tomatoes,
potatoes, carrots, okra, etc., depending on the
season). When tomatoes are out of season, Ballah
diverts his trade into fruits. He pays no rent to
his aunt, but each day he takes home vegetables and
meat (he eats all his meals at home). Each morning
he pays 5 piastres to the Municipality.
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CASE (12)
Bedri is 22 years old, married and has one
daughter (under one year). He was born in a village
near Urn Ruwaba, where he went for two years to a
primary school. At the age of 11 he started to
attend 8 cows his family owned, but two or three
years later he was relieved from the task by his
younger brother. Thereafter Bedri joined his father
in cultivating their farm, but during summer he used
to help his brother in watering the animals.
Bedri first came to the capital six years ago; and
through a fellow-villager he worked as a casual
unskilled worker at a factory in Khartoum North. His
daily wage was 85 piastres and every Thursday he
received his wages for 6 days, but he also often
worked over-time for which he was given 9 piastres
per hour. He worked at the factory for three months
after which he was fired. By then he had saved ES 25
as his expenses were very limited (he lived with his
mother's brother not far from the industrial area).
After leaving the factory, Bedri borrowed ES 10 from
a fellow-villager, who had a corner-shop at
Omdurman, and entered into a partnership with his
father's brother's son. The two cousins started by
selling fruits (oranges, grapefruit, mangoes and
guava) in Khartoum. After three months their net
profits amounted to ES 80. As the agricultural
season was approaching, the partners decided to
return to their village, where they intended to
cultivate a farm jointly. The main crops cultivated
were dura and sesame, but a small part of their farm
was cultivated for ground-nuts. After harvest, net
profits for each partner were around ES 200. For
three more years, during which Bedri married, the
partnership continued; and the partners started to
retain activities at both ends simultaneously, i.e.
during the agricultural season one of the partners
would leave Khartoum with sufficient money to
finance cultivation through wage labour. The fourth
harvest was a failure; and a dispute between the
cousins resulted in the termination of the
partnership. Upon separation Bedri's share was ES
90, of which he invested ES 40 in the establishment
of. a vegetable stall at U'shrra neighbourhood in
Khartoum.	 .
After four or five months of trading at U'shrra,
the Municipality raided the place and stocks worth
over ES 30 were confiscated from Bedri. His
relatives in Khartoum donated ES 20 to compensate
for his loss; but, as the agricultural season was
approaching, Bedri returned to his village. His
relatives in Khartoum were displeased by Bedri's
return, as they took it that he had lost interest in
trading and that he was simply returning to his wife
to enjoy himself. Bedri hopes that he never again
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need to turn to his relatives for help.
After a poor harvest, Bedri returned to Khartoum,
where he now works as a vegetable seller at a
peripheral market at Omdurman. He lives with a group
of young men from his district, and pays ES 8 in
rent each month. His stocks are in the range of ES
20 to ES 30, depending on the season and on the week
of the month. His daily profits vary from a low of
ES 2 to ES 3 to a high of ES 6 to S 8. As he sells
in the open, he is on constant alert against raids
by the Municipality. He maintains that he could not
survive another confiscation because, in addition to
the need for cash to finance his farm, he has to
provide for his wife and newly-born daughter. He is
now looking for a site covered by a permit because
he thinks it is the only way to expand his business.
He is also contemplating emigration, but has so far
failed to secure a contract.
LICENCES FOR OTHER TRADERS
Whereas purveyors of tea, coffee and soft drinks require
Health Certificates in addition to a booth to obtain licences,
traders of manufactured goods and sellers of newspapers only
require a booth. Cigarette sellers may either obtain a booth,
or enter into an arrangement with a licensed trader to place a
stall in front of the shop, in which case the stall will be
covered under the shop's licence.
For the overwhelming majority of traders, to secure even
the minimum requirement of a legal permanent place is most
difficult. Booths in Greater Khartoum are allocated by the
Muncipality in central, peripheral and popular markets, as
well as at certain other strategic sites (e.g. near
hospitals). However, as part of 'the Khartoum Beautification
Plan', in recent years the authorities have not only refused
applications for new licences in central markets, but also
transferred already-•licensed booths to the popular markets on
the outskirts of Greater Khartoum. As a result of this policy,
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the number of sites in peripheral and popular markets to be
allotted to new applicants (i.e. petty traders other than
those being transferred from central markets) has	 been
drastically reduced. A further factor compounding the
difficulties of unlicensed petty traders seeking sites at
peripheral markets is that the Municipality seems to undertake
allocation in such a way that unlicensed petty traders are
granted only a small percentage of the sites marked for 'petty
traders'. This is a consequence of a system of allocation
ostensibly devised to help 'disadvantaged' families and/or
individuals (widowed and divorced women with small children,
handicapped men, etc.). The allocation of sites in the Popular
Market (al-Sug al-Shaa'bi) in Khartoum South is a case in
point.
Al-Sough al-Shaa'bi was initially planned in the early
1970s when the Municipality started to implement plans to
establish a new inter-city bus station away from Khartoum
central market. The site provided a suitable place to transfer
licensed booths
	 from both Khartoum central market and
al-Sajana peripheral market. The number of sites in the new
market was greater than the number of booths transferred, and
for this reason many of the unlicensed wheel-stall traders
evicted from Central Khartoum applied for booths. A number of
craftsmen and a few petty traders managed to obtain sites (not
least through corrupt means such as bribes and mobilizing the
support of influential relatives), but the overwhelming
majority of applications from wheel-stall traders were turned
down. Knowing that there were still sufficient sites to be
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allocated, wheel-stall traders organized themselves into a
union in 1977/78 and approached the Muncipality expressing
their willingness to pay taxes and their wish to be given
sites in the newly established market. The authorities
promised to consider the petition, but eventually the new
sites were almost exclusively granted to people who were not
previously involved in petty trade. Though the Municipal
authorities claim that these allotees are "needy", which is
undoubtedly true of some of them, quite a number of sites were
allotted to relatives and friends of officials. But it is very
rare for such allottees to start business themselves and most
booths are eventually put up for lease.
Furthermore, the Municipality has put pressure on
allottees to build brick-shops on the sites, instead of the
former practice of constructing booths with cheaper materials
such as wood and corrugated iron. Thus, even if sites were to
be granted to unlicensed petty traders, the cost of building a
brick-shop would require over 80% of wheel-stall traders'
capital. A number of relatively well-off unlicensed traders
are of course able to afford rented booths or shops in
peripheral markets, but the demand for such booths and shops
does not originate solely with unlicensed wheel-stall traders.
In addition to retailers and wholesalers 'drifting' to Greater
Khartoum from other urban and rural areas (cf. Chapter Three)
and to craftsmen looking for licensed places to avert official
harrassment, there are also the returned emigrants seeking to
invest their savings in trade and, last but not least, former
government functionaries, who have opted for early retirement
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to invest their 'parallel salaries' (bribes, embezzled funds,
etc.) and to exploit to the limit their connections in the
bureaucratic apparatus (rationing authority, public
corporations, licensing departments, state commercial banks,
etc.).
But this discussion of the difficulties encountered by
wheel-stall traders in obtaining 'fixed places' and licences
is not intended to convey the impression that all unlicensed
traders are seeking licences. Pedlars, for example, do not
need fixed places (otherwise they would not be pedling). The
rule of their game is to be at the right place at the right
time. A normal scene in Greater Khartoum is the clustering of
pedlars and hawkers at hospital-gates during visiting hours,
in front of cinemas in evenings, near stadiums when matches
are played, or even at wedding parties well after mid-night.
By so doing, these petty traders bring before potential
customers a wide range of goods. The purchase of some of these
goods may be in the mind of potential customers (tooth
brushes, tooth paste, nail clippers, key rings, popular
perfumes, footwear) in which case the pedlars provide a
convenient services saving to the customers both time and
transport costs. But there are also commodities which would
not otherwise be bought because the demand for them is
transient and more often than not generated only at that time
at that place. Examples of these goods are chewing-gum,
cigarettes, soft drinks, tea, roasted ground-nuts, boiled
chick-peas, and roasted water-melon seeds. A few pedlars are
fruit-sellers, who carry 'Class A' stocks to
	
sell	 to
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government officials and businessmen at their places of work,
which saves the latter the burden of driving to the
heavily-crowded central markets.
Under current regulations, pedlars will never be eligible
for licences or permits. With their meagre resources, however,
they cannot afford the 'luxury' of waiting for customers to
come to them. Their capital may be as low as ES 10, and they
hope to earn at least one pound in net profits each day to
continue in business. Consequently, a pedlar has to cope with
a compound insecurity, which stems partly from the threat of
having stocks confiscated, and partly from probabilities of
low, or no, turn-over. Confiscation may impoverish pedlars
completely, while slow turfl-over may force them to starve even
more. But nevertheless they seem to survive both dilemmas.
Against confiscation they are on constant alert; and well-fed
sprinters would hardly achieve better results in escaping from
Municipality guards and Police. The cushion against low
turn-over is aggressive marketing, passionate haggling, and
continual walking to more places.
RELATIONS WITH WHOLESALERS
While petty traders and wholesalers show marked
differences in their respective perceptions of the purpose and
implications of the interaction between them, the perceptions
of the multitude of petty traders are by no means homogeneous.
This is particularly so because the implications of the
interaction for petty traders are highly varied. While some
petty traders find in close identification with wholesalers a
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mechanism enhancing the expansion of their small businesses,
others conceive of the interaction in negative terms as they
are either denied access to stocks or caught in a 'debt trap'
in which they are charged retail prices for their stocks
(which undermines their competitiveness against licensed
retail shops).
From the standpoint of wholesalers, on the other hand, the
varied relations with petty traders are unanimously conceived
as	 important mechanisms enhancing commercial capital
accumulation. In other words, petty traders provide
wholesalers with an efficient and cheap system for the
distribution of goods. Though the proportion of the goods so
distributed in the total stocks of wholesalers calls for close
empirical investigation, there can be little doubt that
wholesalers realize higher profit margins from the relatively
small, but more frequent transactions with petty traders than
from the larger deals concluded with retailers. This is
particularly so because, owing to their relatively high
overhead costs, licensed retailers are usually reluctant to
pay more than wholesale prices; and in order to check the
manipulation of the pricing system by wholesalers, they have
in virtually all Sudanese cities formed their own unions,
which are entitled to receive quotas, at official prices,
directly from government (cf. Mohamed Yousif A. El-Mustafa,
1983:21 Off).
Petty traders, who are largely unlicensed, are severely
constrained in their attempt to organize themselves (as in the
case of wheel-stall traders seeking grants of sites in popular
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markets mentioned earlier) and have no alternative but to
depend on wholesalers for their stocks. As their overhead
costs are usually very small (a wheel-stall or horse-cart at
most), petty traders are also more likely to accept paying any
price below retail price to wholesalers. Thus through
transactions with petty traders the wholesalers are in a
position not only to realize their "wholesale profit margins",
but also to appropriate a large portion of the profits
supposed to accrue to retailers and petty traders buying
stocks from them. It is worth noting here that while for most
commodities the government fixes a certain price for the
different levels of the trading hierarchy (i.e. importer to
wholesaler, wholesaler to retailer, and retailer to final
consumer) whereby 'maximum' profit margins are stipulated for
wholesalers and retailers respectively (cf. ibid., pp.
208-14), the "marketing expenses and margins" in the Sudan are
known to comprise the greater proportion (between 55 to 60
per cent) of the retail price (cf. Ahmed Hamza Khalifa,
1977:123 et passim). Thus, notwithstanding variations in the
terms of arrangement made between wholesalers and petty
traders, the latter almost invariably figure as low-paid
'out-workers' for the former.
For our present purposes, four main sets of relations
between wholesalers and petty traders may be discerned. These
are:
(1) Simple exchange relations, in which all transactions
are conducted for cash;
(2) Debt relations, in which goods are taken from
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wholesalers on credit;
(3) Commission-selling relations, in which goods are
advanced by wholesalers to petty traders for
distribution in return for a commission;
(4) Dependent-selling relations, in which goods are
advanced by wholesalers, but neither wages nor
commission are paid to petty traders.
In formulating this typology I do not of course imply that
these sets of relations are mutually exclusive. Though petty
traders were generally reluctant to disclose information, from
previous experience of trading networks in urban Sudan, and
from close association with wholesalers in the past, I know
that petty traders more often than not combine, to varying
degrees, 'simple exchange relations' with 'debt relations'.
Likewise the distinction between 'commission-selling' and
'dependent-selling' is not altogether clear cut as I base it
on the method of remuneration for petty traders; in
'commission-selling' the reward is paid by wholesalers, while
in 'dependent-selling' petty traders are expected to realize
'profits' from consumers. But commision-sellers also commonly
realize profits over and above what they receive in commission
from wholesalers. These two sets of relations may also be
conceived as 'variants' of debt relations. In spite of these
limitations, the typology may be used to help us to
conceptualize in clearer terms the varied strategies adopted
by petty traders in their interactions with wholesalers.
Simple exchange relations may appear self-evident and
require no discussion. But it is important to note that,
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though all transactions are conducted in cash, petty traders
often need to establish close identification with a wholesaler
in order to have accessto stocks. This is particularly true
of stocks which are illegally imported (e.g. smuggled
cigarettes) or which, though legally acquired, are in short
supply and consequently sold at 'black market' prices (e.g.
bread, candles, matches, and cigarettes). For all types of
goods, moreover, 'discounts' are given for large orders, and
for this reason simple exchange interaction with wholesalers
is usually conducted by a group rather than by individual
petty traders.
Though petty traders generally prefer to conduct
transactions in cash, the advantages of keeping stocks of a
wide range of goods often force them to supplement their cash
transactions with the acquisition of goods on credit. This is
particularly true of new wheel-stall traders who have spent
part of their accumulated savings to acquire wheel-stalls.
Unlike simple exchange relations, however, debt relations are
almost exclusively initiated between wholesalers and
individual petty traders. But as wholesalers extend credit
solely to members of groups known to them, through the
provision of stocks on credit they tend to attract the
continued custom not only of the specific petty trader to whom
'facilities' are offered, but also of the whole group of which
he is member. All 47 'established' wheel-stall traders I
interviewed denied taking goods on credit from merchants, but
they all pointed out that "many other wheel-stall traders do
take goods on credit".
388
While in the cases of simple exchange and debt relations
the initiative is normally taken by petty traders, in the case
of commission-selling it is usually the wholesalers who ask
petty traders to sell goods on their behalf. The stocks
involved are normally either sub-standard (incomplete sets,
soiled and/or damaged clothes, etc.) or standard goods out of
fashion or for which the turn-over is low at a time when
storage space is needed f or other stocks. In either case,
relatively generous terms are given by wholesalers; the agreed
price is usually well below the retail price, and often so low
that commission-sellers manage to realize profits, over and
above their commission, by selling the goods for a higher
price. Likewise up to 30% of gross revenue may be given to
petty traders undertaking distribution. Commission-selling is
in many respects the most favourable set of relations that
petty traders can establish with wholesalers. This is
particularly so because petty traders do not need any capital
to receive stocks, and though they have to find customers for
the goods, they do not face the same dilemma as traders taking
goods on credit. In other words, in the event of slow
turn-over,	 stocks may be returned to wholesalers.
Commission-sellers are consequently recipients of
ltpreferential treatment", and for this reason they tend to be
drawn from among the oldest clients of wholesalers, if not
from among those who are also their kinsmen. The case of Taha
highlights the magnitude of profits realized through
commission-selling by a few strategically placed individuals.
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CASE (13)
Taha, who is 42 years old, is married and has five
children all of whom attend primary or junior
secondary schools. He was born in the Northern
Province, and completed primary (then 'sub-grade')
education there. Three years after leaving school,
he came to Khartoum to work in the shop of one of
his relatives (who was then a retailer). He stayed
with his relative for nine years, but, following a
dispute between the two over Taha's heavy drinking,
Taha left the shop and sought to establish himself
as a petty trader. His savings at the time amounted
to ES 12.
Taha's links with wholesalers and retailers in the
market were very beneficial to his business, which
initially consisted of a fixed stall at the Arabic
Market in central Khartoum; but his drinking problem
was a serious drain, and on several occasions he
lost his entire capital and accumulated debts as
well. Each time, however, he managed to recover
through facilities from relatives. After his
marriage 15 years ago, Taha gave up his stall and
started to establish himself as broker and/or
commission-seller. Though the stocks he handles are
normally small, his activities involve selling goods
to retailers and petty traders as well as to final
consumers, and for this reason he does not stick to
any one line of commodities. He deals in, among
other items, empty sacks and cans, footwear and
manufactured goods, petrol, charcoal and fish. But
he prefers to deal in stocks which wholesalers or
manufacturers want to clear. He maintains that such
stocks are usually sold at discounted prices, but in
cases where he has to pay relatively high prices he
prefers	 to	 enter	 into	 commission-selling
arrangements.
One of Taha's tbig hits' in recent months took
place three weeks prior to my interview with him; he
bought 162 dozen slightly sub-standard male
underwears from a factory at Omdurman for ES 1.50 a
dozen, and in three days he sold them to petty
traders for ES 1.90 piastres a dozen, thus realizing
a (26.7%) profit amounting to nearly ES 65. But he
explained that the turn-over of goods was
exceptionally high because petty traders were
stocking in preparation for the approaching Bairum
Feast, at which time Sudanese make the bulk of their
annual purchases.
At the time of the interview, which took place
during the morning four days before the Feast, Taha
was selling footwear for a commission at a stall in
front of a shop in Omdurman, The particular shop
owner was not related to Taha, but the two have a
relatively long-established trading relation. Taha
was initially contracted 15 days before the Feast,
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and was given a stock of 300 pairs to sell at •
 a
stall covered by the shop's licence. The total price
was ES 2,700 (i.e. 9 pounds per pair) and a
commission of 5 per cent was agreed upon. The
prevalent market price was ES 11.50 a pair, and Taha
initially asked for £5 11 from customers and,
through haggling, a price between ES 9 and ES 10 was
usually reached. In the first week, Taha sold 215
pairs for a total of ES 2,037 instead of the ES
1,935 agreed upon (thus realizing ES 102 in
'windfall profits'). He returned the 75 pairs left
and was given ES 105 in commission in settlement of
the first contract, but another agreement involving
500 pairs for a total price of ES 4,500 was
simultaneously concluded. At the time of the
interview, Taha had completed only one day with the
second assignment, but he had already managed to
sell 87 pairs for ES 819 pounds (a windfall profit
of ES 36 in addition to ES 39 in commission). He was
hoping to sell at least 300 pairs during the two
days before the Feast, but I could not interview him
at a later stage. He was very busy at the stall on
the eve of the Feast, and I was unable to meet him
later because he left Khartoum on a relatively long
visit to his family back home.
Taha confided that the profits realized during the
two Muslim feasts are exceptional because the demand
for goods was at its highest. Because of relatively
assured turn-over, moreover, commission-sellers
normally accept a low percentage commission during
the festive seasons. In other seasons the stocks
involved are usually smaller, but due to slow
turn-over the percentage paid in commission is
normally higher. Taha does not keep records of his
different activities, but he claims normally to net
around ES 250 (after deducting maintenance
expenses), of which he sends ES 70 ES 100 to his
wife and children who live in a small town in the
North. He visits his family at least three times a
year. In Omdurman he lives at a house of a related
wholesaler, but depends on restaurants for his
meals.
Another form of commission-selling is found in the
distribution of newspapers and magazines by newsagents who run
licensed book-booths (kiosk-cum-bookshop). Up to the early
1970s, these agents used to sub-contract, also on a commission
basis, young boys for the distribution of parts of their
quotas. Since 1970 .when confiscation measures reduced the
number of national daily newspapers to two only, the
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distribution of newspapers has been the responsibility of a
public agency. This centralization seems to have resulted in a
decline in the rate of commission given to newsagents, and
since then newsagents have largely ceased to engage boys. I
did not encounter a single boy distributing newspapers during
the various periods of my fieldwork.
But new forms of commission-selling have been generated in
other fields. One recent, but conspicuous, form concerns
transactions in currency rather than in stocks of goods. A
number of wholesalers (who also assume the role of importers)
and owners of exchange bureaux have started to provide large
sums in local currency to petty traders. The latter usually
cluster in front of banks and exchange bureaux to buy foreign
currency from emigrant workers on visits. Commission at the
rate of 2% is given to these commission-sellers (or buyers?).
As such currency transactions are proscribed by law, the
commission-sellers were very reluctant to be interviewed. The
little information I obtained was through casual conversation
while concluding a deal with one of them.
The final set of relations concerns dependent-selling,
which combines features of debt and commission-selling. Like
commission-selling, it involves no capital input from petty
traders, and the goods belong to the wholesaler and can be
returned to him. But no commission is received by
dependent-sellers who, like petty traders taking on goods on
credit, are expected to realize 'profits' from sales. Perhaps
the only unique feature of dependent-selling is that it often
involves the provision of certain assets. Many wheel-stall
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traders told me that wholesalers provide some petty traders
with both stocks and wheel-stalls, though I was not able to
locate any of these 'dependent'
cigarette-sellers volunteered
wheel-stall traders. But 5
information about arrangements
with wholesalers, who provided both stalls covered by licences
of shops or restaurants and stocks of cigarettes. The case of
Azrag typifies such arrangements, and the only notable
difference is that Azrag is offered free residence at the
wholesaler's house.
CASE (14)
Azrag is 23 years old. He was born in the Nuba
Mountains, and at the age of 17 came to Khartoum to
work as a house-servant. He worked, and lived, for
around two years at a wholesaler's house for ES 12 a
month. Besides performing various tasks around the
house, Azrag daily carried breakfast and dinner to
the wholesaler's shop, which was not very far from
the house. During these visits to the shop, Azrag
befriended a cigarette-seller, also a Nuba, running
a fixed stall in front of the shop. Hearing of the
'high income' the latter earned, Azrag was
encouraged to invest some of his savings, which were
kept with the wholesaler, in cigarette-selling. He
informed the wholesaler about his wish to start
trading in the evening (after finishing his work at
the house). The wholesaler encouraged Azrag, and the
latter started to sell cigarettes under a lamp post
at the periphery of the (peripheral) market in which
the wholesaler was based. Azrag kept two brands of
cigarettes, and his stocks were 100 cigarettes of
each. He made small profits (20-30 piastres a day),
but as he retained his job as house-servant he was
contented. Six or seven months after starting his
small business, a dispute arose between the
wholesaler and a boy running a cigarette-stall
situated at a restaurant owned by the wholesaler.
Azrag was called to take charge of the stall and to
bring one of his relatives to work as house-servant.
In spite of his 'promotion', he has continued to
live at the wholesaler's house.
The stall which Azrag has taken over consists of a
glass-sided cabinet for cigarettes and a tin-chest
for tumbak . Stocks of cigarettes (worth around ES
300) are advanced by the wholesaler, while the
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tumbak (worth around ES 15) belongs to Azrag. Though
entitled to eating three meals with the chefs and
waiters at the restaurant, he is not considered a
wage worker. The wholesaler provides the cigarettes
at retail prices (i.e. 75 piastres per packet of
10), and Azrag is expected to make 'profit' from his
snuff sales and by charging a 'black-market' price
of 8 piastres per cigarette. The .snuff is bought for
cash from another wholesaler, and costs 65 piastres
per lb (when processed it fetches up to ES 1.50 per
ib). He sells between 500 and 600 cigarettes, and
around 3 lbs of snuff daily. His average net daily
income is around £S3.
Azrag married two years ago, but his wife and
newly-born son live in his home village. He goes at
least once a year to see them, but he sends them
money more frequently. During his absence Azrag, in
consultation with the wholesaler, makes arrangements
with relatives and/or friends for the running of the
stall. Those who take over the stall are given the
same terms as his own, and they do not give him any
money from their 'profits'. So far he has
accumulated ES 300 pounds in savings, which are kept
with the wholesaler. Though his savings are enough
to start a stall of his own, he is not thinking of
separation. He believes that he is being subsidised
by the wholesaler through the provision of free
residence and maintenance. But he is looking forward
to the day when he will be able to establish a stall
to be run by another person and probably on the same
terms as his. Azrag's business is not subject to
official	 harrassment	 because	 of	 licence
requirements, as his stall is considered part of the
restaurant (a service to customers); but his
higher-than-official prices often lead to disputed
with his clients.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter I have attempted to transcend aspects of
the limitations of the literature which seeks to relate the
post-colonial	 proliferation	 of	 unskilled	 tertiary
self-employment in Greater Khartoum to the lack of alternative
employment opportunities by relating it to the process of
urban growth, which generates a steadily increasing demand for
unskilled tertiary services. I have argued that in the sere
of unskilled personal 	 services this increasing demand
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originates almost exclusively with the more affluent strata.
Through the analysis of aspects of car-washing and
laundry-work, I have attempted to show how the rewards for
'self-employed' unskilled tertiary workers can be much higher
than for wage labourers, and how in the face of the insecurity
of 'self-employment' these workers have devised methods to
eliminate dramatic fluctuations in demand/income (through
establishment of relations with a semi-permanent core of
clients). The cultural stigmatization of these services,
however, inhibits the entry of many other workers.
The proliferation of street/petty trading is likewise
related to population growth. But the role of petty traders
does not cease with the provision of goods (and credit) to the
urban population; they also play a very significant role in
furthering capital accumulation by wholesalers.
As petty trade is not subject to cultural stigmatization;
and as very little money may suffice to start trading, the
activity continues to attract a majority of unskilled workers
looking for income-generating opportunities. But I have
attempted to show that entry to petty trading is one thing and
continuity in it quite another. Besides the 'external'
disincentives relating to official harrassment and uncertainty
of turn-over, more often than not continuity depends on one's
background, precisely because each line of trade is dominated
by members of certain 'tribal'/regional group(s). Entrants
from these groups are readily received as members in the
"bachelors' bands" formed by petty traders.
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These bands fulfil several functions. As 'residence
groups' they provide companionship and help to reduce the cost
of maintenance for members; as 'trading networks' they provide
information and facilitate introductions to wholesalers for
the provision of stocks and extension of credit; as 'vigilance
groups', they provide protection; and as rotating credit
associations they augment the capital of each member. Many
members of these groups are thus likely to continue in petty
trade, while other entrants who find it difficult to establish
themselves tend to conceive of petty trade as a transient
activity to be pursued until alternative employment is
secured. Commonly that alternative is manufacturing wage
employment which, 	 as	 explained in Chapter Five, is
characterized by a pattern of widespread 	 'replenishment
recruitment'.
The conditions of 'self-employed' unskilled tertiary
workers described in this chapter have far-reaching
implications for the conventional wisdom which attempts to
characterize unskilled tertiary workers as 'redundant'. But
these implications do not stem solely from the points which I
have attempted to substantiate in this chapter concerning the
"structural determinants" underlying the proliferation of
tertiary activities and the way in which tertiary workers have
managed to 'cope' with the apparent insecurity of
'self-employment'. They also stem from the challenge which the
conditions of tertiary workers pose for the largely
conjectural exercises which seek to postulate "wage
employment" as the only form of "meaningful/productive
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employment" for manual workers. In asserting this, I do not of
course wish to deny either that wage employment opportunities
in urban Sudan are severely constrained by the processes of
peripheral urbanism, or that my analysis indeed suggests that
the large majority of tertiary workers consists of 'hardy'
workers, who earn small, incomes that suffite.to meet basic
needs only. I wish rather to stress the point that neither of
these two 'facts' provides a basis for the characterization of
tertiary workers as 'redundant', precisely because such a
characterization omits to take into account the striking and
significant similarities that are observed between the
conditions of, on the one hand, the unskilled tertiary workers
alleged to be redundant and, on the other, the wage labourers
in government and large-scale industrial and commercial
enterprises. -1 believe this omission stems largely from a
poorly-founded, but widely-held, belief that, unlike wage
employment	 in the	 so-called	 'formal/modern	 sector',
'self-employment' among unskilled manual workers is
characterized by low productivity, dramatic and rapid
fluctuations in the frequency of employment, and/or job
insecurity. But virtually all the concepts devised for the
characterization of tertiary 'self-employment' are, to say the
least, muddled. For example on the rare occasions when the
concept of "low productivity" is not taken for granted as
self-evident, it is usually considered synonymous with "low
earnings" (e.g. Mohamed El-Awad Galal El-Din, 1977a:35). As I
shall discuss in the next chapter, the urban wage workers in
general, and the unskilled wage labourers in particular, not
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only earn "low incomes" (often much lower than unskilled
tertiary workers), but they also face serious job insecurity.
In Chapter Seven, then, I shall seek to expose aspects of the
mystification surrounding the conceptualization of the
apparent structural segmentation of the Sudanese urban wage
labour market.
NOTES
1. For an account of the perceptions of Nuer manual
construction labourers regarding the status of unskilled
personal activities (laundry-work in particular), see
El-Wathig Kameir, 1980b:216 et passim).
2. The fees quoted are for 1981. Insofar as the 15 months I
spent in field research were spread over a period of three
years, inflation and the steady increases in prices posited
serious difficulties in my attempt to use data collected in
interviews in different years. In my analysis of cases on
unskilled personal services I relied on data gathered
between April and September, 1982, while in the analysis of
cases on street/petty trading I relied on data gathered
between May and September, 1981.
CHAPTER SEVEN
ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE URBAN LABOUR MARKET IN THE SUDAN
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For capital, what is important is that the
reproduction of labour-power is subsidized
externally to a much greater extent when it
is located in a predominantly non-capitalist
environment than is usual in industrial
countries (although this is still
significant there), which consequently
allows	 the	 super-exploitation 	 of
labour-power. It is the presence of such
subsidies, and not the high rate of
unemployment and the 'law of supply and
demand', which make low wages economically
and socially possible in
	 developing
countries	 (Frobel,	 1984:71;	 original
emphasis).
The aim of this chapter is to highlight the striking
similarities between the different forms of employment for
manual labour ('permanent' wage employment, 'casual' 'wage
employment and 'self-employment') in Greater Khartoum, which
forms underlie the apparent structural segmentation of the
wage labour market in urban Sudan. The chapter starts with a
brief critique of the literature. The main purpose of this
critique is to outline, and ultimately refute the dualistic
('formal-informal') conception of the structure of the urban
labour market adopted by the ILO Mission to the Sudan, and to
show how the alleged implications of this dualistic structure
have (unconsciously?) been incorporated into contributions
purporting to criticise the Mission's views. I attempt to
compare the terms and conditions of employment for the
so-called 'formal' and 'informal' sectors pointing out their
relative uniformity. On the basis of that comparison, I set
out to formulate an alternative conception of the nature and
origins of the apparent segmentation in the structure of the
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urban wage labour market. I draw attention to the distinction
between unionized and non-unionIzed workers, which I regard as
the pillar of the observed structural segmentation of the
labour market. To substantiate the significance of this
distinction, I dwell on a detailed account of the position of
trade unions in the Sudan. The chapter ends with a brief
conclusion in which I attempt to bring together the main
points raised.
THE DUALISTIC CONCEPTION
Studies on the structure and operation of the urban labour
market in the Sudan, relatively few and preliminary as they
have been, are largely recent and they focus almost
exclusively on the situation in Greater Khartoum. With a few
exceptions (notably Sa'ad El-Din Fawzi, 1954; 1957;
McLoughlin, 1965; 1970; Ali Ahmed Suliman, 1974), the main
body of the literature dates from 1976 and since the arrival
of the ILO/UNDP Employment Mission which, in response to an
official request, sought to formulate a comprehensive
development strategy for the country. In pursuing its task,
the Mission organized a series of research projects to obtain
information on various aspects of the Sudanese economy. One of
these projects dealt with the urban labour market. The larger
part of the literature thus consists either of findings of
research financed and/or conducted by the Mission (e.g. ILO,
1976; Mohamed El-Murtada Mustafa, 1976; 1983; idem. & Khalid
Affan, 1975; 1977; Kannappan, 1977a; Khalid Affan, 1977;
Sheehan, 1978), or of critiques of the Mission's conceptions
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and recommendations (e.g. Chase, 1978; Mohamed El-Awad Galal
El-Din, 1978; 1979a; 1980a; El-Wathig Kameir, 1980a; 1980b). A
few later studies, largely financed by the ILO and/or UNHCR,
followed closely the original formulation of the ILO Mission
(Jenkins, 1981; Ghosh, 1983; Mohamed El-Murtada Mustafa,
1983). It is worth noting that the question of the urban
labour market is also briefly referred to in studies of trade
unionism (Abdel Rahman E. Au Taha, 1970; 1972; 1976; 1977) as
well as in studies of rural-urban migration (Mohamed Abdel
Rahman Ali & Mohamed El-Awad Galal El-Din, 1974; Mohamed
El-Awad Galal El-Din, 1974a; 1974b; El-Sayed El-Bushra, 197.la;
1972a; 1976 .; 1980; Salih El-Arifi, 1971; 1972; 1980; Mohamed
Yousif A. El-Mustafa, 1983).
These relatively recent contributions are of course
welcome insofar as they provide information filling some of
the lacunae in the descriptive literature. But with the
notable exception of the inspiring, albeit very brief critique
by Chase (op.cit.), these contributions place serious
constraints on our understanding of the structure of the urban
labour market. I believe their limitations stem from flaws
inherent in the dualistic conceptual framework shared by both
the ILO-studies themselves and the contributions purporting to
criticize them. This is due to the fact that the mass of data
gathered by the ILO Mission has unfortunately been fed into
the strait-jacket of the ('formal-informal') dualist concept
of labour markets in third world cities first popularized by
the ILO Mission to Kenya (1972) and subsequently incorporated,
with minor modifications, into the analysis of other country
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and city studies organized by the ILO as part of its World
Employment Programme (cf. Bromley, 1979a; Moser, 1979). The
end-product of that 'analysis' of the urban labour market in
Greater Khartoum has been a situation in which the theoretical
statements made in the contributions are often in direct
conflict with the facts described in muted terms in the same
works. This contradiction between research findings and
theoretical perspective is most apparent in the main Report of
the Sudan Mission (see below).
Generally speaking,	 the dualist conception of the
ILO-studies on Third World cities overemphasizes the apparent
segmentation of the urban labour market. It draws a
distinction between the so-called 'formal' and 'informal'
segments, and stresses the implications which it this alleged
distinction carries for the terms and conditions of employment
of the wage labour force in each segment. The Mission (ILO,
1976:109) accordingly informs us that
Urban labour markets [in the Sudan] differ
for the formal and informal sectors. The
former ... is characterised by large scale
of operation, a high degree of capital
intensity, relatively high levels of
remuneration, and a degree of legislative
protection relating to hours of work,
working conditions, minimum wages, overtime
rates, bargaining and grievance procedures,
and compensation and pension schemes; in
other words, employment In this sector is
similar to that found in the urban centres
of industrialised countries. By contrast,
the informal sector is characterised by
small-scale operation, a primitive level of
technology, a relatively low level of earned
income, high dependency on family labour,
and few regulatory measures of any kind..
In the so-called . 'formal' segment of the labour market, we
are told, the employers are government departments, public
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concerns, and large-scale private enterprises. Basing itself
on the returns of the National Population Census of 1973, the
Mission estimates that 'formal' employment in Greater Khartoum
is enjoyed by under 30 per cent of the urban labour force
(ibid., p.363). This percentage covers civil servants and
white-collar workers, as well as manual (skilled, semi-skilled
and unskilled) wage earners.
The ILO studies note that the 'formal' wage labour market
is far from perfect. Thus neither considerations of
productivity, nor the forces of supply and demand, seem to
play prominent roles in the determination of the "relatively
high wagest!; "pressure by trade unions" is said to be the
crucial determining factor (ibid.; Khalid Affan, 1977:62ff).
The assumption underlying this assertion is that since
establishments in the 'formal' sector are large, in terms of
the numbers employed, the trade unions in these establishments
are also usually large in membership; and this is in turn held
to strengthen the position of workers in the process of
collective bargaining.
In contrast to the conditions of workers in the 'formal'
sector, 'informal workers' are said to consist of both
'self-employed' persons and 'casual' wage workers. The ILO
studies assert that the 'self-employed', who are usually
unlicensed, are persistently harrassed by the authorities, and
that the conditions of 'informal' wage workers are
characterized by low earnings, discontinuous employment and a
lack	 of	 'privileges', such as paid sick-leave, annual
holidays, and legislative protection, enjoyed by 'formal'
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workers.
Despite their adoption of the dualistic conception of the
wage labour market, the ILO studies do not suggest, and indeed
emphatically deny that the segmentation results in
discontinuities between the segments. Indeed, we are told that
between the two main segments there exists a "hazy borderline"
surrounding 'formal' employment and comprising the 'temporary'
and 'casual' workers who have terms and conditions of
employment similar to those of workers in the so-called
'informal' segment. In describing this 'borderline', the ILO
Sudan Mission has thus itself provided a point of departure
for critiques of its dualistic conception.
THE DUALISTIC CONCEPTION RECONSIDERED
It is common knowledge in the Sudan that almost all
establishments in the so-called 'formal sector' resort to the
employment of large numbers of wage workers on a 'temporary'
or 'casual' basis. It was not until recently, however, that
much attention was given to the analysis of the numbers in
such employment, to the proportion of this labour to the total
number of wage earners, and to the differences between
permanent and non-permanent employment.
'Casual' and 'temporary' employment in large scale
establishments is most commonly identified with the
construction sector. A recent study of casual construction
workers in Khartoum (El-Wathig Kameir, 1980a; 1980b), which
vividly documents the problems and position of such workers,
is indeed the first systematic analysis of casual employment
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in urban Sudan. In this specific case, contractors usually
face dramatic variations in production schedules owing to
fluctuations in demand for their services or, when demand is
present, because of the frequent shortages in building
materials. Accordingly, the use of casual labour on a daily
basis is viewed by contractors as an efficient, flexible, and
economical way to operate in relation to fluctuations in their
production schedules (see below). The Ministry of Construction
is similarly known to engage unskilled construction workers on
a 'non-permanent' basis (ILO, 1976:365).
Resort to 'casual' and 'temporary' employment is not
confined to the construction industry, or even to those other
government departments and large private establishments in
which the pace and intensity of production fluctuate
seasonally or otherwise. Thus even in the large scale
manufacturing establishments -where employers are expected to
be most concerned with developing a 'durable' relation with
workers- 'non-permanent' employment is widespread. The
following quotations, extracted from the the ILO Report
(1976), provides an overview of the situation:
Employment in the formal sector in the
Sudan,	 whether private or public, is
characterised by an unusually large
proportion of workers who are classified as
"temporary" and who may be laid off without
legislative interference (p. 109)... Data
for 1973 for a group of concerns in the
public industrial sector employing 22,000
workers suggest that as much as 40 per cent
were "temporary" workers, the percentage
being even higher if we exclude the white
collar workers ..(p. 365).
According to Kannappan (1977a:88n), the data for 1973
mentioned above indicate thaf 8,791 out of 21,964 employees in
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that group of concerns were classified as 'temporary'.
Kannappan (ibid.) presents the following table to show the
number of employees by category
Table 7:1
Categories of Employees in a Group of
Public Concerns in Khartoum, 1973
Category	 Number	 Percentage
Skilled	 3,554	 16
Unskilled	 7,003	 32
Temporary	 8,791	 40
White-collar	 2,616	 12
Total	 21,964	 100
What should be taken into account in relation to the table
is that 'temporary' workers are exclusively unskilled.
Excluding the white-collar and skilled workers, who are always
'permanent' employees, we find that 'temporary' workers
actually constitute around 60 per cent of the total unskilled
labour force (i.e. 8,791 out of 15,794 unskilled workers).
Large as it is, there is good reason to suspect that even this
percentage does not show the actual total 'non-permanent'
employment in these concerns, and it certainly cannot be taken
as representative of the actual proportion of 'non-permanent'
employment in the so-called formal sector as a whole. The
reason is that there is no reference in the table to the
'totally casual' workers employed on a daily basis and who,
given the day-to-day fluctuations, are very difficult to
enumerate in any survey (cf. Chapter Five). Moreover, it
should be stressed that the table provides an overview of the
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situation in public industrial concerns only; the proportion
of 'non-permanent' employment in private large scale industry,
which as I explained in Chapter Five is characterized by
excessive rates of labour turn-over, is indeed much higher.
The ILO Mission (1976:365) points out that the (MEFFIT) survey
which estimated manufacturing employment in Greater Khartoum
at 33,000 "placed 'temporary' manufacturing employment at
31,000".
In describing the magnitude of 'temporary' and 'casual'
employment in the so-called 'formal' sector, it is important
to stress that 'permanent' employment is not confined to large
scale private establishments and government departments.
Labour legislation in the country stipulates that a permanent
post must be created if continuous employment is offered for
more than 90 days; and permanent employment may thus be
encountered in the smallest of enterprises. A classic example
of this is an employed shop-keeper who runs a shop on behalf
of an owner who pursues other interests.
The main point to stress is that the facts of 'casual' and
'temporary' employment in the 'formal sector' are recognized
in the ILO studies, which also recognize that the wage labour
force as a whole constitutes around a half only of the entire
manual labour force in Greater Khartoum.	 The Mission
(1976:111) indeed points to the "very small size" of
'permanent' wage workers and contends that "As elsewhere in
the Third World, this is the labour elite, and we need
constantly to keep in mind what a small proportion of the
labour force they are".
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Both the ILO Mission (1976:365) and Kannappan (1977a:88)
attempt to explain the pattern of "heavy reliance" on
'temporary' and 'casual' employment by 'formal' employers. Two
factors have been advanced in this respect. Firstly, there are
"considerations of flexibility" to ccpe with the fluctuations
in production schedules; but this factor is relevant only in
the case of the construction industry (in which production
virtually comes to a halt during the rainy season). Secondly,
the two studies maintain that 'non-permanent' employment is
observed even where fluctuations in schedules are not as
marked; and this might be explained in terms of the desire of
employers to avert the alleged "more expensive commitments"
associated with 'permanent' employment. The ILO studies
generally seem to emphasize the "costly nature" of 'permanent'
employment whether in remuneration (the 'high wages') or
legislation relating	 to	 it	 ("legislative protection",
"after-service payments", etc.). This cQntention
	 is,	 I
believe, far-fetched.
The starting point in the critique of the ILO studies
concerns the problem of classification. Thus, if a large
proportion of	 'formal'	 wage employment	 is	 actually
'non-permanent', and if 'permanent' employment is also
observed in small scale enterprises, the formal/informal
conception of the urban labour market becomes not only
meaningless, but also a distortion blurring the facts of
'temporary' and 'casual' employment in the so-called 'formal
sector' (cf. Chase, op.cit.). The insertion of 'non-permanent'
employment in the so-called 'formal' segment of the labour
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market as a "hazy borderline" between the two segments fulfils
exactly that function.
The serious flaw in the dualistic conception of the
structure of the urban labour market in Greater Khartoum does
not stem solely from the fact that all classification is
necessarily arbitrary, but also, and even more significantly,
from the attempt to identify 'permanent' workers as a 'labour
elite' upon which 'privileges' are alleged to be conferred. It
is my central contention that the ILO studies on the Sudan
have grossly misunderstood the nature, 	 origin,	 and
implications of the distinction between 'permanent' and
'non-permanent' employment. But this misunderstanding is by no
means confined to the ILO studies which initially introduced
the formal-informal distinction and its alleged implications
into the analysis of the urban wage labour market in the
Sudan. Many studies that explicitly reject the formal-informal
conception of the structure of the urban labour market have
uncritically accepted the alleged implications of the
distinction. The otherwise very illuminating comparative study
of factory workers and unskilled construction labourers in
Greater Khartoum by El-Wathig Kameir (1980b) is a good case in
point.
Kameir (ibid.) rejects the formal-informal
conceptualization, and rightly attributes the emergence of the
two "forms" of wage labour employment to variations in the
requirements of different capital accumulation processes. But
he accepts the alleged implications of 'permanent' employment,
and accordingly sets out to show how the differences in the
410
terms and conditions of the 'permanent' factory workers
contribute to their stabilization, while the insecurity of the
'casual' unskilled construction labourers creates conditions
conducive to circular migration between Greater Khartoum and
the home villages. There is a conspicuous absence in Kameir's
study of any reference to -'temporary' employment, or to the
rates of labour turn-over, in the two factories studied.1
TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTION OF THE SEGMENTED STRUCTURE
A detailed assessment of all aspects of the terms and
conditions of permanent employment in the Sudan is of course
an enormous task that cannot be undertaken here. In order to
substantiate aspects of the alternative conception of the
nature and origins of the apparent structural segmentation of
the urban labour market in the Sudan, I will deal with three
closely related aspects of 'permanent' employment which are
said to constitute crucial features of the distinction between
'permanent' and 'non-permanent' ('temporary' and 'casual'
employment as well as 'informal self-employment'). These
aspects are:
(1) The alleged 'legislative protection', of permanent
workers;
(2) The alleged 'high wages' and other 'expensive
commitments" associated with permanent employment;
(3) the alleged role of trade unions in collective
bargaining and its effectiveness in promoting the
living standards of union workers who are exclusively-
union members;
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I would stress that the ILO studies seem to have based
their view of the above aspects of 'permanent' employment on
what appear to be no more than 'first impressions t of labour
legislation in the Sudan. This is clear in the overview which
the Mission (1976:117) presents of the position of the trade
unions in the country, and especially in the contention that:
The organised labour movement in the Sudan
has secured an impressive armoury of
legislation protecting its right to organise
workers and providing the machinery for the
orderly settlement of labour disputes. From
the Trade Disputes Act of 1966 to the
Employer and Employed Persons Ordinance of
1948 (as amended in 1969), to the Workers'
Trade Union Act of 1971, Sudanese workers
are furnished with collective bargaining
procedures that bear comparison with those
achieved by organised labour in advanced
countries. However, a Presidential Order of
1974 prohibited the right to strike, as well
as the employers' right to lock out, without
ministerial approval; in consequence, the
Sudan has been almost free from strikes in
recent years. Far from this creating
resentment among union leaders, the view
seems to be that prohibitionof the right to
strike has not hampered organised labour in
securing better wages and better working
conditions for its members.
Before dealing with the details of the three aspects of
'permanent' employment which are alleged to confer privileges
upon permanent workers, a general point of crucial importance
concerning labour legislation and its relation to the position
of workers has to be emphasized. This is that even if labour
legislation in the Sudan does provide for the protection of
the right of the labour movement to organize, bargain, and
settle disputes in an 'orderly manner', such 'protection'
should not be conceived as the simple consequence of
legislation issued by a 'charitable' or 'impartial
	
state.
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This is indeed particularly relevant in a country like the
Sudan where the state assumes the role of the protector of the
interests of employers, and is also itself by far the largest
employer in the country. The most important point to make here
is that the view of labour laws as an initiative taken by the
state not only overlooks the basis of labour legislation in
the Sudan as a reaction to initiatives of the labour movement,
but also mystifies the status, function, and implications of
such legislation in the class struggle, which the phrase
"industrial relations" actually denotes, albeit in muted
terms. 2 When viewed in the wider context of class struggle,
labour legislation may be seen as the outcome of struggle by
workers against unacceptable terms and conditions of work on
the one hand and, on the other, as an attempt by the state
(representing employers) to avert the radical consequences
that could arise if the struggle by workers was left to run
its course uninterrupted. In maintaining this, I am not
implying that all labour legislation necessarily constitutes
'victory' for the labour movement. Though some laws did amount
to a measure of submission on the part of employers, labour
legislation in the Sudan has, in the main, been designed to
pacify the labour movement rather than to advance the cause of
workers. But it is worth noting that labour legislation
enacted between May 1969 and December 1970 stands as an
exception -one that may be seen as proving the rule, as we
will see later in the chapter. In a nutshell, then, the labour
movement in the Sudan owes very little to labour legislation
except for its temporary containment. This assertion, quite
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contrary to the assertions of the ILO Mission, is as true of
the 'legislative protection' of the right to organize and
bargain as it is of the two other aspects of permanent
employment to be discussed below.
JOB SECURITY
The illusion that 'permanent' workers in the Sudan enjoy
job security appears to stem from the existence of certain
laws that ostensibly provide workers with legislative
protection against unlawful termination of employment by
employers. This illusion is further reinforced when the
apparent situation of permanent workers is compared to that of
temporary and casual workers whom the law excludes. In the
development of this illusion, two crucial points have usually
been overlooked:
(a) What the law stipulates as lawful termination,
against which no protection is provided;
(b) The nature of the circumstances under which
employers may wish to terminate the employment of
workers.
On the issue of the nature and scope of 'lawful
termination', it should be noted that when 'lawful' is defined
in very elastic terms, employers can always act within the law
and legislative protection becomes a mockery of the concept.
This is, I believe, the kind of legislative protection
stipulated in labour laws in the Sudan. The ILO Mission
(1976:393) referred to this issue as follows;
We wish to draw special attention to at
least one other area of protective
Pagination
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legislation, namely that relating to the
conditions under which workers may be laid
off by employers. Legal provisions
pertaining to the termination of employment
are contained in the Employer and Employed
Persons Ordinance of 1949, as amended in
1969 an 1973. But the provisions of the Act
deal essentially with only the, questions of
due notice and compensation. There is no
provision in that Act which seeks to provide
any measure of security for employed persons
from arbitrary and unfair dismissal by an
employer. It could, of course, be argued
that the grievance producedure laid down in
the Trade Disputes Act provides some
protection of job security in this regard,
since unjust dismissals may be channelled
through that procedure. But this is not
really an adequate measure to deal with this
problem.
Before dwelling on the details of the law, I should stress
an obvious, point concerning the circumstances under which
employers might wish to terminate the employment of workers.
As long as the reasons that initially led employers to engage
workers hold, employers tend to have an interest in retaining
their services. In other words, employers do not hire wage
workers for any purpose other than to perform certain specific
tasks, and as long as there are such tasks, employers tend to
keep their workers. This is of course as true of wage
employment in the public and private concerns where
"profitability" is the prime objective, as it is in the
"spending" government departments that provide services.3
The central point is that the position of a wage worker as
'temporary' should not be construed as inherently insecure,
precisely because as long as tasks are available, the position
of the temporary worker will be, other things being equal,
secure. Thus it is the usual practice for employers
(especially government departments) to sack their 'temporary'
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workers by the end of the working day on the last Thursday
before the completion of the 90th day of continuous employment
(after which a 'permanent' position would have to be created),
but to reinstate them on the following Saturday. (Friday is
the Weekend in the Sudan). Indeed, it is not uncommon to find
'temporary' workers who have actually worked for the same
employer for more than six years. In noting this practice, I
do not deny that many 'temporary' and 'casual' workers do get
the sack. The 'casual' construction workers mentioned above
are a classic case, although we have no systematic study of
the conditions of the 'casual' workers who do get fired (Do
they get employed by other contractors?).
The case of the 'temporary' workers who work for several
years for the same employer clearly illustrates my argument
concerning the conditions under which employers tend to
terminate the employment of their permanent workers. In this
respect we should note that 'permanent' positions are usually
offered only in establishments which do not normally
experience marked fluctuations in production schedules;
otherwise employers tend to engage casual workers. In other
words, the desire of employers to terminate the employment of
workers should not be construed as an innate characteristic;
whether employers employ permanent or non-permanent workers,
the question of termination arises in specific circumstances
only. These may relate to circumstances such as a total or
partial dissolution of an establishment, a desire to sack.
incompetent workers, or a wish to get rid of 'militant'
workers and trade union activists. Accordingly, the issue of
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'legislative protection' should not be treated at a high level
of abstraction; instead, our focus should be on the nature of
the circumstances under which the question of termination
arises, and the relation of these circumstances to the concept
of 'lawful termination' against which no protection is
offered.
In an attempt to review the laws regulating termination of
employment, it is worth noting that, despite decades of
'post-colonial' rule, the current labour laws largely retain
the basic concepts and structure of oppressive colonial labour
legislation (cf. Farouk Abu-Eisa, 1981:5). For example, the
current law regulating termination of employment (The Employer
and Employed Persons Act, 1976) is little more than a minor
amendment of the colonial Employer and Employed Persons
Ordinance, 1949. For this reason it is essential to trace the
current laws regulating termination of employment to their
initial sources in the 1949 Ordinance	 and	 its	 later
amendments.
According to Abdel Rahman E. Ali Taha and Ahmed H. El-Jack
(1973:9), the purpose of the 1949 Ordinance was
the regulating of terms of employment in
both private and public establishments. It
set minimum standards relating to hours of
work, overtime, holidays, rest periods, sick
leaves, the payment of after-service
benefits and other terms of employment. It
also contained rules regulating the
termination of employment dealt with under
Section '10 of the Ordinance.
The 1949 Ordinance was not intended as a universal law
covering all wage earners in the Sudan; Section 3 of the
Ordinance stipulated that	 "agricultural	 labourers"	 and
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"temporary workers" should be excluded from the jurisdiction
of the Ordinance. As I explained earlier, it is this exclusion
which created the illusion of the 'legislative protection'
provided for 'permanent' workers and denied to 'temporary'
labourers.
Section 10 of the 1949 Ordinance contained three main
Articles each of which related to specific forms of
termination of employment. Section 10 (3) stipulated the
prohibition of termination by either party when the employed
person is travelling in the course of work and is thus of no
relevance to the current discussion. Sections 10 (1) and (2)
dealt with the termination of contract by either party after
giving notice and the termination of contract by employers
without notice (summary dismissals) respectively; these two
articles, and their later amendments, will be discussed in
some detail here.
In its original formulation in the 1949 Ordinance, Section
10 (1) stipulated that:
Subject as hereinafter provided, every contract of
service wherein no agreement respecting notice of
longer duration is expressed not being a contract to
perform some specific work without reference to
time, shall be terminable by either party:
(a) Where the employed person is engaged on the
basis of a monthly wage, at the expiration of one
month's notice which may be given at any time;
(b) Where the employed person is engaged on the
basis of a weekly wage: [iJ if he has completed
less than 2 years of continuous service, at the
expiration of two weeks notice which may be given
at any time.
[bA) Where the employed person is engaged on the
basis of a fortnightly wage and has completed less
than five years of continuous service, at the
expiration of two weeks' notice which may be given
at any time.
(c) Where the employed person is engaged on the
basis of a daily wage, whether paid daily or not:
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[1] if he has not completed six months of
continuous service at the close of any day without
notice;
[ii] if he has completed six months but less than
two years of continous service, at the expiration
of two weeks' notice which may be given at any
time;
[iii] if he has completed two but less than five
years of continuous service, at the expiration of
two weeks' notice which may be given at any time.
(d) Where the employed person is engaged on the
basis of a daily, weekly or fortnightly wage and
has completed not less than five years of
continuous service, at the expiration of one
month's notice which may be given at any time (cf.
idem., pp.9/10).
What should be noted in relation to the termination of
employment after giving due notice is that employers (and
employees) were not required to justify their wish to
terminate the contract. Likewise, while "notices" were
stipulated where employees had spent a minimum of six months
of continuous service, no after-service payment or gratuity
was to be provided for a worker unless he/she had continuous
service for a minimum period of five years (Section 25 of the
Ordinance dealt with gratuity). Though the after-service
payment was, and still is, not an "expensive commitment", as
we shall see later, an employer could nevertheless manage to
avoid it by simply notifying the worker one month before the
completion of the five years of his desire to terminate the
contract.
Section 10 (2) went even further than the first article by
enabling employers to terminate contracts without giving
notice or a gratuity:
an employer may dismiss without notice an employed
person for wilful disobedience of a lawful order or
gross misconduct in or connected with his employment
or	 serious	 negligence or wilful misconduct
calculated	 seriously	 to injure the employer's
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business.
The nebulous nature of the circumstances under which an
employer could resort to summary dismissals hardly needs
emphasis. Whenever employers wanted to reduce their labour
force for economic reasons, but in such a way as to avoid
payment of a gratuity, or simply wished to get rid of a
'militant' worker, the provisions of Section 10 (2) could be
invoked. As will be explained later, employers commonly
resorted to summary dismissals in order to inhibit the
formation of trade unions; and it was for this reason in
particular that the labour movement singled out Section 10 of
the Ordinance and made an issue of demanding its amendment as
a matter of the highest priority (cf. Farouk Abu-Eisa,
op. cit . )
The first amendments of the Ordinance, however, were not
made until February 1969, only three months prior to the
military take-over which brought Numeiri to power. Of
particular relevance among the amendments are the following
points:
Firstly, the minimum period required for giving notice was
reduced to three instead of six months of continuous service.
The basic stipulation of Section 10 (1) in regard to giving
notice without any requirement of justification was, however,
left intact.
Secondly, the amendment introduced Section 10 (2b) which
recognized for the first time the right of an employed person
to terminate a contract without giving notice to the employer.
The circumstances under which such termination could be
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effected were laid down in terms of four clearly formulated
reasons. There was no provision in the amendment, however, to
recognize the right of workers who thus terminated contracts
to any gratuity, although Section 26 was amended to recognize
the right of employed persons to after-service payments. This
latter stipulated such payments under difficult conditions and
after long continuous service reaching in some cases a minimum
of 15 years (cf. idem, p. 13).
Thirdly, the original Section 10 (2) dealing with summary
dismissals for serious misconduct was amended to specify the
reasons for which employers could sack workers immediately,
and without notice or gratuity. The amendment stipulated
summary dismissals when an employed person:
(1) clothes himself with the personality of another
or presents forged documents;
(2) due to gross negligence commits 	 a	 wrong
resulting in a heavy financial loss to the employer;
(3) in spite of being notified in writing, does not
comply with any instructions made for the safety of
employed persons and of the place of business;
provided that such instructions are in writing and
fixed in a conspicuous place;
(4) omits to carry out his obligations under the
contract of service concluded between him and the
employer;
(5) discloses any industrial secrets;
(6) is convicted of an offence against honour or
involving moral turpitude or if he commits in the
place of business an act inconsistent with morals;
(7) during the hours of work is found in a state of
evident drunkenness or under the effect of a
narcotic substance provided that a medical officer
whenever possible testifies to that;
(8) assaults his employer or the responsible manager
or if, in the course of, or due to a cause
attributed to, the business he commits any grievous
hurt on any of his superiors.
Though this amendment seems to provide	 'greater
protection'	 than the original provisions, the effective
difference between the two is only superficial. I do not deny
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that at least seven of the eight circumstances stipulated are
an advance, in the sense that the new formulation is quite
unambiguous, but I would draw attention to the sixth reason in
particular. The sixth point starts with the unobjectionable
stipulation of summary dismissal when an employed person is
convicted of certain offences, which implies that the case has
been taken to court, but it ends by allowing summary dismissal
for an act "inconsistent with morals". Thus, although it does
not explicitly specify who is to determine whether an act is
"inconsistent with morals", the amendment clearly refers to
the employer or the responsible manager, who could manipulate
this provision for his own purposes. Likewise, the article
fails to specify the standard for such an evaluation of the
act; and this failure also confers upon employers uninhibited
"freedom to hire and fire".
Fourthly, the amendment introduced Section 10 (2c) to
regulate termination of contract by either party without
giving notice. The new article stipulated that all cases of
termination without notice should be referred to the
Commissioner of Labour whose consent was decreed essential to
the validity of the termination. The Commissioner was required
to consider the case and make his decision within a period of
not more than seven days. Section 10 (2d), moreover,
stipulated that if an employed person is summarily dismissed
before the Commissioner of Labour makes his decision, the
employer would have either to reinstate the employed person
and pay him the full wage for the period of suspension, or to
pay him, in addition to gratuity and other entitlement, a
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compensation equalling three months' wages.
The attempt to 'regulate' summary dismissals resulted in a
contradiction in the provisions of the different articles of
Section 10 which became difficult for workers to understand.
As Farouk Abu-Eisa (op.cit., p. 15) notes, Section 10 (2a)
stipulated the right of the employer to "dismiss any of his
employed persons immediately and without notice or gratuity if
the employed person...", while Section 10 (2d) required that
"an employer shall not dismiss the employed person and the
employed person shall not cease to work unless the dispute is
referred to the Commissioner of Labour..".
Section 10 of the 1949 Ordinance (as amended in 1969) was
suspended on 18 October, 1970, when the Council of Ministers
tssie.d its. executive Order No. 993 dealing with the dismissal
of employed persons and trade union officials (cf. Abdel
Rahman E. Au	 Taha and Ahmed H. El-Jack, op. cit., p. 13).
Since the provisions of the Ministerial Order were
incorporated into the Consolidated Labour Code of November
1970 that repealed all previous labour legislation in the
Sudan, I shall deal directly with the Code. Of particular
relevance to this discussion are the provisions contained in
Sections 85 to 87 of the Code.
The most significant difference between the Code (and its
precursor, the Ministerial Order) and previous legislation is
that the Code required employers to justify their desire to
terminate a contract, even if with due notice and the payment
of a gratuity (where applicable). The Code also stipulated
that all cases of dismissal were to be referred to a
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tripartite committee formed of the representatives of the
Labour Office, trade unions and employers; the decisions of
these committees, which were to be made within ten days, were
considered as both binding and final (Section 85). It is
interesting to note in this connection that whereas the
Ministerial Order stipulated the penalty of confiscation of
the establishment in case of non-compliance by employers, the
Code stipulated the reinstatement of the employee who was also
given the full wage for the period of his suspension.
In relation to the conditions of summary dismissals, the
Code retained, under Section 87 (1), most of the provisions of
the former Section 10 (2), but the new section consisted of
seven instead of eight conditions for summary dismissal. The
right of employers to dismiss an employee if the latter "omits
to carry out his obligations under the contract of service",
or if he "commits in the place of business an act inconsistent
with morals" were dropped in the Code. But a new provision was
introduced stipulating that an employer could apply to dismiss
a worker if the latter had absented himself for more than 20
days during the last three months or for more than fifteen
consecutive days.
The Consolidated Labour Code was described by employers
(and their apologetic mouth-pieces) as an infringement of
their (natural?) right to "hire and fire" workers; and, given
the sympathy obtaining between the government and trade unions
on the one hand, and between the government and some former
members of the Sudanese Communist Party on the other (see
below), the Ccde was at times characterized as a 'plot' that
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would destroy the 'fabric' of Sudanese society and/or halt
'economic development t (see, e.g., Abdel Rahman E. Au Taha
and Ahmed Hassan El-Jack, op. cit., esp. pp. 25-35).
Notwithstanding the self-professed 'socialist policy' of
the May regime during that early phase, 4
 the job security of
'permanent' workers was actually no better than it had
previously been. Section 86 (1) of the Code stipulated that
employers could apply to the tripartite committee to terminate
the service of employees if (a) the establishment was
partially dissolved; (b) the machine on which the workers were
engaged broke down; (C) raw materials are not available; or
(d) the job was cancelled. I do not need to elaborate on the
freedom to "hire and fire" left for employers by that
provision and particularly in relation to the elasticity of
the concept of job cancellation. However, it should be noted
that Section 86 (2) stipulated the payment to workers whose
contract was thus terminated of compensation amounting to one
month's wage.
The Consolidated Labour Code was short-lived; and only two
months after its promulgation it was suspended and the
previous 1969 amendment was reinstated pending new
legislation. Section 10 (amendment) remained effective until
1973 when a further amendment was made, and it is this last
amendment which is still operational. The 1973 amendment
repealed the former Section 10 (1) stipulating termination of
contract with due notice and introduced a new provision
stipulating that:
A contract of service shall be terminated due to
any of the following reasons:
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(a) in the case of the disability of the employee to
perform his work or if he is so ill that he would cease
to work even after the completion of the sick leave and
normal holidays to which he is entitled, whether with or
without pay, provided that the disability or illness is
certified by the employer's Doctor or the Government
Hospital, or if any dispute arises by the Medical
Commission;
(b) the completion of the work contracted for;
(c) the total destruction of the establishment.
The provisions of Section 10 (2) were left intact while a
new provision (Section 10 [3]) stipulating that in the case of
the contravention of the notice requirement by either party a
payment equalling the wage for the specific period of notice
should be made to the injured party.
It is interesting to note that the 1973 amendment did not
touch the provisions of 1969 relating to the conditions for
summary dismissals for "serious misconduct", and retained the
very eight points which the Ministerial Order and the Code
modified. Nor did it affect the legal paradox concerning the
stipulation of immediate summary dismissal and the requirement
to refer all disputes to the Commissioner of Labour. Finally,
under Section 12 (a) of the 1973 amendment, a new elastic
provision was introduced stipulating that:
A contract of service is terminable due to the
inefficiency of the employee or due to a reduction
in the labour force for economic reasons.
From this review of legislation 'regulating' termination
of employment, it is clear that the so-called "legislative
protection" of the job security of 'permanent' workers is
nothing but an illusion. As in the case of 'temporary' and
'casual' workers, the job security of 'permanent' workers
lasts only as long as the availability of tasks to be
undertaken, or as long as a permanent worker does not
427
'antagonize' his employer by becoming 'militant' even when
tasks to be undertaken are available.
A conceivable objection to my general contention might be
presented on the grounds that, in spite of the overall
similarities between the respective positions of 'permanent'
and 'non-permanent' workers in an establishment, the former
could still be 'relatively' better placed. Thus it might be
argued that 'temporary' workers, who could be sacked without
'legislative interference', would be most likely to go first
when the labour force is being reduced for economic reasons.
But even if such an objection were substantiated, the fact
remains that termination of contract "due to economic reasons"
was stipulated as "lawful" and that termination might be
sought for other than 'technical' considerations; 'militant'
workers may face "job cancellation", which is a source of
insecurity for all workers, 'permanent' and 'non-permanent'
alike, in an establishment. Therefore, as far as 'job
security' is concerned, the distinction between 'permanent'
and 'non-permanent' workers is essentially irrelevant; and the
kind of "legislative protection" offered to 'permanent'
workers falls far short of any view that they constitute a
'labour elite'.
To recapitulate, then, the job security for wage workers
depends on two factors. The first is availability of tasks;
therefore it is likely that workers in establisments which
experience frequent dramatic fluctuations in production
schedules are relatively insecure. But this is only a
probability; before we induldge in speculation about actual
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insecurity of 'casual' workers we have to establish, through
empirical research, whether or not sacked 'casual' workers are
able to find alternative employment. The second factor
concerns the willingness of employers to retain the service of
a certain worker; therefore 'militant' workers are most likely
to be sacked. But these factors are relevant to all categories
of wage workers and not simply to 'temporary' workers.
Though the context of their employment is different,
'self-employed' workers can hardly be said to face more
serious job insecurity than 'permanent' and 'temporary' wage
workers. For skilled 'self-employed' workers in particular,
both job security and rewards are far better than for wage
workers; hence their progressive withdrawal from public
employment. For the 'hardy' unskilled tertiary workers, on the
other hand, the insecurity of jobs is counterweighed by
several 'coping responses' as I explained in Chapter Six.
Indeed, the label 'self-employed' (even if 'quoted') can be
very misleading when applied to unskilled tertiary workers,
precisely because it implies a false sense of 'independence';
these workers invariably become 'employed' only when they are
employed by others, and whether we characterize what they
receive in return for their work as a "fee" or as a "wage", it
is superfluous to the basic point of their employment for
others. 'Self-employment' in tertiary activities may be better
characterized as a "form" of 'casual wage employment'; the
salient difference being twofold. In the former workers have
'several' employers and are paid 'piece-rates' only'.
In asserting the irrelevance of the "form" of employment
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for job security, I do not wish to dismiss the distinction
between 'permanent' and 'non-permanent' workers as an
'illusion'; I wish rather to stress the view that the alleged
implications of this distinction for job security are either
grossly exaggerated or poorly founded. Accordingly I propose
that the significance of the distinction between 'permanent'
and 'non-permanent' workers stems from its correspondence to
the distinction between unionized and non-unionized workers;
'temporary' and 'self-employed' workers are denied union
rights. It is my contention, which I shall soon corroborate,
that the seeming structural segmentation of the wage labour
market does not arise from the existence of differential terms
of employment in different ('formal'/'informal') segments (or
sectors) of the labour market, but rather from the presence of
different "forms" of employment which create divisions within
the working class on the basis of trade union membership. But
the significance of the unionized/non-unioni zed distinction
does not stem from the present role of trade unions in the
Sudan, but rather from the potential threat of the unions to a
system of production based on cheap labour, i.e. from the
possibility that strong trade unions might lead an effective
struggle for higher wages and better terms and conditions of
employment. Before discussing the question of the role of
trade unions, I need to corroborate the relative uniformity of
the terms of employment for the different sections of the wage
labour force by considering first the issue of the "expensive
commitments" alleged to be associated with 	 'permanent'
employment.
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WAGES AND THE OTHER t EXPENSIVE COMMITMENTS'
Notwithstanding the enactment in 1974 of standard minimum
wage legislation for the lowest-paid manual workers, the
recent literature on the wage structure emphatically asserts
the existence of significant intra- and inter-sectoral wage
variations in the country. 5	In the discussion of these
variations, a series of distinctions are usually drawn
between; (a) the public and private sector; (b) government
departments and parastatal concerns; and (c) large scale and
small scale private enterprises. A typical statement of the
implications of these distinctions for wages is furnished by
Kannappan (1 977a: 90):
Wage rates in Government are higher than in
private employment.. Within Government,
established state enterprises like the Sudan
Railways pay better than other branches of
Government. However, one must note the
practice of employing casual and temporary
staff and of contracting out work through
others..
The position as regards private employment
is more complex because of greater variation
in size,	 activities	 undertaken,	 skill
employed, the influence of government
regulations, the pressures of unionisation,
and so on.
The small number of foreign firms are at the
top of the wage hierarchy, even topping the
Government. A few of the larger Sudanese
firms, including public enterprises, appear
to be in this category, carried over from
the days prior to nationalisation, and the
rest, although among the better paying
employers, perhaps trail the government
scales of pay. Our information is rather
scanty on the smaller enterprises ..[but] it
is widely believed that [they] ..pay wages
well below the government level.
Au Ahmed Suliman (1974:33-34) quotes a statement by the
Labour Minister in 1969 that the minimum monthly wage in the
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public sector was ES 13.90, while the relevant figure for the
private sector did not exceed ES 4.50. A more recent estimate
of the wage differential is provided by Khalid Affan (1977:75;
but cf. Mazioum, 1974) who claims that, "on average", wage
earners in the public sector receive "earnings" that are 25%
higher than in the private sector.
The message which the literature attempts to convey is
clear. 'Permanent' employment in the so-called 'formal sector'
is not only higher paid than 'casual' and 'temporary'
employment, but also better remunerated than both wage- and
'self-employment' in the "numerous smaller private
enterprises". This is the contention which has led to the
characterization of 'permanent' workers in the so-called
formal sector as a 'labour elite'. But in this section I
attempt to refute this contention on the basis of two main
points. The first is that, irrespective of whether workers are
employed on a 'permanent' or a 'casual' basis, wages for
manual work in the Sudan are relatively uniform for the
skilled and unskilled workers respectively. The second point
is that though 'differentials' are observed between the wages
of highly-skilled manual workers and of unskilled workers,
manual work is generally lowly remunerated; the really
significant and far greater differentials being between, on
the one hand, the 'wages' of skilled and unskilled manual
workers and, on the other, the 'real earnings' of the
so-called 'classified staff' (civil servants and
professionals). To clarify this contentions, I will start the
discussion with a brief account of the wage structure in
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government employment.
THE WAGE STRUCTURE: 1900-1973
In Chapter Four I discussed aspects of the problem of
labour shortage which the British colonial administration
experienced during its first decades. In the context of that
shortage, the colonial administration attempted, albeit in
vain, to introduce some measure of control over wage
determination. The following statement by the Governor-General
of the 'Anglo-Egyptian' Sudan (Governor-General, 1909:720-1)
is typical of accounts describing the anxiety of	 the
administration over wages:
I should like to see a fixed rate of daily
pay for unskilled labour made, and all
Government Departments employing men in...
[Khartoum] Province should not be allowed to
exceed the rate fixed. At present a
department paying at the rate of Pt. 3.5 per
diem may find that its labourers have left
to work with another Department which offers
Pt. 4 to Pt. 5 a day...
It should be noted in this connection that the government
intended, from the start, to keep the wages of its workers to
the minimum. This was particularly true of the 'permanent'
workers in government departments as evidenced by the
withdrawal, during the first decade of colonial rule, of
workers from government to private employment (cf. Chapter
Four). But in spite of all the anxiety over the shortage of
labour, the differential between the wages of unskilled
labourers in private employment and the salaries of colonial
administrators was unbelievably large; while in 1902 the
"average" daily wage for unskilled labourers was 3 pt., or LE
0.90 per month (cf. Chapter Four), for example, the starting
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basic salary for the lowest-grade personnel of the Sudan
Political Service, excluding 'fringe benefits', was LE 420, or
LE 35 per month (see, MacMichael, nd., p. 4).
The first successful attempt by the colonial government to
introduce a measure of control (as opposed to co-ordination)
of the wage rates was the system of "Block Grants" adopted in
1937 (See Sa'ad El-Din Fawzi, 1955:159ff). Under this system,
the head of a government department was given an appropriation
(grant) for a definite purpose which might contain provision
for pay of individuals only, or which might provide for a
service or a new project, and might, therefore, include both
the pay of employees and the cost of materials and machines
(ibid.). The head of department was thus his own policy-maker
and, within the financial limits of the Grants, had full
autonomy over decisions relating to both the number of workers
to be employed and the wage rates to be paid. The outcome was
a situation of hybrid wage structure in government employment.
A salient feature of that structure was variation in wage
rates for similar jobs in different departments on the one
hand and, on the other, a stark wage differential between the
wage of the unskilled general labourer and that of the skilled
artisan. It is noteworthy that during this period the majority
of skilled workers were expatriates (Cf. Chapter Four); with
progress in the recruitment of Sudanese into the ranks of
skilled labourers, the differential was progressively narrowed
as I shall explain below.
The emergence of a relatively unified or 'coherent' wage
structure and/or policy in government employment is thus a
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relatively recent development. More precisely, it dates back
to the end of 1951 when the colonial Executive Council
accepted the system recommended by the Unclassified Staff
Commission (better known as the Wakefield Commission, after
its Chairman). According to Sa'ad El-Din Fawzi (1955:165), the
"group system" recommended by the Wakefield Commission aimed
at the creation of seven groups
covering	 the variations	 in skill and
responsibility in jobs undertaken by all
categories from the unskilled general
labourer [Group 1] to the skilled artisan
[Group 7]. Into these new groups were to be
assimilated the then existing categories of
labour. Comparatively short ranges of pay
were attached to the various groups -and no
overlapping between adjacent scales was
allowed. Moreover, the range of pay
applicable to any job was to fall within the
range of pay allotted to a single group
only. The various groups thus constitute
separate but consecutive steps in one ladder
representing	 various	 stages	 of skill,
experience and seniority.
Though the "group system" of the Wakefield Commission
created a uniformity of scales in government employment, its
proposals nevertheless perpetuated the hybrid wage structure.
In the determination of the actual amount to be received in
wages, the Commission decided to adopt the principle of a
subsistence wage for the lowest-paid (Group 1) worker
calculated on the basis of the subsistence requirements of a
family of four. In recognition of regional variations in the
cost of living, the Commission divided the country into
regions each of which was supposed to have a different cost of
living level. The "main regions" with a relatively high cost
of living comprised what we may generally characterize as
"Northern Sudan". The "lower-productivity lower-cost-of-living
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regions", on the other hand, comprised the Southern Region and
a few districts in present-day Darfur and Kordofan and the
Central Regions (ibid., p. 167). In relation to Southern Sudan
in particular, the Commission made two recommendations. First,
workers in the South were not to be promoted beyond Group
Four. Second, the South was to be divided into three types of
district and for each a different wage rate was fixed. Type
(a) consisted of the Zande and Meridi Districts of Eguatoria
Province; type (b) comprised Turit, Yei, Tonj and Aweil
Districts; and the whole of the Upper Nile Province was
categorized as type (c). According to All Ahmed Suliman
(1974:35):
In the North, Group One started with a
monthly wage of LE 5.800 ...In type (a)
districts in the South, Group One started
with LE 1.300, in type (b) districts Group
One started with LE 1.750, while in type (c)
districts the starting wage was LE 2.500 (My
translation).
In adopting the principle of "subsistence wage", the
Wakefield Commission showed sensitivity to probable increases
in prices in the long run. For this reason it recommended that
the wages paid should consist of two components: (1) a basic
wage and (2) a cost of living allowance (COLA). It was thus
envisaged that there would be no need to revise the whole wage
structure in the event of price rises; adjustments in the
COLA, which was to be tied to a price index, would suffice to
compensate workers for increases in prices.
The hybrid wage structure introduced by the Wakefield
Commission encountered many practical problems in its
implementation (cf. Sa'ad El-Din Fawzi, 1955). It also induced
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resentment on the part of individual workers and was opposed
by the trade union movement. To mention but one of its stark
anomalies, workers transferred from the "main" to the
"low-cost-of-living" regions experienced a reduction in their
(money) wages. It was not until 1968 when the recommendations
of the Cadre Commission were accepted, that a policy of equal
pay, irrespective of region and sex, was, at least in
principle, adopted. by the government (cf. Ali Ahmed Suliman,
1974:35 et passim).
The 1968 Cadre Commission introduced minor modifications
into the Group System introduced by the Wakefield Commission.
In recognition of the probable increase in productivity of
workers (compared to 1951), for example, a new group (Group
Eight) was introduced. Likewise, the Cadre Commission
attempted to deal with the complaints of workers who did not
get promoted to a higher group and, consequently, got "stuck"
at the wage-ceilings of their respective groups; these latter,
according to the original system, were to be reached in six
years (i.e. only six annual increments in the basic wage were
given to each group irrespective of the number of years a
worker ultimately remained in that group). All Ahmed Suliman
(ibid.) claims that many unskilled general labourers (tulba)
had actually remained in Group One for thirty years. The Cadre
Commission allowed the annual increments to continue for nine,
instead of six, years, but though it retained the formula of
"basic wage + COLA", the COLA was no longer to be tied to any
price index (cf. ILO, 1976:368). Table (7:2) shows the wage
structures recommended by the two commissions.
437
'0
'1
C)
CD
CD
CJD
I-J
H CD H•
 H 0
	 :
CD	 I-	 CT)
rI.	 CD
I	
L4030Ln
0
II
0
U)
f-I.
1)3
p-I
rt	 IH
I
lCD
I
I1)
rn
CD
'.0
Ui	 Cl)
H
1)3
CD
N)
() N.) N.) I-
-	 '.0 L) 0\ N) '.0	 4
Ui Ui Ui Ui L.)	 03
CD
I.
Ia.	 0
0
CD
'-'1
N)
tTl
ID
rt
C/)
-	 L4. U) N.) N) I-i I- I-' 1)3
Lii —.j I—i 0' I—s 03 Lii N.)
•	 .	 .	 I	 •	 S	 S	 •
Lii U)	 0\	 Lii I.-•
Lii c
-I
0
	N) 	 -J
C/)
-4
0
C)
0' Ui .- U) U) N.) N) p4 CD
-J C\ 0 '.0 N) -J N.) 03 p-a
Lii -I 0' c) IS 03 H•
Q C Lii Ui C CD Lii C i
CCCCCCCC
N)
C/)
438
Table (7:2) corroborates my earlier contention concerning
the narrowing of differentials between skilled and unskilled
workers in the period 1951-1968. In noting this, I should
stress the point that the highest-paid wage workers actually
represent an insignificant proportion of manual workers (a
mere 0.3% of all government employees in 1962 were classified
as Group Seven) while by far the largest single group was that
of the lowest-paid manual workers (24.1% of all 'classified'
and 'unclassified' government employees in 1962); as we go up
the hierarchy of unclassified staff the percentage gets
smaller (cf. Table 7:3). Given the few "ports of entry" into
the ranks of unclassified staff (see Kannappan, 1977a), only a
tiny minority of the relatively well educated (General
Secondary and above) manage to start anywhere but at the
bottom of the hierarchy. For the "ordinary" skilled worker, it
takes over 20 years to be promoted to a supervisory position
(Group Seven); and as such the "highest-paid" are not only
skilled workers, but also ones with either the longest record
of continuous service or, as with technicians, with a good
educational record. In noting the narrowing of the
differential between skilled and unskilled workers, I should
also stress that the real wages of all categories of manual
workers were actually reduced. As shown in Tables (7:4) and
(7:5), throughout the period from 1938 to 1970 real wages were
steadily declining, except for the hardy lowest-paid.
The point about the differential between skilled and
unskilled workers leads directly to the question of the
differential between manual workers in general and the
PERCENTAGE
OF ALL
EMPLOYEE S
24.1
13.2
10.5
5.7
1.8
0.3
0.3
3.2
0.1
0.0
0.2
4.1
0.0
0.8
0.2
0.8
0.0
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Table 7:3
Level and Structure of Government Wages, 1962
CATEGORY! SCALE
Manual employees:
Group I (unskilled)
Group II (semi-skilled)
Group III (semi-skilled)
Group IV (skilled)
Group V (skilled)
Group VI (skilled)
Group VII (supervisory)
Clerical employees
Junior, Class 1
2
3
4
5
Senior, Class 6
7
8
9
10
Semi_?rofessional and
technical staff
Scales group 1 (1)
2 (4)
3 (1)
4 (1)
5 (3)
6 (5)
7 (1)
8 (6)
9 (1)
10 (6)
11 (3)
Administrative and prof-
essional staff
Scales group 1 (1)
2 (6)
3 (5)
4 (3)
5 (1)
6 (3)
7 (3)
8 (1)
9 (2)
10 (3)
11 (3)
AVERAGE
MONTHLY
PAY (ES)
6.750
7.950
10.00
13.415
19.000
27. 500
30. 500
11.500
17.000
18.500
19.000
20.000
22. 500
25. 000
28.335
30. 835
33. 335
11.500
17. 000
19.000
20.000
23. 000
26. 000
32.000
33.250
36. 250
53. 750
69. 165
39. 500
56.450
68.750
76. 250
79. 600
91 .250
97. 540
106. 650
114. 900
130. 270
165. 000
2.7
3.1
5.5
3.0
1.6
1.7
5.5
0.4
3.1
0.4
0.8
1.8
0.2
2.3
0.4
0.8
0.7
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.1
0.0
Source: ILO, 1962:35-6, as quoted by Abdel Rahrnan E. A. Taha, 1976:132-3
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'classified staff' in government employment. As shown in Table
(7:3), the 'average' wage of a skilled worker (Groups 4-7) in
1962 was well below the 'average' salary of the clerical
employees -not to mention the comparatively more highly paid
civil servants and professionals. Likewise, the average basic
salary of the four highest-paid categories of classified staff
in 1962 (130 Sudanese pounds) was four times the wage of the
highest paid unclassified staff, and over six times the
average wage of all categories of skilled workers. As I
explain below, the total earnings of the upper groups of
classified staff are actually much higher than their
respective basic salaries. The highly-inflated basic salaries
(i.e. excluding 'fringe benefits') have for long been
explained as "relics" from colonial days, but, in view of
several post-colonial 'revisions' of the pay structure, such
an explanation may be viewed as either 'naive' or
'apologetic'. To paraphrase the ingenious Sudanese proverb:
when one writes, one does not write one's self off.
THE WAGE STRUCTURE: 1974-1984
In July, 1974, the government enacted the Standard Minimum
Wage legislation and established a minimum monthly wage of ES
16.50 for workers employed in government or in private firms
with ten or more workers in major urban centres (Moharned
El-Murtada Mustafa, 1983:287). The private sector was allowed
a two-year period (i.e. until 1976) to comply with that
legislation (Khalid Affan, 1977). In 1978, the government
adopted the Job Evaluation and Classification Scheme (JECS),
443
which is currently operational in the country.
The JECS abolished the dualism of pay structure in
government employment that was based on the distinction
between 'classified' and 'unclassified' staff by the
introduction of a new Group System consisting of 18 groups
covering all types and grades of government employees (from
the unskilled general labourer to under secretaries). In this
new system COLA no longer forms a component of the wage (or
salary) received. Since the introduction of the JECS, the pay
rates have been revised twice, and at the time of writing
there are rumours about a third revision to cope with the
exorbitant rates of inflation in the country. Tables (7:6,
7:7, 7:8 and 7:9) show the level and structure of wages and
salaries in November 1983, in four different categories of
government employment. Table (7:6) is for employees in
Central, Regional and Local Governments; Table (7:7) is for
employees in the Agricultural Research Corporation which,
being a research institution, has a more 'generous' pay rate
than government departments; while Tables (7:8) and (7:9) are
for two of the three 'pay leaders' in government: the Banks
and Khartoum University. The third is the military employment,
but unfortunately I did not have access to the pay-rates in
the People's Armed Forces, whose personnel are probably the
highest paid in the country.
As maintained earlier, the JECS does not distinguish
between 'classified' and 'unclassified' employees. But neither
the distinction between 'mental' and 'manual' labour, nor the
differentials in their remuneration, were dissolved; nor were
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they intended to be dissolved. Thus, although I have no
information on whether any manual workers in supervisory
positions are in Groups Fifteen and Fourteen, it is certain
that over 90% of the (former) 'unclassified' staff are
encountered in the bottom groups (Groups Eighteen, Seventeen
and Sixteen). This is so on account of the number of years a
worker is expected to spend in any one group, i.e. the years
for which he/she is given annual increments before reaching
the ceiling of the group. The situation is, then, that even if
a worker is promoted in the same year as he reaches the
ceiling of a group, it would still take him/her at least 25
years to move from the bottom of Group Eighteen to the ceiling
of Group Sixteen. A "fresh" University graduate with B.A.
(Honours), on the other hand, is recruited directly into Group
Nine, and within less than ten years he is promoted to Group
Seven at least. And if he should then read for an M.A. or a
Ph.D., his prospects are very substantially enhanced.
Furthermore, as the tables show the differentials in basic
pay only, I would stress the tax-free monthly allowances which
civil servants and professionals, particularly those beyond
Group Seven, also 'earn'. These groups are usually given
government houses (the monthly rent of which is equivalent in
the private market to well over one £S 1,000) or, because of
the recent shortage in government houses, a Housing Allowance
(ranging from £S 200 to ES 350). Every high ranking official
is entitled to this housing allowance, even those who have
received loans to build their own houses. One further and
rather striking set of allowances concerns mileage and
449
transport. Those officials who do not own cars are entitled to
a monthly Transport Allowance of approximately ES 40, while
those who own cars and use them 'in connection with' their
work are given a monthly mileage allowance of approximately ES
100, which is more than double the minimum wage. Car loans are
of course made available to officials, and these are repaid
through deductions of around ES 40 are deducted from monthly
salaries.
In comparing the earnings of civil servants and
professionals with those of manual workers I should stress
that I am not unaware of the fact that in recent years even
the highest-paid government employees have experienced a sharp
decline in their real incomes. The hard facts of inflation
during the last decade, and since 1978 in particular, 5 are
experienced by all those who have opted to stay and work in
the country rather than emigrate to the oil-rich Arab
countries. For the period 1970-1980 the rate of inflation is
estimated as 400% (Africa Contemporary Record, 1979/80:P.B.
121). Table (7:10) depicts the increase in the cost of living
for the low-income (below ES 500 per annum) and high-income
(ES 500+) groups from January, 1970, to end of December,
1979. (6)
In relation to the low-income group, it should be noted
that the minimum wage in government employment in 1970 was ES
13.90. Thus, irrespective of whether or not that wage sufficed
to meet the requirements of the general unskilled labourer at
that time, the deterioration in living standards experienced
by hirh up to 1979 looks horrific. What in 1970 used to cost
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100 Pt., by 1979 was bought for 486.9 Pt. In order to maintain
the same living standard in 1979 as the general unskilled
labourer had enjoyed in 1970, the minimum wage in 1979 ought
to have been ES 67.68; in reality, the minimum wage in 1979
was ES 28.00 (the minimum wage was increased from ES 15 in
1973 to ES 16 in 1974 to ES 28 in 1978).
The rise in the price index for the period 1980-84 was
even higher than in the 1970s. No official statistics are
available, but most estimates point to something like a 500%
increase. According to the latest revision of the wage-rate
(November 1983), the gross annual wage of the lowest-paid is
ES 430, or ES 35.83 per month, nearly half what the minimum
wage ought to have been in 1979 to enable the general
unskilled labourer to maintain a living standard equal to that
which he used to enjoy in 1970.
From the foregoing account of the wage structure of the
so-called 'labour elite' it should be clear that the wages of
manual workers in government employment, and unskilled manual
workers in particular, are far from being a 'privilege' or "an
expensive commitment" for employers. It is indeed because of
this wage structure that Sudanese workers are involved in what
Chase (op. cit.) calls "an extended urban labour market
reaching the Gulf region". Thus, whereas migration to the
oil-rich Arab countries had initially involved technocrats,
civil servants and skilled workers, in recent years the
numbers of unskilled manual workers emigrating from the Sudan
have increased very rapidly (cf. Chapter Five). What should be
stressed in relation to wage-rates in government employment is
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that the 'non-permanent' unskilled workers receive the same
standard minimum wage as their 'permanent' counterparts; both
categories are classified as Group Eighteen, or unskilled
general labourer. There is, however, one important difference;
unlike 'temporary' and 'casual' workers, 'permanent' workers
are given annual increments in pay. The actual value of
increments is, however, very small. Thus, while the starting
annual salary for two workers employed on different contracts
is the same (ES 490), after ten years of continuous employment
the 'permanent' worker may be ES 160 a year, or around ES 13 a
month, better off than his 'non-permanent' counterpart. But
the annual increment does not constitute an inalienable
'right' of workers, as it is only granted on the basis of
favourable reports.
The discussion so far has focused mainly on the level of
remuneration in government employment. To acquire an overview
of the wage structure in the labour market as a whole, we also
need to consider the levels of earning for two other main
sections of the urban wage labour force: (a) those employed by
the so-called "wage leaders" - parastatals and large scale
private enterprises - and (b) those employed (or
'self-employed') in the "numerous smaller private enterprises"
of the so-called 'urban informal sector'.
THE SO-CALLED WAGE-LEADERS
In relation to the contention that the so-called "wage
leaders" pay higher wages than government departments, one
basic	 observation should be spelt out. Nowhere in the
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literature could I find a precise statement on the level of
remuneration paid by the parastatals and/or the large scale
private enterprises, or any comparative figures showing wages
in parastatals and government departments. The contention that
the former constitute "wage leaders" seems to have been
established by assertion rather than empirical evidence, and
is most likely prompted by assumptions concerning the relative
strength of trade unions in enterprises with large numbers of
workers.
Later in this chapter I will deal with the issue of trade
unions and their role in collective bargaining; it is
sufficient to note here that, though differences in wage-rates
could once be noted between parastatals and government
departments, at present - and indeed since 1970- all
distinctions between the two in wages and other terms of
employment have been dissolved. This statement should not be
taken to mean that the pay-rates for all public employees are
identical. I have already noted that in certain 'specialized'
government institutions (such as State banks,
	
Khartoum
University, the National Council for Research and the
Agricultural Research Corporation) workers are paid a little
more than in government departments. But these institutions
are not the parastatals to which the literature refers; the
parastatals comprise the public industrial and commercial
concerns in addition to a number of other corporations such as
Sudan Railways, the Central Corporation for Electricity, and
the Rural Water Development Corporation. As I explain below,
in many of these parastatals a form of 'collective bargaining'
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was observed before 1970 but, as a result of the 1969 ban on
strikes and the re-organization of parastatals in 1970,
workers in them were brought under the same terms and
conditions of employment as in government departments. The
same changes in the structure of trade unions which affected
workers in the parastatals are also observed in the case of
the large scale, mainly foreign, enterprises that once paid
relatively high wages to their workers and used to conclude
agreements with the trade unions representing workers.
EARNINGS OF 'SELF-EMPLOYED' AND 'CASUAL' WORKERS
The data I gathered on 'earnings' for 'casual' and
'self-employed' workers suggest a rather different situation
from what the 'conceptual framework' of the ILO studies
purports to convey. But, in this respect, I would draw
attention to the differentiation process among the
'self-employed' who range from petty commodity producers and
'veiled out-sellers' to 'incipient' and 'full-fledged'
capitalists. In this chapter I do not discuss the level of
income of the relatively affluent stratum of 'self-employed',
comprising categories such as shop-keepers and
workshop-owners, but I here concentrate on aspects of earnings
for petty and/or street traders, unskilled tertiary workers,
and semi-skilled and skilled craftsmen working for others.
Generally speaking, the findings of my research suggest no
significant overall differences between the wages of
'permanent' government workers and paid workers in the
so-called 'informal sector'. In numerous cases of 'informal
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employment' the daily wage of unskilled workers is actually
higher than that of government workers. Given the other
'benefits' which government workers are entitled to, such as
after-service payments and paid annual holidays (see below),
the differences observed between the daily wages of the two
groups tend to disappear. But I should stress that this
generalization is not intended as a strict comparison of the
total earnings of the two groups of workers. An amalgam of
factors renders such a comparison very difficult, if not
virtually impossible. To take one of the most important of
these factors, the earnings of government workers may not be
the same as their wages and other 'benefits'. Quite a number
of government workers engage in 'informal activities' which
effectively increase their total incomes. Many government
drivers (as well as junior clerks), for example, work as
taxi-drivers in the evenings, and some own taxis. Moonlighting
by other categories of government workers is also known to be
a normal practice, often undertaken during official
work-hours. What my generalization is intended to convey,
rather, is that the rewards are basically uniform whether in
government or in so-called 'informal' employment.
As I considered aspects of earnings for self-employed
unskilled tertiary workers in Chapter Six, I now present no
more than a brief recapitulation. My research findings suggest
that, through arrangements with regular clients, workers
engaged in unskilled personal services manage to secure, in
addition to earnings an the 'spot market', a 'guaranteed'
monthly income. For car-wash boys, the minimum guaranteed
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monthly income is ES 35, while for launderers it is ES 50.
Though the incomes of the two categories from the 'spot
market' showed considerable fluctuations, in the maj,ority of
cases total monthly income exceeded ES 100. Though some of the
'hardy' street traders earned a low monthly income of £5 30 to
ES 40, it was common for lowest-grade traders to earn an
average of £5 60, while the relatively 'established' traders
(e.g. wheel-stall traders, licensed vegetable-sellers) earned
at least ES 100 a month. In other words the income of
unskilled 'self-employed' tertiary workers may be three times
as high as the minimum wage in government employment. A
similar conclusion is expressed, in muted terms, by Ghosh
(1 983 :1 00):
Production workers and spinners, etc., who
typically	 work	 in organised sector
establishments,	 do not	 receive wages
substantially higher than those engaged in
casual	 "market-place"	 jobs.	 Thus,
car-washers, shoe polishers, porters,
cart-pullers and aunctioneers, for example,
may get very high incomes. The variation is
quite high, but the simple possibility of
very high returns should serve to attract
people.
To present a wider view of levels of remuneration for
'self-employed' and 'casual' workers, I collected data on
incomes in two so-called 'informal manufacturing and repair'
activities: rope-bed making and car-repairs. I have also drawn
from unpublished data on tailors generously put at my disposal
by my colleague Simaya Agryal. The choice of these activities
was not incidental, but was prompted by common knowledge of
the considerable variations in skill requirements, the level
of income as well as seasonal fluctuations in production
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schedules. Car-repair is the most skilled and best-rewarded of
the three activities, while one of the operations in rope-bed
making (i.e. stringing beds with straw-rope) is accessible to
almost all rural Sudanese from the northern, central and
western regions, as they are commonly undertaken within the
'subsistence sphere' of domestic production. This task is
usually performed by 'target-migrants' and the labour force
involved shows considerable instability. But the other
operations in rope-bed making demand special skills and, as a
result, are relatively better rewarded. These tasks concern
the cutting of cross-pieces and legs for the structure, the
digging of holes on legs to fit cross-pieces, the operation of
electric lathes to decorate bed legs, and the stringing of
beds with strengthened thread (doubara) and plastic rope.
Tailoring requires relatively high skills, but in the industry
many semi-skilled and unskilled workers are also employed in
ironing, sewing of buttons, and so on.
Except in the case of tailoring, remuneration in the
activities surveyed is nora1ly based on piece-rates; and the
level of daily earnings is consequently a function not only of
availability of tasks to be undertaken, but also of the number
of contracts a worker is able to perform. In the case of
rope-bed making the tasks are well-defined and in each of the
markets in which workshops are located there is a strong
tendency for a single rate to prevail for any one type of
operation; inter-market variations are sometimes observed, but
they are generally very small and more often than not reflect
variations in the transport costs for workers. It was in
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rope-bed making, out of the three industries, that a
conspicuous absence of apprentices was noted. But, whereas
qualified tailors working on sewing-machines owned by
merchants normally got a percentage of net proceeds (deducting
cost of thread, buttons, etc.), car-mechanics working for
others were contracted for specific tasks. But unlike the case
of rope-bed workers, for car-mechanics the tasks showed
considerable variations, and there were normally ho fixed
rates for tasks. This was partly due to the fact that the fee
charged by workshop owners was usually determined through
haggling with clients and was also subject to other
considerations such as whether or not the client was a known
regular customer; and in cases of minor repairs (e.g. engine
tuning) it was not not uncommon that no charge was made.
In interviews with, and observations among, workers in the
rope-bed industry in three different markets over a period
totalling three months I probed into the conditions of 63
workers. Three of these workers operated electric lathes, and,
on average, each earned ES 190 monthly. Of the others, 27 were
low grade stringers (using traditional rope), 12 were upper
grade stringers, 16 were hole-makers, and 5 were carpenters
designing and cutting cross-pieces. On average, the low grade
stringers earned a minimum of ES 3.50 each day (working from 7
a.m to 5 p.m), but it was not uncommon for a worker to earn £S
5; higher grade stringers commonly earned ES 7, but
particularly quick stringers earned as much as ES 10.50
(stringing three beds, instead of the average two beds, in a
single day). Hole-making is the most tedious activity, and
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hole-makers earned a minimum of ES 6, but because of the
demanding nature of the activity it was rare for hole-makers
to work for more than six days each week; but while a majority
of hole-makers took a day off on Fridays, a few turned to
stringing with traditional rope. Carpenters earned ES 8 pounds
on average, while the electric lathe operators commonly
secured ES 1.20 per hour worked and, on average, earned £S
8.50. It is worth noting that all carpenters and hole-makers
bought, and maintained and/or replaced, their own tools
(hammers, saws, planes, etc.); the estimated average monthly
cost of tools (covering both maintenance and depreciation
costs) for hole-makers was ES 5, while for carpenters the cost
was ES 7. I was informed by workshop owners that during the
rainy season each year the industry usually experiences a
period of relative recession of demand and production falls by
40 to 50 per cent (compared to the rest of the year).
Nevertheless, because the workforce, especially the stringers
who constitute the overwhelming majority, consists almost
exclusively of migrants who return to their farms during the
rainy season, it is not uncommon for workshop owners to face
problems in finding the necessary number of stringers.
Car-mechanics normally work six days a week. But while the
ideal for experienced car-mechanics, especially those who can
afford to buy the necessary tools, is to establish themselves
as town_account workers t , typically working under the shade of
trees and taking on young boys as hands and/or apprentices, a
majority of mechanics, particularly the recently qualified,
normally work for workshops on sub-contracts and/or on a
460
piece-rate basis. In contrast to the rope-bed industry, in
which production is usually ahead of demand, the pace and
intensity of work in car-repairs depend on demand. But though
I observed day-to-day fluctuations, it was very rare for a
car-mechanic not to find tasks to perform; indeed, clients
were often asked to come the following morning. In observing
23 car-mechanics (8 of whom were 'own-account workers') over a
period of two months, I noted that the lowest level of daily
earnings was by a recently qualified car-mechanic who stayed
at the work site from 7 a.m to 4 p.m. but earned only ES 3.
Qualified mechanics commonly earned ES 7 per day, but it was
not uncommon to find some earning ES 12 or more on at least
one day each week; more experienced mechanics working for
others usually earned around ES 18 daily, but as they were
preferred to less experienced mechanics, it was not
exceptional for them to earn ES 30 on one day at least twice a
ioath. Earning-s of 'own-account' mechanics showed larger
variations compared to those of mechanics attached to
established workshops. On ttaveragelt days, new 'own-account'
mechanics usually earned around £ 15 daily, and though on
"bad" days (which, for reasons I could not establish, were
usually Saturdays) earnings were as low as £ 5 only, on "good"
days daily earnings were well above ES 25. The average gross
earnings of long standing 'own-account' mechanics ranged from
a low "bad" of ES 10, to an "average" of ES 25 and a "good" of
over ES 50. I could not, however, establis h the average net
income of 'own-account' car-mechanics. But, although I cannot
describe	 precisely the	 frequency aød directions of
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fluctuations in demand, it is probable that each type of 'day'
was experienced about twice a week. Remuneration for
apprentices was fixed, and did not vary with the fluctuations
in demand which the master-mechanics experienced; in addition
to one or two meals, a daily wage ranging between 75 pt. and
ES 1.25 was given to apprentices, normally paid weekly (every
Thursday).
Unlike apprentice mechanics, tailoring apprentices were
not given a fixed daily cash wage, although meals were usually
provided by the master-tailor. Their pay depended on the
number of pieces assigned to them (sewing buttons and rim as
well as ironing), but, on average, they earned around ES 2.00
per day. For tailors, on the other hand, income differred for
'own-account workers' (who owned sewing-machines and paid ES
20 monthly for merchants in rent of site) and 'partners' (who
worked on machines owned by merchants and received 50 per cent
of net proceeds). Like the rope-bed industry, tailoring is an
activity with marked seasonal fluctuations, and demand becomes
exceptionally high towards feast days. During the month of
Ramadan (in which Muslims observe fasting), Simaya found out
that while, on average, the net monthly proceeds for tailors
working on machines owned by merchants were around ES 300,
'own-account' tailors earned ES 960 (sewing 12 pairs of
trousers each day). The average monthly net proceeds from a
sewing-machine in other seasons ranged between ES 265 and ES
300, but the proceeds are shared equally between tailor and
machine-owner.
In general, then, the level of income for 'self-employed'
462
and 'casual' workers in the so-called 'informal manufacturing
and repair sector' are without doubt much higher than in
government employment discussed earlier. One possible
objection to the status of the foregoing analysis as a
critique of the ILO studies is that my data relate to the
period 1981-83 and as such are not readily comparable to the
situation described in the literature for the mid-1970s. In
reply, I would contend that, although some quantitative
changes have taken place, particularly since 1978, the basic
relation between the two levels of remuneration compared above
is virtually identical to the situation described in the ILO
studies. By "quantitative changes" I refer, for example, to
the increase in money wage and the decrease in real wage since
1978. The evidence I can bring to corroborate this view of the
situation in the mid-1970s, however, is fragmented and derives
from the very sources that assert the existence of significant
differences in the levels of remuneration between the two
'sectors'. That such evidence is available in the literature
is hardly surprising; I have already noted the discrepency and
contradiction between the 'conceptualization' and 'description
of the situation' in the literature. But the point in bringing
out this evidence is not to show that the so-called 'informal
wage workers' are as 'well-paid' as their counterparts in the
so-called 'formal sector'. It is rather to corroborate the
view that all manual wage labourers in the urban wage labour
market -and unskilled manual workers in particular- are
equally poorly-paid.
To begin with, despite the ILO Mission's contentions
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concerning the low wages of 'informal workers' compared to the
income of the 'labour elite', in discussing the so-called
t informal sector' (Technical Paper 13), it mentions, in
passing, some surprising findings from its 1974 survey of the
'informal sector'. According to the Mission (op. cit., p.
383), the "approximate average monthly revenue" in "informal
manufacturing and repair" was ES 60 ranging from
a low of ES 30 for footwear to a high of £5
150 for metallic products ... The value of
average capital assets was about ES 129 with
a low of ES 14 and £5 15 for leather
products and beverages respectively to a
high of about ES 250 for wood products,
indicating that capital as such may not be a
barier to entrance in some of these
handicrafts ... The average monthly earnings
of employees in these establishments reaches
about ES 20 which is more than the statutory
minimum wage. However, a low of ES 8 for
footwear is reported.
The findings of the Mission not only suggest that in the
overwhelming majority of cases 'informal employment' paid
workers actually earned more than the statutory minimum wage
but, when compared with other data produced by the Mission
itself, also support my earlier contention that the earnings
ot '.noimaX workers' could be relatively higher than those of
'formal'workers. In a table summarizing, inter alia, data on
average daily earnings of paid workers in 'informal
manufacturing and repair', the Mission (p. 381) reports an
average daily income for all 'informal manufacturing' workers
of ES 0.80. In another section in the Report, however, the
Mission presents a table showing, inter alia, average earnings
of workers in a sample of 'formal sector' manufacturing
establishments with five or more workers surveyed in 1973 in
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which the average daily wage of workers (overtime included) is
reported to be ES 0.60 (idem, pp. 367/8, but quoted from Sudan
Government, 1973). Had the Mission compared these two
averages, its logical conclusion would have been that wages in
the 'formal' sector were well below, and not by any means
significantly higher, than in the 'informal sector'. This
point constitutes the corner-stone of Chase's critique of the
Mission's view on the 'labour elite' (op. cit.):
We can consider the privileged wage
standards ... of formal sector urban lai:3our
by reference to the average monthly earnings
(March 1973) of surveyed formal sector urban
manual workers. For the approximately 36 per
cent of workers in establishments employing
fewer than 100 workers, the average monthly
earnings, overtime included, approximated ES
5; while for the approxiraately 64 per cent
employed in firms of 100+ workers the
relevant figure would be ES 21...
The minimum monthly wage in government employment in 1973
was ES 15 (Ali Ahmed Suliman, 1974). Calculating the average
monthly earnings of 'informal workers' from data furnished by
the Mission, the relevant figures would be: ES 17.10 in food
and beverage manufacture; ES 27.60 in the manufacture of
leather and leather products; ES 9.00 in the manufacture and
repair of footwear; £S 27.60 in the manufacture of wood
products and furniture; ES 23.10 in the manufacture and
repairing of metallic products; ES 37.30 in	 electrical
repairs;	 ES	 16.20	 in	 repair	 of motor vehicles and
motor-cycles; and, finally, ES 18.00 in "others" -e.g.
clothing (see ILO, 1976:381). It should be emphasized here
that these averages are of the earnings of paid 'informal
workers' and not of the 'self-employed' who are reported to
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have had a much higher level of "revenue" (an average ES 60
per month).
One serious criticism that could perhaps be levelled at
the foregoing comparison concerns the frequency of employment
and unemployment for 'informal workers', which might well
reduce their actual monthly earnings. It is generally assumed
in the ILO studies that 'informal workers' experience
discontinuous employment and frequent spells of unemployment.
In none of the ILO studies, however, are there any data on
unemployment among the so-called 'informal
	
workers'.	 I
certainly would not deny that in many cases 'informal workers'
do experience unemployment which, if endured for a
'sufficiently long' period, may lead to return migration.
Circular migration for unskilled migrants, however, is in the
overwhelming majority of cases not only the 'norm', but also
the original intention of the semi-proletarianized small
farmers and pastoralists who come to th cities as 'target
migrants'. Their migration, as explained in Chapter Two, is
often intended to supplement their income from primary export
domestic production. It is only in relatively exceptional
circumstances that an unskilled migrant is "lucky enough" to
find a well-remunerated activity and gives up his interest in
the productive activities he used to pursue in his home
village.
In pointing out the incidence of circular migration,
however, I do not altogether endorse the view that 'informal
employment' is as discontinuous as generally assumed. In
Chapter Six I discussed some of the methods by which unskilled
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'self-employed' tertiary workers cope with the insecurity of
their employment. Moreover, even when employment is available,
migrants do sometimes return home when they have realized the
'target' which originally brought them to the city. Leaving
aside the findings of my own research, El-Wathig Kameir's
study (1980a; 1980b) of the casual unskilled manual
construction labourers in Greater Khartoum, who constitute by
far the most extreme case of discontinuous urban employment
documented in the Sudan, may be taken as evidence.
According to Kameir, the unskilled manual construction
labourers (tulab) are all casual workers employed by building
contractors;
Every contractor has a gang of "semi-stable"
workers. The number of workers varies
according to the number of contracts
undertaken by the individual contractor. I
refer to them as "semi-stable" because,
while they usually stay with one employer
during their stay in town, they are not
permanently employed and can be fired
without notice ... The pace of work depends
on cooperation between the builders and the
tulab ... and it is because of this that
contractors normally prefer to employ groups
of builders and tulab that have previously
worked together ... (idem, 1980b:170).
Furthermore, Kameir reports a situation of "feasts and
famine"	 experienced by building contractors and, by
implication, the tulab. He describes how the tula -all Nuer
from Southern Sudan- are organized in "accommodation cells";
and how members of different "accommodation cells", scattered
in new building sites all over the Three Towns, visit each
other and thus facilitate the flow of information about
employment opportunities throughout Greater Khartoum. Through
regular visits by tulab to their home villages in the South,
467
information about employment opportunities is also transmitted
to prospective migrants intending to come to Khartoum.
To substantiate his view of the discontinuous employment
experienced by the Nuer tulab, Kameir presents a table showing
the level of employment by one building contractor over a
period of 30 consecutive days and how the workers were
deployed on seven of his sites. The number of workers taken on
daily varieda great deal from a low total of six on one day
to a high of 23 on three days; and over the whole 30-day
period there was constant "chopping and changing of building
operations between different sites". Table (7:11), taken from
Kameir (1980a:460/1), shows the fluctuations in production
schedules for the contractor.
Though Kameir presents the table as evidence of
discontinuous employment, it can be interpreted in a way that
reveals a fairly continuous pattern of employment not only in
the building industry as a whole, but also with the specific
contractor in relation to whose production schedule the, table
was compiled. In regard to the industry as a whole (the level
of many contractors), I would argue that the unemployment
experienced by members of a gang associated with any one
contractor may be compensated for by employment by other
contractors, given the reported flow of information between
members of different "accommodation cells" as well as the
continued boom in the building industry (see Chapter Five).
But even in the specific case of the building contractor
studied by Kameir, unemployment did not figure as a serious
problem and, certainly, the reported levels of wages received
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Table 7:11
Employment of Day Labourers by One Building
Contractor and the Transference of Workers
Between Seven Sites Over a Period of Thirty
Consecutive Days
NUMBER OF WORKERS ON THE DIFFERENT BUILDING SITES
DAY	 Site 1
	
Site 2	 Site 3 Site	 4	 Site 5	 Site 6	 Site 7
	1	 6	 -	 -	 1	 2	 -	 1
6	 -	 -	 1	 2	 -	 1
	
3	 4	 -	 2	 1	 2	 -	 1
	
4	 2	 -	 2	 1	 2	 -	 1
	
5	 -	 -	 2	 1	 2	 -	 1
	
6	 2	 -	 4	 1	 2	 -	 1
	
7	 1	 7	 -	 1	 -	 -	 1
	
8	 -	 -	 -	 23	 -	 -	 -
	
9	 -	 -	 -	 23	 -	 -	 -
	
10	 -	 -	 -	 23	 -	 -	 -
	
11	 4	 -	 2	 3	 2	 -	 1
	
12	 4	 -	 1	 1	 2	 -	 1
13	 2	 2	 1	 1	 -	 -	 1
14	 2	 2	 1	 2	 -	 2	 1
15	 2	 2	 -	 3	 -	 4	 1
	
16	 -	 2	 -	 2	 -	 4	 -
	
17	 -	 2	 5	 2	 -	 4	 1
	
18	 -	 6	 -	 3	 -	 4	 -
	
19	 4	 2	 -	 2	 1	 2	 -
	
20	 3	 -	 -	 2	 2	 4	 1
	
21	 3	 -	 -	 2	 2	 4	 1
	
22	 -	 -	 -	 2	 -	 4	 1
	
23	 -	 2	 5	 -	 -	 4	 -
	
24	 4	 2	 -	 2	 1	 4	 -
	
25	 3	 -	 -	 2	 1	 4	 -
	
26	 2	 -	 7	 2	 -	 -	 -
	
27	 4	 -	 2	 2	 -	 5	 -
	
28	 4	 -	 2	 2	 -	 5	 -
	
29	 4	 -	 4	 2	 -	 1	 -
	
30	 -	 -	 -	 2	 2	 4	 1
Source: El-Wathig Kameir, 1980a:460/61
TOTAL
NUMBER
10
10
10
8
6
10
10
23
23
23
12
9
7
10
12
8
14
13
11
12
12
7
11
13
10
11
13
13
11
9
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by the members of the "semi-stable gang" of that contractor
were by no means lower than those of government workers.
The membership of the "semi-stable gang" associated with
the contractor is reported as consisting of 14 workers. The
frequency of employment in the month surveyed for each member
can accordingly be calculated as the average of the total
man/days deployed by the contractor excluding those man/days
in excess of 14 (the number of gang members) deployed in any
one single day. On the 3 days when 23 workers were employed
(days 8, 9 and 10), for example, the relevant figure was 14
only. The assumption here is based on Kameir's report that
contractors tended to recruit workers mainly from members of
the semi-stable gangs. The total frequency of employment for
all gang members during the 30 days can therefore be
calculated in the following way:
(1) The lowest number of workers employed
continuously is 6 (the first six workers when
six or more workers were employed), and this
gives us 180 man/days;
(2) A seventh worker was given employment for
29 days (the first additional worker when 7 or
more workers were employed);
(3) An eighth worker was given employment for
26 days (the second additional worker when 8 or
more ...);
(4) A ninth worker was given employment for 25
days (the third additional worker when 9 or more
... );
(5) A tenth worker was given employment for 23
days (fourth additional worker when 10 or more
.. . ) ;
(6) An eleventh worker was given employment for
16 days (the fifth additional);
(7) A twelfth worker was given employment for
13 days (the sixth additional worker);
(8) A thirteenth worker was given employment
for 7 days (the seventh additional worker);
(9) A fourteenth worker was given employment
for 4 days only (the eighth additional worker
when 14 or more workers were employed).
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The total man/days worked by the gang would thus have been
180+29^26^25^23+16+13+7+4, which amounts to 324 man/days.
Given the arduous nature of the work, no one worker could be
expected to be present throughout the 30 days; because of
this, I calculate the days worked in terms of the average
frequency of employment for all members of the gang at around
23 days in the 30 days surveyed (i.e. 324/14). This
calculation, it should be noted, assumes that the member of
the gang rests rather than either seeks re-employment through
his "contacts" on other building sites or takes on another
activity (e.g. cigarette-selling as described in Chapter Six).
Furthermore, on the basis of the calculated average
frequency of employment, we can go further to estimate the
average monthly earnings of the members of the gang. Kameir
reports that the "average" daily wage was ES 0.60; but in two
particular operations (digging of foundations and concrete
enforcement) the wage was ES 1.25. Of the 30 days surveyed, 3
days are reported to have been on concrete enforcement on the
ceiling (these were when 23 workers were employed); and I
ssreie that dlg-g-Ing of foundations was for two days only.
Calculating on this basis, the average earnings for each
member of the gang during that month were as follows:
(1) 18 days on 'average wage' 18x60= 	 £S 10.80
(2) 3 days on enforcement	 3x125=	 ES 3.75
(3) 2 days on foundations	 2x125=	 ES 2.50
Total earnings in 23 days	 ES 17.05
When El-Wathig Kameir conducted his survey in 1977/78, the
minimum wage in government employment was ES 16.50 (cf. Khalid
Affan, 1977:72). In other words, even the most vulnerable of
'casual workers' could well earn above the minimum wage for
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'permanent' government workers. Even when the earnings of the
casual construction workers during the 23 days are calculated
at the lower, "average", daily wage of ES 0.65, total earnings
per worker would still be ES 14.95. Such figures clearly defy
all attempts to characterize 'formal' workers as a 'labour
elite'.
The foregoing comparison of earnings in the 'formal' and
'informal' sectors is intended as a plea for a more careful
approach to the analysis of the urban wage labour market than
hitherto offered by 'conventional wisdom', Clearly, the
comparison should not be taken to denote "virtual identity" in
the terms of employment experienced by the two groups of
workers. One must give full recognition to the so-called
'benefits' and the alleged 'expensive commitments' associated
with 'permanent' employment: the paid annual holidays, the
provisions for sick-leave and the after-service payments
together with the stipulated compensation in cases of death or
injury in the course of work. But though, in principle, the
presence of such 'benefits' has potentially far-reaching
implications for the conditions of 'permanent' workers, in
monetary terms the current values of these 'benefits' are so
low that they serve only partly to compensate 'permanent'
workers for their poor wage-rates as compared to their
counterparts in the so-called 'informal sector'.
THE 'FRINGE BENEFITS'
In this section I will consider aspects of the 'benefits',
which are the exclusive 'privilege' of permanent workers: paid
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annual holidays, provisions for sick-leave and after-service
payments together with the stipulated compensation in cases of
death or injury in the course of work. The first three of
these 'benefits' was originally stipulated in the 1949
Employer and Employed Persons Ordinance, while compensation
was first dealt with in the Workmen's Compensation Ordinance,
1949 (Sudan Government, 1975, vol. III).
In the original Employer and Employed Persons Ordinance,
paid annual holidays were given to permanent workers with two
or more years of continuous service; and for all categories
the holiday was 15 days only. In the 1969 (Amendment) Act,
however, the minimum period of service was reduced to 18
months of permanent employment, and the duration of the
holidays was made a function of the period spent in employment
ranging from 15 days for workers with less than five years of
service, to 20 days for workers with more than five but less
nan ten years of service, to 25 days for workers with more
than ten but .less than twenty years of service, and to a
maximum of 30 days for workers with over 20 years of
continuous service (cf. Farouk Abu-Eisa, op. cit.). The
Consolidated Labour Code of 1970 reduced the minimum period
for a worker entitlement to annual paid holidays to one year
of continuous employment, and increased the minimum period of
holiday to 18 days for those with less than four years of
employment. With the suspension of the Code in 1971, however,
the same provisions as in the 1969 Amendment were reinstated
and are operational at present (cf. Sudan Government, 1975,
III pp. 362ff).
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In relation to paid sick-leave, the 1949 Ordinance
stipulated that workers who spent a minimum of two years in
permanent employment are entitled to paid sick leave of 30
days for every 24 consecutive months of continuous service.
The 1969 Amendment retained the two year minimum for
entitlement, but distinguished between three categories of
paid leave according to length of employment as follows:
(1) Workers who spent more than two but less than ten
years of continuous employment are entitled to a
month on full wages, a month on half wages, and a
month on quarter wages for every 24 months of
continuous employment
(2) If the worker bad cornp1ete between ten and twenty
years in continuous employment, he was to be
granted a month and a half on full wages, a month
and a half on half wages and a month and a half on
quarter wages for every 24 months of continuous
employment.
(3) If the worker had completed twenty or more years,
he was entitled to 2 months on full wages, two
months on half wages and two months on quarter
wages for every 24 months of continuous employment.
Again, the Consolidated Labour Code stipulated more
favourable terms for workers, and not only reduced the minimum
period of continuous employment to three months, but also
increased the duration for full wages, half wages, and quarter
wages, to three months each and, in addition, stipulated a
further three-month period of leave without pay -i.e.
stipulating sick-leave of up to one year for every two years
of continuous employment. At present, however, it is the 1969
Amendment which is operational (cf. ibid., pp. 360ff).
With regard to after-service payments, the Employer and
Employed Persons Ordinance of 1949 stipulated a minimum of
five years of continuous service for entitlement. For workers
with five but less than 12 years of continuous employment, the
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Ordinance stipulated an after-service payment of half the
basic wage plus COLA for each year of service. For each
additional year of service the worker receives a full month's
basic wage plus COLA, provided that this is calculated in
terms of the average wage for the last three years of service.
For a worker with twenty years or more, the Ordinance
stipulated the payment of full annual wages plus COLA.
The 1969 Amendment, again being the current law, reduced
the minimum period for entitlement to after-service payment to
three years. According to the Amendment, workers with three to
ten years service are entitled to half the basic monthly wage,
plus COLA for each year of service; those with ten but less
than twenty years of service are entitled to one month basic
salary, plus COLA for each year over the first ten years;
while for those with twenty or more years of service the
after-service payment was amended to become the equivalent of
two years full pay instead of one. The short-lived Code
reduced the minimum period to two years of service, and for
the first ten years stipulated the payment of three-quarters
of the monthly wage for each year, a full month's wages for
each year from the '11th to the 20th, and one and a quarter
month's wages for each year of continuous service for those
with more than 20 years service. The after-service payment
stipulated in the Code, however, was not to exceed the total
wage of 36 months nor to be less than the wage of 24 months
calculated on the basis of the last month in which wages were
received As maintained earlier, the provisions of the Code
were suspended; and the present law regulating payments is the
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same as the 1969 amendment.
In connection with the payment of compensation, the
current law constitutes a virtual reproduction of the colonial
Workmen's Compensation Ordinance, 1949. According to the
latter, the dependants of a worker who dies in the course of
work are entitled to the equivalent of wages for 30 months or
LE 600, whichever is the lower. In cases of injuries resulting
in being bed-ridden permanently, the compensation stipulated
is either LE 700 or the wages for 42 months, whichever is the
lower. In cases of partial disability, the compensation is to
be calculated (according to a Table of Percentage Disability
attached to the Ordinance) as a percentage of the compensation
for total disability. The only attempt to amend the Ordinance
was in the Code, which stipulated the payment of the wage of
1,260 days or ES 800, whichever is the greater, as
compensation for full disability and ES 600 or the wage of 900
days, whichever is the greater, in compensation for death (cf.
ibid.). With the suspension of the Code, however, even these
small gains were lost to the workers.
When their money-value is calculated, the so-called
'privileges' and 'expensive commitments' associated 	 with
'permanent'	 employment	 actually	 cost very little. The
compensation for death, for example, is less than what
administrators and professionals earn in one month.
Nevertheless, we should not overlook the relative security
which some of these 'privileges' provide -a security which the
so-called "legislative protection" does not provide, as we saw
earlier. This is particularly true of sick-leave stipulations..
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A 'permanent' worker, in case of illness, may stay for a
period ranging from three to six months (though not with full
wages throughout) and comes back to find his lob waiting for
him. Neither the 'temporary' workers nor the totally 'casual'
workers are entitled to anything resembling paid sick-leave or
an assured position upon return to work.
The role of trade unions in achieving this modest, but
nevertheless positive gain for 'permanent' workers cannot be
ignored. It is indeed to avert the consequences of a strong
trade union movement that in some branches of production, such
as manufacturing industry, which do not experience marked
fluctuations in production schedules, we find "heavy reliance"
on 'temporary and casual' employment. Needless to say, had the
unions been strong enough to engage effectively in a process
of collective bargaining, the wage levels of union workers
would have been higher, and the 'benefits' would have been a
relatively "expensive commitment". But as I shall now explain,
the conception of the ILO studies of "pressure by trade
unions" as the determining factor of the alleged 'high wages'
of 'permanent' workers is poorly-founded.
TRADE UNIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Prior to the military take-over in 1969, the forces of
supply and demand, productivity considerations and collective
bargaining played minimal roles in the determination of wages
(cf.	 Khalid	 Affan, 1977:62ff). Wages were thus almost
exclusively determined	 through	 administrative	 and/or
legislative action (cf. Abdel Rahman E.A. Taha, 1977:193ff). I
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have already described the role of the two Commissions of
Wakefield (in 1951) and Cadre (in 1968) as well as the present
JECS. However, in a handful of large scale, mainly foreign,
companies (e.g. Mobil Oil and Shell) and a few public concerns
such as Sudan Railways and the Gezira Board, a form of
'collective bargaining' was adopted. In relation to these
exceptions, it is generally recognized that the adoption of
collective bargaining was a function of the size of the
workforce and, by extension, of the relative strength of the
trade unions. In the case of the multinational and foreign
companies in particular, desire to avert the emergence of
widespread nationalistic feelings was probably a relevant
additional factor. By virtue of their strength, trade unions
in these few establishments managed to obtain for their
members higher wages and better terms of employment than in
either government departments or small scale private
enterprises.
It should be emphasized in relation to the pre-1969
situation that while a form of collective bargaining existed
at the level of a few single enterprises, general trade unions
and federations were almost totally excluded from the higher
levels of national wage policy. More than once the government
not only refused to negotiate with the Sudan Workers Trade
Union Federation (SWTUF), but also declined to even recognize
the SWTUF as the legal representative of workers (Abdel Rahman
E. All Taha, 1977:195). The only occasion on which a pre-1969
government actually engaged in negotiations with the SWTUF, in
January 1968, was in response to a desire by the government to
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avert widespread industrial action by union workers (ibid.).
The antagonistic government-trade union relations throughout
both the colonial and post-colonial periods will be considered
below. For my present purpose it suffices to point out that
throughout its history the trade union movement in the Sudan
was fighting more to assert its right to exist than to obtain
better terms and conditions of employment for its membership
comprised of 'permanent' workers.
Thus, up to the take-over by the Free Officers in May
1969, only a few relatively strong trade unions in some large
scale private enterprises and a few public concerns were able
to involve themselves in negotiations with their employers
within single establishments. For the large majority of
workers, the terms and conditions of employment were decided
unilaterally by government; the workers could only influence
decisions indirectly, through industrial action rather than
through negotiations.
The retme of FIeLI 1karshaL Nuteiri has passed through two
distinct phases in its relations with the labour movement. In
the first phase (May 1969 - February 1971), the Free Officers
adopted a self-professed 'socialist' programme and proved, in
the main, to be 'sympathetic' to the demands of the labour
movement. This phase, which reached its highest point in the
promulgation of the Consolidated Labour Code of November,
1970, witnessed the closest coordination and 'understanding'
between government and trade unions ever experienced in the
Sudan. With the suspension of the Code in February 1971, the
second phase began. In this second phase, which is still under
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way, the regime has proved to be the most difficult opponent
with which the labour movement has had to deal.
The 'sympathetic' attitude of the May regime during the
first phase did not result in improvements in the general
conditions of workers. As Abdel Rahman E. All Taha (1976:122)
puts it, in return for 'sympathy', "workers were asked to
forego wage demands, to increase production and lend political
support for the regime.. workers ..not only froze their wage
demands, but were [also] subjected to a heavy tax burden". As
will be explained in more detail below, the "sympathy"
referred to concerns measures that effectively increased the
number of trade unions and their membership. At the same time,
the regime undermined the effectiveness of trade unions as
'pressure groups' from the first day of the coup, first by
prohibiting strikes through a Republican Order, and later by
measures to 'regulate' certain public concerns and which
brought collective bargaining to an end in the few
esta'olis'hments where relatively strong trade unions had
previously managed to involve themselves in the determination
of wages.
The measures affecting collective bargaining were
stipulated in a 1970 Republican Order that suspended the
internal rules and regulations of some 18 public concerns
"pending their revision". The establishments affected included
Sudan Railways, the Gezira Scheme Board, the Central
Corporation for Electricity and Water, and the Rural Water
Development Corporation, which had the strongest trade unions
in the country (cf. Farouk Abu-Eisa, op. cit.). The Republican
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Order in effect denied the workers in these establishments the
gains for which they had fiercely fought, and subjected them
once more to the general rules and • regulations operating in
other government departments. In large scale private
enterprises, on the other hand, collective bargaining came to
an end as a result of the ban on strikes. Private employers
could thus ignore workers' demands without any fear of
disrupting production through industrial action. It is indeed
these constraints upon trade union activity which explain why
the real wages of workers are progressively decreasing as
inflation rises steadily. A relatively weak trade union
movement is of course one of the pre-conditions for the
prevalence of such conditions, and it is for this reason that
I need to consider aspects of the initial emergence and later
development of trade unions in the country.
THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT IN THE SUDAN
Though the trade union movement in the Sudan consists of
both blue- and white-collar workers, it is the former who
initiated the movement historically. Since a number of
contributions dealing with aspects of the history of trade
unionism in the Sudan are available, I do not need to give a
detailed historical account. The most important contributions
are those by Sa'ad El-Din Fawzi (1957), Abdel Rahman E. All
Taha (1970; 1972; 1976; 1977), Mohamed Omer Beshir (1974) and
Lobban (1977; 1982). In addition to these, we have had a few
contributions to the study of labour legislation in the Sudan
in recent years (Abdel Rahman E. A. Taha & Ahmed El-Jack, op.
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cit.; Farouk Abu-Eisa, op. cit.; Hashim Abdel Karim Rufa'i,
1 981); and the contribution of Farouk Abu-Eisa is particularly
useful in understanding the legal provisions affecting trade
unions.
One important reservation should be spelt out in relation
to the contributions to the historiography of trade unions.
This concerns the tendency of most scholars to equate the
origin of the trade union movement with the legislation issued
by the colonial state in 1949 (The Trade Union Ordinance)
which recognized the right of a small sector of wage workers
to organize. Most scholars have thus tended to assert that the
movement is "a creature of the recent past" dating back to the
strikes of 1947/48 staged by railway workers. These strikes,
it is often claimed, were induced by the increase in prices
following the Second World War (Sa'ad El-Din Fawzi, 1957:22;
Abdel Rahman E. A. Taha, 1972:14); and their success resulted
in the promulgation of the Employer and Employed Persons
Ordinance and the Trade Union Ordinance in 1949. Despite this
assertion, all scholars have, in the actual course of their
accounts, dealt with some of the "events" that had occurred at
least a decade earlier and which are relevant to the
understanding of trade unionism in the Sudan. As Abdel Wahab
Musa (1959:147) says, in his review of Fawzi's The Labour
Movement in the Sudan, "instead of telling the story
chronologically", these scholars "chose the other way...
[they] started at the point where the workers' consciousness
crystallised in a clear, attempt to form trade unions, and from
there went on to tell the story in detail".
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I am not concerned merely to refer to the correct
chronology; but I also wish to stress the view that, through
placing emphasis on the events of the 1940s and attempting to
equate the "birth" of the trade union movement with the
legislation of 1949, two basic points have, in effect, been
overlooked. The first concerns the relationship between trade
unions and the Trade Union Ordinance. The Ordinance marked
neither the "birth" of trade unions, nor even the
"crystallization" of workers' consciousness to form unions. It
was, rather, a capitulation by the colonial state to an
already established and well-organized -albeit illegal- trade
union movement that forcefully asserted itself. This point has
been well made by Farouk Abu-Eisa (op. cit., p. 6):
The 1949 Ordinance recognized the right of
workers to organize in trade unions that
could serve their objectives and regulate
their relations with employers ... [Well
before that Ordinance, however] Sudanese
workers had established their own unions and
engaged in union activities despite the
opposition of the colonial government to,
and lack of laws to legitimize, such
organizations and activities. In the face of
the intensive pressure applied by the labour
movement through industrial action, however,
the foreign administration had no
alternative but to concede the right of
workers to organize ... The Ordinance thus
followed in order to 'regulate' an already
established trade union movement. This is a
crucial point which has to be recapitulated;
the right of workers to organize is not a
'gift' from anyone. It is a right of which
workers had been deprived, but which they
forcefully seized through a long and
protracted struggle... (My translation).
In the same way that the workers gained recognition for
their trade unions through their own struggle, they engaged in
concerted struggles to assert the right of trade unions to
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organize into a federation. Thus, in spite of resentment by
the colonial state, in 1950 the workers unilaterally declared
the establishment of the Sudan Workers' Trade Union
Federation, SWTUF (see, Sa'ad El-Din Fawzi, 1957; Abdel Rahman
E. All Taha, 1970; 1972). In the fce of opposition from the
colonial administration, the newly established SWTUF organized
in August 1951 one of the most successful strikes in its
history; and from then onwards it continued to assert its
existence despite lack of government recognition, which was
eventually gained in 1968.
The drive of the labour movement towards the formation of
trade unions found its first successful expression in numerous
workers' clubs in many Sudanese towns, starting with Atbara
(1934) and Khartoum (1935). Though these clubs were ostensibly
established for "social" and "recreational" purposes, from
their inception they constituted bases from which the labour
movement struggled to obtain recognition for the right to
organize trade unions. The leadership of the trade unions
emerged from among the members of these clubs, and the clubs
were themselves explicitly identified with the trade union
movement. This last point is clearly corroborated by the case
of the workers' club in Khartoum, which in 1946 launched its
own magazine, E1-A'mil El-Sudani (The Sudanese Worker). From
the time of its first issue, the magazine advocated the need
for the establishment, and recognition of fully-fledged trade
unionism to represent Sudanese workers nationally (cf. Sa'ad
El-Din Fawzi, 1957). There is no way then in which trade
unionism can be equated with the colonial Trade Union
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Ordinance. The initiative of the labour movement to establish
workers' clubs, and of the railway men in particular to form
their national federation (The Workers' Affairs Association)
in 1946, well before the enactment of the Ordinance not only
testifies to the organizational skills of Sudanese workers,
but also, and more significantly, reflects the workers'
crystallized consciousness of their common class position and
interests at a very early stage.
The first point leads directly to the second, which
concerns misconceptions in the literature of the process that
resulted in trade unionism. As maintained earlier, most
scholars tend to attribute the origin of the trade union
movement to the strikes of the 1940s and then contend that the
post-war rise in prices was the "main factor" behind the
militancy of workers. My central contention in this connection
is that trade unionism, defined as the concerted efforts of
workers to unite in their struggle to obtain better terms and
conditions of work, was an integral aspect of the process of
the emergence of a wage labour force in the country.
Fully-proletarianized workers deprived from the ownership of
the means of production and whose consumption requirements are
to be satisfied not by their own products but through
purchases made by the money obtained in return for sale of
their labour power, find it imperative to struggle against
employers to obtain a higher purchasing-power. An individual
worker stands no chance of effective struggle; and unity among
workers becomes a necessity rather than a virtue. But unity is
a process; it starts from the level of the single
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establishment, through industrial or sectoral levels, to
national (and international) levels. At all these levels the
principle underlying workers' organization is that of trade
unionism, that is to say, of the need of workers to unite in
order to be effective in their pursuance of better terms and
conditions of work. Trade unionism in the Sudan, which can
only be meaningfully conceptualized in the terms proposed,
thus be traced back not only to the establishment of workers'
clubs, but also as far back as 1903, when workers from the
Forestry Department went on strike in protest against their
conditions of work (Mohamed Omer Beshir, 1974:190). From that
date on, and throughout the colonial period, the militancy of
workers never ceased, as evidenced by a long series of strikes
that increasingly involved larger numbers of workers drawn
from different regions of the country (idem., pp. 190ff; Abdel
Wahab Musa, op. cit.). Bearing in mind that the Sudanese wage
labour force was virtually non-existent before the turn of
this century (cf. Chapter Four), one may well contend that
trade unionism is a characteristic inherent in the class
position of wage workers; and we can then see how the
progressive proletarianization of increasing numbers of
Sudanese led to the further entrenchment of trade unionism.
At the beginning of this chapter I claimed that labour
legislation in the Sudan was intended to constrain rather than
to consolidate the labour movement. The 1949 Trade Union
Ordinance is no exception. The Ordinance was issued to contain
industrial action by workers rather than to encourage genuine
workers' unions. The original design of the colonial state was
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indeed to establish 'works committees' that would involve
workers in a "consultative capacity"; but it was explicitly
stated that these committees were not to concern themselves
with the rates of pay and terms of service of government
employees (Sa'ad El-Din Fawzi, 1957:7). As workers rejected
the designs of the colonial government, and pressed for the
recognition of their own organizations, the Ordinance was
issued, but in such a way as to hamper the development of
effective trade unionism. Union membership was accordingly
restricted to 'permanent' workers; and, given the small size
of that group of workers in a situation in which employers
could resort to 'temporary' and 'casual' employment, a major
constraint was imposed upon trade unions at the very moment
that they were recognized. Likewise, even with their
restricted membership, the trade unions were faced with many
provisions in the Ordinance which constrained further their
effectiveness. Section 17 of the Ordinance, for example, made
registration a compulsory condition for the recognition of a
trade union; and no union or any of its members could engage
in union activity before the completion of the registration
requirement. The colonial Registrar of Trade Unions found a
convenient pretext in this provision to obstruct the formation
of trade unions by means of prolonging the formal procedure
for registration (cf. Farouk Abu-Eisa, op. cit.). Likewise,
Section 27 (2) prohibited those registered trade unions with
members who were public employees from affiliation to, and
unification or collaboration with, any "political"
organization or party in pursuit of their objectives. Given
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that during the colonial period "public employees" constituted
by far the majority of union workers in the Sudan, the attempt
by the colonial government to obstruct union activity is
clear.
In accounting for the struggle waged by the labour
movement during the colonial period, many scholars have tended
to over-emphasize the "nationalist" nature of the movement and
virtually to disregard its working-class origins. But in
stressing the class, or 'partisan', roots of the labour
movement I do not, of course, deny that almost all wage
earners did, and continue to subscribe to the ideology of
(7)	 .
nationalism. Nor is it my intention to belittle in any way
the crucial and decisive role which the labour movement played
against British colonial administration. As Abdel Rahman E.
Au Taha (1972:15) puts it, the industrial action by Sudanese
workers "must have shaken the colonial government and
destroyed the facade of invincibility that surrounded it".
What should be stressed in connection with the apparently
'nationalistic' or anti-colonial character of trade unions in
colonial Sudan, however, is the position of the colonial state
as the largest employer of union workers in the country. In
other words, the conflict between the trade unions and the
colonial state was underlain, on the one hand, by the unions'
struggle to improve the terms and áonditions of work and, on
the other, by the unwillingness of the colonial state (both as
employer and as 'guardian' of the interests of employers in
general) to concede such improvements. Such was the situation
between government and trade unions in colonial Sudan, and
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such has been the situation in the post-colonial period up to
the present. In both periods, the trade unions entered into
conflict with the state by virtue of class interests. But in
asserting this view of the origins of trade unions I do not
suggest that formal trade unions are merely "tools" of the
labour movement to fight for its rights. Trade unions are
themselves arenas for class struggle; thus, in order for trade
unions to fight for workers, the labour movement did, and
continues to, fight fiercely for the control over unions. But
this fight is not solely against the designs of employers who
attempt to contain trade unions through labour laws issued to
create divisions within the working class (along the
unionized/non-unionized distinction) or to control the unions
(see below), but also against workers who, by upholding
'nationalistic' and/or 'sectarian' loyalties, may act in a
fashion contrary to their class interests.
TRADE UNIONS AND THE 'NATIONALISTS'
The conflict with the colonial state, coupled with the
ideology of nationalism among workers, had created conditions
conducive to the fostering of an alliance between the labour
movement and the "educated elite" that was seeking to control
an independent Sudan. Despite persistent efforts by the
'elite' to mobilize the support of individual workers,
however, the alliance between the labour movement and the
Graduate	 Congress	 led	 by the 'elite' has never been
consummated, A more convenient alliance was instead formed
between	 the	 'elite' and the various fractions of the
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(commercial and agricultural) bourgeoisie along with the
religious and 'tribal' leaders (who in many cases were also
part of the bourgeoisie). With the disintegration of the
Graduate Congress and the formation of the "traditional"
political parties in the Sudan, the various fractions of that
alliance came to constitute the leadership of the political
parties which gained power after flag Independence in 1956.
The only allies that the labour movement could find were, and
still are, a small minority of 'petit-bourgeois' elements (a
few professionals, a handful of academics, students, etc.) and
the Communist Party of the Sudan which, though small in
membership compared to the "traditional" parties, nevertheless
carries more than proportional political weight (Mudathir
Abdel Rahim, 1969; Warburg, 1978; Mohamed Omer Beshir, 1974;
Fatima Babiker Mahmoud, 1984). As soon as flag Independence
was achieved, and the "nationalist" movement started to
subside giving way to "sectarian" loyalties, the
'post-colonial' state proved just as uncompromising with the
labour movement as its colonial predecessor.
The conflict between the labour movement and the state was
thus carried over into the post-colonial period. The crisis
accruing from the intensification of the conflict in the
immediate post-colonial years culminated in a general strike
in October 1958 (Mohamed Omer Beshir, 1974:198). The
government, which was controlled by the rural-based Umma
Party, was also facing another crisis in Parliament over the
issue of accepting aid from the United States; and as a result
of the weakening position of government the first
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parliamentary democracy in the Sudan came to an end. The
military junta of General Abboud was literally handed power by
(formerly General) Abdalla Khalil, the Prime Minister, on 17th
November, 1958. Among the first measures undertaken by the
junta was the arrest of union leaders and the dissolution of
all trade unions in the country. These measures were met by
stiff opposition from workers, and the military government had
to submit to the right of 'blue-collar' workers to organize.
Thus it was that early in 1960 an Ordinance was issued
recognizing trade unions for manual workers whereas
white-collar workers were not given that right. As with the
original Trade Union Ordinance, the new law imposed many
constraints on trade unions. Not only was no federation
allowed, but the minimum number of workers required to form a
union was increased from 30 to 50. As unions could only be
established by workers of the same employer, the new law
resulted in a drastic decrease in the number of unions and in
the total number of members. According to Abdel Rahman E. All
Taha (1972:18), the total union membership decreased from
86,355 workers organized in 135 unions in 1958 to 61,959
members organized in 71 unions in 1960.
The attempts by the Abboud Regime to pacify trade unions
only resulted in the intensification of the struggle by
workers to overthrow the government. The labour movement,
however, was not the sole target of alienation by the junta.
As opposition to the military gained strength, the October
1964 general strike staged by workers and students (who were
soon followed by other sections of the population in the first
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total civil disobedience in the Sudan) effectively guaranteed
the overthrow of the junta and/or the success of the October
Revolution.
The 'revolutionary' elements that assumed power in 1964
had the full backing of the labour movement in the Sudan which
took the "unprecedented step of suspending wage demands so as
to help the government cope with the economic crisis it was
facing" (Abdel Rahman E. Au Taha, 1972:20). The Secretary
General of the SWTUF became Minister without portfolio in that
'revolutionary government'. By June 1965,
	 however,	 the
"traditional" political parties once more assumed power in the
Sudan; and with their ascendency there was a renewal of the
antagonistic relations between the government and the labour
movement. In an attempt by the government to divide, and
ultimately weaken, the trade unions, the Trade Union Ordinance
(Amendment) Bill was issued in 1966 (cf. Farouk Abu-Eisa, op.
cit.). The Bill prohibited the formation of trade union
federations except by unions belonging to the same industry or
employer, and only federations constituted along these lines
could form a confederation. Consequently, two federations were
formed comprised of private-sector workers and public
employees respectively.
MAY REGIME: FROM COURTSHIP TO COURT-MARTIALS
With the exception of the brief period from October 1964
to May 1965, the trade union movement in the Sudan was thus in
a constant state of struggle to assert its sheer existence as
the legal representative of workers. Only in a few public and
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large scale private establishments could trade unions (at the
level of a single establishment) involve themselves in
collective bargaining. When the Free Officers rose to power in
May 1969, the labour movement lent support to the 'socialist'
programme of the Revolutionary Command Council. Though I
accounted earlier	 for	 the course in which collective
bargaining was brought to an end during this first
("sympathetic") phase of the present regime, in other measures
the sympathy of the Free Officers could hardly be doubted.
TUE ERA OF 'SYMPATHY'
The sympathy of the government is, for example, clearly
corroborated by the creation of the Ministry of Labour (in
place of the former Labour Department) and by the attempts to
involve the trade union movement in the process of labour
legislation and policy-making. Following brief negotiations
between the Labour Minister and the SWTUF, the Revolutionary
Command Council authorized the former to establish a competent
committee led by trade unionists to review all labour
legislation and to present recommendations for new laws (cf.
Farouk Abu-Elsa, op. cit.). Thus, in the early part of the
first phase, no new laws were issued, but a number of
Ministerial Orders, which constituted the basis of the
Consolidated Labour Code of November 1970, were introduced to
deal with some urgent issues of the labour movement. Of
particular relevance to this point are the Orders which,
respectively,	 suspended Section	 10 of the Employer and
Employed Persons Ordinance, 1949 (as	 amended	 in	 1969);
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abolished the principle of "same employer" in the formation of
trade unions; and, finally, simplified the procedure for the
compulsory registration requirement.
I have already dealt with the Ministerial Order No. 993
suspending Section 10 of the 1949 Ordinance that regulated
termination of employment and I need not' repeat all the
details here. What is important is that the new provision
constituted a severe constraint upon the manoeuvres which
employers used to adopt in their attempts to obstruct the
formation of trade unions in their respective establishments
by firing, from time to time, a number of workers to reduce
the size of the workforce to under 30 workers (which was the
minimum legal size to form a union). Another Order reduced the
procedure for the compulsory registration requirement to the
simple filing of papers by unions and the prompt checking of
number of workers by the Registrar. The most significant
Order, however, was that stipulating a new principle for the
formation of trade unions (cf. Farouk Abu-Eisa, op. cit.). By
means of this last, workers in small establishments, who
because of their small numbers had until then been unable to
form a union on the basis of the same employer, were allowed
to organize on the basis of the same industry at the level of
the one town or district. The Code went even further than the
Orders and recognized the right of apprentices to join trade
unions. In consequence, the first phase of Numeiri's regime
witnessed a dramatic increase in the numbers both of trade
unions and of members. The Code also stipulated the necessity
for unity in the trade union movement, and accordingly
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prohibited the formation of more than one federation each for
blue-collar and white-collar workers unions whether at the
level of a single industry, or sector, or nationally.
Likewise, whereas the Code recognized the right of teachers to
have their separate national federation, the right of the
national federations to form a single confederation was also
recognized.
The identification of the Code with trade unions was most
explicit in its definition of "worker" which effectively
abolished the distinction between 'manual' and 'mental' labour
and as such recognized the rights of blue- and white-collar
workers to form a joint trade union if the members concerned
decided to do so; affiliation to the higher levels in such
cases was also left to be decided by the members of the joint
union. The position of individual trade unionists was also
consolidated. The Code stipulated many guarantees for union
leaders against dismissal because of union activity; and
transfer of union leaders, except with the consent of the
union, was also prohibited. Finally, the Code stipulated wage
payments for full-time union officers, paid-leaves relating to
union activity for non-full-timers, etc., all of which had
previously been at the discretion of employers.
In relation to the involvement of trade unions in
policy-making, the Code stipulated the creation of three
Councils consisting of the representatives of workers,
employers and the government; and in each council the
representatives of workers were to comprise at least half the
total number of members. The first of these Councils, the
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Supreme Labour Council, headed by the Minister of Labour, was
to be responsible for the formulation, in accordance with the
general policy of the state, of policies concerning all
aspects of work organization and industrial relations. The
other, and lower, two councils headed by the Undersecretary
for Labour were the Manpower and Training Council and the Work
Relations Councils. These two were to be specialized councils
advising the Supreme Council. Subject to the consent of the
Labour Minister, moreover, the decisions of the Supreme
Council were to be automatically operational; and in cases of
disagreement the policies were to be submitted before the
Cabinet for a final decision.
The Consolidated Labour Code was thus a landmark in the
history of the labour movement in the Sudan, not least'because
it recognized the class basis and interests of trade unions
and unionists, Only two months after its promulgation,
however, the Code was suspended with the effect of reinstating
all the pre-1969 labour laws it had repealed. The suspension
of the Code heralded the beginning of the second phase in
government-trade union relations in the era of Numeiri, an era
which is still under way. The factors contributing to this
change are several and complex and cannot be discussed in any
detail in the present context. For my purpose it is sufficient
to note briefly some of the salient factors that induced the
change.
The most important point is that, whereas pre-1969
governments persistently tended to mystify aspects of the
class struggle taking place in the Sudan, the rise of the Free
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Officers to power not only unmasked, but also intensified
class struggle at a number of levels. The self-professed
'socialist programme' of the new regime shattered the myth of
the impartiality of the state, which post-colonial regimes had
previously claimed. Through the measures undertaken to end the
domination of foreign, mainly finance, capital in the Sudan,
to nationalize and/or confiscate a majority of large scale
industrial and commercial	 enterprises,	 and	 to assert
forcefully the control of the state over all banking and
foreign trade in the country, the Free Officers, in effect,
engaged in an offensive against the bourgeoisie (in spite of
the inclusion of the so-called "national bourgeoisie" into the
"forces of national alliance"). The Code was thus only one
among several measures that antagonized the bourgeoisie who,
in return, sought not only to re-assert their 'privilege' to
"hire and fire" workers, but also to restore their control
over the commanding heights of the Sudanese economy -foreign
trade in particular. Likewise, the 'secular' orientations of
the Free Officers challenged the authority and power of the
various 'tribal', sectarian, and political leaders who, as in
the armed confrontation staged by the Ansar in Abba Island in
March 1970, opposed the new regime and attempted to bring
about its overthrow. In short, as a result of the the measures
undertaken by the Free Officers, a struggle over power
exploded, and it had to be resolved one way or the other. The
Free Officers, however, were not themselves a homogeneous
group; and in the absence of a mass organization to resolve
the disagreements in the Revolutionary Command Council in a
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democratic fashion thought appropriate by the masses, friction
developed among the Free Officers themselves. The commonly
held contention that the conflict within the ranks of the
Officers was between "communists" seeking transformation and
"social democrats and nationalists" pursuing reforms is a
gross oversimplification. The same conflict was observed
within the ranks of the Communist leadership and it resulted
in splits within what had once been the strongest and most
organized Communist Party in Africa and the Middle East. But
the details of that conflict are beyond my purpose. It is
sufficient to note that Numeiri and the 'reformists'
eventually resolved the question of power following the
abortive counter coup by the "communist" Officers, albeit at
the cost of retreating from virtually all the 'socialist'
measures previously undertaken. This retreat was, and
continues to be reflected in the reinstatement and further
entrenchment of foreign finance capital (foreign banks) and
multinational corporations, as well as in the emergence of the
"new rich" and the repression of the labour movement.
THE ERA OF REPRESSION
The Trade Union Act, 1973, and its 1976 amendment, typify
the retreat in relation to the labour movement. Thus not only
have the union rights of apprentices been withdrawn and the
distinction between 'mental' and 'manual' labour been
reintroduced, but the very objectives of the trade unions
recognized by the state have been emptied of their class basis
and interests. In Section 2 (5) of the Act which defines the
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objectives of trade unions, priority was given to "increasing
production" over the role of unions in defending the rights of
members "within the limits of union laws, and the imperatives
of the national economy") 8 The attempt to restrict union
activity through the insertion of the nebulous "imperatives of
the national economy" hardly needs any emphasis. Article (6)
of the same Section which deals with the "legitimacy of union
activity" went even further; it now stated that unions and
federations are entitled to adopt all the means suitable to
the realization of their objectives in accordance with the
Act, but it stipulated "exceptions" for activities considered
to "constitute a crime against the security and peace of the
state, or against the security of its basic institutions, in
accordance with the current laws". As pointed out by Farouk
Abu-Eisa (op. cit., p. 52), this last clause constrains the
legitimacy of union activity, and accords undue discretion to
the state to define, and from time to time to change what is
to be construed as touching on its security.
The observation that the regime in this second phase has
attempted to constrain union activity does not, of course,
posit any new experience for the labour movement. Virtually
all governments in the Sudan, colonial and post-colonial
alike, did what they could to that end. What really
constitutes a new experience in this second phase is the
persistent effort to bring trade unions under the direct
control of the state and the ruling party (the Sudanese
Socialist Union -SSU), and to dissociate 'formal' trade unions
from the labour movement altogether. Up to 1971, the trade
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unions had developed independently of direct state control and
supervision although the state, through legislation, attempted
to create divisions within the labour movement and to
constrain trade unions in advancing the cause of union
workers. The Trade Union Act of 1973, however, not only
stipulated a new structure and organization for trade unions
that conferred unlimited powers upon the Minister of Labour,
but also accorded to the General Registrar the authority to
suspend the activities of any union organization.
The provisions for the new structure and organization of
trade unions (cf. Hashim Rufa t i Abdel Karim, 1981) are
contained in Section 3 of the Act, which is supplemented by
two other laws (Basis for Union Formation Regulations and
Union Structure Regulations) issued by the Labour Minister.
Starting from the lowest level, there are the branches (with
50 or less members), union bureaux (with over 50 workers),
general unions and, finally, federations. Article 8 (2) of
Section 3 accords the status of legal personality to the
general unions and federations, but denies it to both the
branches and the bureaux. Coupled with the new powers accorded
to the Minister concerning the formation of general unions and
federations, this new organisation effectively constrained
trade unions in representing their membership even at the
level of the shop-floor.
According to the new regulations, the Minister of Labour,
"in consultation with trade union federations", is authorized
to specify the sectors, industries, occupations and
establishments in which workers can form general unions and
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federations. But the Minister has consistently formed general
unions by bringing together, as "one sector", union bureaux of
workers who work for different and unrelated employers, and
whose work is varied. The formation of the General Union for
Services and Housing is a good case in point. This general
union represented, among others, workers from the Customs
Department, the Central Corporation for Water and Electricity,
the Ministry of Housing, the Ministry of Public Works, the
Prisons Department, and the Civil Aviation Department (cf.
Farouk Abu-Eisa, op. cit., p. 54). Only the union bureaux of
workers from the Central Corporation for Water and Electricity
managed, perforce, to extricate themselves from that
strait-jacket. It is worth noting that the branches and
bureaux were deprived of the legal personality status. Thus,
in the event of any shop-floor dispute, employers can refuse
to negotiate with them, and can demand negotiations with the
legally recognized centre. Owing to the diversity of the
problems of the different bureaux, the general union
representatives cannot always be informed about the precise
nature of the dispute at the level of an establishment -not to
mention the burden imposed upon general unions to deal with
every dispute in due time. The predicament of union branches
and bureaux hardly needs further elaboration. On the one hand,
workers have to accept affiliation to the "legally recognized"
general unions decided by the Minister -unless, of course,
they are exceptionally strong which is very rare in the Sudan
at present. (Article 29 [A] of Section 3 of the Act authorizes
the Registrar to refuse applications from bureaux to •Eorm
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general unions unless the formation is in accordance with the
instructions of the Minister). On the other hand, any branch
or bureau which undertakes action without the consent, or not
in accordance with the decisions of the general union is
subject not only to the suspension of its affiliation and
activities, Articles 13 (1) and 13 (3), but also to
dissolution as it would be committing a "violation of the
consent of the trade union movement", Article 13 (5). Above
all else, the weakness of the trade unions is most evident in
the impossibility of undertaking 'legal' industrial action.
Strikes are prohibited in the Sudan; and any person and/or
union activist found enticing workers to strike is liable to
prosecution under the State Security Act. The railway workers
staged a strike in 1981, and in spite of the status of their
union as the most powerful in the country, many of its members
were imprisoned. To avert any further disruptions in the
transport sector, a so-called Strategic Regiment was created
within the People's Armed Forces. Recruits are instructed in
wide-ranging skills, not least among which is train-driving.
It is only the 'privileged' professionals (judges, academics,
physicians, engineers, etc.) who seem to be effective in
persuading the government, through 'industrial action', to
improve their pay, as the events of the last three years have
shown. As soon as wage workers or junior clerical workers
appear to be staging a series of strikes which might culminate
in a general strike, the government reacts simply by declaring
a state of emergency as clearly witnessed by the events of
Summer 1984. Needless to say, such a tactic by the regime is
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effective only in the short-term, for workers cannot endure
for long the progressive deterioration in their living
standards.
I do not need to consider the other provisions of the
Trade Union Act, which are equally detrimental to the labour
movement, in order to corroborate the conclusion that the
trade unions in the Sudan are severely constrained, and that
these constraints help us to explain how the deterioration in
the living standards of union workers has been allowed to take
place. In view of the foregoing discussion, it is very
surprising to encounter assertions that the trade union
movement in the Sudan "has secured an impressive armoury of
legislation" and that "Sudanese workers are furnished with
collective bargaining procedures that bear comparison with
those achieved by organised labour in advanced countries". But
notwithstanding the gains achieved by organized labour in
industrialized countries, it has to be stressed that most of
these gains were actually achieved during periods of general
economic expansion, when capital	 could easily afford
concessions to neutralize the militancy of the labour
movement. During periods of economic recession and of crises
of accumulation, however, no concessions of any kind are
allowed unless the labour movement threatens (or succeeds in)
the total destruction of capital. But in the Sudan (as in
other underdeveloped countries) the crises of capital
accumulation are chronic; and no 'concessions' are allowed
unless the labour movement engages n a general strike intended
to transform the processes of peripheral capitalism which
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underlay the politico-economic crises.
One final point I should briefly touch onconcerns the
relations between trade unions and the Sudanese Socialist
Union, the sole political organization recognized in the
country. At each level of the SSU hierarchical structure
(towns, districts, provinces, regions and centre) there is a
Workers' Secretariat; and the Workers' Secretary at the
highst level enjoys ministerial status. All secretaries are
appointed by the President of the SSU (who is also the
President of the Republic) or his subordinates at the lower
levels. At present there are no laws explicitly stipulating
the subordination of trade unions to the Workers'
Secretariates, but, at the highest level at least, the
Secretary is in close contact with the national federations as
well as the national general unions. The general unions and
federations, on the other hand, do not -at least not overtly-
oppose the policies of either the government or the SSU and
among their officers there are usually a number of members
and/or ardent supporters of the SSU; but, as in the cases of
the 1980 Memorandum protesting against low wages in the
context of inflation and the 1981 strike by the Railway
Workers Union, it should not be assumed that all formal trade
unionists are complacent. It is also relevant to recall here
that any trade unionist who opposes government policy is
liable not only to prosecution for illegal opposition, but
also to denial of the right to participate in union activity
altogether, not least through arbitrary arrest without trial.
In this context of severe constraints upon formal trade
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unions, the workers often undertake action independently. The
"grain prices crisis" in El-Obeid (November, 1980), in the
course of which workers engaged in demonstrations, broke into
merchants' grain stores and burnt the buildings of the SSU
Regional Secretariat, is a good Oase in point. But, though
such sporadic and spontaneous measures posit the evidence of
continued workers' militancy, they cannot replace the
organizational forms that can wage concerted and organized
struggles to improve terms and conditions of employment. The
institution of such organizational forms, however, is not a
scholastic question to be analysed in the abstract, precisely
it depends on praxis by the labour movement and, first and
foremost, on the will and efforts of the workers themselves.
CONCLUS ION
The urban labour market in the Sudan, as in other
underdeveloped countries, is characterized by a apparent
structural segmentation. Scholars have tended to explain this
'segmentation' as a consequence of differential terms and
conditions of employment experienced by different sections of
the urban manual labour force. Central to this explanation is
the distinction between 'formal' and 'informal' workers. The
former are said to constitute a 'labour elite', upon which
'privileges' are conferred, while the latter are assumed to
lack all 'privileges'. However, in their actual accounts,
scholars have pointed out another distinction between
'permanent' and 'temporary and casual' workers in the
so-called 'formal sector', but have contended that the 'formal
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workers' employed on a 'non-permanent' basis experience the
same terms and conditions of employment as do 'informal
workers'.
The central point I have attempted to develop in this
chapter is that the literature on the urban labour market in
the Sudan has grossly misconceived the nature, origins and
implications of this apparent structural segmentation. I have
therefore considered in some detail three main aspects of
'permanent' employment, and compared them to conditions of
'casual' and 'self-employed' workers to corroborate the
relative uniformity of the conditions of the manual labour
force as a whole. These aspects are (1) the alleged job
security and "legislative protection" which the 'permanent'
workers are said to enjoy, (2) the assumed "high wages" and
"expensive commitments" of 'permanent' employment and, (3) the
role of trade unions in collective bargaining. The evidence
available suggest that the so-called 'labour elite', far from
earning 'high wages', actually receive less than the 'casual'
and 'self-employed' workers, but the 'fringe benefits' to
which the former are entitled compensate for their relatively
lower pay-rates. More significantly, the evidence indicates a
horrific deterioration in the standards of living of wage
earners in general, and unskilled labourers in particular,
over the last decade.
In stressing the homogeneity of the terms and conditions
of the different sections of the urban wage labour force, my
intention has been to dismiss neither the distinction between
'permanent' and 'non-permanent' ('temporary', 'casual' and/or
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'self-employment') as irrelevant, nor the apparent structural
segmentation of the urban labour market as a figment of the
imagination. On the contrary, I believe that the apparent
segmentation has its material basis in the differential
placement of the different sections of the urban wage labour
force, and that the distinction between 'permanent' and
'non-permanent' workers is relevant to the understanding of
the origins of the apparent segmentation. This relevance arise
from the correspondence of the 'permanent'/'non-permanent'
distinction to the distinction between	 'unionized'	 and
'non-unionized' workers. Union workers are exiusively
'permanent' workers; 'temporary', 'casual' and 'self-employed'
workers are all denied union rights by labour legislation. But
this denial weakens the position not only of 'temporary' and
'casual' workers, but also of the trade union movement itself.
Through a detailed assessment of the development of trade
unionism in the Sudan, I have attempted to show that
throughout their history trade unions have been fighting more
for the assertion of their right to existence than for
involvement in collective bargaining and the determination of
the terms and conditions of employment. By stressing this
position of trade unions, my aim has been the corroboration of
the view that the significance of the unionized/non-unionized
distinction does not stem from any present or past roles
assumed by trade unions, but rather from the potential threat
which a strong trade union movement poses to the process of
capital accumulation based upon cheap labour.
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NOTES
1. Had El-Wathig Kameir (1980b) studied the conditions of
'temporary' workers in the two factories and compared them
with those of 'permanent' workers, he would have noted how
little, if to any extent, the difference in in wages for the
two groups is. Basing my analysis on the wage-rates for the
'casual' workers in the constructibn industry reported by
El-Wathig, I will attempt a comparison later in the chapter.
2. Such a view has been advanced by Abdel Rahman
and Ahmed H. El-Jack (1973:38) who, with the
contempt for Sudanese workers, write as follows:
We	 believe	 that	 the	 regulations	 of
termination of contract, and for that matter
all labour legislation, should be designed to
fit the socio-economic environment of the
particular country in question. We propose
that in this stage of our economic
development it might not be wise to place too
many restrictions on the freedom of employers
to run their establishments effectively. The
industrial labour force in the Sudan is an
infant creature. It lacks discipline, skill,
and commitment to industrial life. Under such
circumstances employers justifiably need more
freedom to handle their labour force...
E. All Taha
utmost of
3. ThIs view of the reasons to engage workers Is not intended
to cover all forms of employment in the country. The case of
the Unemployment Relief Fund which was created to neutralize
University graduates and Secondary School leávers (cf. Chapter
Three) is one such exception.
4. The Consolidated Labour Code was enacted during what I
call the 'first phase' of Numeiri's regime, which was
established in May 25, 1969. In order not to distract
attention from the discussion of termination of employment,
however, I will postpone the consideration of aspects of
government-trade union relations under the present regime, and
deal with it later in the chapter.
5. According to Khalid Affan (1977:72), "this law excludes
three quarters of the labour force in the Sudan since it does
not cover seasonal agricultural labourers or workers outside
'stipulated' urban areas or workers in establishments that
employ less than ten employees, or workers whose age is below
18 years".
6. The deterioration in the value of the Sudanese Pound since
1978 is one indicator. Until June 1978, one Sudanese Pound was
equal to US$ 2.87; in 1979 it was devalued to £S 1= US$ 2,
and, after a series of devaluations between 1979 and 1985, in
April 1984 it stood at £5 1= US$ 0.55, and now (February 1985)
the actual price of US$ 1= £ 5.20.
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7. The commodities and items covered by the study are those
selected by the Department of Statistics for its household
budget survey of 1967/68. These comprise (1) vegetables and
fruits which numbered 20 varieties; (2) grain, beans, milk,
oil and fats, all of which numbered 18; (3) sugar and drinks
-eight commodities inclusive of cigarettes; (4) clothing,
which comprised 29 varieties for adults (over 15 years) of
both sexes and 29 for children .(under 15 years);
	 (5)
accommodation requirements, which include house-rent,
cooking-fuel and lighting; (6) miscellaneous items such as
linen and blankets, household utensils, matches, industrial
soap and other 'personal items' (e.g. toilet soap,
hairdressing, education, books, newspapers and recreation,
which includes cinema, games, and subscriptions in clubs and
unions). The relative importance and weight of each item for
each income-group is calculated separately. For the low-income
group, food and drinks stood as 66.52% of total expenditure;
accommodation requirements at 12.36%; clothing at 5.51%, and
miscellaneous at 15.21%. For the high-income group expenditure
on the same items was 60.46%, 11.31%, 0.60%, and 21.46%
respectively (see, Al-Maidan, op. cit.).
8. A specifically "Sudanese" nationalism is of course lacking
in case the term "nationalism" is to be construed as denoting
the phenomenon that furnished the ideology when the
nation-states emerged in Europe. The fact that the present
boundaries of the Sudan are a colonial creation that cut
across the human frontiers of race, religion, and language
hardly needs recalling. The current turmoil in Southern Sudan
(not to mention the 17 year war in the South that ended in
1972 along with the 'regional' movements that gained political
weight in the mid-i 960s such as those of the Beja of the Red
Sea, the Nuba of Kordof an and the Darfurians) clearly points
to the unresolved "national question(s)" in the country. In
using the term "nationalism" thus I denote the dominant
perception of the what binds the different groups of the
country to one another. I refer to this perception as an
"ideology" because it masks the structure of asymmetrical
(class and other) relations which comprises the essential
component of that bond.
9. As pointed out by Farouk Abu-Eisa (op. cit.), the listing
of the objectives of trade unions in that order was not
incidental. It does not only accords credibility to some
current calls to have increasing productivity as the primary
target of trade unions, but also attempts to constrain the
class basis and interests of trade unions. Given that the
state is the largest single employer of union workers in the
country, whatever action undertaken by unions in pursuit of
the class interests of workers would be interpreted as
contrary to their 'basic objective' (of increasing
productivity).
OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSION
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We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time
(T.S. Eliot: ' Lt.tle. GLddLn.g')
Under the growing influence of the world-system-dependency
perspective, considerable progress has been achieved in the
understanding of the peripheral capitalist basis of the
processes of urbanization and urbanism in the so-called 'Third
World'. In contrast to the earlier 'conventional wisdom' which
saw urbanization as a suprahistorical process and 'Third World
urbanization' as a 'reiteration' of the historical process in
19th century Europe, very few scholars would today advocate
any approach to urbanization which fails to consider the
significant variations in the socio-economic and historical
contexts within which urbanIzation is taking place. I
subscribe to the view that conventional wisdom has mystified
the conceptualization of the role of capitalist-colonialism
which has led to the re-orientation, and the structural
malformation, of the production processes in the colonies in
the context of the institution of an international division of
labour.
Notwithstanding the progress achieved in the critique of
the conventional wisdom and/or in the understanding of the
dynamics of urbanization in underdeveloped countries, views
reminiscent	 of	 that 'wisdom' still loom large in the
literature. In the Sudan, as in other underdeveloped
countries, scholars have continued to assert that rural-urban
unskilled labour migration is the main factor behind the
recent acceleration of urban growth, but very little has been
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achieved by way of substantiating that assertion. Likewise,
and despite significant differences in their interpretation of
the 'push-factors' stimulating rural-urban labour migration,
many scholars continue to view in negative terms the
implications of unskilled labour migration for the structure
and operation of the urban wage labour market. It is
accordingly still claimed that the rate of increase in the
wage labour force exceeds the rate of employment generation
and that a growing section of the urban unskilled manual
labour force is steadily being made 'redundant' or forced into
unskilled tertiary 'self-employment' to eke out a living by
'inventing' jobs. It is also claimed that the 'labour-surplus
situation' which obtains in 'Third World cities' has resulted
in a structural segmentaion of the labour market. The various
"forms" of employment which obtain in these cities (i.e. wage-
and 'self-employment'; 'permanent' and 'non-permanent'
employment, etc.) are accordingly said to carry significantly
different terms and conditions of employment for workers.
Thus, 'permanent' workers in the so-called 'formal' sector of
the labour market are conceived as a 'privileged' section of
the workforce, whereas 'informal' workers and
'casual/temporary' workers in the 'formal' sector are said to
be 'insecure' and 'impoverished'.
On the basis of analyses of the political economy of
peripheral capitalism in the Sudan and of the structure and
operation of the wage labour market in Greater Khartoum, I
have set out in this thesis to expose and redress, at least in
part, the limitations of such conventional wisdom. In Chapter
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Two I presented an analysis of the major transformations which
the domestic form of agricultural production has experienced
over the last eight decades, and explained aspects of the
dynamics of proletarianization (or the transformation of
non-wage producers into wage labourers), which underlies the
rural-urban unskilled labour migration. The central point
substantiated in Chapter Two is
	 that	 the Sudan was
transformed, under conditions of full-scale
capitalist-colonization, into an arena for primary export
production, and that this transformation was achieved on the
basis of the domestic form of production which, by satisfying
a large part of the consumption requirements of producers
through its 'subsistence sphere', provided the cheapest source
of labour. The processes of monetarization and
commercialization which underpinned the transformation of
domestic agricultural production, however, set into motion a
process of qualitative differentiation, by which a few
producers graduate into incipient capitalists while a majority
is forced to seek employment in the labour market. The outcome
of the contradictory interplay between the resilience of
domestic production and the process of differentiation has
been semi-proletarianization. The large majority of
semi-proletarianized domestic producers, however, seek wage
employment in rural agriculture, while only a small minority
undertakes rural-urban migration.
The number of rural-urban unskilled labour migrants in the
Sudan is small not only in comparison to the
semi-proletarianized workers seeking wage employment in the
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countryside, but also in relation to the total number of
rural-urban migrants who, in addition to wage labourers,
include capitalists, bureaucrats, and professionals as well as
'non-economically active' categories such as students,
house-wives and children. As the Census data do not specify
the social characteristics of migrants to Sudanese cities, and
as analyses of the dynamics of urban growth have been
distorted by ideological intrusions, the role of migrations by
these other strata has been almost completely overlooked. To
substantiate my view of the significance of these other forms
of rural-urban migration, I explored in Chapter Three the
dynamics of population growth in post-colonial Khartoum; and
comparative data on El-Obeid, Port Sudan and Wad Medani were
considered to corroborate the relevance of this type of
analysis to the understanding of urban growth in the country
at large. Through a critical assessment of Census returns in
the period 1955/56-1983 and a synthesis of data on growth of
specific categories, i set out to show that though the urban
manual labour force has undoubtedly increased considerably
during the post-colonial period, a far greater growth has
taken place among 'non-wage earners' (businessmen, civil
servants and professionals), while the greatest rates of
growth have occurred in categories of 'non-earners'
(house-wives, children, students, elderly, etc.). The ultimate
objective of the chapter was to show that when increased
rural-urban migration is accepted the single most important
factor in population growth relate to these other groups and
not to wage labour migrants. In the course of the analysis,
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several lacunae in the literature on the dynamics of growth in
Greater Khartoum were pointed out. There is, for example, a
general failure to recognize the role of the extension of
municipal boundaries in boosting rates of migration to, and
fertility in, Greater Khartoum, while virtually no research
into the dynamics of female and child migrations has been
undertaken. What is certain, however, is that the manual
labour force (skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled,
irrespective of whether wage- or 'self-employed') not only
represents a tiny minority of the total urban population, but
also constitutes less than half the 'economically active'
population.
The small size of the manual labour force in Greater
Khartoum is not at all surprising when we take into account
the implications of the pattern of peripheral capitalist
urbanism, whose functioning remains tied to the colonial-type
trade economy, and whose 'basic' activities (administration
and commerce) demand only a relatively small manual labour
force. In Chapters Four and Five I considered the implications
of the colonial-type trade economy for the determination of
the 'intra-urban processes' governing the operation of the
wage labour market in Greater Khartoum during the colonial and
post-colonial periods. In these two chapters I explained that
the larger part of the demand for urban labour in 20th century
Sudan has been external to both administration and the 'basic'
avenues of capital accumulation (import-export trade and
related activities such as banking, insurance and transport).
Thus, although the demand in commerce and industry, small as
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it was, continued to grow throughout the colonial period, the
major source of labour demand was the construction industry,
and the unstable nature of this demand meant frequent
oscillation between 'labour-surplus'/'mass unemployment' and
'labour-shortage'/'full employment' situations in the oper-
ation of the wage labour market. The dramatic post-colonial
expansion in primary export production intensified further the
processes of the colonial-type trade economy, and employment
levels in both administration and commerce 	 increased
appreciably. Most of these opportunities, however, concerned
bureaucrats and professionals rather than manual workers. The
deformed industrialization prompted by import-substitution
policies created relatively significant opportunities for wage
employment during the first two decades of flag Independence;
but from 1969 onwards Greater Khartoum 1btt itsattraCtiOfl
power for industrial investment, but due to widespread replen-
ishment recruiting 'modetn' manufacturing industry has con-
tinued to provide (transient). industrial employment :for large
numbers of workers.
Recent industrial investment in Greater Khartoum is almost
exclusively confined to capital-intensive food-processing
industries, especially 'bread manufacture'. Needless to say,
the main factor underlying continued investment is underlain
by the increased demand for bread consequent upon population
growth. But the more significant effects of the population
momentum in post-colonial Khartoum concern the generation of a
steadily growing demand for a wide range of personal and
community	 services,	 which	 provide	 employment for
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ever-increasing numbers of people ranging from high-level
manpower to unskilled 'self-employed' workers.
In Chapter Six I analysed the findings of my research into
the conditions of the unskilled tertiary 'self-employed'
workers in Greater Khartoum. I attempted to illuminate the
role of population growth in augmenting the demand for
unskilled tertiary services, and came to the conclusions,
largely contradicting to widely-held views regarding the
conditions of these workers. I attempted to show how the
increase	 in the number of workers performing unskilled
personal	 services	 (e.g.	 car-washing,	 shoe-shining,
laundry-work and porterage) has been promoted almost
exclusively by the continuing growth of the affluent urban
strata. While the demand for the services of petty and/or
street traders originate from elements of all classes, a large
part of the demand seems to be from the low-paid clerical and
manual workers. But the role of petty traders does not cease
with the provision of goods to meet this demand. Petty trading
provides wholesalers with a cheap system of distribution
(compared to retail shops) which augments their accumulation
because it is through interaction with petty traders that the
wholesalers are able to appropriate a large portion of margins
stipulated for retailers, in addition to the officially
stipulated 'wholesale profit margins'.
Furthermore, in Chapter Six I highlighted aspects of the
'coping responses' or mechanisms by which 'self-employed'
tertiary workers managed to minimize, and often even to
eliminate, the insecurity of their 'self-employment'. In the
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case of petty traders, insecurity is mitigated through ethnic
and/or regional specialization; and membership in these groups
grants admission to residential groups and/or trading networks
as well as to rotating credit associations -all of which are
important for continuity in petty trade as they help in
different ways to augment the small capital possessed by the
individual traders. In the sphere of personal services, on the
other hand, 'self-employment' is increasingly becoming a form
of concealed wage employment in which 'connections' with
established urban families and/or individuals are crucial, as
workers seek to conclude tentative 'long-term' contracts with
a core of clients. By this method 'self-employed' workers
manage to secure a minimum 'guaranteed' income, over and above
what they may earn on the fluctuating and insecure 'spot
market'. Workers who do not belong •to the regional/ethnic
groups dominating an activity often find considerable
difficulty in establishing themselves, and there is as a
result a high degree of circulation of personnel. Some of
these 'badly placed' workers appear to seek alternative
employment, especially in 'modern' manufacturing industry
which is plagued by 'replenishment recruitment', while others
tend to re-enter the rural wage labour market, or to emigrate
to neighbouring Arab countries. More systematic research is
however needed regarding the pattern of circulation between
wage- and self-employment in urban Sudan.
The levels of earnings of the 'self-employed' tertiary
workers analysed in Chapter Six compared favourably with the
pay-rates of wage earners in the so-called 'formal sector'
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which I discussed in Chapter Seven. The earnings of workers in
the so-called 'informal manufacturing and repair sector' were
found to be much higher than those of wage workers in the
public sector and the large scale private enterprises. But the
differences in daily earnings of the different sections of the
unskilled labour force tended to disappear when I took into
account the alleged 'expensive commitments' that associate
'permanent'	 employment,	 viz.,	 after-service	 payments,
compensation schemes, paid holidays and sick-leave. The
difference in level of earnings between wage and
'self-employed' skilled workers remained conspicuous even when
the 'privileges' were taken into consideration, and it is
because of this that skilled workers in particular are
increasingly withdrawing from wage employment into the
potentially much higher rewarding 'self-employment'. In
relation to the unskilled workers in the so-called 'formal
sector', differences in pay-rates were noted between
'permanent' and 'non-permanent' ('temporary' and 'casual')
workers. Available evidence on the conditions of unskilled
'casual' construction labourers in Greater Khartoum defies all
allegations concerning the status of 'permanent' workers as a
'labour elite'; but more research into the conditions of
'temporary workers', especially in 'modern' manufacturing
industry, is indispensable in our search for a better
understanding of the conditions of 'non-permanent' workers.
Particular attention should be accorded to the investigation
of the alternatives pursued by 'non-permanent' workers after
they are sacked.
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The overall uniformity of the conditions of the different
sections of the manual labour force is not confined to aspects
of remuneration. Through a critical review of labour
legislation and trade unionism in the Sudan, I demonstrated
that the views held in relation to the position of 'permanent'
workers actually are poorly-founded. The 'legislative
protection' against 'unlwaful termination', which 'permanent'
workers are said to enjoy, was thus found to be a mockery of
the concept, as the scope of what is 'lawful' is so wide that
employers can invariably act within the law. Likewise, the
role of 'pressure by trade unions' in the determination of
wage rates in the so-called 'formal sector' proved to be a
gross exaggeration; since their inception, trade unions in the
Sudan have been fighting more to assert their right to exist
than engaging in effective 'collective bargaining'. Only a few
trade unions in certain large scale public and private
concerns were, in the pre-1969 period, strong enough to
acquire for their members relatively better terms and
conditions of employment compared to other wage workers. With
the 1969 ban on industrial action, the 1970 re-organization of
parastatals, and the 1973 Trade Unions Act, all of which
served to undermine the relative strength of these few unions,
the relatively 'privileged' status of workers in large scale
concerns has, in effect, been undermined. Although from its
inception to
	 1969	 trade unionism in Sudan developed
independently of the state (except for the latter's
intervention through legislation), in recent years the regime
has made persistent efforts to bring the trade union structure
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under its direct control. This is particularly true in the
case of the higher levels of the union hierarchy (general
unions, federations and confederations). But though a degree
of tension appears to exist between the higher and lower
levels of union structure, a thorough dissociation of 'formal'
trade unions from the labour movement has not been achieved,
as many recent events in the Sudan testify. The severe
constraints facing the higher levels of union hierarchy should
not be construed as a total emasculation of union activity,
but very little is known about trade unionism and its role at
the shop-floor level.
In stressing the present weakness of trade unions in the
Sudan, I do not, of course, deny the modest gains which the
trade union movement has so far achieved for its members;
entitlement to paid holidays and sick-leave in particular are
very important as they provide a measure of job security which
the so-called 'legislative protection' actually fails to
provide. But I should stress that employers very seldom employ
a wage worker on a 'permanent' basis unless he/she is skilled
or, in the case of unskilled workers, unless a high degree of
commitment to the establishment is required (as in the case of
guards and messengers, who must be trustworthy). In the case
of other unskilled workers, employment on a non-permanent
basis seems to be the rule, especially in those branches of
production, such as the building industry, which experience
frequent fluctuations in production schedules. Thus, in
'modern' manufacturing industry, which does not experience
fluctuations in labour demand, only a small core of the
Pagination
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unskilled workforce is employed on a 'permanent' basis, while
most are recruited as 'casual' and/or 'temporary' workers.
As far as the terms and conditions of employment are
concerned, then, there are scarcely any appreciable variations
between the different sections of the wage labour force. This
uniformity clearly discredits current conceptions of the
origins and
	 implications of the apparent	 structural
segmentation of the	 labour market (i.e. the observed
prevalence of different "forms" of employment for manual
workers). But I conclude that the apparent segmentation
cannot be wholly explained in terms of variations in the
labour requirements and/or production schedules of different
capital accumulation processes, or of specific 'disincentives'
and/or difficulties for capital regarding the institution of a
wage labour process in certain branches of production (as in a
majority of unskilled tertiary activities). Nor can we Impute
a relation of 'virtual identity' between the different "forms"
of employment.
One of the major points I attempted to substantiate in
Chapter Seven was thus that we should not dismiss the
distinction between 'permanent' and 'non-permanent' employment
as irrelevant, as this distinction has material implications
manifested in the differential placement in relation to
entitlement to trade union membership. In other words the
significance of the distinction between 'permanent' 	 and
'non-permanent' workers is in its correspondence to the
distinction between 'unionized' and 'non-unionized' workers;
union membership is exclusive to workers employed on a
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'permanent' basis, while 'casual', 'temporary' and
'self-employed' unskilled workers are all denied union rights
by labour legislation. But, given the present position of
trade unions, the significance of this latter distinction
stems not from any present or past roles assumed by unions,
but rather from the potential threat which a strong trade
union movement poses to the processes of capital accumulation
based upon cheap labour. The exclusion of 'casual',
'temporary' and 'self-employed' workers, who constitute a
majority of urban wage workers, from union membership has
served to create divisions within the working class and, to
maintain union membership as a 'privilege' for a small group
of workers -so small as to be severely constrained in its
attempt to improve its terms and conditions of employment. In
other words, the apparent structural segmentation of the urban
wage labour market, far from being the consequence of
differential terms and conditions of employment for different
section of the manual labour force, is indeed the cause and
precondition for the maintenance of generally poor terms and
conditions of employment for wage workers throughout the
economy.
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